[be not such a franchise as may subsist in the hands of the Crown, there is merely judgment of ouster, to turn out the party who usurped it (z). The judgment on a writ of quo warranto, (being in the nature of a writ of right,) is final and conclusive even against the Crown: which, together with the length of its process, probably occasioned that disuse into which it is now fallen; and introduced a more modern method of prosecution, by information filed in the Court of Queen's Bench by the attorney-general, in the nature of a writ of quo warranto;-wherein the process is speedier, and the judgment not quite so decisive. This is properly a criminal method of prosecution, as well to punish the usurper by a fine for the usurpation of the franchise, as to oust him or seize it for the Crown (a). But it hath long been applied to the mere purposes of trying the civil right, seizing the franchise, or ousting the wrongful possessor (b); the fine [being nominal only (c).] It is therefore considered in modern practice as merely a civil proceeding (d). This proceeding is now applied as [between party and party, without any intervention of the prerogative, by virtue of the statute 9 Anne, c. 20; which permits an information in the nature of quo warranto to be brought with leave of the court, at the relation of any person desiring to prosecute the same,-who is then styled the relator (e),—against any person usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding any franchise, or office, in any city, borough, or town corporate (f).] The same Act provides for the speedy determination of such information (g); (c) See the difference in the application of mandamus and quo warranto respectively illustrated in the cases of R. v. Oxford, 6 Ad. & El. 349; R. v. Winchester, 7 Ad. & El. 215; R. v. Phippen, ibid. 970. After an office is determined, an information in quo warranto to try the title thereto will not be granted. (Re Harris, 6 Ad. & El. 475.) An information in quo warranto does not lie for exercising the office of guardian to a poor law union. (Re Aston Union, ibid. 784.) But it lies in respect to the office of clerk to a board of guardians appointed by statute. (Queen v. St. Martin's in the Fields, 17 Q. B. 149.) It does not lie in respect of the office of clerk to the justices of a borough. (The Queen v. Fox, 8 Ell. & Bl. 939.) (d) 4 Bl. Com. 312. In virtue of its being considered as a civil proceeding, the court will grant a new trial, though the verdict should have been for defendant. (R. v. Francis, 2 T. R. 484.) The Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, does not, however, apply to an information in quo warranto. (Reg. v. Seale, 5 Ell. & Bl. 1.) (e) By Reg. Gen. M. T. 3 Vict. (see 11 Ad. & El. 2) no rule shall hereafter be granted for filing any information in the nature of a quo warranto, unless, at the time of moving, an affidavit be produced, by which some person or persons shall depose, that such motion is made at his or their instance, as relator or relators. And such person or persons shall be deemed to be the relator or relators, in case such rule shall be made absolute, and shall be named as such relator or relators in such information, in case the same shall be filed, unless the court shall otherwise order. (See R. v. Hedges, 11 Ad. & El. 163; R. v. Anderson, 2 Q. B. 740.) As to who may be relator, see R. v. Parry, 6 Ad. & El. 810; R. v. Greene, 2 Q. B. 460. And see 6 & 7 Vict. c. 89, s. 5, as to the notice to be given to the opposite party of the application. &c. (f) But an information in quo warranto cannot be brought against a body corporate at large, for acting as a corporation, unless at the instance of the attorney-general. R. v. White, 5 Ad. & El. 613. (g) By 6 & 7 Vict. c. 89, s. 5, the court may order the venue in infor and directs [that if the defendant be convicted, judgment of ouster, (as well as a fine,) may be given against him; and that the relator shall pay or receive costs according to the event of the suit.] By the 32 Geo. III. c. 58, intituled "An Act for the Amendment of the Law upon Information in the nature of Quo Warranto," it is also provided that the defendant may plead in bar to any information in quo warranto in respect of any office in a town corporate, (whether exhibited by leave of the court, or by the attorney-general on behalf of the Crown,) that he first took upon himself such office, six years or more before the exhibiting the information; and that such plea may be pleaded with any other pleas that the court may allow, and may be met by a replication that a forfeiture of such office. happened within the period of that limitation. And it is further provided, that the title of the defendant derived under any election shall not be affected on account of defect of the title in the person electing,-provided the elector shall have been in the exercise de facto of his office, six years previous to the information. And by later statutes, 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 78 and 6 & 7 Vict. c. 89, it is further enacted, that every application to the Queen's Bench, for the purpose of calling upon any person to show by what warrant he claims to exercise the office of mayor, alderman, or burgess, in any borough within the Municipal Corporation Act, shall be made before the end of twelve months after the election of the defendant, or the time when he shall become disqualified; -that no election of any mayor shall be