much of the political activity. They got the farmers out, and with Grange business concluded, it was easy to adjourn and then immediately start a lively political discussion. In the contest between the farmers and the railroads the real issue turned on the right of the state to regulate the charges of common carriers. The roads argued that they were in the position of any corporation chartered to transact business, and that the state had no more authority to control their rates than it had to fix the selling price of any commodity. The farmers argued that the roads were different from an ordinary corporation; that they were public service corporations, and as such they were subject to public supervision and control. The theories of the farmers found expression in a number of laws, imposing various restrictions on the roads. In 1871 Illinois established maximum passenger fares, and enacted a law providing that freight rates were to depend entirely on distance. To see that these laws were properly enforced the state created a railroad commission. The roads at first refused to obey, but the state courts finally compelled something like compliance. Minnesota passed laws providing for fixed schedules for both passengers and freight, and also for a commission, similar to that in Illinois. When these measures were upheld by the state courts, the roads appealed to the federal courts, and in the meantime attempted to evade the laws. Iowa and Wisconsin followed the example of the other two states, both in regulating charges, and in creating commissions. The railroads consistently fought the laws, and in addition to carrying their cases to the federal courts they tried out various experiments designed to make the farmers change their minds about the wisdom of the Grange laws. Grain shipments of prominent Grangers might be allowed to stand on the tracks, in damp cars, until the whole shipment became worthless, or cars would be withheld when the Grangers wanted to ship their grain. Harvesting machinery consigned to Grangers would be held back for weeks or months, and then delivered after the season was over. Then some roads reduced their passenger service almost to the vanishing point, in their endeavor to compel the farmers to change their policies. In 1876 the Federal Supreme Court handed down decisions in eight so-called Granger cases. Declaring that the real issue was whether or not the roads were properly subject to public regulation, the Court held that they were. So far as the roads were engaged in interstate commerce the Court held that Congress possessed authority to regulate them, but in the absence of Congressional action, the states were free to take charge. Those decisions furnished a substantial basis for public regulation, a work later taken up by Congress. DECLINE OF THE GRANGE But before 1876 the Granger movement had passed its climax. In 1874 there were about twenty thousand Granges or local chapters in all parts of the country; by 1880 only four thousand were left. There were a number of reasons for this decline. Some of the farmers had expected too much from it. Hearing it described as a device to improve their social and economic status, they jumped to the conclusion that it was a panacea for all their ills. Because it did not measure up to their exalted expectations, they not only dropped out, but became avowed opponents of the order. Then too in many cases the local Granges owed their establishment not so much to local demand and interest as to the contagious enthusiasm of the national officers. When they failed to keep in touch with the locals, these disappeared. Perhaps the chief reason for the decline was the failure of the Grange to carry through successfully its plans for coöperative buying and selling. In joining the order many farmers had hoped to free themselves from the domination of the commission merchants and middlemen. The farmers felt that they were always at a disadvantage in dealing with the commission houses, and they were convinced that they were the victims of sharp practices. They sold their produce at low prices, and then they read the daily quotations for wheat and corn in eastern markets. The discrepancy between the price they received, and the price in the East was due, so they argued, to a conspiracy of the commission merchants and the railroads. Therefore they would regulate the roads, and organize their own selling agencies. The Grangers complained too that many manufacturers were charging more than was worth for their products, especially farm machinery. They heard that in Europe, where the corporations were subjected to real competition, they were selling the same sort of goods at lower prices than those charged in America. This situation they attributed to the protective tariff, and they began to urge tariff reform; at the same time they planned to build factories for making their own farm implements. Finally, because they found the local merchant a kind of tyrant, with his high prices and his high interest rates, they determined to drive him out of business by opening coöperative stores. But in a contest of that sort the railroads, commission merchants, manufacturers, and local merchants all had advantages over the farmers. They were more familiar with market conditions, and they had more capital. The manufacturers were able to combine, and by resorting to a drastic price-cutting war they were able to drive many of the cooperative stores out of business. The failure, partial or complete, of these various business enterprises, served to discredit the Grange among outsiders