in the character of nations and of individuals. Tacitus. if we mistake not, describes such a feeling prevailing at Rome when Augustus assumed power, and it has prevailed at two epochs in France within half a century. Many of the political characters in 1801 and 1802 were as weak and despicable in every sense as those of 1852. When Bonaparte complained to Kellerman, at a public reception, of the rejection of his candidate for the Tribunat, General La Martellière, Kellerman excused his own proceedings in the matter, throwing the blame on François de Neufchateau, who had led him into error. Bonaparte walked through the room to single out François de Neufchateau and charge him with the act. Neufchateau, thunderstruck, grew pale and faltered. Bonaparte, meanwhile, rang with much vehemence, which in a still greater degree disturbed Neufchateau. When servants and attendants entered, however, the First Consul merely exclaimed with sang froid, Donnez un verre d'eau au Senateur François de Neufchateau, il va tomber en defaillance. This trait will sufficiently indicate of what miserable materials the opposition was then composed. There are not wanting François de Neufchateaus in our own day who cannot palliate their weakness and servility by the excuse that they merely render involuntary homage to superior power.

In 1801, and the beginning of 1802, a spirit of equality reigned in the army, which the First Consul was most desirous of breaking. It was, however, necessary to proceed with discretion and prudence, not to awaken suspicion, and not to destroy old illusions and habitudes. Dignities and places were created with a lavish hand, with a view to render the transition facile from a ten years' to a life tenure of power. The older and more refractory generals received missions and embassies; the older portions of the army, too, were moved from garrison to garrison, to the end that the First Consul might surround himself with young aidesde-camp more devoted to the person and ambition of the General, and in whom he might place a greater confidence. With this view, a consular guard was created, under the

command of such mere personal adherents as Bessières, Duroc, Beauharnais, and Murat. The military police were in the hands of Savary, who said that if Bonaparte ordered him to kill his father, he would kill him; and Paris was under the command of Junot and Lefebvre, mere satellites of the First Consul.

The soldiers of 1794, such as Massena, Brune, Jourdan, and Augereau, were regarded with an evil eye. Pure republicans, such as Dessoles, Gouvoin St. Cyr, Saint Suzanne, and Lecourbe, were regarded with dislike; and Bernadotte and Moreau were under suspicion. Old officers were removed, as we have said, to embassies, or to remote portions of the French territories, and young adventurers, and unserupulous men were placed about the person of the First Consul. The Junots, Murats, and Durocs of 1801 and 1802 are not without their prototypes in 1852. We have now the St. Arnauds, the Canroberts, and the Espinasses,prostituting their military faith to a man who has no connexion with the glory or military services of the French army, and whom one of the first of French soldiers denounces under his hand as the perjured President. As the Consul of 1801 and 1802 stuck at no means to arrive at perpetuity of power— as he served himself with all kind of instruments, Jacobins, Royalists, and Terrorists-so has his putative nephew followed to the letter his example.

Though far from agreeing with M. Thiers in many of his appreciations, yet we agree in some of his remarks touching the occasional tactics and fruitless opposition of the Tribunate. We may say that the opposition raised by the Tribunate to the Code Civil and to the establishment of a form of worship, were miscalculated and unwise. Without a Code Civil, it is impossible that property or family can long subsist. Marriage, divorce, paternal power, contracts, rights, and wrongs are all defined and regulated by a code. The Tribunate also committed an error in throwing any impediment in the way of the Concordat. This act, signed in April 1802, while it restored the authority of the Pope,

restored it only on the basis of the Gallican liberties. Though advantageous in a certain sense to the See of Rome, it was still more advantageous to the Chief Consul, for besides the nomination of priests, he reserved certain fiscal rights, and limited the number of metropolitan sees. The organic articles are creditable to Bonaparte's sagacity and political talent.

The Concordat once carried, the event was celebrated by a Te Deum at Notre Dame. At this religious fete Bonaparte insisted that the generals of the army should attend in a body. Some of the most free thinking of the general officers, such as Augereau and Launes, at first refused to assist at ceremonies in which they did not believe, but these scruples were overcome, and men were seen to go through certain forms of devotion who were well known as railers against all religion and haters of the order of Melchisedec.

