s. 41, and 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 20, s. 13, duties detained in the hands of tax collectors may be recovered as a debt upon record to the Crown, with all costs and charges (y). An extent for recovery of the Crown's debt issues from the Court of Exchequer (z), as being the court principally presiding over all matters relating to the royal revenue (a). And it directs the sheriff to take an inquisition (or inquest of office) on the oaths of lawful men, to ascertain the lands, goods and debts of the defendant; and to seize the same into the hands of the sovereign, &c. It is, however, in general, necessary that the extent should be preceded by a scire facias (b), in order to bring the defendant into court, and afford him an opportunity of showing that it ought not to issue (c); though in cases where there is danger of the debt being lost, a baron of the Exchequer may authorize an immediate extent, (i. e. an extent without a scire facias,) upon affidavit of the circumstances (d). The writ having issued, and the inquisition taken, and the seizure made under it by the sheriff being returned into court, the defendant, if he means to dispute the debt,-or any third person, who thinks proper to advance a claim to the property set forth in the inquisition,-must enter an appearance in the Court of Exchequer for that purpose; when he will be permitted to plead to the extent (f). As to the defendant, he is allowed by statute 33 Hen. VIII. c. 39, s. 79, to allege or show, in such pleading, any good and sufficient "matter in law, reason, or good conscience," in bar or discharge of the (y) R. v. Wrangham, 1 Tyrw. 383. (2) By 5 & 6 Vict. c. 86, s. 8, all extents, &c. may bear teste and be made returnable on any day certain in term or vacation; and claims to goods seized may be made in vacation, &c. (a) Vide sup. vol. 11. p. 548; vol. III. p. 402 et seq. (b) Chit. Prerog. 271. As to scire facias generally, vide sup. vol. 111. debt: but, as he is found by the inquisition itself to be the owner of the lands and chattels, it is unnecessary for him to claim in his pleading any property in them. If he succeeds in showing matter in bar or discharge of the Crown debt, his right to the property in question is of course incontestable (g). On the other hand, where a third party is let in to plead to the extent, he is not entitled to deny the debt due from the defendant to the Crown: but, by his plea, he must show a title in himself, to the lands or chattels; and either traverse, or confess and avoid, the title of the Crown,-or, what is the same thing, that of the debtor against whom the writ issued (h). Issue of law or fact being joined, it is decided either on demurrer, or by trial by jury, pursuant in general to the ordinary course of practice in suits between subject and subject (i); and is followed by judgment. Which, when given for the Crown, is that the subject takes nothing by his traverse or plea; if given either for the debtor, or the third party let in to plead, is an award of amoveas manus (k). Upon this judgment, error also lies, provided the consent of the attorneygeneral to that proceeding, be previously obtained (1). With respect to the effect of an extent, the lands of a Crown debtor are bound, in general, from the time when the debt became one of record (m); which, in the case of such bonds as are mentioned in 33 Hen. VIII. c. 39, s. 50, is from the time the bonds are executed. (g) Chit. Prerog. 367. (h) Ibid. 368. As to the practice However, (k) R. v. Evans, 6 Price, 480. (1) Chit. Prerog. 373. The property seized under an extent may, if the right of the Crown be established, be sold. Such sale, if of lands, is regulated by 25 Geo. 3, c. 35 (as to the effect of which, see King Geo. III. v. De la Motte, 2 H. & N. 589); if of chattels, it takes place under a writ of venditioni exponas. (m) 2 Roll. Ab. 156, B. pl. 1. even at common law, debts, (though not of record,) due from certain known public officers and accountants to the Crown, bound the debtor's lands from the time they accrued due; and the 13 Eliz. c. 4, extends the common law exception, by providing that arrearages due from tellers, receivers and such other officers as are mentioned. therein, shall bind their lands from the time when they entered into the offices (n). As for the goods of the debtor, they are bound from the teste (or date) of the extent (o); and the rule seems to be the same as to any debts owing to him (p). It is also provided by 33 Hen. VIII. c. 39, s. 74, that [the Crown's debt shall, in suing out execution, be preferred to that of every other creditor, who hath not obtained judgment before the Crown commenced its suit (g).] On the other hand, however, it is enacted by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, that no debt due to the Crown, on judgment, statute, recognizance, inquisition of debt, obligation, or specialty,-nor any acceptance of office thereafter accepted by tellers, receivers, &c.,-shall affect any lands, tenements or hereditaments as to purchasers or mortgagees, unless and until such memorandum or minute thereof, as in the Act provided, shall be left with the senior Master of the Court of Common Pleas; who shall forthwith enter the particulars in a book to be intituled "The index to the debtors and accountants to the Crown." And further, that whenever a quietus shall be obtained by a debtor or accountant to the Crown (r)—and an office copy thereof left with such Master, together with a cer (n) Wilde v. Forte, 4 Taunt. 