liable to be questioned by reason of a defect in the title of such person to the office of alderman or councillor to which he may have been previously elected, unless application shall have been made to the Court of Queen's Bench, calling upon such person to show cause by what warrant mations in quo warranto to be laid in Middlesex or London, and the trial to take place therein. See VOL. IV. also as to changing venue in quo he claims to exercise such office of alderman or councillor, within twelve months after his election thereto;-and that every election to the office of mayor, alderman, councillor, or any other corporate office within the said boroughs, which shall not have been called in question within twelve months after such election, shall be deemed good and valid. V. The writ of Habeas Corpus. This is the most celebrated writ in the English law, and the great remedy which it has provided for the violation of the right of personal liberty (i). We had occasion, in the first volume (k), to make some remarks upon this writ, but a more particular detail of its history, and the practice connected with it, may here be acceptable. In the first place, we may remark that the vindication of liberty, though the principal, is not the only purpose to which it is applied; for, of the habeas corpus [there are various kinds made use of by the courts at Westminster, for removing prisoners from one court to another for the more easy administration of justice. Such is the habeas corpus ad respondendum, when a man hath a cause of action against one who is confined by the process of some inferior court, in order to remove the prisoner and charge him with (i) As to the remedy by action for false imprisonment, vide sup. vol. 111. p. 498. Blackstone notices, (vol. iii. p. 128,) besides the habeas corpus, three other writs for removing the injury of false imprisonment: 1st, The writ of mainprize, manucaptio, commanding the sheriff to take sureties for the appearance of the prisoner, usually called mainpernors, and to set him at large; 2nd, The writ de odio et atiâ, commanding the sheriff to inquire whether a prisoner charged with murder was committed on ge neral cause of suspicion, or merely propter odium et atiam, for hatred and ill will,―with the view, if the latter was found the case, of afterwards issuing another writ to admit him to bail; 3rdly, the writ de homine replegiando, commanding the sheriff to replevy a man out of custody in the same manner that chattels taken in distress may be replevied, upon security given that he shall answer any charge against him. All these remedies however have long fallen into complete disuse. (k) Vide sup. vol. 1. p. 149. [this new action in the court above (1). Such is that ad satisfaciendum, when a prisoner hath had judgment against him in an action, and the plaintiff is desirous to bring him up to some superior court to charge him with the process of execution (m). Such are also those ad prosequendum, testificandum, deliberandum, &c., which issue when it is necessary to remove a prisoner in order to prosecute or bear testimony in any court, or to be tried in the proper jurisdiction wherein the fact was committed (n). Such is, lastly, the common writ ad faciendum et recipiendum, which issues out of any of the courts of Westminster Hall, when a person is sued in some inferior jurisdiction, and is desirous to remove the action into the superior court; commanding the inferior judges to produce the body of the defendant, together with the day and cause of his caption and detainer -whence the writ is frequently denominated a habeas corpus cum causâ,-to do and receive whatsoever the king's court shall consider in that behalf (o). This is a writ grant (1) Jones's case, 2 Mod. 198. (m) 2 Lilly, Pract. Reg. 4; Gibb v. King, 1 C. B. 1. By 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 127, a habeas corpus ad satisfaciendum shall not in future be necessary to charge in execution a person already in the prison of the court. But he may be charged in execution by a judge's order, made on affidavit that judgment has been signed; and if not satisfied, service of such order on the gaoler shall have the effect of a detainer. See also 25 & 26 Vict. c. 104, s. 2, cited sup. vol. 111. p. 239, n. (1). (n) As to writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum, &c., see 43 Geo. 3, c. 140, and 44 Geo. 3, c. 102; Graham v. Glover, 5 Ell. & Bl. 591; Marsden v. Overbury, 18 C. B. 34; Ex parte Cobbett, 3 H. & N. 155; Binns v. Mosley, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 116. By 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, s. 9, it is provided, that one of her majesty's principal secretaries of state, or a judge of one of the superior common law courts, may at his discretion issue a warrant or order for bringing up a prisoner confined in any gaol (except under process in a civil suit), before any judicature to be examined as a witness; and he shall be dealt with in the same manner as a prisoner brought up by habeas corpus is to be dealt with. And by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 31, a similar power is given to the judge of a county court. (0) This writ is still one by which a cause is removable from most of the inferior courts, although, under the present law of arrest, the operation of the writ will usually be confined to the proceedings. [See Reg. Gen. H. T. 1853 (Pr.), rr. 115-117; and as to the nature of the writ, |