Again in this same eventful year of 1916 the United States purchased the Danish West Indies for $25,000,000, thereby acquiring one of the strongest naval positions in the new world. With the European War going on, the administration was taking no chances. When these various strategic points had been acquired, it was plain that the United States had become "the supreme lord of the Caribbean."

"From Guantanamo, the United States can control the Windward Passage between Cuba and the Dominican Republic. From Porto Rico the United States can control the Mona Passage. Haiti and Santo Domingo . . . each has an excellent harbor for a naval station, Mole St. Nicholas and Samana Bay; the former commanding the eastern side of the Windward Passage, and the latter commanding the Mona Passage from the west. The treaty with Nicaragua gives the United States possession of the Great Corn and Little Corn Islands off the east coast of this republic together with the right to build a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca. St. Thomas has a splendid harbor for a naval station too. Colon and the fortifications of the Canal, the Canal itself, which has become the center of the naval power of the United States, completes the picture of the southward progress of the United States."

In the words of Secretary Hughes, "the adequate protection of this canal-its complete immunity from any adverse control-is essential to our peace and security. We intend in all circumstances to safeguard the Panama Canal. We could not afford to take any different position with respect to any other waterway that may be built between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Disturbances in the Caribbean region are therefore of special interest to us not for the purpose of seeking control over others but of being assured that our own safety is free from menace."

Statesmen and publicists in Latin America and in Europe are convinced that these advances made in 1916 were not the end of American expansion. They prophesy that in time the United States will own everything between the Rio Grande and the Canal.

In explaining the position of the United States with reference to its rights in Latin America, Professor Shepherd quotes the reply of a British minister, who was asked what reason Great Britain had for holding Egypt: "that of being in a position to give the khedive authoritative advice." But the American people in general have not asked for explanations; in fact, it is doubtful if many of them know what has been going on, or why it has been done. The Carib

bean policy never appears as an issue at the polls, and no one has ever voted for it or against it. The expenditure of $25,000,000 for the Danish West Indies caused hardly a ripple of comment.

Under the combined auspices of the State and Navy Departments "supposedly independent republics have had their independence diminished or destroyed, their affairs taken over and their inhabitants and property made subject to officials acting under the orders of the President of the United States-all without the slightest constitutional warrant-and yet who among us seems noticeably to care?" European historians have commented on the tendency of administrative departments to operate unobserved by the voters, and uncontrolled by legislative authority. The successful and uninterrupted prosecution of the American Caribbean policy is a case in point. On the material side the results of this occupation have been undeniably good. Haiti and Santo Domingo are in better condition now than they have ever been in all their history, at least since 1492. The natives have been taught to keep the peace, and they have received the benefits of modern medicine and sanitation. The benefits of the Panama Canal are apparent to every observer. On the other hand, the Latin Americans object to being ruled under a system completely at variance with their former free and easy existence, and they point out the inconsistency in American theory and practice. Perhaps the following quotation from an Argentine statesman is typical of the Latin American point of view. "The Monroe Doctrine is not a doctrine of America for the Americans, but of America for the North Americans. It has served as an admirable instrument for the United States to separate Europe from America and to establish its hegemony over the latter. The United States has been at all times preoccupied in obtaining concessions of every kind at the cost of the sovereignty of the rest of the American states. The doctrine is dangerous because it is North American Imperialism hidden under a principle of international law." It is plain to observant Latin Americans at least that it will take surprisingly little more in the way of an advance by this country to bring Central America solidly under the control of the government at Washington.

MEXICO

In the spring of 1920, Mexico, for some time quiescent, or sufficiently so to be kept on the inside pages or entirely out of the news

papers, again became active. An anti-Carranza revolution broke out in Sonora, with General Obregon as leader. In May, Carranza fled from Mexico City only to fall into the hands of the revolutionists. They ended his career, in orthodox Mexican fashion. His overthrow was due to the feeling that he had "betrayed the Revolution," that he had set up the same sort of autocratic centralized power which had existed under Diaz.

