such a federation; which could scarcely, according to the ideas of the period, have been formed without one. He He was, therefore, recognized as the head of the Western Church; a position, which was not only necessary as the centre of unity to the great Ecclesiastical league, but seems, according both to the prevailing feudal notions and to the ideas of a hierarchy which the clergy had derived from the ancient Eastern Church, the completion of an otherwise imperfect system.

The papacy thus arose, and the very end of its existence. was conflict with the civil powers. There can be no doubt that, for several centuries, it was both socially and politically a great blessing. There is as little doubt that that time has long gone by. For, while the papacy was developed in the Providence of GOD for wise and good purposes, those purposes have now been answered, and the papacy is now in the process of being developed away.

In this point of view the Reformation was the crisis at which the new ideas became strong enough to contend with the old. The kings had for ages been contending with the popes; but in vain. At length, in the sixteenth century, the time arrived when their efforts were to be successful. Ephemeral views of political expediency, in some cases, prevented the sovereigns from taking any part in the struggle: But wherever they did make the attempt they succeeded in freeing themselves and their subjects from the papal power. But this could only be done where the necessary conditions existed. One of those conditions was a disposition on the part of the clergy and people to revolt against the medieval system of theology.

This system, as has already been remarked, has no logical connection with the papacy, or with any form of Church government. For aught that an observer can see, it might coëxist with the externals of Presbyterianism or Congregationalism. Of course it is to be understood, that the medieval system of theology is something very different from the medieval system of Ecclesiology.* The latter could hardly subsist without a

* By Ecclesiology is here meant, not merely Church architecture, but in addition to that art, every thing which relates to the externals of worship. The mediæval system of these things seems now to be specially dreaded as the very essence of popery; though the connection between the two is really very slight.

hierarchy. Yet there does not seem to be any necessity for a pope; still less for the peculiar system of theology which flourished in the middle ages.

That system was not wrought out by the popes, and was not, humanly speaking, the basis of their power. That rested upon the mediæval Ecclesiastical Law, as that again did upon. certain forgeries, which the popes did not commit, but of which they very unscrupulously availed themselves.

The medieval theology had quite a different origin; which was, in fact, the same as that of the Common Law of England. Both arose from the wonderful logical subtlety, which pervaded the mediæval mind. In the very early ages of the Church, very little use was made of logic in the interpretation of Scripture. The usages of the Church, perhaps even more than Scripture itself, were looked upon as the rule of action and of faith. For it was assumed, upon a principle logically sound, that the first preachers of the Gospel and their hearers understood the Gospel system, better than it could be explained by any mere logical process. But in the lapse of time questions would arise as to what had been the usage among those primitive Christians. These questions could not be determined by logic, but, like other questions relating to matters of fact, only by evidence. The evidence was either traditional or in writing. After the lapse of a few ages, the former disappeared and the latter became the sole resource. The writings of the ancient bishops and divines came to be appealed to as the only evidence of the sense of the primitive Church. The system of theology which prevailed at that time may be called the patristic; for the ancient bishops and divines had come to be known by the general name of the Fathers.

But new

questions arose, and the men of the period, with whom the logic of Aristotle was the favourite study, and was pursued until the love of logic became almost, or quite, a disease, applied this new instrument to the settling questions of theology. They were very nearly allied to the school which is now called rationalistic. But there were very important

differences.

The medieval logicians did not, like the modern rationalists, apply their dialectic powers immediately to the interpre

tation of the Sacred Text. Still less did they apply them to its correction or mutilation. They were content to take the Bible as they had received it, and with it the patristic interpretation. They assumed the soundness of the patristic theology. Now the Holy Scriptures are full of mysterious doctrines. Upon these the Fathers delighted to comment in a figurative and sometimes even in a fanciful style. The patristic theology was thus full of mysteries, and its language of figures and fancies, which afforded a wide field of discussion. Upon this field, the Schoolmen, so the logical divines came to be called, entered.

They treated all the mysteries, the figures, and the fancies of the patristic theology as alike the premises from which they were to reason. It so happens that none of them were fitted for the purpose. For you cannot reason from a mystery; because you do not understand it. A mystery is a proposition the parts of which you are unable to reconcile. Of course you do not know how or where they limit each other. You cannot, therefore, safely make any portion of the mystery the basis of your reasoning. Neither can you so employ the whole, because you do not comprehend the whole, and so cannot see what may or may not be inferred from it.

