donment" of its friends, and questioned the authority of Washington himself. On August 23, 1793, Jefferson requested the new French government to recall its exuberant representative, which they were very glad to do. Genêt, however, knew that his head would come off if he ventured home, so he settled down in New York, married a daughter of George Clinton, and lived quietly, in strange contrast to his feverish diplomatic career, until 1835. NEUTRAL TRADE Fortunately for the United States, the embarrassing activity of Genêt was not the only by-product of the European war. The struggle opened up possibilities of commercial intercourse which enabled the Americans to reëstablish something like the prosperity of colonial times. It so happened that two thirds of French trade ran between France and her islands in the West Indies; in addition the French had been importing quantities of fish from the Newfoundland region. These food supplies were vitally necessary. When the war came the English navy proceeded to destroy the French merchant marine, and then the French government removed all its old barriers, and threw open its commerce to neutrals. To the Americans this meant virtually a revival of the old lines of commerce. France and the French islands would pay high prices for all the meat and grain they could get, and by so doing they helped recover for the farmers their former West Indian market for foodstuffs. From 1793 to 1801 American trade expanded steadily, and signs of prosperity were everywhere in evidence. During the period, American tonnage more than doubled, and American exports increased nearly five times over what they had been in 1791.1 1 Exports from the United States, 1791-1801 Under the circumstances Great Britain could hardly have been expected to let this trade continue without at least an effort to stop it. The Cabinet saw the work of the English navy regularly frustrated by this neutral commerce, and British merchants watched with alarm the steady growth of a rival merchant marine. In order to put a stop to all this American help to France, the English worked out a theory of maritime law distinctly favorable to themselves as the greatest naval power. They held that enemy-owned goods might be seized and confiscated even if carried in neutral vessels, and they were inclined to a very broad definition of contraband. Also Great Britain insisted upon the observance of what she called the Rule of 1756, namely that trade closed in time of peace could not legally be opened in time of war. In addition, officers of the royal navy stretched to an extreme their rights of visit and search, and made themselves obnoxious by the practice of impressing seamen, taking both Englishmen and bona fide Americans. The significance of all this became plain when in June 1793, the Privy Council issued an order authorizing the seizure of all vessels laden with grain or flour. By way of retaliation, the United States proclaimed a temporary embargo. In Congress more radical expedients were suggested, one going so far as to provide for the suspension of all commercial intercourse with Great Britain until she had indemnified American merchants for her arbitrary seizures, and until she agreed to surrender the Northwest posts. Washington knew that the passage of that arbitrary measure would mean war, and at the time circumstances made it imperative upon him to avoid war. In 1793 the federal government was still nothing more than an experiment, depending for its success upon a regular income. Practically all the national revenue then came from tariff duties, and of the imports which furnished these, nearly ninety per cent came from England. Furthermore, exasperating as the British maritime policy had been, it had not been bad enough to prevent a steady and substantial increase in American commerce. War would have sacrificed both federal revenue and neutral trade; with those gone, the federal government would have been doomed. THE JAY TREATY Knowing therefore that war would be equivalent to national suicide, Washington and Hamilton shaped their policies to conform to the dictates of common sense. Neutrality and isolation must continue. But the achievement of this primary aim might be rendered more certain if some of the existing causes of friction could be removed. For this purpose Washington determined to send a special commissioner to England. The man selected for this delicate piece of diplomacy was John Jay, the hero of the negotiations of 1782, at this time chief justice of the Supreme Court. Arriving in England in June 1794, Jay proceeded at once to his work. He was instructed to secure an adjustment of the controversy in the Northwest, in other words, the evacuation of the posts. At the same time he had orders to negotiate a commercial treaty, in which neutral rights might be clearly defined, and to get damages for the illegal seizure of American vessels. Fortunately for the success of the mission, the British government was not unwilling to come to an agreement. Wayne's victory over the Indians at Fallen Timbers had made the British grip on the American part of the Northwest precarious. Also, rumors were circulating in Europe to the effect that a new armed neutrality league might be formed, and it would be to England's advantage to keep the United States from joining it. Again, during the war, with European trade upset, England's exports to the United States could not be sacrificed, and her officials were ready to make concessions for the purpose of preserving her American commerce. For some reason, Jay was not