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bat must lead to a decision.' In spite of this energetic assertion, it appears from General Klapka's own statements that he, as well as Görgey, passed the better half of the day of the battle at Aszod, about ten miles from the scene of the contest, that the combat had been raging above five hours, and that the village of Pered, against which the operations were directed, had been lost and won when Görgey arrived on the battle field, at two o'clock in the afternoon. It had taken him four hours to ride over the ten miles of ground between Aszod and Pered! Here, then, we have the flower of the Hungarian army taken on a desperate expedition, and the operations conducted with the utmost indifference by the commander. When he reached Pered, he ordered the troops into bivouacks, deposed the officer in command for having commenced the attack without sufficient authority, and on the following day, when the main force of the Austrians returned to the charge, he exposed his troops in an unprotected position' to the fire of the Austrian batteries. In the course of the day he managed to get himself surrounded by the Austrian and Russian forces, so that nothing but the courage and devotion of the Honveds enabled him to make good his retreat to Aszod. Two thousand five hundred of his brave troops remained on the field of battle. General Klapka, who wrote rather in favour of Görgey than against him, states, that if the Austrian attack had been conducted with greater dispatch and energy,
this eventful day would have witnessed the rout and ruin of a large part of the Hungarian army.' After the battle of Pered (these are still General Klapka's statements), the commander-in-chief and his staff fell a prey to a maudlin helplessness; two corps were left for ten days at least,' and for no earthly purpose, on the left bank of the Danube, while the defence of Raab, against which the Imperialists concentrated the whole of their forces, was left to General Pöltenberg with only 9000 men. At the eleventh hour, a corps, which was stationed at Komorn, received Görgey's orders to reinforce the garrison of Raab. But the distance to that city was above forty
miles; the corps itself had been decimated in the late battles, and Raab was lost to the Hungarians. The Imperialists occupied the place on the 29th of June, in spite of General Pöltenberg's heroic defence.
After these losses the Governor Kossuth despatched three commissioners to Komorn with orders for General Görgey to retreat to the banks of the Maros. It was the Governor's intention to concentrate the bulk of his forces in the vast plains between that river and the Theiss. Görgey promised obedience; but after the departure of the commissioners he accepted battle from the Imperialists, who pressed upon his outposts at Ats, in front of Komorn. His advanced positions were driven in, and he was compelled to seek shelter in the entrenched camp which surrounds the fortress. Of this fact he informed the Government-adding, that the enemy was too powerful, and that he could not possibly obey the orders of the Governor respecting the protection of the city of Pesth. All he could do was to remain at Komorn. He invited Mr. Kossuth and the Members of the Government to come to that fortress.
If the Governor had followed General Görgey's advice, he would have given himself into the power of a man who hated him more cordially than even his Austrian enemies could hate him, who fought his battles to the ruin of his cause, and who waited but for a favourable opportunity to terminate the war. It appears that this message aroused the Governor to a sense of his own precarious position. He took at length what he considered extreme measures. He issued a decree which deprived Görgey of his command. General Meszaros was appointed in his place, and despatched to join the army at Komorn.
The old general left Pesth, but he halted on the road and turned back, when, on reaching Almas, the distant and continuous peals of artillery apprised him of a general engagement between the two armies. But General Meszaros was not the only bearer of the Governor's decree. A courier, who travelled on another road, reached the fortress on the evening of the 2nd July.
He arrived in time to witness the last struggles of a terrible contest in which above 1500 Hungarians, and 2000 Imperialists were killed. The former were driven behind their entrenchments. Görgey himself, who happened to get entangled in a charge of cavalry, was bleeding from a sabre-cut in the back of his head. That wound played an important part in the history of the Hungarian War. For a long time, whenever he appeared in public, his head was wrapped up in thick and most inconveniently conspicuous bandages. He never discarded the hat which had been cut through by the sabre. He wore it on all occasions, thereby provoking a boundless enthusiasm amongst the troops.