You cannot reason from a figure, because it only represents something, which it is not, but only resembles. It does not resemble it in all respects, or it would be the same thing and incapable of being used for illustration. You cannot make it the basis of reasoning, until you have ascertained exactly how far it represents the substance; that is, how far it is true. When you have ascertained that, it is no longer wanted; you can reason from the truth which the figure illustrates far better than from the illustration; provided always that the truth be an intelligible one, and not a mystery. If it be a mystery, you cannot use it; but still you have gained nothing by substituting the figure for the substance.

It needs no proof that one cannot reason from a fancy; since no man would now dream of founding a doctrine upon a fancy. The great error of the Schoolmen was that they could. not, or did not, distinguish between truths and fancies. As great masters as they were of deductive logic, they do not

seem to have been great in the distributive part of the science. The system which they built up was defective for three reasons. It was founded without a due use of distributive logic, so that truths, figures, and fancies were all treated alike. It was built by and of a deductive logic, too subtle and refined for practical use, and such logic was applied where no logic was properly applicable. They thus, as has been happily said, succeeded in freezing the metaphors of the Fathers into doctrines. Moreover, they froze the mysteries of the Holy Scriptures into hard, dry, and cold facts. They thus raised a system of theology not liable to be overthrown very easily before a mere dialectic assailant; but which really wanted a root. That system was the medieval theology; which is at this day the theology of the Church of Rome.

Its defect is the greatest that a system of theology can have. It wants a soul. It is too objective; while the soul of a system of theology lies in that portion of it which is subjective and appeals to the heart and conscience of the individual. The chief end of the Christian religion is the salvation of men; and this not an outward external salvation from the consequences of sin, but an internal salvation from sin itself. The thing chiefly required is a change of heart. It is true that the Almighty CREATOR might, in the exercise of His Omnipotence, work such a change, and so fit a man to be the subject of happiness instead of misery, by giving him a new and holy nature. But such is not His pleasure, or no Revelation would have been required beyond that which the experience of each changed individual would bring to him of his own personal change.

It is the will of the RULER of the Universe in this as in other matters to work by means. The Incarnation and the Atonement are the means by which He commences the process, and the next step, as it were, is the Revelation by which He communicates these stupendous facts and the gracious purposes with which they are connected to mankind. The blessing of salvation is thus purchased and offered to the mass. Its appropriation to individuals is the next thing to be done. For this purpose the Church and the Sacraments were instituted. They are the means devised by Infinite Wisdom, Power, and Good

ness. They are not merely devised by Him, but instituted and endowed with power to work effects, which they have no natural or inherent power to work. It is by His Power that they work, or to speak more accurately, His Power works in them.

But His Power is infinite and irresistible. If it work at all it must work effectually; such is the logical deduction which the Schoolmen drew, and which certain modern divines also draw. The Schoolmen held that the Church and the Sacraments, being the divinely instituted means of saving man, must save all men to whom they are applied. This is the doctrine. of the opus operatum, that if the work be done, it must produce its effect. And looking only at the premises which have been used, it is impossible to resist the conclusion. The modern Calvinist reasons that GOD can, by His mere Will, change the hearts of men and mould them at His pleasure. He does not need the Church and the Sacraments, and therefore He does not use them. They are mere external things, having no natural or inherent virtue, and can be no aid to Him. This reasoning is also unanswerable. The two arguments are equally strong; yet the two views are equally unsound. Moreover, they both proceed from the same premises, which premises are undoubted; yet both cannot be true, because they are inconsistent with each other. There must be some element which both classes of reasoners have neglected.

you

There are not a few persons to be found, who will accept the last proposition, and will say that the modern reasoners who have been mentioned have erred by leaving out of their argument the principle of man's free will. They will tell that it is not the Will of the Almighty FATHER to change the heart of any man, who does not concur in the change. He stands at the door and knocks, but it is only when a man opens the door that He will come in and will sup with him who has opened, and he with Him. [See Revelation iii. 20.] It is true that he who openeth the door must rise in order to do so, and that he can have no power to rise except it be given him from above. But it will not be given him, unless he will accept it when it is offered, and use it when it is given. This is precisely the element which is wanting in the reasoning of both the two classes of logicians to which reference has been made.