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to effect any good in the matter; and that, as no advantage is to be expected from the further stay of the undersigned at Rome, he is ordered to return to his post at Florence.

"The undersigned is at the same time instructed to express the deep regret of his Court, that all its endeavours during the last year and a-half to cooperate in re-establishing tranquillity in Italy have proved abortive. The British government foresees that if the present system is persevered in, fresh disturbances must be expected to take place in the Papal State, of a character progressively more and more serious, and that out of those disturbances may spring complications dangerous to the peace of Europe."

The date of this document is September 7, 1832; and we would again ask, what is there in it which might not with equal force and propriety be addressed to our Foreign Office

to-morrow?

If Lord Palmerston then expressed himself with somewhat unbecoming severity on the maladministration of the Roman government, averring as he did in his place in parliament, that the "rule of Mazzini was preferable to that of the Pope," he was so far warranted that the abuses which still demand redress have been for years in existence, have been over and over again brought under the notice of the Pontifical cabinet, have been made matter of friendly remonstrance by France and even by Austria, and have been denounced by a solemn congress as incompatible with the peace and prosperity of the land.

M. Montalembert, however, tells us that these charges are only the exaggeration of ill-informed tourists or the calumnious impertinences of practised libellers. Of himself he says he "knows nothing of such ;" and to Lord Palmerston's assertion, that they "who govern in the Pope's name have committed gross acts of cruelty and oppression," he boldly asks, "Ou? quand par qui ont ils été commis? Has the distinguished viscount ever mixed in Italian society? Has he ever heard the innumerable narratives every family can relate of priestly interference, domination, and insolence? Has he listened to tales

of corruption and infamy which no writer dare commit to press? Has he been told of justice warped, of arbitrary severities exercised towards those deemed lax in the observance of religious duties? Have not the very highest functionaries of the state exhibited lives that would bring reproach upon any society? Is the story of the Delegata of Bologna, who attempted the seduction of a young girl of that city so late as three years ago, and, failing, imprisoned her family and killed her by a broken heart, unknown to the illustrious pamphleteer? Or has he never heard that the actor in that infamous tragedy, Signor Bedini, is now a cardinal?

It is with deep reluctance we are driven to reply thus, to a challenge so ostentatiously thrown down. We are ready to declare that if the question be repeated, we will quote not one but fifty instances of cruelty and tyranny in the administration of the Papal government, and with circumstances of name, and date, and every detail that can insure accuracy.

M. Montalembert artfully persists in asserting that our Italian policy can have no other aim or object than the subversion of the Catholic church. If this charge, however, be true, what becomes of our alliance with Sardinia? Where are the ties which bind us to that state? Where the warm good wishes that every sincere Englishman extends towards the rising liberties of that noble land? If we bounded our desires for Italy solely to the downfall of the Roman Catholic church-if we ignored the miseries of the people, their sufferings and their slavery could we ask for anything more likely to attain that object than a system of government based on the darkest barbarism of the days of the Inquisition? Could we, with all our fleets and armies, inflict so heavy a blow on the church as its own cruelties, based on its own corruptions, are daily, hourly doing? Is it not the present terror in every devout Catholic, whose mind is elevated by study and whose intelligence has been enlightened by reason, that the actual government of Rome may destroy the church? This fear has found expression in the writings of some of the most distinguished men of Italy. We have but to quote the name of

Massimo D'Azeglio as one who maintains and avows this sentiment.

The artifice of ascribing this policy to England is evident enough. To make Protestantism and Mazzinism convertible terms has long been an Austrian master-stroke. In one of the letters of instructions sent by Prince Metternich to M. Mentz, the Austrian political agent and adjunct to the governor of Lombardy, there is a very remarkable passage, in which English policy and the views of the revolutionary party are assumed to be identical. Lord Palmerston, with what little justice the liberals will acknowledge, has long been regarded as the great ally of all who would subvert thrones and overturn despotisms. It may well be doubted whether a man as keen as Metternich, and as conversant with all the prejudices and leanings of English society of the first rank, ever confounded the noble viscount with the men of movement and disorder. It however served his purpose to assume the fact, and to organize his policy on the assumption. Tried by his acts, there is not perhaps a single statesman in England who would come out more triumphantly under such a charge. If arraigned, however, by what he has said, the result would be very different. Never has any man in high and responsible station uttered more loose and imprudent sentiments; and, stranger still, never has any man's character stood so high by the very absence of the reserve which is regarded as the essential attribute of a statesman. Were Lord Palmerston to be judged gravely by his parliamentary services or his ordinary departmental abilities, no one would think of ascribing to him the first place. It is as the daring exponent of some far-looming policy-the courageous champion of some suffering and insulted nationality--that we ever deem him great; and he is in the singular position of owing the greatest part of the consideration he has obtained to nothing higher or nobler than his indiscretion.

