Leonard Wood received no command in France because of his tendency to outspoken criticism.

THE A. E. F.

For commander-in-chief of the American forces in France, Wilson selected Major-General John J. Pershing, then in charge of the American army on the Mexican border. In June Pershing proceeded to France, and on July 4, he exhibited the troops of the 1st Division in Paris. After these first troops had arrived, the next American contingents sent over were engineers and construction men, to prepare for handling and transporting the large American army on its arrival. In the French coast towns south of Brest the Americans constructed docks, with a network of railways connecting these ports with the front. Plans were made to send over all the necessary supplies for the men, so that they would not constitute an additional burden upon the French government. For the first year of the war the American forces were engaged in preparing for work on a large scale. As late as March, 1918, there were only 250,000 American troops in France, and of these more than half were technical men, engaged in the work of providing port facilities and lines of communication. But beginning with the spring of 1918 the work was so well done that the commanders were able to receive troops at the rate of ten thousand a day for five solid months. Never before in the whole history of the world had any such extensive troop movement been carried out over such long lines of communication.

In this work of building a new army, constructing ships to carry it to France, providing facilities for handling it after its arrival there, and keeping it supplied with food and munitions, the administration had to deal with a series of entirely new situations, and progress was necessarily slow. The American people were in the habit of getting results quickly, and they demanded them more quickly than ever in 1917. When delays were found to be inevitable, critics berated Wilson and his whole party. In July, 1917, the opponents of the administration tried to secure the appointment of a Congressional joint-committee on the conduct of the war. Wilson entered a vigorous protest against this, and the plan failed. In December, 1917, Congress called for an investigation of the War Department. This revealed the handicaps which were being overcome, and showed that the authorities were working with more than usual perseverance.

But impatience at the seeming inability to get results-the critics had been expecting some spectacular display of American power on the Western Front-finally reached the breaking point. On January 19, 1918, Senator G. E. Chamberlain, a Democrat, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, spoke at a luncheon of the National Security League in New York. There he charged that "the military establishment of America has fallen down. . . . It has almost stopped functioning... because of inefficiency in every bureau and in every department of the government of the United States."

Wilson met this charge, in true Rooseveltian manner, with the wrathful declaration that Senator Chamberlain's statement was "an astonishing and absolutely unjustifiable distortion of the truth.” Chamberlain followed up his attack on the President with a bill for the creation of a special War, or Munitions, Cabinet, and the newspapers suggested Roosevelt as the fitting head for such a body. Wilson announced that he would veto any bill containing any such proposal. Then, by way of circumventing his critics, he had Senator Overman of North Carolina bring in a bill giving the President authority to reorganize government departments, or to create new ones. In May, 1918, this measure became a law, and as a result of it Wilson became a dictator for the duration of the war.

By the spring of 1918 the demands of the war had brought about the evolution of a kind of War Cabinet, including the heads of the following boards: Shipping, Food, Fuel, War Trade, Railroads, and War Industries, and the heads of the War and Navy Departments. In little more than a year after the declaration of war the country and the government made it possible for American troops to enter the active fighting in sufficient numbers to turn the scale of the conflict. As compared with the time consumed in changing England over from a peace to a war economy the American government did well. As compared with the achievements of Madison and Armstrong in the War of 1812, or with those of McKinley and Alger in the war with Spain, Wilson and Baker performed miracles. They were expensive miracles to be sure, but in 1917 and 1918 cost had to be sacrificed to results.

THE WESTERN FRONT

By March, 1918, it had become apparent to the German leaders that the American war preparations were proceeding more rapidly than their own submarine campaign. Destructive as that had been,

it had failed to crush England. With the prospect of American military movements on a scale large enough to threaten the German lines in France, the Germans were compelled to try their last resource: an attack along the whole line with their whole available force before the American armies should become too large. On March 21, the German divisions began an advance, on a fifty mile front south of Cambrai. Their immediate objective was to separate the English and French armies, turn the English lines back toward the coast, and then-so they hoped-push on toward Paris. After a week of desperate fighting, during which the German advance averaged about six miles a day, the drive was checked. The determination of the Germans to stake everything on this spring campaign induced the Allies to appoint a general-in-chief, with Ferdinand Foch as the supreme commander.

The beginning of the great German drive gave a new impulse to American war preparations. By July, 1918, there were a million American troops in France, and the number was doubled by November. When the German advance came in March, four American divisions were ready for active service. For four months after the beginning of the drive the Germans remained on the offensive. On April 9 their divisions moved against the British in the Lys Valley, west of Lille. Although their advance was slower than their first drive in March, they carried it far enough to threaten the British supply system. On May 27, they struck again, between Rheims and Soissons, pushing the Allied line back to Château-Thierry. A few more dents like this would have brought the Germans to Paris.

On May 28, the American 1st Division captured Cantigny, a little village west of Montdidier. On the 31st, a part of the 3d Division helped block the German advance at Château-Thierry. These exploits were perhaps small in themselves, but they showed what the American troops could do in action.

On July 15, the Germans struck for the fourth time, along the line from Château-Thierry to the edge of the Argonne Forest. This proved to be the last German offensive. By August 4, Foch had straightened out his line west of Rheims, thereby relieving the danger of an attack upon Paris. On August 8, English forces began to push the Germans back toward Montdidier, and by the 18th they had eliminated the dangerous German salient in that sector. American troops assisted in both these counter-attacks.

By September there were enough American troops ready so that Pershing could organize an American field army. On the 12th in coöperation with French troops, the Americans attacked the Germans in the St. Mihiel salient, east and south of Verdun. In two days fighting the Germans were driven out, and the Allied line straightened again. It was becoming apparent that the Germans had passed the peak of their power, and that Foch now had troops enough to strike often and hard. From this time on to the Armistice in November the German troops were in retreat.

On September 26, with nine American divisions in action, the battle of the Argonne was begun. The region itself with its ravines, river valleys, hills, and woods made the advance and offensive operations next to impossible. This battle lasted forty-seven days, with fighting going on continuously.

Before this campaign had been under way a week the fate of the Central Powers was beginning to take shape. Bulgaria withdrew from the war on September 30, with an unconditional surrender, and by that time the German prospects were gone. The great drive of the spring of 1918 had been made possible by the withdrawal of Russia from the war, and the consequent release of all the German divisions in the East for service on the Western Front. They had tried, and had failed.

WORKING TOWARD PEACE

From the summer of 1917, some sort of peace proposal was always under consideration. On January 5, 1918, Lloyd George outlined a part of the British proposals, and on January 8, President Wilson made public his program of the world's peace "the only possible programme, as we see it," the famous Fourteen Points. These follow in order:

1. "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."

alike in peace

2. "Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas and in war, except as the seas may be closed . . . by international action for the enforcement of international covenants."

3. The removal of "economic barriers," and "the establishment of an equality of trade conditions" among all the nations "consenting to the peace.

4. Guarantees for the reduction of armaments.

5. "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all