loom up large in the battles of the Revolution, but I have noticed that the losing side, in its histories, does not lay much emphasis on defeats.

Col. Mercer says: "Major McPherson and the head of Armand's horse led the column; I followed with my troops; then at a considerable interval the Continental light infantry were followed by Gen. Wayne's brigade, the whole amounting to 2200 effective men, a force rather unequal to 8000, the flower of the British army, posted with every advantage not now more than a mile in front."

Major McPherson was ordered to take command of 150 riflemen on the left, and Lieut.-Col. Mercer of a similar number on the right. The latter attacked a picket of 100 or 150 men near a house, drove them off, and gained possession of the house. At this moment his troop was sent to him, and though they "could be of no possible use, to encourage the riflemen and give them confidence," he drew up the troop in a lane which led towards the main road and the enemy. The enemy opened with three pieces of artillery at from 300 to 400 yards. Almost at the first discharge Col. Mercer's horse received a cannon-ball in his body, which carried away his rider's stirrups and bruised his foot, several of his troop were dismounted, and the riflemen fled. He mounted another horse, but it was impossible to rally those who had fled, and the whole front line of the enemy advanced with shouts. Two pieces of artillery now arrived, but Col. Mercer advised the Captain to withdraw them, "which advice he followed with reluctance and saved his pieces. This advanced corps was entirely dispersed, and the wounded were retaken by the enemy." Col. Mercer continues: "I fell back with a few of my troops, having ordered on the others to join a party who acted as bodyguard to the Marquis. At the distance of about 300 yards in the rear of where we had been engaged, I found Gen. Wayne's brigade drawn up across the road and through the wood to the right. I staid with them until they were defeated. We had just begun to assume the stiff German tactics, as the British acquired the good sense, from experience in our woody country, to lay it aside. Wayne's brigade was drawn up in close order, while the

British advanced in open order, keeping up a deadly fire, and the destruction among Wayne's troops was very great. In less than thirty minutes from the retreat of the advanced corps, the rout was total, and our flying and dispersed soldiers escaped along the causeway and through the morass." Fortunately the British horse, "who never made an effort during the action," did not advance, for, if they had done so, "had charged down the road and taken possession of Green Spring," Col. Mercer thinks that very few of the Continental troops could have escaped, the Marquis's army would have been broken and dispersed, and Lord Cornwallis would have escaped the catastrophe at York.

The editor has a note on this battle, stating that this account is at variance with the printed accounts, and he refers to Johnston's The Yorktown Campaign and the Surrender of Cornwallis, and to Marshall's Life of Washington, but as it is the account of an eyewitness and participant in the engagement, who acknowledges a disastrous defeat, it deserves the greater credit.

Col. Mercer continues: "As it was, the troops collected that night a few miles beyond Green Spring, and the next day being not pursued and being joined by an excellent corps of horse from Baltimore commanded by Captain More, and having preserved all their baggage, they soon forgot the disaster of this day.

"The British were, therefore, perfectly right when they speak of defeating the militia in the commencement of this action; they defeated those I commanded, who, being reinforced by the corps of Galvan and Willis, the corps of volunteer horse and two pieces of artillery, made no doubt a very formidable appearance, although none of them did any mischief except the Riflemen and Galvan's, and the latter, not much. When our accounts speak nothing of the engagement of the advanced militia, it only shows that such confusion reigned that no one had any just knowledge of this affair who has yet described it. Thus terminated one of the most silly and misjudged affairs that took place during the war.'

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The editor here quotes from Tarleton's Campaigns, who says: "The events of this day were particularly important and claimed more attention than they obtained." He thinks that Cornwallis "might certainly have derived more advantage from his victory;"

that, if the light infantry and cavalry had been detached next morning before dawn of day to pursue the Americans, “La Fayette's army must have been annihilated," and this "would have prevented the combination which produced the fall of Yorktown and Gloucester."

Col. Mercer informs us that "The next day the Marquis thought proper to compliment my corps highly in general orders which, indeed," continues he, "they always deserved, but on that day none of them were with me till towards the close of the action of small arms, and although afterward they were exposed to great danger, they could not possibly render any service," and he concludes his narrative of the action near Green Spring: "Many of the gentlemen of this corps being dismounted, and all exhausted, and finding that the armies were about to operate on the south side of James River, I obtained permission for the corps to return to their homes, and I know nothing farther of the military transactions of this campaign till the siege of York and Gloucester, but believe they were altogether unimportant and almost devoid of military incidents."

