accomplished save by me or by some man of my temperament.' This exercise of executive authority brought results, concrete, tangible results. At the same time it aroused the suspicion and ill-will of certain sections of Latin-American public opinion, and likewise brought down upon Roosevelt's head the acrid criticism of those who measured these acts by abstract ethical standards.

"THE BIG STICK"

One of the guiding principles of Roosevelt's public career was, in his own words, "Speak softly, but carry a big stick." This adage he called into play particularly in dealing with matters involving the Monroe Doctrine. In 1901 Venezuela fell into trouble, on account of unpaid financial obligations. The governments of Germany, Italy, and Great Britain all prepared to collect their claims by force, and to this end Germany and Great Britain declared a "pacific" blockade of Venezuelan ports. Many of the claims were of doubtful validity at best, and the United States watched proceedings with peculiar care. Upon the establishment of the blockade Secretary Hay formally protested. Great Britain and Italy seemed inclined to come to a reasonable understanding, but Germany, the leader in the enterprise, behaved much as France had done in Mexico during the Civil War. In 1902 Great Britain and Germany declared a formal blockade, but. the British authorities drew back when a clash with the United States seemed imminent.

Roosevelt had profound faith in the proper application of force. He collected the American navy in West Indian waters, and put Admiral Dewey in command. Every battleship and torpedo boat in the navy was there, and all together the fleet numbered about fifty vessels. Then Roosevelt had an interview with von Holleben, the German Ambassador, in which the President explained that the United States could not consent to a German occupation of Venezuela, and that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration. Roosevelt had no intention of permitting the Germans to found a colony near the Isthmus of Panama, and he told von Holleben that if the Kaiser did not offer to arbitrate within ten days, Dewey would start for Venezuela. When the German tried to argue the question, Roosevelt told him that he had laid the facts before him, not for argument, but for his information.

About a week later von Holleben came around for a call, and after

an aimless conversation about nothing, Roosevelt asked him what he had heard from Berlin. The Ambassador replied that he had heard nothing. Roosevelt then told him that there was no object in waiting the ten days, and that Dewey would start for Venezuela within fortyeight hours. But, he suggested, there was nothing on paper, and there was still time for the Kaiser to decide to arbitrate. Within thirty-six hours von Holleben reported that the dispute would be submitted to arbitration. All of these conversations had been kept secret; Roosevelt then wound up the comedy by publicly complimenting the Kaiser on his enthusiasm for arbitration, a joke, as the biographer of John Hay pleasantly records, that was relished far more keenly in Washington than in Berlin.

SANTO DOMINGO

If the smaller Latin-American countries could drift or plunge into indebtedness, and if they were protected from punishment by the United States, that government was compelled to assume a certain amount of responsibility for their good behavior. Unpaid or repudiated debts always tempted European intervention. By 1905 Santo Domingo was in danger of punishment; to ward it off, and at the same time to satisfy the creditors the United States established a sort of financial guardianship over the island government. The management of the customs revenues was put into the hands of an American official, who applied part of the proceeds to the wiping out of back debts. When the United States Senate objected to this new policy, and refused to ratify the treaty providing for it, Roosevelt announced that the plan would be put into effect by an executive order. The Senate might ratify when it got ready. That body eventually came around. In this way the Monroe Doctrine was given a new positive construction, which tended to keep the countries out of trouble with Europe. After the Panama Canal was completed, this arrangement for financial control was extended to other Latin-American states, then developed into a series of protectorates. Before Roosevelt's "second" term was well started the foundations of the modern Caribbean policy of the United States were firmly laid.

These proceedings were typical of the Roosevelt foreign policy. He had the capacity for seeing a problem through, from beginning to end, and he was possessed of a keen understanding of human nature. His words carried conviction, and his acts were decisive. Whatever

he did in foreign affairs, whether it was securing a right of way for the Canal, maneuvering Germany out of Venezuela, arranging for the Russo-Japanese peace conference at Portsmouth, or helping to bring about the Algeciras conference over Morocco, he did with a vigor that commanded respect.

CHAPTER LXIV

POLICIES AND POLITICS, 1904-1911

Roosevelt's activities as President made an interesting impression on the public. The people in general liked his cocksure convictions, and his touch of swagger; they admired his audacity in striking at the "trusts," and they even became interested, slightly of course, in the problem of foreign relations and policies. Under him the presidency acquired an element of the spectacular, and people turned to the Washington dispatches as they turned to the sporting pages, hoping for, and generally getting, some sort of thrill. The President had become "news."

Such at least was the attitude of a majority of Republicans. But the minority wing of the party was not happy. This element included the representatives of the business interests who could not forgive Roosevelt for experimenting with the Sherman Act, and for driving the anthracite operators into at least the semblance of decency. Roosevelt had carried some of his party with him on the road toward reform, but he left others far behind.

As early as 1903 the Republican Party began to reveal, not a break, but a line of cleavage, between the special privilege element and the public interest group. In 1904 and again in 1908 Roosevelt's own personal popularity and the absence of effective leadership opposed to him prevented the two groups from separating. "Mark" Hanna would have entered the field against Roosevelt in 1904, but he died in February, before the conventions were ready to meet. Left without a real candidate, the conservatives somewhat unwillingly followed the Roosevelt enthusiasts. When the Republican convention assembled, the President was unanimously nominated, by acclamation.

As usual, the Democrats were without a strong candidate. The party had tried Bryan twice, with less success the second time than the first; a third trial at that time seemed like poor strategy. The conservative Democrats had never approved of him, and they were gradually regaining their influence in the organization. With the Panic of '93 and the Morgan gold purchase ancient history, Cleve

land became a possibility, and a fairly strong one in the West. Roosevelt looked upon the possibility of his nomination with considerable concern, fearing that he "would draw a great many votes both from the honest rich and the fool respectable classes." But Cleveland was passed over in favor of Judge Alton B. Parker of New York. According to one report, Parker was nominated to prevent the honor from going to William Randolph Hearst, a rising newspaper magnate, with a widely advertised interest in sensationalism and reform.

The contrast between the personalities of Roosevelt and Parker was as marked as the difference in their prospects. Parker was quiet and conservative, both in temperament and manner. Almost unknown outside of his own state, he lacked the qualities to make a successful appeal as a campaigner. Roosevelt's election was inevitable. The campaign was uneventful almost to the end, when Parker caused an unexpected diversion by publishing charges regarding Republican campaign funds. Picking out Cortelyou, the Republican campaign manager as his particular victim, Parker accused him of using information acquired in the Department of Commerce and Labor to blackmail the corporations. That the Republicans were being largely financed by the corporations was true; that Cortelyou was guilty of the practice charged was certainly never proven, and was probably untrue. Roosevelt had no objections to gifts made by "Big Business," provided they were made without thought of special favors in return. In fact, the President not only welcomed contributions, but asked for at least one, to finance the local campaign in New York.

The charges of an intimate connection between the Republicans and "Big Business" brought out nothing new, nothing that every well-informed voter did not know; they had therefore no influence on the final vote. Roosevelt's plurality over Parker was over two and

a half million.

In Roosevelt's second term the theory of public interest as applied to corporations was given a more definite application. Additional anti-trust suits were brought, and suits were undertaken to punish corporations which had violated the law. The American Sugar Refining Company was convicted of evading the import duties on raw sugar; this fraud was made possible by tampering with the scales. The company paid something over four million dollars to the government, and several of the officials were convicted and punished.

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