It was readily admitted as a general principle that every effort ought to be made for the country in time of danger, but the Tribunes contended that in time of peace there should be a line drawn between a conscription for the defence of the territory and conscription for the purposes of conquest, and that in this respect the system of Bernadotte should be followed. On this, M. Thiers is altogether silent; yet it is a point on which a conscientious and constitutional historian ought to enlarge, for it is obvious that the laudable efforts of the Tribunate were directed to restrain wars of conquest and of mere personal ambition. Constitutional and proper restraints did not however suit the humour of Bonaparte. He had destroyed the project drawn up under the influence of Bernadotte because it imposed limits, and now he felt still more irritated at the bitter and sharp denunciations uttered by a few men who preferred civil freedom and independence to conquest. Feeling that the imputation of ambition was a just reproach, he could not bear that it should be cast in his teeth. He was too consummate a tactician and commander to commence great enterprises with crippled means and limited resources, and it was because some of the leading members of the

Tribunate wished thus to control him that he champed and chafed like a war-horse curbed.

The remarks of M. Thiers on the politic permission to return, accorded by the First Consul to certain exiles are marked by good sense. His observations on exile itself acquire now a personal interest, as he himself has recently undergone its bitterness. A horrible invention of civil discord, says he, is exile. It not merely renders the exile miserable, but it completely alienates and changes his heart; it makes him an almoner of a foreign nation, it displays the affecting spectacle of the woes of his native land.

He

No portion of the efforts of Bonaparte at this period receive more praise from M. Thiers than those made by him for the education of the rising generation. founded thirty-two establishments, which he called Lycees; but it should be added that though the education afforded at the Lycees was literary and religious, and modelled upon a system of civil equality, yet it was altogether military. Religious instruction was given at these schools by almoners; military instruction by old officers, who had left the army. Tous les mouvements (says M. Thiers enthusiastically) devaient s'y exécuter au pas militaire et au son du tambour. Though this may appear very admirable to an amateur of military government, yet it is a system little pleasing to the notions of an Englishiman. What did such a system of education create, but bands of officers, sous officiers, intendants, military commissaries, army surgeons, and employés, intertwining themselves with a system of repression at home, of spoliation and conquest abroad?

Fond as are the French of every thing military, the First Consul was forced to create 6400 gratuitous bourses, charged upon the State, of 600 or 700 francs each, before pupils came to the Lycees in any considerable number. It may be remembered that in the past year, and indeed in the year previously, indications of the purpose of the present ruler of France to struggle for dictatorial power were allowed to ooze out in certain pamphlets published

says M. Thiers, saisie de crainte et d'admiration en presence du Général Bonaparte, which may be rendered, 'filled with fear and transported with admiration in the presence of General Bonaparte, agreed to the peace of Amiens.' No admiration of the man, and still less any fear of his power, had anything to do with the peace of Amiens. Politicians

and official men in England, even of the not very exalted calibre of the Addingtons and Hawkesburys, are not governed, in their dealings with foreign nations, either by feelings of admiration or the more ignoble sentiment of fear, but are guided by suggestions of sound policy and public duty.

M. Thiers commences his fourth volume with an assertion which, to a certain extent, is true; but not to the extent he states it. He says that the re-establishment of religion and the recal, of the emigrants charmed the English aristocracy,

especially the pious George III. There can be no doubt that these measures were seen with satisfaction by the higher classes in this country, but neither the one nor the other excited any enthusiastic or hopeful feelings, or in any degree operated on the bearing of public measures.

M. Thiers praises Bonaparte for not having, in the treaty of Amiens, infringed on the French prohibitive and protectionist system. He avers that a mistake was made in the treaty of 1786, which too freely opened the French markets to English products. M. Thiers would

have his readers believe that the rupture of the peace of Amiens arose from English mercantile cupidity, and not from any fault on the part of France. Because, says he. British commerce could not have a monopoly, it became discontented. Then, according to this veracious historian, the paying off of the fleet threw a number of sailors out of employment. These unfortunate beings, reduced to misery, might be seen wandering up and down the quays of the Thames. We say that in this statement there is not a word of truth. Everybody but M. Thiers is aware that the Thames, unlike the Seine, the Neva, and the Liffey, is without quays, and that if the

British seamen were in distress, there were, in 1802, totally irrespec tive of poor laws, institutions for the relief of suffering seamen - such as Greenwich Hospital, Seamen's Home, &c.

