CHAPTER LXIII

THE PANAMA CANAL

In displaying his understanding of what would or would not appeal to the country Roosevelt was never more fortunate in his judgment than in his promotion of the Panama Canal. The American people admire the man who can act; when that action seems to promote national greatness, their admiration may turn to worship. "Manifest Destiny" had not entirely disappeared as a factor in American life, and the prospect of an American-built, American-owned canal was bound to stimulate once more the desire for national expansion. Reference has been made to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, to the treaty with New Granada which preceded it, and to that with Nicaragua which followed (see Chapter XL). In the New Granada Treaty the United States guaranteed the "perfect neutrality" of the Isthmus of Panama, and it also guaranteed to New Granada the rights of sovereignty and property which she had in the Isthmus. The Panama Railroad, built in 1855, was an American enterprise. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty provided for joint British and American control of any canal which might be built between the Atlantic and the Pacific. In the third treaty, with Nicaragua, the United States acquired the right of way for a canal through Nicaragua, with the understanding that other nations would be associated in the agree

ment.

The Civil War, with its blockade-running, emphasized the need of an American naval station in the Caribbean, which Grant tried to secure in Santo Domingo, and in addition the desirability of easier communication with California. An Isthmian canal might answer both purposes. If, however, it was to serve as a substitute for a naval station, the plan of joint ownership and operation would hardly be feasible. After the Civil War therefore various presidents tried to secure the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Grant and Hayes both called for an American canal.

In 1878 a complication arose when a French company, headed by de Lesseps, the builder of the Suez Canal, got a concession from Colom

bia, formerly New Granada, for a Panama canal. Under this concession, which expired in 1904, the company began work. In the United States, in both official and unofficial circles, there was pronounced opposition to this project. Some regarded it as a blow to the Monroe Doctrine, and all who were interested in the matter could see that it might mean the end of the hope for an American canal. Fortunately for the United States a combination of labor troubles, tropical disease, and financial corruption left the French company bankrupt, and put a complete stop to its work.

Blaine and Frelinghuysen, Secretaries of State, both tried to get around or to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, but to no purpose. Frelinghuysen in particular negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua providing for a canal to be built by the United States, and owned jointly by the two signatory powers. This document was still under consideration in the Senate when Cleveland became President, and he withdrew it, before it was ratified. There the matter rested until after the Spanish-American War. But the voyage of the Oregon around Cape Horn, a distance of 13,400 miles, demonstrated anew the need of a canal which would mean a saving of 8,800 miles.

CANAL NEGOTIATIONS

The State Department began negotiations with Great Britain looking toward the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and in December, 1901, the two powers came to an agreement, in the HayPauncefote Treaty. This expressly abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and gave to the United States sole power to build, operate, and control the proposed canal, and by implication the right to fortify it. In the agreement regarding joint control Great Britain had an asset of unusual value, and her officials could hardly be expected to surrender that out of sheer good will. The price which she demanded and received was Article III, Section 1 in the HayPauncefote Treaty. "The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these Rules, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise." When this new document was duly ratified by the Senate, December 16, 1901, one obstacle was removed.

The next question of importance was to decide on the route. Both Panama and Nicaragua had their advocates, and Congress heard the

relative merits of each discussed for months. The Panama route offered certain advantages. It would have good natural harbors at both ends, while the proposed Nicaragua route would require artificial harbors at both ends. The Panama route was much shorter, forty miles as against a hundred seventy. This of course would mean a difference in the time required for a vessel to pass through the canal: twelve hours for the Panama route, thirty-three for Nicaragua. The estimated cost of completing the Panama Canal was $156,378,250, and $200,540,000 for the longer one. The Commission appointed to investigate the two routes at first recommended the Nicaragua route, because of the refusal of the bankrupt French company to sell its rights for a reasonable sum. Its concession would not expire until 1904, and it offered to sell to the United States for $109,141,500. When the United States proposed to build through Nicaragua, the French company reduced its price to $40,000,000, and the United States accepted.

With the route decided upon and the French company satisfied, the next step was to secure from Colombia the right of way through Panama. In January 1903, in the Hay-Herran Treaty, the United States agreed to pay Colombia $10,000,000 and in addition $250,000 annually, for control over a zone six miles in width. The United States Senate ratified this treaty in March, 1903, but the Colombian Congress refused to ratify. While it had the treaty under consideration, the Colombian government demanded $10,000,000 from the French company, and $15,000,000 additional from the United States. When these demands were refused, Colombia rejected the treaty. According to Elihu Root, between 1898 and 1903 no congress met in Colombia, except the one which rejected the Hay-Herran Treaty, and it took no action on any other business. This one was carefully selected by the dictator, Maroquin, who determined to secure the highest possible price for his most valuable asset: the route for the canal.