We see from this narrative of Col. Mercer, and from that of Col. Tarleton, that Cornwallis did not take advantage of his success near Green Spring; and if he had taken proper advantage of it and routed Lafayette's army, which seems to have been in his power, he might have escaped the subsequent disaster at Yorktown.

The final section of Col. Mercer's letter gives his experiences in the siege of York and Gloucester, which had been invested by Washington and Rochambeau, with the fleet of Count de Grasse at the mouth of York river. He says: He says: "Early in September [1781] Gen'l. Weedon, being about to take the command of the troops destined to act against Gloucester, applied to me to accompany him, promising me a command of select militia.

"I consented and Genl. Weedon . . . . took post at Dixon's mill about the middle of September, and, soon after, Genl. Choisy joined us with the legion of the Duke de Lauzun and 1000 marines, having now command of 1600 French regular troops and about 2000 American militia.” Agreeably to Genl.

Weedon's order I had selected from the militia such old soldiers as I could find, who, having retired from the army after the expiration of their terms of service, were now performing their tours of duty with the militia as other citizens. To these I added the most likely young men that volunteered their services, and such young gentlemen as officers as appeared most promising; personally I was acquainted with none of them. Of such material I collected a corps consisting of 200 rank and file, and a proportionate number of officers. Without much relation to size, as a distinction that appeared best calculated to create an esprit de corps, they were termed the Grenadier regiment. After arming and disciplining them in the best manner time and circumstances would permit, they were attached to the legion of Lauzun, the infantry of which did not exceed 350 men fit for duty.

"Until this time I had acted without any commission, but the Court of my native county of Stafford, probably being apprized of the circumstances, recommended me to the Executive, who forwarded me a commission as Lieutenant-Colonel of the militia of that county, but which was not necessary to confer an authority that was never disputed."

Here follows an account of the action before Gloucester of October 2, 1781, the only action in which Mercer's troops were engaged before the surrender of Cornwallis.

He says: "Early in the morning of the 2nd of October, I was ordered with my corps to join Lieut.-Col. Count Robert Dillon, who, with 150 of the Dragoons of Lauzun, was directed to gain the road that led to Gloucester by York River and to move on towards that post, whilst Gen. Choisy and the Duc de Lauzun, at the head of 150 Dragoons, proceeded down the Severn Road in the same direction, followed at a considerable interval by the French and American infantry, the whole intended to take up a position as near as practicable to the town of Gloucester."

Gen. Choisy overtook the foraging legions of Tarleton and Simcoe, and, as he had no infantry with him, "he requested me to hasten my march by dismounting and setting an example to the corps by running;" which Col. Mercer did, and he soon joined the French Dragoons, who found it necessary to fall back

before the British horse. "This they did slowly, with order and firmness, under the fire of the enemy until they found that my corps was just emerging from the lane, when they fell in behind them and faced about to receive the charge of the British horse now formed again and advancing with their infantry in the wood." "My little corps of new troops, which did not exceed 160 rank and file fit for duty, were at first somewhat startled to find the French horse retreating so rapidly by them in the open field, exposed to at least 460 horse of the enemy and a body of infantry in the wood; and their situation was evidently rendered more critical by having a very high fence in their rear, and the lane they advanced through blocked up by the French horse. However, they were immediately ordered to deploy, so as to push their left flank into the wood, which they did with great celerity and good order, and commenced firing, one-half on the cavalry on the right, and the other half on the infantry advancing rapidly through this wood. The horse of the enemy had approached within 250 yards, and the infantry were not at more than 150 yards distance when the firing began. No regular troops could behave with more zeal and alacrity than this corps of militia. Their spirits had been raised by running them up, and being hurried into action without time to reflect on their danger, they discovered as much gallantry and order as any regular corps that I ever saw in action. Fortunately Tarleton did not like the reception prepared for him, and at a critical moment sounded a retreat, when not 100 cartridges remained unexpended in the regiment."... "From the fire the corps kept up, Col. Tarleton no doubt concluded them much more numerous than they were, but nothing could excuse his not proving the fact, with his great superiority.

"That night I took possession of the advanced redoubt on the main road with 150 French and 150 Americans, and the French and American troops encamped in the fields on each side of the lane." He resumes: "The siege continued a tiresome, uninteresting blockade on the Gloucester side, without military incidents, except that men were repeatedly and uselessly sacrificed by the French General in idle reconnoitring. The day before the sur