Neither our space nor our inclination will admit of our dwelling on this theme, or halting to consider how far careless sentiments, uttered rather for the sake of epigram than truth, have compromised the English abroad, and led foreigners to dislike or distrust us. Enough that

we know such to be fact, and that the random phrases spoken in reply to an address, the casual expressions in an after-dinner speech, have been gravely accepted as the declarations of a deliberate policy.

In no part of Europe have these chance expressions done so much mischief as in Italy. While they have strongly contributed to make the rulers of that country averse to our counsels and deaf to remonstrances, they have equally served to mislead and deceive those for whose special encouragement they seemed to have been spoken. To assure an excitable and impassioned people that the highest sympathy is felt for their sufferings-that the wrongs they are enduring are the shame of the century; that their princes are depraved and odious tyrants; and that the chance despotism of a mob is wiser and better rule than the sway of a Pope and his Cardinals-these are, to say the least, dangerous experiments, and, when not followed by any thing more energetic than mere words, are more likely to irritate and offend than to cheer and encourage. After severe censures upon the governments of the Peninsula, haughty and even insolent denunciations of their policy, sneering allusions to the capacity and fitness of those who act as their ministers, the people of Italy naturally looked for something more than mere pity and commiseration, and are ill satisfied by being told that "our envoys at the different courts receive instructions to press by all friendly means the necessity and the urgency of wise reforms in the administration." To press the necessity upon whom? Upon the very men and the very governments we are daily, hourly holding up to public reprobation for incompetence, ignorance, and even worse. Is it thus we hope to obtain anything from the rulers, or any confidence on the part of the people?

We cannot-although Lord John Russell does not seem to think so we cannot go to war for Italy. The case of the Peninsula presents no aspect which should drive us to that last resort. Are we, then, to leave her to her fate? Is a continuance of evils, as cruel as they are gratuitous (for there are not, as in Spain, the rival pretensions of two houses)

Are

to add its embittering influence
to the struggle of parties?
we utterly to desert the cause
of those who, of all continental peo-
ple, repose the deepest trust in our
national good faith and our national
prowess? And are we to abdicate
the high position which years have
acquired for us on the whole littoral
of the Peninsula? This would by
no means appear necessary, but yet it
is not an easy task to say in what
manner we should most efficiently
serve those we are desirous to aid.
Any really efficient alliance with
France for this purpose we hold to
be impossible, and for the reasons we
have already stated. Differences of
policy might possibly merge into
some common plan of action, save
that the present Emperor is actually
bound to his peculiar line by the ne-
cessities of his own position. The
successful working of a constitutional
government throughout Italy might,
with all its adverse contrasts towards
France, be borne: the peril is, how
to change the existing order of things
and not to go too far; how to enter
upon the road of revolution and stop
at the first stage-mere reform !

The

vernment, viz., a mixed population, differing in blood, race, and traditions. However paradoxical it may seem, there is strength in this same discord. The Genoese, the Savoyards, and the Piedmontese have each their separate and individual traits, which, by intermixture and reaction, result in the broader features of a national character, just as the English, Scotch, and Irish are found to blend and amalgamate in our own parliament.

It is plain enough, even from these few remarks, to see that the example of Piedmont can scarcely guide us in our hopes for the rest of Italy; not that for a moment we would be understood as despairing of constitutionalism in the other states, or disparag ing the admirable efforts they made towards it in the year '48.

Will the Emperor of France contribute to a renewal of that experiment? Will he, who has given the mockery of a representation at home, counsel the adoption of a real one abroad? Will he, who has trammelled free discussion with every species of restriction, advocate a free press? Will he, whose whole policy is based upon the influence of the priest, enter upon a course of action which may, indeed must, limit the power of the church?

