families, or rather certain members of families, have, through some unknown powers of their own, or advantageous outward circumstances, been more successful than their rivals, and have gained the day. For instance, we may see in some parts of the forest that bamboos, or the cardamon plant, or small palms, have almost wholly monopolised the ground."-(The Cornhill Magazine. New series. vol. xxii., p. 194.) And in another paragraph he speaks of various growths as "pushing and elbowing one another for dear life." In these passages the writer infers that there is a struggle for existence among plants that live together by referring to plants that live apart, as though the isolation of the latter were the result of the competition of the former. But where only one kind of plant is found, it is probable that the immediate circumstances will be found specially favourable or less adverse to its development. It secures the sole possession of a particular sphere because it is more or less especially adapted to its needs. The fact that different species live apart in spheres different from each other would seem to indicate a cessation of internecine struggle. On the other hand, the fact that many species live together and assist one another in the struggle against the disabilities of their external conditions is an illustration of that principle of co-operation which, as we have seen, logically excludes the view of a ruthless competition between race and race. We have seen that when one species displaces another it is not necessarily more fit to live than the other, but only that it possesses some advantage over the other which can sometimes be discerned and sometimes not. We have seen that the struggle ends in the extinction, or at least the extermination, of one species and the continued existence of the triumphant species in an unmodified form. Among all the instances cited by Mr. Wallace in his argument for Natural Selection based on the struggle for existence, only one example is given of the attempt of the threatened species to maintain its place by modification of its structure: and that attempt miserably fails. We have seen that the displacement of one species by another may be due to an independent effort of each species to overcome some external disability, which is successful in one case and fails in another; or to the fitness of one species and the unfitness of another for a new sphere. We have seen that sometimes different species live apart or live together, and all or most of them flourish equally well. These phenomena seem to me utterly to militate against the idea that the transmutation of species by means of Natural Selection is proved by the survival of one species and the extermination of another species. The destruction of one perfectly adapted species by another perfectly adapted one; the conflict of race with race which leads to the extermination of the one and the preservation in an unmodified form of the other; the survival of one species which is modified by the direct action of the conditions and the destruction of others which are unable to adapt themselves to the same conditions; the fitness of one species to new conditions and the unfitness of another;-may be taken as vivid illustrations of the preservation of favoured species in the struggle for life and of a certain kind of selection which takes place in nature: but there is no trace whatever of the action of Natural Selection, either in the strictest or the most lax sense of that term. And yet, strange to say, the struggle for existence which does not necessarily produce the survival of the fittest, but only of the stronger of two competing species; which does produce extermination; which leaves organisms unmodified; which does not adapt the unfit to new conditions; which ceases in the mutual separation of allied species; which produces a co-operation of very distinct species, enabling them to resist the disabilities of their outward conditions; which, in no one of its different phases produces the transmutation of species by Natural Selection, is cited as the strongest argument to prove the efficient and all-embracing influence of that supposed law of nature. (b) NO ORGAN OR INSTINCT EXISTS FOR THE SOLE BENEFIT OF ANOTHER SPECIES. "Bear ye one another's burdens." 66 Every man must bear his own burden." -PAUL. The second argument urged by Mr. Romanes is based upon the fact that "among all the millions of structures and instincts which are so invariably and, for the most part, so wonderfully adapted to the needs of the species presenting them, we cannot find a single instance, either in the vegetable or animal kingdom, of a structure or an instinct which is developed for the exclusive benefit of another species." This argument does not, however, apply to the cases in which "a structure or an instinct is of primary benefit to its possessor and then becomes of secondary benefit to some other species on account of the latter being able in some way or other to utilise its action."+ "From the first Darwin invited criticism to adduce a single instance, either in the vegetable or animal kingdom, of a structure or an instinct which should unquestionably be proved to be of exclusive use to any species other than the one presenting it. He * Darwin and After Darwin. p. 286. even went so far as to say that if any one such instance could be shown he would surrender his whole theory on the strength of it. Now, as this invitation has been before the world for so many years and has not yet been answered by any naturalist, we may by this time be pretty confident that it never will be answered. How tremendous, then, is the significance of this fact in its testimony to Darwin's theory. Therefore I say that this immensely large and general fact speaks with literally immeasurable force in favour of Natural Selection as at all events one of the main causes of organic evolution." (Darwin and After Darwin. pp. 286-7.) It might seem a simple act of prudence to leave unnoticed so powerful an argument as this; and bearing in mind the warning that "fools rush in where angels fear to tread," it might be well to give up an attempt which no one has been rash enough to make. But if this unanswered challenge constitutes "a general consideration of the largest possible significance in the present connection,” one would have supposed that the advocates of the theory would have frequently employed so powerful an argument. But curiously enough it is not so. Mr. Romanes says:— "It is somewhat remarkable that the enormous importance of this argument in favour of Natural Selection as a prime factor of organic evolution has not received the attention which it deserves. Even Darwin himself, with his characteristic reserve, has not presented its incalculable significance, nor do I know any of his followers who have made any approach to an adequate use of it in their advocacy of his views." (Darwin and After Darwin. pp. 291-2.) That the opponent should avoid and ignore an argument of so much importance-an argument which, it might be assumed, he could not answer satisfactorily—is intelligible enough; but that the advocate should hesitate to use such an argument is simply astonishing, when we consider the very great acumen, sometimes almost amounting to genius, which characterises those who have defended this theory. Let us see if there are any reasons why this strong argument has not been employed. I venture to say that the reason why no naturalist has responded to this challenge arises from the fact that he is invited to discover what cannot possibly exist in the actual world of nature. No one, however opposed he may be to the theory of Natural Selection, would think of denying that there is a struggle for existence, or that self-preservation is the first law of nature, though it is not, let us hope, the only one. In such a case the last thing that anyone could expect to find on a priori grounds is the existence of organs and instincts which are primarily of no use to their possessors, but which are employed for the benefit of another species. This phenomenon would handicap the assisting species so that it would run the risk of self-effacement. The fact of the absence of the phenomenon under consideration is said to be "just precisely what we should expect if this theory (of Natural Selection) were true, while upon no other theory can its universality and invariability be rendered intelligible." But surely all theories of the transmutation of species, when brought out of the region of pure speculation, must assume as the axioms of their reasoning the struggle for existence and the need for modification in order that organisms should be adapted to new and different conditions. Whatever be the problem that a race has to solve-to preserve a present adaptation or to create a new one, to adapt itself to new conditions by one method or by another-it must be solved in such a way as to secure the preservation of the race. It is contended that on the hypothesis of the beneficent design theory, "it is inexplicable that no species should ever be found to present a structure or an instinct having primary reference to the welfare of another species, when, ex hypothesi, such an endless amount of thought has been |