This first and last wound, of which the commander-in-chief of the Hungarian armies ever could boast, preserved him his command. The Governor's orders for his deposition were disobeyed. The chief of Görgey's staff fomented a conspiracy among the commanders of the corps. Those orders were
peremptory. Görgey was to resign his command. The army was to be conducted to the Lower Danube. General Klapka had been commissioned to provide for the immediate execution of these orders.
of doing this, he assembled a council of war, and obedient to the desire of the conspirators, he consented to proceed to Pesth, and insist on the Governor cancelling his decrees. At the moment of his departure he received another decree, by which he
was ordered to hasten the march of the army,' while he himself was peremptorily desired to remain at Komorn, with 18,000 men. The hopeless demoralization of the military leaders is most glaringly shown by Klapka's naive confession, that the contents of this order 'spurred him on to greater speed,' and that he immediately proceeded to Pesth.* His mediation sufficed to shake the Governor's resolution, and it was agreed that Görgey should resign his office as secretary at war, the functions of which he had never condescended to perform, and that he should remain with the army, and retain its command, if he would acknowledge Meszaros as com
mander-in-chief, and promise obedi ence to his orders. On the return of the negotiator to Komorn, Görgey very readily assented to these conditions, which left him in possession of all his powers of mischief. He promised to obey the orders of the new commander-in-chief, but he knew how to distinguish between his promise and its performance. He was again required to march his troops to Pesth. Instead of doing this, he assembled a council of war, and proposed to lead the army to the lake Balaton. This plan was so diametrically opposed to the real interests of the Hungarian cause, that the generals, and especially Klapka and Nagy Sandor, more than suspected his secret intentions.
It is characteristic of the temper of mind of these patriots,' and espe cially of General Klapka, that in spite of this tardy suspicion he consented to support the traitor's manœuvre. He confesses that after the battle of Raab, Görgey dropped his mask,' and that but a thin veil of secresy was thrown over his intention of making a disgraceful surrender. The word negotiation was at that time openly mentioned in Görgey's camp; his fear of victory, and his desire either to abandon the Governor or to entice him to his headquarters were so apparent, and the danger which these criminal intrigues threatened to the country was so great, that General Klapka and his fellow-generals would have been justified in arrogating to themselves that power which the Governor Kossuth dared not exert. But George Klapka, whose 'Roman character' consented to a disgraceful conspiracy against General Dembinski, was far too conscientious to act openly against the man whom, on his own confession, he knew as a traitor. Inexperienced, indolent, vain, and withal thoroughly selfish, he played a double game, and sought to be the favourite and confidant of the two rival powers, to profit by the success or to save himself from the ruin of either. He conspired against Dembinski because that offilution; he shrank from taking the cer exposed his ignorance and irreso Governor's part against Görgey be
* See Klapka's War in Hungary, vol. i. p. 150.
cause he was afraid of his stern comrade, and because that comrade's scheme might possibly be attended with success. Not a thought was given to his suffering country, and the cause for which thousands of her sons courted death. Once, and once only, did Klapka attempt to obey the Governor's orders, by despatching General Nagy Sandor with a corps to Waitzen. This was done by stealth, and the measure was revoked and the troops recalled the moment Görgey intimated his displeasure at this contempt of his authority.' The services of the largest and best appointed army were lost to the cause of Hungary at the very time when those services were most needed.
Above 40,000 troops and 209 pieces of artillery were, throughout one-half of the campaign, locked up in the entrenched camp of Komorn, while the smaller corps, in other parts of Hungary, were left to contend with the overwhelming numbers of the Russian army. Such an intrigue could have but one result. The arms of the Hungarians had during all this time been victorious in Transylvania, and in the south, where Bem and Perczel, men devoted to the cause, commanded. The fortress of Arad had been compelled to surrender to the Governor's troops, and the corps which had conducted the siege was a welcome and indeed a necessary addition to the forces in the South. But the weak point of the Hungarian defences, the Gallician frontier, where Dembinski and afterwards Visocki commanded a small corps of 12,000 men, was left exposed to the attack of the Russians, who, advancing by slow and cautious marches, forced the defiles of the Carpathians, occupied Eperies, Kashau, Miskolcz, overran the plains of the Theiss and entered Debreczin on the 3rd of July. The combined Austrian and Russian armies at Raab, meanwhile, discovered that the forces at Komorn required but to be watched, not opposed, and after the battle at Komorn, General Haynau thought himself justified in detaching a strong corps in the direction of Pesth. On the day that the Russians entered Debreczin the head-quarters of the Austrian commander-in-chief were at Babolna.