and to deprive it of thousands of members. But the Grange was far from being a failure. It had succeeded in its primary purposes of arousing the interest of the farmers, and of encouraging more social activity and recreation among them. There is no doubt that they were stirred out of their ruts, and they found it easier to undertake reforms in the future. The Grange put the farmer in touch with improved methods, and so made for better agriculture. Kelley's vision was in part fulfilled. In 1876 and 1880 the farmers went enthusiastically into the Greenback party, while it was advocating a number of reform projects, such as railroad and trust regulation, and tariff reduction. In one form or another the farmers were in politics to stay. Their activity varied inversely with the extent of their economic well-being. If times were good, the farmers were relatively quiet. But when times. were bad, during the late eighties, and especially after the Panic of 1893, they plunged into a genuine whirlwind of reform. CHAPTER LV CLEVELAND AND REFORM During the latter part of Arthur's administration, party lines ceased to be of serious importance. For practical purposes Democrats and Republicans were so much alike that nothing but tradition and custom held members to their allegiance. Of course the two organizations were still intact, but like the Whigs and Democrats of an earlier period they had become little more than agencies to assist in the scramble for federal jobs. There was no little dissatisfaction with the Republican Party, revealed in state and local elections; for example in 1882 Grover Cleveland, Democratic candidate for governor in New York, swept his state by a hundred ninety thousand majority. In general, though not perhaps in New York, this uneasiness was due as much to a feeling that the Republicans had been in too long as to any deep-seated conviction that the Democrats held out any hope of improvement. As 1884 approached, voters looked forward to an apathetic contest. To the surprise of every one, the campaign proved to be one of the liveliest in years. THE CAMPAIGN OF 1884 In the usual casting about for candidates the Republicans had to decide first whether or not to give Arthur another chance. He had made an excellent record, but he never commanded the support of a majority of the party. Some of the leaders hoped to rehabilitate the party and to fill up the somewhat weakened ranks by running General Sherman, but in his direct and forceful manner he refused even to consider a nomination. "I would account myself a fool, a madman, an ass," he wrote, "to embark anew, at sixty-five years of age, in a career that may at any moment become tempest-tossed by the perfidy, the defalcation, the dishonesty, or neglect of any one of a hundred thousand subordinates utterly unknown to the President of the United States, not to say the eternal worriment of a vast host of impecunious friends and old military subordinates." The next possibility was James G. Blaine, defeated for the nomina tion in 1876 and in 1880. He was still laboring under the same old difficulty, the reputation of having subjected his official duty to his desire to make money. Blaine was an able politician, and he saw plainly that the election would be close, and he did not care to lose. With the general loosening of party ties he knew that the Republican label alone would not necessarily bring election, and he could see that he was far from popular with the reform wing of the party. And yet in spite of his own indifference and of the opposition of the reformers, he got the nomination. In the convention two young delegates, one from Massachusetts and one from New York, both sought to prevent Blaine's nomination. They were Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. Although they did not want Blaine, their political philosophy taught them to remain "regular" and they both voted for him. But the reformers, "Mugwumps" as they were called, would have nothing to do with Blaine. Insistent in their demand for reform, and supported by a number of influential newspapers, they considered the possibility of an independent ticket. Eventually they decided to support the Democrats, as the only hope of success. The Republican platform contained little that was distinctive. It made the protective tariff its leading issue, and the protection of the American worker its slogan. It also pledged itself to the principle of federal control of interstate commerce. For the Democrats, spurred on by the partial promise of "Mugwump" support, there was really only one possibility, Grover Cleveland of New York. He was as deeply involved in the bad graces of the professional politicians as Blaine was in those of the reformers, but the professional politicians were fully alive to the advantages of picking a winner. Cleveland had been put into office as mayor of Buffalo, on a reform ticket. His record there had been excellent. Then in 1882 the Democratic leaders placed him at the head of their state ticket, not because they liked him, but because of his widespread popularity. During his career as governor he proved to be fearless and aggressive, always ready to stand up for his principles, and not unwilling to fight for them. He had little sympathy with the professional side of politics, with office mongering and place hunting. Sometimes he went rather far in telling members of the New York Assembly what he thought of them and their methods. All this delighted the reformers, who enjoyed the discomfiture of the machine. The Democratic platform consisted of the usual criticisms of the |