ÆSTHETICS—RUSKIN'S MODERN PAINTERS.

1. Introduction to a Study of Esthetics. By JAMES C. MOFFAT, Professor of Greek in the College of New Jersey. 12mo., pp. 284. 2. The Philosophy of the Beautiful, from the French of VICTOR COUSIN. Translated, with Notes aud an Introduction, by JESSE CATO DANIEL, Chestnut College, 12mo., pp. 185.

3. Modern Painters. By a Graduate of Oxford. New York: Wiley and Halsted. 4. vols., 12mo.

4. Seven Lamps of Architecture. By the same Author and Publishers. 1 vol., 12mo.

ART is one thing, Theories of Art another; and a third thing, quite distinct from either, is Criticism. Of these three, Art, or the act, or fact, must precede the science, or theory of the fact, and both the fact and some theory of it must precede any criticism upon it.

Of the three works named at the head of our article, the first two relate chiefly to the Science of Art, and the two latter are eminently works of Criticism. And yet the theories of Art can scarcely be discussed without something of criticism as a means of deducing the principles from the facts; and criticism not only presupposes those principles, but, in the present stage of Esthetical Science at least, necessarily involves some discussion of them.

There has been for some time felt, a growing want of a comprehensive term that should include all the various branches of this general subject of Art, the productions of the works of Art, and criticism. The tendency has been setting more and more in the direction of the word Esthetics, and indicating that as, on the whole, the most proper and convenient of any that could be devised. But here, as everywhere, the difficulty in finding a name arises from not exactly knowing what is the thing to be named. At first names were undoubtedly arbitrary signsto a considerable extent, at least. But after some progress had been made in naming the first and most obvious things that occurred to men's thoughts, the principle soon obtained, in all the Indo-European languages, of increasing the number of names by a derivation of the new ones from one or more of those already in existence. Hence names become of themselves

significant of the object which they may be used to denote. But in the case before us, what is the object to be denoted? This is the question which Science itself has scarcely yet decided. Do we say that it is Beauty? If so, we must first decide whether beauty is a property of external objects-objects external to the mind, we mean, or a mere emotion; or, again, is it an intuition? These are fundamental questions, all of them, and questions that must be settled, or assumed as settled, at the very threshold of our Science; and before any name can be fixed upon, that will remain permanently in use, and satisfactory.

Prof. Moffat, after reviewing several theories of Beauty, and considering the objections that may be urged, as he thinks, with force against them all, concludes that Beauty "is not a quality of objects, and must be some condition of the sentient being,an emotion of the observing mind." "Taking this conclusion to be correct," he says, "we shall use the word 'Beauty' to mean an emotion, 'Beautiful' to characterize an object calculated to awaken the emotion, and the Beautiful shall be employed to designate the immediate antecedent of the emotion, whatever it may be."-p. 21.

Here, then, we have three terms fixed, and a good deal assumed as settled and fixed, whether right or wrong.

The terms fixed are, "Beauty," as a concrete term used to denote an emotion, or state of the soul; secondly, “ Beautiful,” as an adjective to designate and distinguish any object which excites the emotion, as when we say-a beautiful rose! a beautiful landscape! and, thirdly, all the objects of which this adjective may be affirmed as a predicate-as when we say of the "beautiful rose," "it [the rose] is beautiful," are included in a class denoted by a class, or general term-" the Beautiful.” But manifestly we must have one term more before we can proceed with our discussion, the necessity for which Prof. Moffat appears not to have distinctly seen. We must have an abstract term to denote that quality which we ascribe to an object when we call it beautiful, as from white comes whiteness, from good, goodness, from humble, humility, &c. And the fact is, as we believe, the word beauty is far more frequently used as this abstract term-to denote the quality in objects-than

as Prof. Moffat proposes to use it, namely, as a concrete term -to denote the emotion produced by the beautiful object. And, in fact, it is one of the faults of the Professor's most excellent book, that he uses the word "beauty" in both senses throughout its pages, often introducing error and confusion of thought thereby.

But, as we have said, there is a great deal assumed in these definitions, and, as we believe, well and wisely assumed. These assumptions are for the most part, however, directly opposed to Cousin's teachings. With him, beauty is a property of external objects. It is perceived by intuition; and the emotion follows and depends upon the judgment of beauty.

This point requires a little discussion; and unfortunately such is the state of Science that a recurrence to primary and fundamental distinctions seems to be indispensable to any clear comprehension of the subject before us. And even in order to do this, we must refer to an Analysis of the phenomena of the Mental Activity, not to be found, as we believe, exactly as here given, in any of the published works on Psychology or Intellectual Philosophy.