capital began at this time to despair of the war. They were assured that the army at Komorn remained unconquered, and the greatest care was taken to conceal from them the advances of the Imperialist armies. But the evil news oozed out. Besides, their nights were disturbed by the hollow rumbling of artillery and heavy waggons, which betrayed the clandestine removal of the archives and stores. Hence the greatest confusion prevailed. The looks of the people were anxious and careworn; many took to flight. False rumours were flying about in all directions. Some of the populace assembled in tumultuous meetings; others sought to liberate the Austrian prisoners of war. Cries of "Treason!' filled the air. The government was compelled by threats of extreme measures of severity to prevent the outbreak of an insurrection.
The Governor himself prepared to leave Pesth. His personal property was removed to Szolnok. His own departure was fixed for the 2nd of July. He wished to leave the city secretly, but the news transpired, much against his will. Before the carriage drew up at his door, the square was filled with people, who were anxious to witness his depar
Thus discovered, his plans
were changed. He issued from his palace in simple dress, with the cross of St. Stephen slung round his neck, preceded by three bishops, bearing crosses and banners, and surrounded by his adjutants, one of whom bore the standard of Hungary. him came his guards. The people cheered the procession as it emerged from the gateway, and proceeded to the great cross in the square. The Governor stopped at the cross, and knelt down. The people knelt with him. After this act of devotion, Mr. Kossuth assured them that the Magyar Isten, the God of Hungary, who protected them in the battles of Hatvan and Kapolna, would not now withdraw his protection from his people. The Governor's aspect, his anxious, careworn features, and the impressive tones of his voice, sufficed to fill the populace with a transport of grief and enthusiasm. Those who but a few days before provoked his threats The inhabitants of the Hungarian of courts-martial and wholesale fu
sillades, now rushed forward to embrace and kiss his knees and feet, and even the stones on which his foot had trod. He told them to be of good cheer and promised a speedy return. Crowds of people followed him, bewailing their own lot and his, as the carriages drove slowly away. But few of the male population stayed behind. They left, partly from patriotism, and partly from fear of the vengeance of the Austrians. About a week afterwards the two capitals of Buda and Pesth were occupied by the advanced guard of the Austrian army. The commander, General Haynau, issued a proclamation, in which he told the inhabitants of Pesth that he would make them responsible one for all, and all for one,' and that their lives and properties were forfeited in expiation of their crimes. Their city bore the traces of a first chastisement; if they provoked him, he would turn it into a heap of ruin and ashes, a monument of their treason and his revenge. To make these menaces the more impressive, he reminded the inhabitants of the capital of his achievements at Brescia. The Jews of Pesth, who had throughout supported the Hungarian government, were mulcted in a sum of 1,500,000 florins.
The Governor of Hungary, meanwhile, had removed the seat of what was left to him of power to Czegled, and afterwards to Szegedin. He made strenuous but fruitless endeavours to attract Görgey and his army in defence of the capital. Messenger was sent after messenger, order followed upon order, but without result. Mr. Kossuth's entreaties, and the orders of General Meszaros, were addressed to General Klapka, but while that officer lamented his inability to meet the governor's wishes, he consented to support Görgey's plan of dividing the army at Komorn into two corps, of which the weaker, under Klapka, was destined to guard the fortress, while the flower of the army, under Görgey's command, was to march away, for a purpose which at that time was a secret to those only who affected to admire Görgey's brutality as independence, his frantic waywardness as chivalrous daring, and his secresy as a certain indication of a deep and brilliant plan for the restoration of
the fortunes of the war. But Gene ral Klapka, who had followed his career throughout, who knew the intensity of the hatred' he bore to Kossuth, and who was perfectly aware of Görgey's contempt for the national cause and army, could not for one moment doubt the result of an expedition which he nevertheless volunteered to support. On the 11th of July an attempt was made to break through the allied Imperialist armies on the right bank of the Danube. Klapka commanded, and Görgey, who pleaded his wound, remained a spectator of the battle, which ended with the retreat of the Hungarians. The loss on either side amounted to about 1500 in killed and wounded. The Hungarian troops fought with the greatest heroism: their defeat was the result of the want of discipline on the part of the leaders of the various corps. Each division of their army seemed to fight on its own account. There was no concert in their attack, no combination in their movements, no co-operation in their retreat.
