public rejoicings at Montreal because of the capture of Washington be postponed in order that the fall of Baltimore might be celebrated at the same time.

Some time after midnight of the 13th the British commenced their retreat, and re-embarked on the morning of the 15th.

General Winder, with a brigade, was sent in pursuit, but owing to the fatigue of the troops no serious molestation was undertaken. The 3rd Brigade was not discharged from the service of the United States until November 18th, by a general order signed by "W. Scott," which says: "The Major-General in taking leave of this fine body of citizen-soldiers, who have done themselves and country so much honor, offers to them the thanks of the United States for their distinguished services."

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Much rain fell during the days of the campaign and the American troops were in the open and received their rations irregularly, but the behavior of the men was good, and the unwonted exposure was cheerfully borne.

Lossing says: "The successful defense of Baltimore was hailed with great delight throughout the country, and trembling Philadelphia and New York breathed freer."

The effect of this failure, with the almost simultaneous one at Plattsburg, on the minds of the English Ministry is shown by the fact that, upon receipt of the news, it was proposed to send the Duke of Wellington himself to take the command in America.

The reports were received in London on October 17th, and on November 4th the Earl of Liverpool and Earl Bathurst both wrote to the Duke. The Earl of Liverpool says: "The other idea which has presented itself to our minds is, that you should be appointed to the chief command in America," and presented arguments in favor of it. Earl Bathurst wrote in the same terms. The reply of the Duke to the Earl of Liverpool, dated Paris, November 7th, is as follows:

"My Dear Lord-I have received your letters of the 4th and you will have seen by that which I wrote to Lord Bathurst on the same day that I feel no disinclination to undertake the American concern, but, to tell you the truth, I think that, under

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existing circumstances, you cannot at this moment allow me to quit Europe."

On November 9th he wrote to the Earl as follows:

"I have already told you and Lord Bathurst that I feel no objection to going to America, though I do not promise to myself much success there."

On November 18th he wrote to the same :

"I have already told you that I have no objection to going to America, and I will go whenever I am ordered."

On November 18th the Earl of Liverpool wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Viscount Castlereagh :

"I send you a copy of my last letter to the Duke of Wellington. There has not been time to hear from him in reply, but I trust no further difficulty will occur respecting his leaving Paris, and the knowledge that he is to have the command in America, if the war continues, may be expected to produce the most favorable effects."

The Earl wrote to Mr. Canning on December 28th, referring to "communications which I had with the Duke of Wellington. He had agreed to take command of the army in the ensuing campaign if the war should continue, but he was particularly solicitous for peace, being fully satisfied that there was no vulnerable point of importance belonging to the United States which we could take and hold except New Orleans."

The signing of the treaty of peace between England and the United States at Ghent on December 24th, 1814, of course put an end to the idea of the Duke's coming to the United States.

The failure of the British campaign at Baltimore, and at Plattsburg, had a decided effect upon the terms of the treaty of Ghent in favor of the United States. The Commissioners were in session when the news was received on October 17th, in London, and there were yet two months of negotiation before the treaty was signed.

Goulborn, one of the British Commissioners, wrote to Earl Bathurst on October 21st: "We owed the acceptance of our

article respecting the Indians to the capture of Washington, and if we had either burnt Baltimore or held Plattsburg, I believe we should have had peace on the terms you have sent to us in a month at latest. As things appear to be going on in America, the result of our negotiations may be very different."

A comparison of the instructions which the American Commissioners received on June 25th, 1814, as to terms, and what they got in December, especially on impressment, will show that some influence was at work to hold up their hands and increase their demands.

It was not the battle of New Orleans, for that was fought after the treaty was signed.

A London paper of June 17th had said that the Naval and Military Commanders on the American Station carried with them "certain terms which will be offered to the American Government at the point of the bayonet."

No history of any part of the War of 1812 would be complete without considering the attitude of New England during that time and which greatly affected the conduct of the war.

As early as in 1808, Sir James Craig, Governor-General of Canada, employed John Henry as a confidential agent to go to New England and report on the feeling there prevalent. In February he wrote that after a few more months of the non-intercourse policy, the New England States would be ready to withdraw from the Confederation. In February, 1809, he wrote: "There is good ground at present to hope that the States of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Hampshire and Vermont will resist every attempt of the French party to involve the United States in a war with Great Britain." Those who favored the war were called sometimes the French party because the opponents declared that a war with Great Britain necessarily involved an alliance with France.

The English Ministry was of course kept advised of these sentiments.

It is unnecessary to quote here all the actions of the Legislatures and people of New England which were promptly made

public in England, but only to record the effect upon the attitude of Great Britain.

There was a policy of differentiation in the conduct of the war between the North and the South.

A British Order in Council of October 26th, 1812, clearly made a difference between the New England and the Southern States in favor of the former. President Madison noticed this and called it a policy "having for its object to dissolve the ties of allegiance and the sentiments of loyalty in the adversary nation, and to seduce and separate its component parts, one from the other." In other words, to encourage secession.

On March 30th, 1813, the Prince Regent issued a public notification of the blockade of ports from New York to New Orleans, but no mention was made of New England ports.

From the tenor of the British despatches of the time it seems likely that peace would have been proposed before but for reliance upon that hostile spirit and the threatened secession of that section from the Union.

Sir Henry Goulbourn wrote to Earl Bathurst on October 21st, 1814 (after referring to the operations at Baltimore and Plattsburg): "Indeed if it were not for the want of fuel at Boston, I should be quite in despair."

The Earl of Liverpool wrote to Viscount Castlereagh on December 23rd, 1814: "The disposition to separate on the part of the Eastern States may likewise frighten Madison, for if he should refuse to ratify the treaty, we must immediately propose to make a separate treaty with them, and we have good reason to believe that they would not be indisposed to listen to such a proposal."

While the opposition of New England to the war was on economic grounds, the question which brought it to a head and led to the Hartford Convention was one of "States' Rights." Massachusetts refused to put her troops under the command of a United States officer, and the Secretary of War then declined to pay those troops, whereupon a joint Committee of the Legislature of Massachusetts made a report on the subject and recommended a convention of delegates from sympathizing States which met at

Hartford on December 15th, 1814, and in which all the New England States were represented.

No such question was raised in Maryland, because General Winder, a United States officer, held and exercised a command in this campaign. Niles' Register says: "On the 10th of September, Gen'l Winder was in Baltimore with all the forces of the 10th Military District at his command."

In conclusion, the Battle of North Point saved Baltimore from a pre-determined fate; it encouraged the rest of the country; it, with Plattsburg, caused the English Ministry to suggest that the Duke of Wellington should take command in America and it influenced the terms of the treaty of Ghent in favor of the United States.

Authorities consulted :

Official Reports of Generals Smith and Stricker.

66 "Colonel Brook and Admirals Cochrane and Cockburn.

The Annual Register, London, for 1814.

Niles' Register, Washington, for 1812, 1813 and 1814.

Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army at Washington, Baltimore and New Orleans, by G. R. Gleig.

The Citizen-Soldiers at North Point and Fort McHenry, September 12th and 13th, 1814, published by N. Hickman, Baltimore.

Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington, edited by the Second Duke. London, 1858. 9th volume.

Official map of General Winder in the library of the Maryland Historical Society.

Manuscript Notes, by Wm. M. Marine.

Field Book of the War of 1812, by Lossing.

The Hartford Convention, by Dwight.

The Canadian War of 1812, by Lucas. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1906.