Although Obregon was duly installed as President, the United States for some time would not recognize the new régime. This refusal was due to the economic policy of the Mexicans, with special reference to petroleum properties. In 1917 a new Constitution declared that the ownership of all petroleum fields was in the hands of the Mexican nation. Under this new document Carranza attempted to deprive the foreign oil companies of their property, including all the improvements made. This he was ready to do without paying for the land or the improvements.

The new Obregon government seemed inclined to follow Carranza's policy in this matter, and on that account American recognition was withheld until 1923, when satisfactory assurances were given concerning petroleum interests. It may be that the Latin Americans are not day-dreaming when they point to the steady consolidation of American interests in Central America, and they suggest that Mexico is being caught in a vice.

CHAPTER LXXI

PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION

After the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles, Congress and the country at large found it possible to devote more attention to the problems involved in post war reconstruction. These were as numerous as they were perplexing. Intervention in Europe had drawn the federal government into a variety of abnormal activities, and at the same time had suddenly and profoundly altered the economic conditions of the people themselves. Readjustment and change therefore became the order of the day.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1920

It so happened that the first steps toward reconstruction were taken during the excitement of the presidential campaign of 1920. By that time signs of the long-accumulating impatience with the Wilson administration were apparent on every hand. Republican stock, decidedly below par from 1909 to 1918, had begun to rise in 1918, and by 1920 it had reached a high level. It was plain on all sides that only a remarkable candidate or a miracle could keep the Democrats in power.

The obvious weakness of the Democratic party was reflected in the convention at San Francisco. President Wilson, stricken in body and broken in spirit, made no attempt to exercise any of his prerogatives as party leader, and there was no one to take his place. William Jennings Bryan, the storm center of the Baltimore convention of 1912, had no appreciable influence in 1920. The various aspirants for the nomination hardly measured up to the qualifications of any of the presidents after 1893. The best known, if not the strongest on the list of possibilities, William G. McAdoo, suffered somewhat because he was Mr. Wilson's son-in-law. On the first ballot he secured only a small minority of votes, 266, while his closest competitor, A. Mitchell Palmer, got ten fewer. James M. Cox, of Ohio, who finally got the nomination, had only 134 in the beginning. Virtually unknown outside of his own state, the successful candidate aroused no enthusiasm.

The Republicans were peculiarly well-favored, not perhaps in available candidates, but in the certainty of success. Among the aspirants Herbert Hoover was the only one for whom there was any evidence of a popular demand, and it was neither widespread nor long lived. The conservative business interests of the party favored Frank O. Lowden of Illinois. Two energetic campaigners, General Leonard Wood and Senator Hiram Johnson, appealed for support to the surviving elements of Rooseveltian progressivism. Of all these Wood was unquestionably the best advertised at a cost to his backers of some $2,000,000—and yet on the first ballot, at the Chicago convention, he could muster only 2872 votes. The professional politicians in the party had selected Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio as their favorite. After nine fruitless ballots his supporters began their active work and on the tenth he received the nomination. For Vice-President the Republicans nominated Governor Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts, the hero of the Boston police strike. The campaign was the most apathetic of any since the Civil War. Far from stimulating the interest of the voters, both candidates aroused something akin to disgust. Comments such as "hold your nose and vote," or "thank God, only one of them can be elected," were not at all uncommon; and the editor of one paper solemnly announced that for President he would support Dr. Sun Yat Sen! President Wilson appealed for a "great and solemn referendum" on the League of Nations, but the League could not be made the main issue. The real force at work was a lively determination to get away from Wilsonism, and on the strength of that Harding won the election. Voters flocked to the Republican side, not because they liked the candidate, but because they wanted to punish the Democrats. Cox has the distinction of being the only Democratic candidate since 1877 who failed to carry the whole "solid South;" Harding carried Tennessee. The Republicans carried the "border states," except Kentucky, and the whole North and West. Harding's plurality was almost seven million, and the electoral vote stood 404 for Harding to 127 for Cox. The Congressional elections gave the victors the unprecedented majority of 165 in the House, and 24 in the Senate.

HARDING POLICIES

In one of his highly illuminating, pregnant phrases President Harding described the aim of his administration as "a return to