nearly as wide awake as he had been twelve years before. On his previous mission, he had been quick to scent every possible advantage which the Americans had. In 1794 it seems that he did not grasp fully and clearly the strong English desire for a settlement. Even the primary significance of Wayne's victory was partly lost upon him. He got his treaty, to be sure, but his own contemporaries, and historians of later years generally, agree that he might have secured considerably more. Signed on November 19, 1794, the famous Jay Treaty provided that certain disputed points, including the New England boundary line, and indemnities for shipping seized, were to be settled by joint commissions. The Northwest posts were to be evacuated by June 1, 1796. As for the old pre-Revolutionary British debts, they were to be assumed by the federal government. With reference to commerce, the Americans were allowed free trade from Vermont with Quebec and Montreal, and the East Indian trade was opened to Americans without restrictions. For the all-important West Indian trade, Article twelve of the treaty opened it to American vessels, of not over seventy tons burden, on the express condition that the United States should agree to export no molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton, no matter where grown, to any foreign country. Concerning neutral rights on the high seas, the treaty said nothing at all. The Senate refused to accept Article twelve, but ratified the rest of it, and the British government accepted the amendment, so leaving the English West Indian trade where it had been: entirely closed to Americans. Although the document was not satisfactory, it was better than nothing, and Washington approved it on that ground. It was bitterly criticized in the Senate, and the House for a time refused to appropriate certain sums of money called for by the treaty. In the country at large the treaty and the administration responsible for it were violently attacked, and Jay himself, burned in effigy in the seaport towns, became the target for unmeasured abuse. As a matter of fact, the treaty was good enough and important enough to exert a profound influence upon Spain. That decrepit government, long the scourge of the United States, felt grave concern at the news of the Anglo-American agreement. What if it should be the preface to a formal alliance? Visions of the loss of Florida, Louisiana, and Mexico began to trouble the Spanish foreign office, and the officials decided to curry favor with the American republic. On October 27, 1795, Thomas Pinckney signed the Treaty of San Lorenzo. This opened the Mississippi to American navigation, and granted the right of deposit. Furthermore, in it Spain agreed to accept the thirty-first parallel as the boundary between Georgia and Florida. The treaty removed another set of difficult issues from the list. Altogether, the Washington administration had made a remarkable record. Indian problems in both the Northwest and Southwest were settled, and serious controversies with Great Britain and Spain were brought to a close. With these prolific sources of danger out of the way, the question of frontier loyalty was solved, for all time. The United States had proved strong enough to give the pioneers what they most needed, commercial privileges, and with those secured, there was nothing to be gained by flirting with Spain or England. Over and above all else, the new government had been organized, and made to function so successfully that it could demonstrate its advantages. The experimental stage was over. CHAPTER XXIV JOHN ADAMS The makers of the federal Constitution had prided themselves on being practical men, able to deal with realities. In most respects they had done so, but in one matter, the political party-they kept a long way from earth. The failure of the Convention to recognize the importance of parties is surprising, because the colonies had had their organizations, with all the attendant machinery. But no matter how calmly their existence might be ignored in the supreme law of the land, they could not be kept out of the federal government. By the end of Washington's first term they were clearly in evidence, and by the end of his second they were actively at work. POLITICAL PARTIES The fundamental differences between the Federalists and the Jeffersonian Democrats go back to the alignment for and against the ratification of the Constitution. That contest had been one largely of town versus country, merchant versus farmer, with the leading Virginians on the side of the town. The same divergence of interests which separated the two groups in 1787 and 1788 kept them separated after 1789. The agricultural interests almost to a man opposed Hamilton's financial policies, and on that issue Madison and Jefferson joined their natural associates, the farmers. In order to make out a strong case against Hamilton and his measures, his opponents emphasized the principle of strict construction of the Constitution, which denied to the federal government all powers except those specifically named in the document itself. Then, when the French Revolution came, the Federalists, with their business interests, tended to support England; the Jeffersonians, France. The Federalists, representatives of the governing class, had been well organized even before the new government was established. The successful campaign for ratification proves that. The agricultural element had the numerical strength, but it was lacking in cohesiveness. Jefferson set himself to correct this lack. During the eight |