CHAPTER XXVI

EMBARGO AND NON-INTERCOURSE

With the renewal of the European war in April 1803, Jefferson soon found himself confronted by much the same set of maritime problems which had troubled his predecessors. Neutral rights ceased to exist, as they always do in every life and death struggle between nations. Neither from 1803 to 1812, when the nation was weak, nor from 1914 to 1917, when it was strong, were the merchants of the United States free to trade where and how they would. In each case their commercial course was shaped for them—not interrupted, it should be observed-by powers over which they had no control. Their government could protest in their behalf, but, with national existence at stake the protests of a neutral were worth precisely nothing.

From 1803 to 1807 American merchants were undeniably prosperous, and they were not confined to any single field. They were exchanging American raw products for English manufactures, and they found a profitable carrying trade between the West Indies and France. The value of their exports nearly doubled until the trade was wrecked, possibly in part by a combination of European decrees, more probably by the Jeffersonian Embargo.1

ENGLISH ORDERS AND FRENCH DECREES

By 1807, The European war had settled down to a unique endurance test, with neither one of the two chief belligerents, France and 1 Exports from the United States

ENGLISH ORDERS AND FRENCH DECREES 279

England, able to strike a decisive blow at the other. In October 1805, Nelson's fleet had annihilated the French navy in the battle of Trafalgar, thus making an attack upon England an impossibility. On the other side, Napoleon had defeated all of his continental enemies: Austria at the battle of Austerlitz in 1805, Prussia at Jena in 1806, and Russia at Friedland in 1807. England was as powerless to crush Napoleon on land as he was to fight England at sea. Such being the case, both parties resorted to economic warfare.

England began this new phase of the war with a measure designed to interrupt the movement of West Indian goods to France. In judicial decisions rendered in 1799 and 1800, in the Emanuel and Polly cases, respectively, the English courts had held West Indian products on American vessels exempt from seizure, provided they were American owned, and had actually passed through a United States customs house. In 1805 a new decision in the Essex case reversed the above ruling, much to the dismay of American merchants and their French customers. Next, beginning with May, 1806, the British government issued a series of Orders in Council, all aiming at cutting off supplies from France. One declared the coast. from Havre to Ostend under blockade, and prohibited to neutrals any coasting trade between Havre and the Elbe River. Another, published in January, 1807, declared the whole French coasting trade closed to neutrals. A third, of November 1807, put the whole European coastline under blockade, from Trieste to Copenhagen. Under this last order, no neutral ship could enter any port from which British vessels were excluded, unless it had first cleared from a British port, and had paid duties there. But any ship which met those requirements was liable to seizure in any French port!

Not to be outdone at this contest in paper blockades, Napoleon, always ambitious, planned for nothing less than the complete exclusion of English commerce from Europe. His great rival, he reasoned, was dependent for her very life upon the European market. Close it, he concluded, and the merchants would be ruined. Then, in their desperation, they would compel the government to make peace. What could be more simple? To this end he began to bring the ports of Europe under his control. By 1807, with his Russian treaty, he had everything in his hands, except Spain and Portugal. Such, in brief, was his "continental system."

By way of retaliation for the Orders in Council, Napoleon issued a

series of decrees, aimed of course at neutral as well as British trade. In November, 1806, from Berlin, he declared the British Isles under blockade, and announced that no vessel clearing from any English port would be admitted to any French port. In December, 1807, by the Milan decree, he proclaimed that any ship submitting to search by English officers, paying any duty to the British government, or even bound for or coming from a British port, would be seized on its appearance in French waters.

It is a difficult matter to tell just how these measures affected American trade. Because France was far from economically selfsufficing, Napoleon was obliged to make numerous exceptions in favor of neutral merchants; under his licenses, therefore, much trade went on. Furthermore, he was utterly unable to interrupt the commerce between the United States and England. Consequently the only trade cut off was that portion between the United States and France, which happened to be within reach of the British navy. The figures given above (see page 278) show certainly that up to the end of September, 1807, American commerce was still steadily expanding.

There is no doubt, however, that during this period the British navy made itself especially obnoxious. Finding it more convenient to cut off French trade at the source than at the destination, British forces maintained a virtual blockade of American ports. In doing this they stopped and searched neutral merchantmen, which they had a perfect right to do, under certain conditions. They also made a practice of impressing seamen, a procedure of doubtful validity at best, and certainly illegal at worst, and occasionally they killed an American sailor.

