the attack. Those who hold that belief overlook not only the seizure of property, but the infinitely more important attack on Fort Sumter. For a government which wanted only to be let alone the course of Davis and Beauregard with respect to it was, to say the least, very peculiar.

CHAPTER XLIV

MILITARY ACTIVITIES, 1861-1865

Before the Confederate attack upon Fort Sumter the North had been characterized by indifference or indecision, or both. There was no visible evidence of unanimity, nothing to indicate that in case of crisis the new President could depend upon adequate support. Even so influential a molder of public opinion as Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune urged that "the erring sisters" be allowed to depart in peace. The news of Sumter startled the North, and shocked it into action. Filled with that exaltation which comes with the knowledge that a crisis has arrived, men hurried to enlist, to save the Union. A war merely to exterminate slavery would have failed dismally at the start. A war to uphold the Union was immediately, and through the Northern states, almost universally popular.

THE RESOURCES COMPARED

As the two governments, Federal and Confederate, took stock of their respective resources, it must have seemed to the former that the war was won before it began, so great was its superiority in all material assets. Had the South not been driven on by the most sublime faith in the justice of its cause, it could not even have entered the struggle. The Union consisted of twenty-three states, with a population of twenty-two million seven hundred thousand, while the Confederacy had eleven states, with a white population of about five million ninety-six thousand. This discrepancy in numbers was in part made up by the obvious geographical advantages which the South enjoyed. Fighting on the defensive, the South had shorter lines of communication, with far less difficulty in transporting troops. Its territory was well served by rivers, which facilitated Confederate movements, and made obstacles for their opponents. If it had not been for the railways built during the preceding decade, the South might have won.

In other respects the odds were heavily against the Confederacy. The chief source of revenue of its citizens was cotton, worthless if cut

off from a market. The value of this asset was practically destroyed by the Union blockade. Thrown back upon its own resources, the South was badly off. Manufacturing had never developed there and the section could not be self-sustaining. In the North there was a wide variety of manufacturing, most of which could be turned to account either directly or indirectly in the prosecution of the war. New England and the Middle States had textile mills and machine shops in numbers almost sufficient to take care even of the abnormal needs of war. Moreover the highly diversified and very profitable economic life of the North had made available the necessary capital for a long war. There had never been enough accumulated capital in the South to finance its own peace-time needs.

The South had confidence in its military resources. The seceding states had fair supplies of arms and munitions at the start. A larger portion of the population had been accustomed to outdoor life, to horsemanship, and to the use of arms, than was the case in the North. It was a common prediction that one Southerner could "lick" at least four Yankees. Besides, some of the best army officers, and West Point graduates then out of the service, went with their states into the Confederacy.

Both sides had to learn the art of war from practice in the field, and there the immediate advantages of the South were at first obvious. It was not until after 1863 that Northern resources began to tell. In 1860 the regular army consisted of about sixteen thousand officers and men. None of the officers had ever seen service with large forces, not even during the Mexican War. When Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand volunteers there was no one fitted by experience to handle an army of that size. The War Department had no plans or machinery for moving, clothing, or feeding such a force. Worse yet, the War Department was in the hands of a professional politician, incompetent in everything except his chosen field.

After the call for volunteers, the President devoted himself to the task of keeping the border states in the Union. Because Maryland was divided, with part of the population notoriously hostile to the Union, troops were massed in Washington. Others were placed at Cincinnati, with evident reference to their possible use in Kentucky, and others in St. Louis, Missouri. In this last state there was a local civil war, between sympathizers of the two "nations" under

the direction of rival state governments. The work of Francis P. Blair and Captain Nathaniel Lyon finally kept the state in the Union.

BULL RUN

The volunteers and regulars collected in Washington remained there without any spectacular movement until midsummer. By that time the country was becoming impatient, and popular opinion was clamoring for an attack upon the Confederates. Their forces were just across the Potomac, almost within sight of Washington itself. Besides this army, under Beauregard, there was another Confederate force in the Shenandoah Valley, under General Joseph E. Johnston. Both of these threatened the Federal capital. In July, the administration planned to have General McDowell attack Beauregard. To make sure of success, General Patterson was sent to defeat Johnston, or at least to hold him in the Shenandoah Valley, so that he might send no reinforcements to Beauregard. Patterson, however, was no match for Johnston, and before the Federal commander knew what had happened, Johnston's whole force had gone to Beauregard's assistance.

The Battle of Bull Run started on July 21, and for a time, in spite of the inexperience of the troops, the Union commander had his plans working well. By three o'clock in the afternoon it appeared that he had won a brilliant victory. But the arrival of a fresh detachment of Johnston's army enabled the Confederates to turn the tide, and the Federal forces broke and ran. The volunteers, plunged into hopeless confusion, were unable even to obey orders; further fighting was out of the question. What had been an army became a panicstricken mob, and what should have been a retreat became a disorderly flight. Most of the men were stopped when they reached their fortifications south of the Potomac, but some crossed the river and hurried into Washington.

The defeat was perhaps not a bad thing for the North. It put an end to any notions that the Confederates could be easily conquered, or that the war would be short. The South was in earnest, and it had given a thoroughly unpleasant demonstration of Confederate generalship in action. As a result of Bull Run the North settled down to prepare for a long struggle.

The day after the Battle of Bull Run, Lincoln called upon General George B. McClellan to take command of the forces around Wash

ington. McClellan had been at work in the western part of Virginia, where Union sentiment was strong, and where the people had carried the idea of secession one step further. They withdrew from Virginia, and formed a new state, loyal to the Union. McClellan had had little to do there, but thanks largely to good fortune, he acquired the reputation of a successful man. His record before the war had been noticeable, and the country turned to him to end the struggle. McClellan was of too slow and cautious a nature to be a great soldier. To him victory meant simply the application of superior force; he could never have accomplished anything where cleverness and audacity in maneuvering his men counted. Never willing to take any chances, he spent months in drilling the collection of volunteers into a regular army, and by November 1861, it seemed that this part of his work was finished. His plan was to develop a perfect fighting machine, of at least two hundred fifty thousand men. With that army, an overwhelming force, he counted on a march to the Confederate capital. But much to the disgust of the President and the country, he spent all the fall and winter in getting ready.

THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN

Between Washington on the Potomac and Richmond on the James lie two rivers, the Rappahannock and the York, which run through marsh land, swamps, and forests. Although the shortest distance between the two capitals is hardly over a hundred miles, no army could travel in a straight line. McClellan's first plan was to move his force overland, keeping it between Washington and the Confederate army. Then he suddenly changed his mind, and decided to send his men around by boat to the peninsula between the York and the James. That route seemed to offer fewer natural obstructions. Lincoln sanctioned the change, with the express condition that Washington be fully protected meanwhile.

McClellan had an army three times as large as that of Johnston, then in command in Virginia, better equipped, and in every way better prepared for battle. According to the conclusions of military experts, if McClellan had advanced at any time in January and February, he could have easily won a decisive victory. Had Grant been in command at the time, it is reasonably certain that he would have beaten Johnston without difficulty.

Being a general rather than a mere army organizer, Johnston