All the phenomena of the Mental Activity are primarily referable to three classes-Sensibility, Intelligence, and Will. The functions of the Sensibility are primarily two-Sensation and Emotion-Sensation when the state of the Sensibility tends to Intelligence-and Emotion when it tends to volition or ac tion. Of the Intelligence there are seven primary classes of functions: (1) Perception [of external objects and by the senses]; (2) Intuition [of unseen and immaterial realities and relations]; (3) Imagination, which pictures to the mind concrete realities, whether actual or only possible; (4) Conception, which forms the abstract ideas of objects and classes of objects, on which Science is based; (5) Memory, which retains the ideaimages created by the imagination and the abstract ideas of conception; (6) Judgment, which affirms ideas or conceptions of one another; and (7) Reasoning, which combines judgments into syllogisms and arguments. Of these, the first, second, and third, come directly within the scope of our present subject. The functions of the Will constitute but one primary class namely, volition.

But besides this classification there are several combinations of these functions which we need to notice in this connection. A sensation always leads to a perception. The sensation produced in the sensorium by any object acting on the retina of the eye, for instance, leads to the intellectual act of perceiving that object, the perception awakens an emotion towards it, and the emotion may, or it may not, lead to a volition or act of the will, which will stretch forth the hand to take hold of it. And even the emotion itself, without the act of the will at all, will in some cases produce the act, as in all the cases of what is called involuntary action.

Sensation is purely physical and dependent upon the physical organs, of which we reckon five as special and one as general; the five are sight, sound, touch, taste, and smell. But be sides this we have sensations of the states of our own body, and which we never refer as to anything out of the body itself, as fatigue, headache, &c. But Emotion is manifestly of two distinct classes. We have the purely animal emotions of appetite and affection, and also over and above these, the rational emotions of duty, piety, &c., which have no necessary connection with, or dependence upon, the body or bodily organs. And while Sensations have but one only source of origin-namely, material objects-Emotions have two: (1) the sensations produced by external objects, and (2) the intelligence itself, by its idea-images and its conceptions. An idea-image of a fine din ner will often make the mouth water with appetite, and the corrupt imaginings of the impure heart are well known to have a most powerfully stimulating effect on the sexual appetite. On the other hand, it is the conception of an act as right or wrong, that excites the moral emotions. A conception is all that we can have of God-an idea-image constructed by the imagination is impossible, and hence our theistic or pious emotions are excited by the conception which we form of God, and depend for their character upon the nature of that conception.

One point more of preliminary definition. In perception as in intuition we cognize an object by its properties. We see an orange, for example, as round, yellow, &c. The idea of it which we form in the one act of perception, we analyze, and obtain as elements or results each of the properties which we

had seen it to possess: to each of these elements we give a name-calling the substance orange-and each of the properties roundness, yellowness, &c., &c. By a synthesis which we call judgment, we restore the words which we had destroyed, in another form however, and say, "the orange is round,” &c., predicating of the orange each of the properties which we had seen it to possess. And these judgments, for the convenience of having a name for them, we designate by the predicates themselves; thus, the judgment which affirms that "the orange is round," we would call the judgment of roundness.

These judgments sustain two entirely different relations to the emotions. In the first place, they may precede and determine the emotion, as, when we feel remorse for an act that we have performed, the remorse depends upon the judgment that the act was wrong, and that we did wrong in doing it. Without this judgment we may have regret, but remorse would be impossible. Or, in the second place, if an object excites the emotion of horror, for instance, we call it "horrible." In this case the emotion precedes the judgment, and the judgment is based upon, and determined by, the emotion. This distinction is recognized in common usage, when we speak of those propositions which affirm judgments, preceding and determining the emotions, as expressing judgments and opinions, and those which affirm the judgments that follow and depend upon the emotions, as expressing sentiments.

Now, as entering into any Theory of Esthetics and constituting its foundation work, we have the emotion of beauty and the judgment of beauty, and the correctness of the theory will depend upon the accuracy of our analysis and description of these elements.

No doubt can exist as to the reality of the emotion of beauty. In the presence of certain objects, we feel emotions of beauty. Between the emotion and the sensation, there must have been an act of cognition. Sensation and emotion both belong to the sensibility; but cognition belongs to the intelligence. Sensation is in order to cognition, and cognition is in order to the emotion. The emotion of beauty, then, always presupposes an intellectual state as its antecedent and formal

cause.