then, restrained by a law made by Bishops. Why, then, cannot the same Bishops, by another law, enforce restrictions upon the exercise of their collective authority?

It may be well here to state the precise position, which it is the design of this article, and those which may follow it, to maintain. It is that the Right of government is so inherent in the Office of a Bishop that no act of government can be done without the Bishop, where there is a Bishop. But that it is, nevertheless, competent for the Church, with the assent of the Bishops, who are her governing body, so to regulate the exercise of their powers, that the consent of other persons shall be necessary to their action. In other words, that Bishops are under the control of law; while no law can be made without the consent of Bishops.

The writer still holds the doctrine, which he formerly asserted, that in each diocese, the Bishop in the absence of any restrictive law has absolute power. But that where such a law exists he is bound by it, so far as it extends. Beyond its own limitation it can of course produce no effects. Where the law does not touch them, the Inherent Rights of the Bishop are Reserved Rights. The Right of Legislation is one of the Inherent Rights, which cannot be taken away from the Bishop, although the exercise of it may be restricted. It follows that no law ought to be made by any diocesan authority without the assent of the Bishop. All the constitutions of the American dioceses, which authorize the enactment of canons, by diocesan Conventions, without the assent of the Bishop, are therefore violations of Church principle; although so long as any Bishop chooses to acquiesce in such an arrangement, his acquiescence may be regarded as a virtual assent to the canons thus enacted.

It is perhaps proper to speak first of diocesan arrangement; because the dioceses are the elements of which the Church is composed. The first thing to be considered is, then. the primitive condition of a diocesan Bishop. This seems to be a necessary step in the analysis of the functions of Synods, without which there is danger of confounding those functions with each other, and attributing to all, that which is true of some only.

Dr. Pusey* seems to have fallen into this very error, and made it the basis of his book. He shows, what no one ever doubted, that the ancient Synods were all composed of Bishops, and then attempts to show that all Synods must be so composed; because one of the functions of a Synod is that which he very properly calls attesting the faith. But in the first place that is not the function of a Synod, but of the individual Bishops who compose the Synod. This Dr. Pusey proves in two ways. First, he maintains the true doctrine, that a Council is made œcumenical, not by anything in its own constitution, but by the acceptance of its definitions by the Bishops of the Church diffused throughout the world. Secondly, he shows that the attesta tions to the faith were sometimes gathered by letters without any Synod.

As to the attestation of the faith, it may be further observed, that while it is perfectly true, that the laity never had any share in the function, it is also true, that the Bishops have now lost it. No modern Bishop, except he of Rome, now claims the right of attesting traditionally to the ancient faith, because all Churches but that of Rome acknowledge that the power has become extinct with the traditions, which it implied.

But to return to the primitive diocesan Bishop. He possessed, as Inherent in his Office, all the Rights and powers of government. This was the theory. But the government was administered on the domestic, or paternal, principle, with perhaps one qualification. The Bishop consulted his presbyters on every occasion of the exercise of his authority in any important instance.

The powers which he possessed were, practically, either administrative or judicial. For there was, as yet, no properly legislative power in the Church, authorized to dictate principles and rules to the individual Bishops. Each Bishop had that quasi-legislative power, which consists in laying down the rules by which the judge will govern himself in the administra

As, from this point, there will be frequent references to Dr. Pusey's late work, in fact, there have been some already, it seems proper to insert its title in the margin, although there is no intention of writing a regular review of it. The title is: "The Councils of the Church from the Council of Jerusalem, A. D. 51, to the Council of Constantinople, A. D. 381; chiefly as to their Constitution, but also as to their objects and History. By the Rev. E. B. Pusey, D.D., &c. Parker. Oxford and London."

tion of justice. This seems inseparable from the judicial office; although, when a legislature is in existence, its extent and use are both much curtailed. It seems to be the germ of all legislation.

The administrative functions of a primitive Bishop seem to have consisted in three things. The most important was that of ordination. The next was that of assigning to the clergy their positions within the diocese. This involved the right of receiving into the diocese, or refusing to receive, any clergyman already ordained, who might desire to labour therein. The last was the administration of the pecuniary affairs of the diocese.

Of these, which were all once inherent in the Office of the Bishop, the last has disappeared altogether, while the second has become little more than a shadow anywhere.

