THE RELATIONS OF CHURCH AND STATE.

IN the last number of this magazine there was an article under this title; of which the present is designed as the continuation. That paper was chiefly occupied in pointing out the nature of the two great Divine institutions to which it related. It was observed that they were both authorized interpreters of the Divine Law within their respective jurisdictions. That those jurisdictions cannot be separated by any line drawn among persons or actions; because, in truth, both societies have an universal jurisdiction over all persons and all actions; which is only limited by the necessity of adhering to the principle upon which the authority is founded. These principles are in each case different from that which is the foundation of the authority of the other society. It is in them that the true boundary between the two jurisdictions is to be sought.

The two societies were established by the Divine Wisdom for different purposes. The Church as a means of promoting the salvation of souls; the State to provide for the temporal welfare of men. Each has thus a peculiar object for which its authority was given, and which is really the end of its own existence. Like all other accountable beings and all other collections of accountable beings, each must keep in view the end of its creation. Moreover, they were furnished with dif ferent modes of enforcing their decisions. The Church must rely on excommunication as her means of coercion in the last resort. The State is armed with the literal sword, and can enforce her authority by physical force. Hence the boundaries of the two jurisdictions are twofold.

The Church is not to meddle with anything which relates merely to the temporal welfare of mankind. Her business is with sins and consequently with motives. She has nothing to do with a man who prosecutes an unrighteous claim in good faith; for the title to things temporal, relates only to the temporal welfare of men. But she has a right to censure a man who presses a righteous claim in a vindictive or grasping spirit; for revenge and avarice are sins. Again, when she has made her decision, and is about to enforce it, she has no right to call in

the aid of physical force, not even by compact with the State. The State, on the other hand, must confine herself to the pres ervation of peace and order and justice among men, and to such other measures as may promote their temporal welfare. With their salvation she has nothing to do. Nor is she at liberty, even by compact with the Church, to seek the enforcement of her authority by spiritual censures. The moment that spiritual censures are attempted to be enforced by physical power, the State, which only can legitimately wield the power, has a right to be satisfied of the justice of the sentence. The moment that civil authority is attempted to be sustained by spiritual censures, the Church, which only can wield such censures, has a right to control the administration of civil justice.

It was by the neglect of these principles that all the controversies between the Church and the State were engendered. The moment that they attempted to act in concert, there was danger of a conflict. For neither could delegate to the other its authority, without abandoning its own duties. This neither could do. But as each desired the aid of the other, each sought to dictate to the other. So long as an alliance continued between the Church and the State, so long the question of superiority would arise, and would bring with it a struggle for the power of dictating the law.

It may be said that the law which both acknowledged was the same the Divine Law-and that the true interpretation of it must always be the same. This cannot be denied. But the authorities of neither society are infallible. They may err on one or both sides, and error would almost certainly lead to contradictions and collisions. The answer of the Church of Rome to this is that the Church is infallible. Were it true, would be a triumphant answer. An infallible Church ought to dictate the Law to the fallible State. The right of the Church of Rome to domineer over all civil authority is a fair logical deduction from her infallibility. The decision which cannot be wrong must rightfully overrule that which may be

wrong.

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All attempts to bring about any sort of connection between the Church and the State must fail, as they have failed; and there is nothing to be done but to leave the two institutions, as they are in

this country, independent of each other. But even this condition has its difficulties. While they coexist on the same soil, govern the same persons, and regulate the same actions, there will be more or less danger of collision. This danger can only be averted by a sound view of the respective authority of the two parties, and a scrupulous avoiding, on both parts, of any interference in the province of the other. There does not appear on either side, in this country, any disposition to such interference. The general feeling of the people is against unnecessary legislation, and there is little danger of laws being made encroaching on the just liberty of any one. The Maine Law fever seems to have been an indication of a possible change in the public feeling; which might lead to encroachments on the jurisdiction of the Church; although the particular case had no such tendency. Yet the general course of American' legislation has not been, and is not like to be, in the direction. of aggression upon the Church.