THE PANAMA REVOLUTION

The action of the Colombian legislature aroused extraordinary excitement in Panama, and profound dissatisfaction in the Roosevelt administration. Prominent citizens from the Isthmus came to the United States for help, and the legal representative of the French company, M. Buneau-Varilla, became interested in the prospect of a revolution in Panama. For several months, in Panama and in the

United States, the revolutionists were at work, and their plans were an open secret to everybody at all interested. Roosevelt was heartily in sympathy with the proposed revolution. "Privately," he wrote to the editor of the Review of Reviews, on October 10, "I freely say to you that I should be delighted if Panama were an independent state, or if it made itself so at this moment; but for me to say so publicly would amount to an instigation of a revolt, and therefore I cannot say it."

But the President could so dispose certain naval forces of the United States that a revolution on the Isthmus would be successful, and he did so. On November 2, 1903, he ordered an American gunboat to the Isthmus, to keep the Panama Railroad open for traffic. On the next day, official Washington awaited news of the expected uprising. None came. At three forty p. m. the State Department sent the following despatch to the American consul at Panama: "Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly and fully informed." At eight fifteen the Department received the consul's reply. "No uprising yet. Reported will be in the night. Situation critical." At nine fifty a second despatch came in: "Uprising occurred to-night, six; no bloodshed. . . Government will be organized to-night." On the 4th the Panama Republic was proclaimed, and on November 6, Roosevelt recognized the independence of the new nation.

During the revolution the United States refused to allow the Panaina Railroad to be used by either Colombian or Panaman forces, a neutral action of tremendous benefit to Panama, and the Colombian government was prevented from landing any reinforcements on the Isthmus. The United States did not instigate the Revolution, but it clearly made it impossible for Colombia to reestablish her authority over the rebellious state.

At the time of the Revolution the President was blamed for permitting the outbreak to take place, and the Colombian government held the United States responsible for the loss of Panama. Elihu Root insisted that the State of Panama, originally independent, had voluntarily joined the confederation known as the United States of Colombia, in which the individual states retained a liberal measure of local autonomy. In 1885 a dictator overthrew the constitution, and placed Panama under an arbitrary government. The people of Panama rebelled against this new government in 1885, and again in

-1895, and in 1899. Root at least felt that they had ample cause to repudiate Colombian authority.

On November 18, 1903, an agreement between the United States and Panama, the Hay-Buneau-Varilla Treaty, was signed, by which the United States secured a perpetual lease and absolute administrative control of a canal zone, ten miles in width, and in addition the right to intervene in Panama at any time, if necessary, to preserve order. In return the United States agreed to pay $10,000,000, and after nine years, $250,000 annually as long as the treaty should last. This cleared away the last obstacle, and work was begun. The Canal was finally finished and opened for traffic in 1914, at a cost of $361,874,861, well over the $200,000,000 original estimate.

Roosevelt always looked upon this work of making the Canal possible as one of his greatest achievements, and he had little sympathy with the critics, either in this country, or in Colombia. “To talk of Colombia as a responsible Power to be dealt with as we would deal with Holland or Belgium or Switzerland or Denmark," he wrote in 1915, “is a mere absurdity. The analogy is with a group of Sicilian or Calabrian bandits; with Villa and Carranza at this moment. You could no more make an agreement with the Colombian rulers than you could nail current jelly to a wall,-and the failure to nail current jelly to a wall is not due to the nail; it is due to the current jelly. I did my best to get them to act straight. Then I determined that I would do what ought to be done without regard to them. The people of Panama were a unit in desiring the Canal and in wishing to overthrow the rule of Colombia. If they had not revolted, I should have recommended Congress to take possession of the Isthmus by force of arms. When they revolted, I promptly used the Navy to prevent the bandits, who had tried to hold us up, from spending months of futile bloodshed in conquering or endeavoring to conquer the Isthmus, to the lasting damage of the Isthmus, of us, and of the world. I did not consult Hay, or Root, or any one else as to what I did, because a council of war does not fight; and I intended to do the job once for all."

In 1908 in summarizing his achievements, Roosevelt made the following statement in a letter to a friend: "Then I took the Panama Canal. I do not think that any feat of quite such far-reaching importance has been to the credit of our country in recent years; and this I can say absolutely was my own work, and could not have been