South Carolinians had naturally found encouragement in Georgia's complete immunity from punishment, and they could find no reasonable explanation of the discrepancy. No one can, for that matter. Jackson was guided by his feelings in both cases, and because of that fact he could completely overlook in the Georgia case the principle which he enforced against South Carolina. But Calhoun came from South Carolina, and Calhoun and Jackson were no longer on speaking terms.

CHAPTER XXXIII

JACKSON'S TRIUMPH

Out of the tangle of issues, controversies, personal animosities, and political intrigues which occupied a great part of Jackson's administration there were gradually fashioned two leading political parties, to take the place of the chaotic factional and sectional groups of 1824 and 1828. The voters who elected Jackson had ample numerical strength, but they lacked nearly all the essential attributes of a party. They had neither platform nor national "machine," and aside from Jackson himself, they had no leaders who had any hold on the diverse elements in his following. Consequently once his commanding personality was out of the way, the country might look for more confusion, until someone else should strike the fancy of the voting public. The members of the Kitchen Cabinet, Jackson's group of political experts, determined to prevent such an outcome. To this end they assigned themselves the task of consolidating the Jackson following into a single organization, and their success in the election of 1832 is a tribute to the ability which they applied to their work.

JACKSONIAN POLITICS

In the work of party reorganization, the introduction of the spoils system might be considered the first step. By means of the offices, Jackson's managers were able to give the local leaders a definite stakes in the success of the President. In this way a small, but strategically important group acquired a vested interest in party fortunes, a situation which they were only too glad to perpetuate. In addition to this master stroke, as the first term progressed, the leaders found new opportunities to strengthen and solidify the Jackson enthusiasts. The victory of the "Old Hero" in 1828 had been made possible by means of an alliance between Jackson and Calhoun, both strong men, both leaders in their respective sections. Because of Jackson's lack of experience in politics, Calhoun confidently expected to have the deciding voice for four years, and then to become the president in 1832. But neither Jackson nor his friends had any intention of giving

Calhoun his own way. Instead of running the government, Calhoun found himself pushed more and more completely into the background, and eventually forced out of the party. The break between the two men occurred in the spring of 1830. For some reason Jackson had been suspicious of the good faith of Calhoun, and these suspicions were confirmed by a letter written by Crawford, in which Crawford asseverated that Calhoun, as Secretary of War, had advocated punishment for Jackson on account of his high-handed proceedings in Florida. The President had considered Calhoun as his friend at the time, and would have continued to do so, had it not been for the machinations of Lewis and other "Kitchen Cabinet" manipulators. They wanted to bring about a break between the two men, in order to ruin Calhoun's prospects for the presidency. When the Crawford letter appeared, Jackson asked for an explanation, which Calhoun could not very well give, except to justify his stand in 1818, and to criticise Crawford for publishing a Cabinet secret. To Jackson any criticism of his acts or any opposition was always equivalent to a personal insult. After reading Calhoun's attempt at self-justification, he broke off relations, informing the Vice-President, in words that bite even at the present time that "no further communication with you on this subject is necessary."

Shortly after Jackson excommunicated Calhoun, the Cabinet began to break up, due partly to the President's determination to get rid of Calhoun's friends, and partly to a dispute over the social status of Mrs. John B. Eaton (formerly Peggy O'Neal), wife of the Secretary of War. She was a handsome young woman of vivacity and charm, with enough unconventionality to make her all the more alluring to some of her admirers. She was the daughter of a Washington boardinghouse keeper, and, according to rumor, her conduct before her marriage had been shaped somewhat by the environment of a tavern. Her sudden elevation to the exalted rank of a Cabinet member's wife provided Washington with the thrill of a delightful scandal, dear to the heart of every "society." In such matters, men, left to themselves, are considerably more catholic in their tastes and charitable in their judgments than women. They could forgive a good deal in any one so fascinating as the sprightly Peggy. It may be that this masculine tolerance confirmed the wives of the other Cabinet members in their determination to ostracise Mrs. Eaton. In any case they did so, and in doing so they were led by Mrs. John C. Cal