On the other hand the Church, in her fear of conflicting with the State, has gone the length of abandoning all pretence of lay discipline. This is, in part, the consequence of her descent from the Church of England. The connection of Church and State in that country is such, that the Church cannot exercise lay discipline without the leave of the State; which has undertaken the task of enforcing the decisions of the Church courts by her physical power. The consequence has been that the Church of England has lost all lay discipline. The American Church has, therefore, not inherited lay discipline, and she has made no attempt to begin it. For this there are two reasons. The fear of collision with the State, and the aversion to all government, which we have inherited from our Teutonic ancestors. With the last we have at present nothing to do. The other presents a good reason for prudence, but surely none for surrendering an authority derived from GOD Himself. But whether the Church have or have not the exercise of lay discipline, she is bound in that or in some other form to express an opinion upon doubtful questions of morals.

As it is, questions of morals are decided by public opinion; which is formed by the general practice. The law of the land has an effect in regulating this public opinion, which it ought

not to have. That which the law does not prohibit, and, a fortiori, that which it expressly permits, being assumed to be right. This proceeds upon a false idea of the object of the civil law, which is not to prohibit that which is wrong, but that which is injurious to the public. It is certain that every thing which is wrong is injurious to the public. But it may be so only indirectly, and so remotely that the civil government would not be likely to prohibit it; especially in a country in which there is such an aversion to the regulation of private conduct as there is in ours. It is then perfectly competent for the Church to decide questions of morals which the State has left undecided. Her decision would be binding upon her members. It would not constitute any act an offence against the State, and it would not be intended to have any such effect. Yet it might be an aid in the formation of a sound public opinion, taking away from the currency which loose moral notions acquire, because they do not conflict with the laws of the land.

The Church and the State are independent of each other, and have no common, earthly superior, to decide controversies between them. They have jurisdiction over the same subjects. Hence there is danger of such collisions. The danger is at two points. One where the relations of the Church affect civil rights. The other where either institution prohibits that which is commanded by the other.

Of collisions growing out of the last cause there is but little danger; while the Church commands nothing but the mode of conducting religious worship, and the State commands nothing but that the citizen should contribute his share towards the public expenditure. The State has no motive to interfere with religious worship; as she has no right so to do. A principle which she has, in this country, fully acknowledged. The Church, on her part, has nothing to do with the public expenditure. The apportionment of the share to be borne by each individual is an affair of the State. The Church can only enforce on her children the duty of obedience to the laws on that subject, as on every other. There is, then, very little danger of collisions connected with conflicts between commands on one side and prohibitions on the other.

But there seems to be a morbid fear on the part of Church

men in this particular matter; which, we apprehend, has its origin in some confusion of ideas. A conflict of jurisdictions may arise when one commands what the other prohibits. But there can be none when one prohibits that which the other only permits. In that case there can be no difficulty in obeying both. Since the prohibition requires the person under the authority of the prohibiting government to abstain from an action, which the other government does not enjoin, but only does not prohibit. Any one, therefore, who is deliberating upon the propriety of any action, would find himself obliged to abstain from it were it prohibited either by the Church or State. He would not be absolved from that prohibition even by the permission of the other institution, still less by the mere absence of its prohibition.

Collisions on this point will then be prevented by the authorities on both sides abstaining from commands, so far as it may be practicable so to do. It may also be, sometimes, necessary to abstain from prohibitions, where they will interfere with the regulations of the other institution in some very pecu

liar case.

This may be illustrated by the case of the mode of contracting matrimony. It cannot be doubted that this is of civil jurisdiction; for it involves important civil rights.. The State has consequently a right to declare what she will regard as a marriage for such purposes. Nor can it be doubted that it is of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; since the existence or nonexistence of a marriage between two individuals affects the question of the sinfulness or innocence of their lives. Marriage, moreover, is something more than a civil contract, to be regulated by the civil law; because it is a Divine institution, having certain qualities annexed to it by Divine authority. One of these is its indissolubility. We use the word without concerning ourselves with the dispute whether the indissolubility be absolute or liable to exceptions. All Christians agree that it is, in the main, indissoluble. This quality gives a very high importance to the formation of the connection. This importance is rather increased than diminished by other cir cumstances to which it is not now necessary to allude. But the importance of the step will be conceded on all sides. From