MUCH has been written about the nature of the inferior animals, which is not very well considered. Their nature contains what may be considered the germs of all the principles of human nature, except perhaps that of conscience. The outward manifestations which dogs sometimes exhibit, and which have been supposed to indicate the presence of conscience, may more - probably be referred to fear. But dogs and elephants, and in a lesser degree other animals, do manifest, at least the germ of, the reasoning faculty. Some notice, although but little, has been taken of this fact, as well as of others connected with what may be regarded as the super-animal part of the merely animal nature. The expressions seem strange, but they will probably be understood.

Perhaps the most mysterious part of the animal nature, as it is usually treated of, is that which is called instinct. It seems to be taken for granted, that the distinction between men and animals consists in this, that men are governed by reason, brutes by instinct. This seems to be a mistake. The true dis tinction, we apprehend, lies in the possession by man of a moral nature, which is wanting in the brute. They have not even its germ; but they have an undeveloped and imperfect reason. Still, it is true that they are, in the main, governed by instinct. But what is instinct?

Few subjects have been more carelessly handled. In fact, three classes of things which are essentially distinct, are generally grouped together under the general name of instincts. One of these is sometimes distinguished from other instincts by the name of appetites. The other two have been inextricably confounded under the name of instincts. It would be hopeless to attempt to introduce any other name for either. Yet they are two distinct classes of things, and may be distinguished into inciting instincts, or those which incite to action, and directing instinets, or those which regulate action. The first is the class which is most nearly allied to appetite, and is the germ of that which has been most happily termed the emotional nature of man. The other supplies to animals the place of reason; but it is not the germ of reason, as the other class is the germ of the passions and affections. The appetites are to be distinguished from the inciting instincts in that they are really physical wants, which act upon the physical nature. These appetites exist in man as in beasts, although modified by their coëxistence with the the higher parts of human nature. They are three in men and three in beasts, and are not to be confounded either with instincts or emotions. In man or in beast they are merely animal, and directly connected with merely animal sensations.

Both in men and in other animals the appetites are directly under the control of directing instincts, and it is remarkable that the very few directing instincts which man possesses are connected with the appetites. All the actions of brutes are under the direction of such instincts. The little reason which they possess is only occasionally called in as an aid to the instinct, supplying its place a little way beyond its limits. On the other hand, men are placed under the dominion of reason as the ordinary guide of their lives. It is more fallible than instinct, but is capable of being applied in a much greater variety of cases, and is, moreover, capable of being improved by exercise. It is therefore the fitter guide for a moral being. The directing instincts operate each within a narrow compass, but direct the animal to results at which reason could only arrive by long and tedious processes. They are very useful to animals incapable of reasoning, or only capable of reasoning imperfectly; but

they are unnecessary to a being which possesses a faculty capable of being made to supply their place by labour and industry. Perhaps, also, they are less suited to the condition of a being in a state of probation; where an infallible guide, constantly at hand, would relieve one from a wholesome responsibility, which is enforced by the necessity of using the services of a fallible guide, like reason, and of making exertions to improve the quality of the guide. This seems to be the difference between Romanism and Catholic Christianity. The infallibility of the Church is like the infallibility of the directing instincts; it saves trouble, but it is not so well adapted to a being in a state of probation as the exercise of a private judgment, confessedly fallible, but for the right decision of which the individual is himself responsible. The true distinction between Romanism and the Church's doctrine of authority seems to be this: The Romish Church decides all questions for her people, and expects their entire submission; the Catholic Church expects her people to decide for themselves, but presents her own expositions as an important element among the materials of the decision. So the bee, under the guidance of an infallible instinct, forms its combs into hexagons, without knowing any reason for so doing. The man, who desires to unite strength of construction with economy of materials, adopts the same form, under the guidance of a fallible but instructed reason. The one comes to the conclusion at once; the other after long study, in which both his intellectual and moral natures have been, or, at least, may have been, improved. The directing instinct might have been very convenient so far as material interests were concerned, but would not have been so advantageous to the moral nature. Hence, man has no directing instincts except such as are connected with the merely animal appetites; which it is not convenient should be made the subjects of much thought or attention. Even with respect to these, the directing instincts are inferior to those of the beasts. For man has no instinct which points him unerringly to food, medicine, or poison; most beasts have.

But the inciting instincts are something very different from the directing, and may undoubtedly be considered as the germs of our emotions. They differ from directing instincts in that

they do not govern action, but only incite to it. They differ from appetites, in that they are not merely animal sensations, the results of certain physical processes which have been going on in the animal system. In fact, they testify very distinctly to the existence of that, which the wise man calls "the spirit of the beast, which goeth downward to the earth." [Eccles. iii. 21.] By those words Solomon probably intended to intimate that the inferior creatures were not merely material, but that there existed in their nature a principle which, although mortal, was spiritual.

The proofs of the existence of such a principle, which observation furnishes, are chiefly derived from the inciting instincts. It is not easy to account for these things, so different from mere appetites, upon any theory which does not allow, to the beings by whom they are possessed, something more than a mere organization of matter. They are not, like appetites, the results of known physical causes; yet they are seen to affect the conduct of animals. They differ from directing instincts, in that they are not unerring, and seem only to incite, not to govern.

The inciting instincts may be reduced to three classes, each of which is composed of the developments of a single instinct. These three instincts may, in a certain sense, be called primary; although, in a certain other sense, only one of them is primary. They are self-love, malevolence, and benevolence. Of these, self-love is a primary instinct in a different sense from the others, although also in the same. For the malevolent and benevolent instincts alike give pleasure, by their gratification, which pleasure is a gratification to self-love. Hence a school of moralists have denied the existence of any other principle of action than self-love, or, as they prefer to call it, selfishness.

But it is plain that there are principles in our nature, and even in that of beasts, which derive gratification from the well-being or the suffering of other sentient beings. These are something different from the principle which seeks and rejoices in our own well-being, without reference to any being without us. This last principle is properly self-love, and, when over indulged, selfishness. Selfishness is the exaggeration and abuse of self-love. Selflove, then, seeks simply the advantage and well-being of the self