M. Thiers would seek to make his countrymen believe that perfide Albion wished to victimize them as they victimized Russia and Portu gal, by the credit system. English markets and manufacturers will laugh at crudities of this kind, and at the still more ridiculous crudities of Russian emperors not being free agents, in fact, running the risk of being poignarded if they did not yield to the exigencies of English

commerce.

While these rash, and we may now say ridiculous assertions are hazarded, M. Thiers admits that Mr. Addington was truly and faithfully desirous of maintaining peace.

But the English journals of 1802, like the English journals of our own day, spoke their mind out openly touching Bonaparte and his system, in a manner as little pleasing to the supposed uncle. as to the putative nephew. The attacks which most annoyed Bonaparte were those of a French emigrant named Peltier. We are not about to defend these attacks, which were not confined to Bonaparte alone, but were extended to all the members of his family, female as well as male. Neither the pungency nor the cleverness of these diatribes could, however, excuse their gross personality-a per sonality altogether indefensible. Against Peltier the French govern ment proceeded for a libel. The information was tried in the King's Bench, in February, 1803, before Lord Ellenborough and a special jury. The prosecution was conducted by the then Attorney-General (Perceval), and the defendant was represented by Mr., afterwards Sir J., Macin tosh, and Mr. Cutler Ferguson. afterwards Judge-Advocate. After a most eloquent defence by Mr. Macintosh, and an impartial charge by Lord Ellenborough, Peltier was found guilty. The Chief-Justice laid it down that every publication which has a tendency to promote public mischief by defaming the per sons and characters of magistrates and others in high station in other

countries is a libel. The jury, without retiring from their box, returned a verdict of guilty, thus proving the unsullied purity of British judicature, and the impartiality by which its decisions are governed. Into

these facts M. Thiers does not enter. Neither does he advert to the correspondence between M. Otto and Lord Hawkesbury on the subject of Peltier in the summer of 1802.

M. Otto, in the month of July, 1802, addressed a diplomatic note to Lord Hawkesbury, complaining of the abuse of the liberty of the press, and contending that the law could not give more latitude to a libellist than to any other individual, who, without declaration of war, should permit himself to violate the duties of good neighbourhood. M. Otto directed the attention of Lord Hawkesbury not to Peltier alone, but to the editor of the Courrier Francais de Londres, and to Cobbet, and urged that the perfidious and malevolent publications of these men were in open contradiction to the principles of law. Lord Hawkesbury replied, in a despatch to M. Merry, at Paris, intimating that it was impossible not to feel considerable surprise at the circumstances under which it had been thought proper to present such a note, at the style in which it was drawn up, and at the complaints contained in it. His Majesty's principal Secretary of State said. that his Sovereign never would, in consequence of any representation, or any menace from any foreign power, make any concession which can be in the smallest degree dangerous to the liberty of the press as secured by the constitution of the country. Lord Hawkesbury properly urged that the constitution admitted of no previous restraints upon publications of any description, and intimated that there existed judicatures wholly independent of the executive government, capable of taking cognizance of such publications as the law deems to be criminal, and which are bound to inflict the punishment the delinquents may deserve. As to the Alien Act, and the power which his Majesty was supposed to have under that act, of sending foreigners out of his dominions, the Secretary for Foreign

Affairs remarked that the provisions of the act were made for the purpose of preventing the residence of foreigners whose numbers and principles had a tendency to disturb the internal peace of the king's dominions. Lord Hawkesbury urged that it did not follow it would be a warrantable application of such a law to exert its powers in the case of individuals against whom complaint was made and who were liable to be prosecuted under the law of the land. Lord Hawkesbury proceeded then to show that the authorised organ of the government in France had used strong and abusive language in reference to Great Britain; and his lordship concluded by asserting that the French Government must have formed a most erroneous judgment of the disposition of the British nation and of the character of the Government, if they had been taught to expect that any representation of a foreign power would ever induce them to consent to a violation of those rights on which the liberties of the English people are founded.

This was the high and dignified ground to assume, utterly regardless of consequences or results.