334; Chit. Prerog. 294; 3 Bl. Com. 420. As to the estate of a public accountant sold under an extent, &c., see 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 121, s. 10. (0) Chit. Prerog. 285; 1 Saund. by Wms. 219 g. (p) Ibid. 304; R. v. Lambton, 5 Price, 428. As to the effect on partnership property, see R. v. Saunder son, Wightw. 50; Shears v. Lord Advocate, 6 Clarke & Fin. 180. (4) As to the priority of the Crown in cases of extent, see Edwards v. Reginam, 9 Exch. 628. (r) See also further provisions on this subject, contained in 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, and 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35 s. 22; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 115. tificate signed by the accountant-general, that the same may be registered,-that the Master shall forthwith enter the same in the said book accordingly. And also that it shall be lawful for the lords of the Treasury, (or any three of them,) by writing under their hands,-upon payment of such sums as they shall think fit to require into the receipt of her Majesty's exchequer, to be applied in liquidation of the debt or liability of any debtor or accountant to the Crown, or upon such other terms as they may think proper,-to certify that any lands, tenements or hereditaments of any such Crown debtor or accountant shall be held by the purchaser or mortgagee, or intended purchaser or mortgagee thereof, wholly exonerated from all further claim of the Crown; or, in cases of leases for fines, to certify that the lessee shall hold the premises exonerated in like manner, without prejudice to the right of the Crown to the reversion upon such lease, and the rents and covenants reserved by the same: and that thereupon the same lands, tenements and hereditaments shall respectively be held exonerated as aforesaid (s). Such is in general the state of the law relating to the principal kind of extent, called an extent in chief. Besides this, however, there is an extent in aid; which issues, not at the suit of the Crown, like an extent in chief, but at the suit or instance of the Crown debtor against a person indebted to the Crown debtor himself (t). And it is grounded on the Statute of Extent, 33 Hen. VIII. c. 39, and on the principle that the Crown is entitled to the debts due to its debtor. The writ sued out in this case, directs the sheriff (without mention of body, goods or lands) to seize the debts, specialties and sums of money due to the Crown debtor: the effect of which is to cause (s) See also 25 & 26 Vict. c. 53, ss. 20, 114, as to exonerating lands registered under that Act, from claims of the Crown. (t) As to the persons entitled to extents in aid, see R. v. Gibbs, 7 Price, 633; R. v. Tarleton, 9 Price, 647; R. v. Kynaston, 11 Price, 598. an inquisition and seizure to be made of such debts for the Crown's use (u); though by consent of the Crown the produce of the extent may be paid over to the Crown debtor, (or prosecutor,) himself. This practice of issuing extents in aid, was at one time carried to so great a length, (particularly by issuing them for larger sums than were in fact due to the Crown from the prosecutor,) as to enable Crown debtors in almost every case to convert to their own benefit a species of execution properly belonging to the Crown; and thereby to obtain an undue preference as regards other creditors; but the resort to extents in aid is now subjected, by 57 Geo. III. c. 117, to restraints which tend to the rectification of this abuse (x). There is also a special writ of extent, which is issued in the event of the death of a Crown debtor; and is called a diem clausit extremum, because it recites the death of the party (y). By this writ the sheriff is commanded to inquire by a jury, when and where the Crown debtor died; and what chattels, debts and land he had at the time of his decease; and to take and seize them into the Crown's hands. As to the course of proceeding and law relative to an extent in aid, and diem clausit extremum, in any particular not above specified,—it is in general similar to that which prevails upon an extent in ordinary cases. (u) As to what may be seized, see R. v. Lushington, 1 Price, 94; R. v. Hunter, 4 Price, 258; R. v. Lambton, 5 Price, 428. (a) And see a Rule of the Exchequer (22 June, 1822), that no fiat for an extent in aid shall be issued, without affidavit that there will otherwise be danger of the debt being lost to the Crown. We may remark here, that there is also an extent in chief in the second degree, which differs from the extent in aid in thisthat the first is a proceeding by the Crown proprio motu against the debtor VOL. IV. of him against whom an extent in chief has issued; the latter is where the extent is issued at the instance of a Crown debtor against his debtor, to aid his payment of the Crown debt. The stat. 57 Geo. 3, c. 117, does not apply to extents in chief in the second degree. (See R. v. Shackle, 11 Price, 772; Reg. v. Adams, 2 Exch. 299.) (y) See Ex parte Hippesley, 2 Price, 379; R. v. Hodge, 12 Price, 537; R. v. Hassell, M'Clel. 105; R. v. Lord Crewe, 5 Dowl. 158. G |