ment, as defined by Canning, was that Spain could not possibly recover control of her colonies; that recognition of the new republics could be left to a more opportune time; that no obstacle should be placed in the way of amicable negotiations between Spain and the republics; that Great Britain did not aim at the possession of any of the territory there, but that she could not see any of it transferred to any other power. The note closed with the suggestion that the powers might join in publicly proclaiming these items as their policy. While the Monroe administration was trying to decide what to do with reference to the European complications growing out of the Latin-American issue, the President and his Secretary of State were confronted by a somewhat similar difficulty in the Northwest. In 1821 the Czar of Russia issued an order warning all foreign vessels not to come within one hundred miles of any part of the Pacific coast of America, north of the fifty-first parallel. The Oregon territory, then under the joint control of Great Britain and the United States, extended up to the parallel of 54° 40′, therefore the Russian policy was equivalent to a high-handed seizure of territory which did not belong to it. John Quincy Adams had no intention of permitting the aggression. By way of reply to the Russian minister, Adams announced that the United States would contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment in North America, and that "we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments." Later, he announced that, outside the European colonies already established, "the remainder of both the American continents must henceforth be left to the management of American hands."

During the whole of November, 1823, Monroe's Cabinet was occupied with a discussion of foreign policy. Richard Rush, the American minister to England, had kept Monroe informed of Canning's suggestions, and Monroe had written to his two predecessors, Jefferson and Madison, for advice. Monroe himself favored joint action with England, and Jefferson and Madison both agreed with him. John Quincy Adams, however, stubbornly opposed the President on this issue. "It would be more candid, as well as more dignified," he declared, "to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cock boat in the wake of the British man of war." His purpose would be to disclaim any intention of propagating American ideas by force, or of interfering in Europe, and at the same time

to make it known that the United States expected the European powers to refrain from any attempt to spread their principles in America, or to conquer any part of American territory.

Adams knew that Great Britain would oppose European intervention in Latin America, and that British policy would be the same no matter what the United States did. Therefore, if it came to a question of force against Europe, the United States would have the help of British power, without the possible disadvantage of formal alliance. The Secretary of State consequently converted the President to his point of view, and so really formulated the foreign policy of the administration.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The Monroe Doctrine consists of two sections of Monroe's annual message to Congress of December 2, 1823. The first part, aimed at Russian aggression in the Northwest, declared "that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." The second part made plain the purpose of the United States to refrain from concerning itself with European complications, and announced that the United States would consider any attempt of the European powers to extend their system to any part of America "as dangerous to our peace and safety." Any interference in Latin America would therefore be construed as an act of unfriendliness toward the United States. This doctrine was not new. Again and again various prominent American leaders had expressed sentiments similar in part to those embodied in Monroe's message. The Monroe Doctrine therefore simply became a name for an old policy. The doctrine was not a part of international law, nor even a rule binding on the United States. No obligation was created by it, either to Europe or to Latin America. It was neither a pledge to anybody, nor an agreement with anybody. It was merely a statement regarding the attitude of the administration toward certain issues. It did not have even the force of law in this country. Any administration would be just as free to repudiate it as Monroe was to proclaim it.

The durability and popularity of the doctrine have been due, not to any sanctions inherent in it, but to the fact that it fitted in remarkably well with American theories and desires. Based upon existing

facts, harmonizing with long standing theories, it has lasted because the country likes it. After its publication, it was never invoked by name until the dispute with Venezuela in Cleveland's second administration, although the principle of it was set forth in the controversy with Napoleon III over Mexico. These various experiments with it will be discussed in due time.

Canning described the doctrine as "very extraordinary," and compared it with the order of the Russian Czar already referred to, neither of which, he declared, would England recognize. But as the danger of European interference in Latin America disappeared, the doctrine was generally forgotten, to be revived only when similar dangers again arose.

CHAPTER XXXI

POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY, 1820-1829

The Missouri Compromise and the Monroe Doctrine were virtually the only matters of outstanding importance in the Monroe administration. Practically everything else was bound up with party politics, and with the fortunes, good and bad, of those who looked forward hopefully to succeeding the President in 1825. By 1820, the Federalist party had disappeared; so completely was this the case that Monroe's electoral vote in 1820 for his second term, was two hundred thirty-one, out of a total of two hundred thirty-two. With only one party therefore the customary type of political activity disappeared; and the few years immediately after 1820 have sometimes been described as the "era of good feeling." This description may be correct, so far as the absence of an opposition party went, but it hardly applied to the Democratic organization, which was full of bitter factional disputes, carried on even within the President's own Cabinet. The leading members of this group were John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, who has already been described; John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, Secretary of War, up to 1820 a leading nationalist; and William H. Crawford of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury. Crawford was greatly admired by Albert Gallatin, who found in him an expert in public finance very much to his liking. All three of these men were open and avowed candidates for the presidency in the coming election of 1824, and their official relations were not as pleasant as their chief would have desired.

Monroe himself was a solid, substantial individual, not at all brilliant, and, after he became President, not especially offensive to anybody. As Secretary of State under Madison, he had been generally accepted as the heir apparent. Although there was a good deal of opposition to his nomination, he finally got the honor, and with it the election. With the prevailing state of political affairs, he was sure of two terms, and the politicians had to reconcile themselves to a long wait. But in waiting they proposed to lose no time, and so the

campaign of 1824 really began immediately after Monroe's nomination in 1816.

THE NEW DEMOCRACY

During the interval there were various manifestations of a new spirit of democracy in the United States. Between 1816 and 1830 ten new state constitutions were adopted, nearly all of which dropped the property qualification for voting, thereby bringing in the western ideal of universal manhood suffrage. At the same time the majority of states abandoned the old plan of having presidential electors chosen by the state legislatures, and turned the responsibility of selecting them over to the voters. Then too, while these alterations were being made, the presidential nominating machinery was subjected to severe criticism. The selection of candidates for the highest office in the land had been left to the party caucus. This method was now opposed, on the ground that it violated the spirit of the Constitution. It was impossible to keep the executive separate from the legislature, the critics argued, if the majority in Congress made the president. Further objections came from those who said the scheme of caucus nomination was essentially undemocratic, in the sense that it deprived the people of any voice in a most important matter. In 1816 the caucus almost made a mistake. With Monroe all slated for the nomination, Crawford nearly got it for himself, losing by the narrow margin of sixty-five to fifty-four. The feeling aroused over the nominating caucus was destined to have an important bearing in 1824.

THE ELECTION OF 1824

The campaign of 1824 has been characterized by Woodrow Wilson as "the scrub race for the presidency," probably not because of the caliber of the candidates, but because of their number and their tooobvious scrambling for the place. In addition to the three members of Monroe's Cabinet, there were two other aspirants, both strong men, both decidedly "available," and both from the West: Henry Clay of Kentucky, the Speaker of the House, and Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, the hero of New Orleans and the enterprise in Florida. All these but the last had had extensive experience in public affairs. Jackson knew nothing of statesmanship, but he was a genuine soldier and a born leader of men. Not many campaigns in American history can display so promising a group of candidates.

The contest was not entirely one of personalties, although at times