If France be unlikely to adopt this policy, is it probable that Austria will every tradition of whose rule is in direct opposition to it? Will she advise institutions, which shall cost her the great kingdom of Lombardy, and lose to her the fairest province of her crown? Can she favor the growth of institutions she has denied to her own people, and confer upon Milan what she denies to Vienna ?

Piedmont, it may be said, has done this. True; but Piedmont is not Italy. The Sardinian States are really and truly totally unlike anything in the Italian character. Less impetuous, less excitable than the inhabitants of the Peninsula, the Piedmontese, in his habits of patient toil and steady industry, has a strong resemblance to the northern European. He is cold, sententious, and calculating; not easy of persuasion, or apt to act on speedy influence. His tastes dispose him to discuss and canvass whatever is proposed to him, in a cautious, careful spirit. The aim of every well administered working of constitutionalism found state is two-fold-the protection of an apt people in this state. They those beneath its rule, and the mainwere proud of their privileges, and tenance of a strong government. The quickly sought to estimate and com- princes of Italy have never underprehend them. The principles of stood any but the latter condition. self-government were adapted to Always, or nearly always, in a state those who themselves exercised the of contention with their subjects, virtues of self-control. It is not very their whole ingenuity has been emdifficult to estimate how widely dif- ployed in devising means of repres ferent would be the working of such sion, or inventing plans which should a system in the more impetuous blood disconcert their adversaries. The of the southern race. Piedmont poswhole machinery of government has sesses, besides, one element which become thus converted into a compliwould seem essentially advantageous cated system of secret police, with all to the free play of constitutional go- its odious train of denunciation 3,

arrest, and imprisonment. We are far from assuming that the dangers which menaced them were not real and tangible. The system of secret societies is the greatest peril of a land, but by whom has this system been fostered and engendered ?— whose the fault that men are SO driven to desperation, that all the terrors of the gallies or the guillotine are weak in comparison with the daily sufferings of a life of tyranny ? The smuggler has no existence where the liberty of free trade prevails; and in the same way the agent of secret societies and the conspirator find no calling in countries where the laws are well administered, and the stream of justice flows pure and undefiled. The fault of Italian rule has been to create an organized antagonism to the state-to divide the country into two unequal divisions --the paid servants of the crown, and the remainder of the population. To the Austrians is mainly due the merit of introducing this mode of governing; though-in justice to them be it said they rather shrink from than seek occasions of severity, and if left to themselves would rather reduce the national spirit to a tone of indifference and effeminacy, than stimulate it to acts of outrage for the sake of subsequent repression. In the correspondence between M. Mentz and Prince Metternich, in the year 1833, there is a very singular and interesting memorial addressed to the prince on "the public spirit of Lombardy, and the mode of improving it." This document, we believe, fell into the hands of the Marquis of Gualterio, during the occupation of Milan by the Piedmontese army, and has been published by him, with a number of other very remarkable state papers, as an appendix to his history of the late Italian revolutions. The "Memoir" is cleverly, and, making allowance for the quarter whence it issues, fairly drawn up in many respects. Its statements of the secret societies, their means and their objects, the grievances they propose to redress and the plans by which they would remedy them, are fair and reasonable. It is when summing up his view of the national character of the Lombard, and passing in review his traits of weakness and his prejudices, that the Macchia

velian spirit displays itself, and we see how much more eager is he to profit by accidental flaws and defects, than to correct the blemishes and develope the natural good gifts of those beneath his rule.

After a short description of the general characteristics of the Italian nature, he sums up those of the Lombard thus :

"1-An exaggerated degree of selfesteem (amour propre). 2-Great vivacity, physical and intellectual. 3-Excessive imagination. 4-More of persistence and determination than in the southern Italian. 5-—A strong devotion to material interests. 6Considerable astuteness, counterbalanced by a sense of probity not found usually in the rest of Italy."