This question of impressment was a troublesome one. The navy was of course England's only hope in the contest with Napoleon, and yet its efficiency was steadily undermined by wholesale desertions. Life on board a British man-of-war was nearly unbearable, with wretched quarters and even more miserable food. Many of the crews had been filled by the press gangs, so it is not surprising that the seamen escaped when opportunity came. Being wise, they chose American ports as the best place to make their change; because in those they were always sure of employment in the American merchant marine. According to one estimate, American vessels were getting every year an average of twenty-five hundred deserters from the royal navy. Search parties took back about a thousand a year, along

with some bona fide American citizens. These practices were maddening, to be sure, but American trade continued, and the merchants clearly preferred to tolerate them, rather than to take chances with retaliation or war.

THE CHESAPEAKE AND THE LEOPARD

Sometimes British officers definitely passed over the line dividing the merely presumptuous and overbearing from the distinctly hostile, as for example in 1806 when the Leander was responsible for the death of an American seaman. But the most flagrant case occurred in 1807, in the Chesapeake-Leopard affair. In June of that year the American frigate Chesapeake started off for a cruise in the Mediterranean. According to rumor she had on board a deserter from the British navy, one Ratford. As the American vessel put out to sea, she was followed by the British frigate, Leopard. Once safely outside American waters, the Leopard hailed the Chesapeake, and announced that she had despatches for the American commander, Commodore Barron. When the Chesapeake hove to, the British commander demanded the right to search her for deserters. This would have been permissible in case of a merchant vessel, but in the case of a man-of-war, it was nothing but an arrogant insult. Naturally Barron refused to comply, whereupon the British ship immediately opened fire.

The Chesapeake was not in shape for action. Her guns had not been fitted to their carriages, her gun deck was piled up with supplies for the voyage, and her ammunition was inaccessible on short notice. Completely at the mercy of the Leopard, Barron surrendered, after his crew had succeeded in firing a single shot. The British then searched the vessel, found Ratford, and carried him off. For good measure, they also took three seamen, all genuine American citizens. News of this utterly indefensible proceeding naturally aroused a demand for war. Had Jefferson cared to resort to arms, he would have had the support of practically a united country. Even New England, which looked upon everything which Jefferson did as good reason for taking the opposite side, would have favored force to avenge the Chesapeake.

But Jefferson would have no war. Both Washington and Adams had insisted upon a policy of neutrality for the United States, and on the whole the country and posterity approved their course, in

spite of French insults to Pinckney and the whole X. Y. Z. affair. There were just as urgent reasons for maintaining peace after 1803 as before 1801. Federal revenue was still largely derived from English imports. No sane official desired to face a war, the first and most noticeable result of which would be to cut off the income essential to its successful prosecution. If the two Federalist presidents were ‘justified in making every effort to preserve peace, Jefferson should not be too severely criticized for doing the same thing.

Whatever view may be taken of it, the Sage of Monticello had not the remotest intention of leading his country against Great Britain. In 1806 he tried John Adams's expedient of a special mission, sending William Pinckney and James Monroe to England. All they could get was the draft of a treaty so thoroughly unsatisfactory that Jefferson never even submitted it to the Senate. But the President was a man of almost infinite resource. Realizing that war would be no remedy for the difficulties of the time, and unable to get any results through diplomacy, he took his cue from the two belligerents in Europe, and began to ponder over a scheme of economic warfare. Knowing how eagerly both France and England were working to secure American foodstuffs and raw materials, he reasoned, with admirable logic, that these supplies furnished him with a possible weapon. Suppose American exports were entirely cut off; would not the haughty Europeans immediately sue for terms? First fascinated and then captivated by this product of his own brain, Jefferson proceeded to put it into execution.

THE EMBARGO

In his annual message to Congress in December, 1807, the President outlined his plans for "Peaceable Coercion." The legislature responded promptly, and the Embargo became law. This measure prohibited the sailing of any vessel from any port of the United States to any foreign port. Ships engaged in the coasting trade were required to furnish bonds, double the value of the cargo, that they would land their commodities only in American ports. In this way Europe would be deprived of supplies, and France and England would be starved into a course of decency toward the United States.

On more than one occasion Jefferson was forced to learn that the fabric of his dreams was not sound enough to stand the rough wear of real life, and never was the lesson brought home with more bitterness than in the case of the Embargo. "Peaceable Coercion" was not