Two days afterwards, on the 13th of July, General Klapka commanded another attack upon the Austrian forces on the right bank of the Danube; and Görgey, who had crossed to the left bank of that river, commenced his fateful expedition into the interior of Hungary, by marching upon the city of Waitzen. He had gained his ob ject. For more than fourteen days he had thwarted the movements of the national armies, enabled the Russians to invade the country from Gallicia, and to occupy almost all the important cities of the kingdom. Their armies occupied the country from Debreczin to Waitzen. They met him in the vicinity of that town, and defeated him. He turned aside, and marched upon Miskolz and Tokaj, closely pursued, with his rear guard engaged in frequent skir mishes, and negotiating all the while. His famous retreat was a brilliant piece of military acting from beginning to end. The Russian ar mies never lost sight of him. But his they took care not to press upon heels. The quarters which he left each morning, were in the evening occupied by the staff of Prince Paskiewich. More than once the Rus sian commander might have crushed
him between two corps. On other Occasions, Görgey might have turned on and defeated his pursuer. Russian officers passed his outposts in the evenings, and returned before the break of day. The negotiations were evidently not confined to his
own fate and that of his army. His ambition grew with his success, and the fate of Hungary was decided when he again appeared on the scene and offered to co-operate with the national armies.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CAPTAIN DIGBY GRAND.
THE HUNTING REVEILLÉE-A CRACK MEET IN 'THE SHIRES'—A PATTERN MASTER OF
AMONGST all the heathen gods
and goddesses to whom we sacrificed so liberally at Haverley, Morpheus was the only one that could with reason complain of systematic neglect. Diana we worshipped most perseveringly during the day; Bacchus could boast a phalanx of unflinching votaries in the evening, for who might resist Sir Peregrine's dry champagne, or pass untasted by the silky twenty-five, with a ‘magnum' of which Soames, no unworthy representative of the wine-god, appeared punctually every quarter of an hour? Nor was Venus forgotten; when mirth, music, singing, and ecarté in the drawing-room, with an occasional impromptu dance as midnight approached, showed how willingly we yielded ourselves to her rosy fetters. But for the god of sleep, we professed, one and all, but little regard; the only time at which he seemed to vindicate his power being that too-fleeting twenty minutes which elapsed between the summons of one's vigilant domestic, and the painful effort so dreaded by the sluggard, termed 'getting
out of bed.'
I could have sworn on the morning after the ball, that my repose had only lasted five minutes-a brilliant five minutes truly, illumined as it was by the image of my affianced Flora, when my uncompromising servant entered the room, under a burden of hot water, clean linen, top-boots and spurs, and snowy appliances thereto belonging, wherein it was my intention to over-ride as much as possible the Hark-Holloa hounds, advertised to meet' on that day at Haverley Hall. Oh the delight of that first moment of con
sciousness, ere I could gather from my scattered faculties what it was that made my heart bound so lightly in my bosom!-the first dawning of the sober certainty of waking bliss,' worth all the dreams ever yet sent by Proserpine through her ivory gate. Could mortal man be happier than I was on that auspicious morning? Debts, difficulties, and annoyances were all forgotten; if I thought of Zoë, it was but with a twinge of reproach which enhanced the joy succeeding so momentary a pang. Flora was mine! Such a thought alone was sufficient to fill my mental atmosphere with sunshine, nor was it an unpleasing under-current of ideas that I was that day to ride a capital horse, with as crack a pack of hounds as England could produce. The original young thorough-bred one, whose tuition first brought about that interview with old Burgonet which obtained for me a commission in Her Majesty's service, was now an experienced, steady, and very capital hunterA matchless steed though somewhat old,
Prompt in his paces, cool and bold.
And in honour of the friendly old general, denominated 'Sir Benjamin.' Such a mount' was in itself an anticipation of success, and who that remembers the ideal laurels which 'going well' through a fine run' confers upon the brow of imaginative twenty-one, will refuse to sympathize with my feelings of exhilaration and excitement, as I descended the stairs to partake of that merriest of meals, a hunting-breakfast!
The party were assembled when I entered the dining-room, and my being five minutes later than the