Taking these traits in the order in which they stand, he proceeds to show how they may be dealt with to render their possessors, not greater, or wiser, or richer, but simply better and more amenable subjects to Austrian rule. Their self-love, for instance, would develope itself in glorious memories of past national greatness, in recalling times of ancient splendour and supremacy, and this sentiment he tells us, "n'aurait en lui-même rien de dangereux sil prenait tonjours une tendance conforme aux intérêts de l'état," which it will be, he adds, his chief aim to give it. He then goes on to show that prize essays on various subjects connected with history would insensibly draw men towards the state which conferred the rewards, and thus, while appearing to minister to national vanity, the real object would be what he calls " un but favorable

à l'état."

When treating of the impassioned and impulsive temperament of the nation, and the necessity thus imparted for action, he says that theatres and places of public amusement occupy the first rank, and that the national vivacity may there find a safer vent than in the ebullitions of political strife; adding this reflection, Le cirque etait du temps des Romains le secret d'êtat pour les rendre soumis au gouvernement, et les Italiens modernes ne sont pas moins exigeans, ni moins maniables a cet objet." Here is the old policy of classic times, the "panem et circenses," avowed with a candor at least worthy

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of all praise. Mentz, perceiving that their nature is unchanged, that their ancient spirit still survives, as acutely reasons that the corruptions

So

successfully employed by the Caesars would still have their efficacy. As the lawyers say, "a like case like rule." These are but the sons of those who sold their liberties for mere subsistence and an hour of pleasure. Why not profit by the heritage thus bequeathed them? Recal to their imagination the ancient glories of their race; but take care it is but the vices of their sires they are led to imitate !

It is difficult to believe that men of station and character would ever have descended to such counsels; but the document exists, and its truth and authenticity are beyond a question. We should stop here in our quotation, were it not that the same page contains an admission so strange and singular, we cannot resist the temptation to record it. After dilating with some vain glory on the munificence with which the Austrian government has always treated theatrical institutions, and the great opera 'La Scala' of Milan, in particular, he goes on to recommend even an increased subsidy to this establishment, in order that more splendor should be given to the representations; and then says, "Pour des raisons prémentionnées il satisfira egalement la genie nationale par tout apparat public, specialement PAR LES POMPES ECCLESIASTIQUES, si l'on doit juger par le grand concours du peuple qui afflue de tous les cotés pour la procession de la Fête Dieu." This from a Catholic, a devout follower of the church, a high and confidential servant of the Holy Roman and Apostolic Empire! Only imagine for a moment what they are that he places in the same category; the mimic grandeur of the stage and the most sacred solemnity of the church ; the crash of the orchestra, the sacred song of the priests; the march in the Prophête beside the procession of the Fête Dieu! We have already transgressed the limits by which we purposed to bind ourselves in this paper, and have not adverted to what we feel to be the only policy open to us with respect to Italy.

♥ That policy in our estimation can

not be in strict alliance with any of the great European powers, and yet does not necessarily involve us in serious difficulty with them. It is essentially a policy of time and patience, waiting on events rather than urging or precipitating them. Dangerous as the state of Italy is to the peace of Europe, it presents no case for armed intervention on our part. Our first and most obvious duty is to obtain, if we can, the withdrawal of French and Austrian troops. We are well aware that such a measure, if done rashly and precipitately, would involve a revolution; but the same consequence has been staring us in the face for the last five years, and no measures have yet been taken to provide against such an emergency. The policy by which the Pope should meet the difficulty of his position is yet to be adopted; and if the French and Austrian occupation continue, there is no reason why the actual state of things may not, ten or twenty years hence, be the same as it now is, unless, indeed, the crash of revolution should intervene to decide the question.

The withdrawal of the armies of occupation is essential on every ground of policy and good sense. It is not only that by their presence they impart an unfair and preponderating influence to the powers they represent, over the Pontifical government, rendering it indifferent to remonstrances and representations from other quarters; but that they exalt the action of the government to a height of irresponsibility to the demands and wishes of the people. Whatever is possible to do by force is now the rule of the administration. And, lastly, the presence of foreign troops is an outrage on the feelings and sympathies of the people, which nothing but the gravest emergencies should ever warrant or permit. The most benevolent acts of a government thus supported would be, and very naturally, regarded with distrust; while its severities would as certainly be deemed the tyrannical exercise of a power artificially sustained. The enormous cost of these occupations is a terrible addition to a budget already yearly increasing in its demands, and augmenting its deficits.

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