As

much exception is taken to the tone of a portion of the English press in 1852 as was taken in the Moniteur of the 9th of August, 1802. The Times of 1802 was called in the Moniteur, low, vile, base, miserable,' and in 1852, epithets not less strong are applied to it and to other independent British journals, which exercise the privilege of commenting on the career, conduct, and government of M. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. But we trust that if any representations are made to the Foreign Office on the subject, be the locum tenens Whig, Tory, or Derbyite, the answer will be at least as dignified as that of Lord Hawkesbury.

In his long chapter on the rupture of the peace of Amiens, M. Thiers imputes the worst feelings to the British nation. Imagine, says he, an envious person present at the success of a formidable rival, and an idea may be formed of the sentiments which were felt in England at the prosperity of France. A manifest vexation seized upon every English heart; jealousy every

where became visible. The larger merchants, finding the seas covered with rival flags, openly regretted the discontinuance of war, and showed themselves more discontented than the aristocracy itself. Grosser misrepresentations were seldom penned. Withoutcontending that English merchants are above, or uninfluenced by pecuniary considerations, we believe we may safely aver, that they are less exclusively actuated by such considerations than any commercial men in the world. English merchants, like all other thinking Englishmen, were influenced by mixed motives. No patriotic mind could see without a pang Italy, Germany, and other portions of the Continent, almost provinces of France; and when in addition to the disturbance of the balance of power, there was a disturbance of the course of trade, no doubt the commercial and private mixed itself up with the public and patriotic feeling. It is the greatest mistake, however. to suppose, as is asserted by M. Thiers, that Wyndham, Grenville, and Dundas represented the mercantile interests in London and the outports in 1802. Not one of these gentlemen had any particular connexion with trade or commerce, or represented any commercial constituency. Mr. Wyndham was member of Parliament for Higham Ferrers; Mr. Thomas Grenville sat for Buckinghamshire; and Mr. Dundas for the county of Edinburgh. In giving expression to the opinions which they enunciated half a century ago, these gentlemen faithfully reflected public opinion. Nor did the London newspapers, charged by M. Thiers with hostility, express in a greater degree the opinion of the merchants than of all the intelligent and Alvarad classes among his then Weiss subs

M. Thiers dvs sot scruple to say Du Mr. Adèngton, in paying Georgy Okdendal knew that he WAN NIYANTOR & conspirator; but veror penyeteer affords no proot'd of Mr. Addington ever paid

Whether George Cadoudal, Påy many order emigrants, received WAY Jymiary assistance from the Miglia Government, we now have

wus of verifying; but we hesi

tate not positively to assert, that he never was rewarded as a conspirator. In passing through Kent on his way to France, Cadoudal saw Lord Hutchinson, who then commanded in the district; and on the Chouan announcing to the English general his real design in revisiting his country, Lord Hutchinson expressed himself sharply against the enterprise, not merely as contrary to the law of England, but as contrary to every sanction of the law of nations.

When England found, in November, 1802, that the French army had entered Switzerland, and that the object of the First Consul was to render his power dominant on the Continent, orders were given that Malta should not be evacuated. Early in February, 1803, the message delivered to the British Parlia ment breathed of war and preparations for war. Even Thiers admits that a sudden revolution at this time took place in the changing and passionate mind of Napoleon. A degree of anger seized upon him. To conquer England, to humiliate, to humble, to destroy her, became the passion of his life. Persuaded that all things are possible to man, having followers, intelligence, and a determined will, he took up the idea of passing the Straits of Dover, and of transporting upon our soil a considerable army.

war

On the 13th May, Lord Whitworth, after having declared the ultimatum of the Government of England, left Paris; on the 17th, an embargo was placed on all ships belonging to the French and Batavian republics; and on the 22nd, France formally declared against England. The reader will see that the month of May, 1803, was fruitful in events; the month of May, 1804, still more fruitful; for on the 18th of the month, in the latter year, by a senatus consultum, the title of Emperor was conferred on Napoleon Bonaparte. As there is not one original idea in the mind of the putative nephew of the First Consul and subsequent Emperor as he is a mere servile copyist, without originality, who can invent nothing-as he blindly imitates what was done half a century ago by a man whom he resembles only