houn. Jackson was firmly convinced that the wife of his Secretary of War was the victim of a grave injustice, and he ordered his advisers to pay due respect to the injured beauty. Because of the danger of domestic insurrections most of them had to refuse. Van Buren, however, was a widower, untrammeled in his social maneuvers, and consequently free to treat Mrs. Eaton with the most gallant courtesy. He therefore won the instant and lasting regard of Jackson, while his less fortunate colleagues were soon set adrift. In the spring of 1831 the Cabinet broke up. Even Van Buren resigned, but with Jackson's full approval, in order to become candidate for the vicepresidency. In getting rid of his first Cabinet, Jackson was able to secure men more directly in sympathy with him and his measures, and in that way to promote party unity.

JACKSON AND THE BANK

The attainment of something like party solidarity during the first term was hastened by Jackson's attitude toward the Second Bank of the United States. It provided what had heretofore been wanting, a definite, tangible, concrete issue upon which politicians could seize, and out of which they could get a slogan to arouse the voters. Chartered in 1816, the Bank had not been entirely happy during its first few years. Bad management brought embarrassments, and popular opposition seemed almost to threaten its very life. Had it not been for the Supreme Court, in its McCulloch vs. Maryland decision, the Bank would have been taxed to death in the Southern and Western states. Under Cheves, and later under Biddle the Bank became a

success.

In his first annual message Jackson referred to the approaching end of the Bank's charter, and remarked that both "the constitutionality and the expediency" of the law creating the institution had been seriously questioned. Both the President and his follow as in the West were opposed to the Bank, partly on the ground that it had been a financial success. More particularly, their opposition was due to the conservatism of the officers, which the debtor section, always looking for "easier" money, resented. Furthermore the Bank was a great monopoly, with more power than was good for it or for the people. According to rumor, zealously circulated by Kendall, Hill, and Blair, the Kitchen Cabinet group, the Bank had used its influence against Jackson in the campaign of 1828.

Just why, or even just when Jackson decided to make the Bank an issue is not clear. In any case, he was pondering over the matter in 1829, and raised the question again in 1831. Because of the effect of the President's questioning upon business, Biddle, the Bank's president, determined to settle the controversy by applying for a new charter. He did so in January, 1832. A bill for a recharter was introduced in the House in March, and finally passed in July, by narrow majorities. On July 10, Jackson vetoed the bill.

From the standpoint of banking and economics the veto message was ludicrous, in its ignorance of all the fundamental principles of finance, public or otherwise. But Jackson did not pretend to be a financial expert. He was a popular politician, and there was good political capital to be derived from an attack upon the great monopoly. As a move in campaign strategy, the message was a remarkable document. In addition to attacking the monopoly features, Jackson calmly put to one side the decision of the Supreme Court concerning the constitutionality of the Bank. No statement of that body, he declared, was necessarily binding upon either the executive or the legislature. These were all coördinate departments of the government, each one free to form its own opinion concerning the Constitution. The Court had no more authority over the opinion of Congress than Congress had over that of the Court. The President was independent of both the other branches.

In the veto message, Jackson gave formal expression to the doctrine of executive infallibility in judging the work of Congress and of the Court; at the same time, he made the Bank the leading issue in the presidential campaign of 1832. This brought him support in the West and South, where the Bank had been especially unpopular. His Indian policy, especially his failure to act when the State of Georgia repudiated the Supreme Court, made him even more popular in tsouth. The break with Calhoun strengthened him, because it freed him from any show of dependence upon a popular leader and possible rival. Whatever he lost in dropping Calhoun was more than made good by his Indian policy.

Jackson's nomination for a second term was inevitable. He was sure of that, anyway, but it came to him in somewhat different manner from the earlier one. His victory in 1828 had been distinctly a personal triumph, secured with the help of able individuals, but without the agency of a regular party. By 1832 Jackson had a