The judicial functions of a primitive diocesan Bishop consisted in enforcing the discipline of the Church. While dioceses continued to be small, this was done in the domestic mode. When they became larger, it was found necessary to have recourse to the forensic mode; in which the forms of a contest and a court of justice are observed. But it seems to have been very early thought necessary to provide some correction, in the nature of an appeal, for the errors into which Bishops might fall. The remedy adopted was that of Synods; the first institution of which was before the dawn of Ecclesiastical History. They are provided for and regulated by sev eral canons. The first is the thirty-eighth of those called Apostolical, the thirtieth according to the enumeration of Dionysius Exiguus, and Johnson. Others are the twentieth of Antioch, the fifth of Nice, and nineteenth of Chalcedon. They all agree in treating the Synods as provincial tribunals of appeal. The first says: "Let them determine all doctrines of religion among themselves, and put an end to all ecclesiastical controversies that may happen." That of Nice, which is the most important, says: "Let there be a Synod of the Bishops of every province, that examination be made whether any have been excommunicated by the too great severity or rashness of the Bishop."

Such was the origin of Ecclesiastical Councils. From the appellate powers which they possessed the legislative were

easily developed. It is involved in the very idea of the decision of an appellate tribunal, that its decisions must be followed by the inferior tribunals, from which an appeal lies to its decision. It is involved in the very idea of a tribunal, that it must have the power of laying down the rules and principles upon which it proceeds. The two ideas easily coalesce into that of making rules, which the inferior tribunals are bound to obey; that is, of making laws. It would seem that no other account can be given of the origin of the legislative power of Synods than this. There is no trace of it, or indeed of Synods, in the New Testament. For Dr. Pusey is certainly right when he asserts that the Council of Jerusalem mentioned in Acts xv, is a thing sui generis, affording no precedent for subsequent Synods either as to their constitution or their authority; since it derived its authority from the presence of the inspired Apostles.

The legislative authority of the Provincial Councils having been once developed, became, as well as their judicial power of appeal, a modification of the Inherent Rights of Bishops considered as diocesans. When once they were subjected to the revision of their sentences and to the operation of law, they ceased to be monarchs and became members of an oligarchy. Their absolute powers within their respective dominions were limited. In exchange they received a limited and checked power in the dioceses of others. It would seem that this was an important instance of the limitation of the exercise of the Inherent Rights of Bishops.

Besides their judicial and legislative functions, the provincial Synods possessed a very important administrative function. This was the filling of vacant sees. A Bishop could only be consecrated by Bishops. This entailed the necessity, when a see became vacant, of a meeting of several Bishops to conse crate a successor to the deceased Bishop. This was perhaps the origin of Synods. At any rate, so soon as Synods existed, they assumed the function of consecrating to vacant sees within the province as their own. They had no superiors, and the right of consecration involved the right of election. This was another Inherent Right of Bishops, which moreover could only be exercised in a Synod, and so might be called an Inherent Right of Synods.

The present writer, in a work on the Episcopate which he published two or three years ago, asserted that the early Bishops were elected by Bishops. The idea seemed startling to some persons, and the question was asked publicly what was his authority for the assertion. The authority was the ancient canons. Those more especially relied on were four in number. The first was the thirty-ninth of those called Apostolical, according to the enumeration of Hammond, which is sometimes numbered the thirty-seventh, and by Dionysius the twenty-ninth. The other three were the sixteenth, eighteenth, and twenty-third of Antioch. Dr. Pusey, with greater learning, has found more authority, and has conclusively proved that the election was by the Bishops; although it must be made in the presence of the people. The proof will be found in his book, pages 39 to 48. It may be remarked that even here there is a limitation on the exercise of an Inherent Right of Bishops or Synods. So strictly was this restriction observed, that the second General Council, the first of Constantinople, having determined to choose St. Flavian Bishop of Antioch, did not formally elect him, but left that office to a synod to be assembled at Antioch.

The See of Antioch, says Dr. Pusey, was not filled until after the enactments of the Council. For the election lay with the Bishops, but was to be made in the presence of the people. It could not take place then until the Bishops should return from the Council to Antioch. [Page 310.]

It is true that Dr. Pusey not only asserts but proves, that the people had no voice in the matter; yet their presence was still a limitation imposed on the exercise of the Inherent Right of the Bishops. It may perhaps be said, that the presence of the people was an original limitation of the Inherent Right. But this is altogether without proof. There was no such limitation of the appointing power recognized by St. Paul in the cases of Timothy and Titus. But even if it be admitted that the neces sity of the presence of the people was an original limitation of the Inherent Right of the Bishops to elect, what can be said to the fact, that the right of election has been so encroached upon that barely a shadow remains? if it can even be called a shadow. In fact one of Dr. Pusey's arguments against the necessity of a lay element is, that the laity now choose their own Bishops. It would not be easy for him to name the part