may go, and let the honest advocates of confidence read the Alien and Sedition Acts and say if the Constitution has not been wise in fixing limits to the Government it created and whether we should be wise in destroying those limits. Let him say what the Government is if it be not a tyranny which the men of our choice have conferred on the President and the President of our choice has assented to and accepted, over the friendly strangers to whom the mild spirit of our country and its laws, had pledged hospitality and protection; that the men of our choice have more respected the bare suspicions of the President than the solid rights of innocence, the claims of justification, the sacred force of truth and the forms and substance of law and justice. In questions of power then, let no more be heard of confidence in man but bind him down from mischief by the chain of the Constitution.

"That the Commonwealth does therefore call on its co-States for an expression of their sentiments on the acts concerning Aliens and for the punishment of certain crimes hereinbefore specified, plainly declaring whether these acts are or are not authorized by the Federal Compact. And it doubts not that their sense will be so announced as to prove their attachment unaltered to limited Government, whether general or particular, and that the rights and liberties of their co-States will be exposed to no dangers by remaining embarked on a common bottom with their own. That they will concur with the Commonwealth in considering the said acts as so palpably against the Constitution as to amount to an

undisguised declaration that the Compact is not meant to be the measure of the powers of the General Government but that it will proceed in the exercise and these States of all powers whatsoever: That they will view this as seizing the rights of the States and consolidating them in the hands of the General Government with a power assumed to bind the States (not merely in cases made Federal) but in all cases whatsoever by laws inade, not with their consent but by others against their consent; That this would be to surrender the form of government we have chosen, and to live under one deriving its powers from its own will and not from our authority, and that the co-States, recurring to their natural rights in cases not made Federal, will concur in declaring these acts void and of no force, and will each unite with this Commonwealth in requesting their repeal at the next session of Congress.

"EDMUND BULLOCK, S. H. R.
"JOHN CAMPBELL, S. S. pro tem.

"Passed the House of Representatives Nov. 10, 1798.

"Attest THOMAS TODD, C. H. R.

In Senate, November 13, 1798; unanimously concurred in.

Attest B. THURSTON, Clk. Senate.

Approved Nov. 16, 1798.

JAMES GARRARD, G. K.

By the Governor
HARRY TOULMIN,

Secretary of State.

By comparing the Jefferson resolutions with those of Breckinridge, it will be seen that there is a radical difference between them. The Jefferson set provide, at the beginning of the eighth resolution, which is a long one, embodying various. matters, for a committee of conference and correspondence to communicate the resolutions to the different state legislatures, with a view to inducing these bodies to declare null and void acts of congress not authorized by the constitution, while the eighth resolution in the Breckinridge set is short and provides only for transmitting the resolutions to the Kentucky senators and representatives in congress, with a view to securing the repeal of the unconstitutional acts.

Human ingenuity could hardly use words to express thoughts and embody principles more antagonistic. To repeal an act of congress in the way pointed out by the constitution, has no conceivable similarity with its nullification by a single state, in its assumption of a sovereignty over and above congress. The two principles are the antipodes of the political globe.

Again, in the eighth resolution of the Jefferson series, will be found the following significant words which are not in the Breckin ridge series: "That in cases of an abuse of the delegated powers, the members of the general government, being chosen by the people, a change by the people would be the constitutional remedy, but where powers are as

sumed which have not been delegated, a nullification of the act is the right remedy; that every state has a natural right in cases not within the compact, to nullify of their own authority, all assumptions of power by others within their limits."

And this eighth resolution closes with the following additional remarkable words, not to be found in the Breckinridge series: "Will each take measures of its own for providing that neither these acts nor any others of the General Government, not plainly and intentionally authorized by the constitution, shall be exercised within their respective territories."

These two extracts from the Jefferson resolutions embody the doctrine of nullification, as exemplified by South Carolina in 1832, but it will be in vain to search for this doctrine in the Breckinridge, or Kentucky resolutions of 1798. And if there were no other differences between the Jefferson and Breckinridge resolutions, this variance is fundamental enough to assign to the two sets separate authorship and to class them as formulas of different political creeds.

The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, while asserting in its length and breadth and depth the doctrine of States Rights, look only to the repeal of unconstitutional laws passed by congress, while the Jefferson resolutions look to the nullification of such acts, and this by a single state.

The resolutions of 1798 were adopted by the Kentucky legislature without amendment, precisely as they were offered by Mr. Breckinridge, but not without opposition. The opponents were few as compared with the advocates and yet quite a debate occurred between Mr. Breckinridge, the member from Fayette, and Mr. William Murray, the member from Franklin, a lawyer of commanding intellect, learning and eloquence. However interesting a report of the discussion might be to a few special readers, the large space already granted to this important subject, forbids its reproduction here. Other distinguished members of the House Thomas Clay of Madison, Philemon Thompson of Mason, Robert Johnson of Scott, James Smith of Bourbon and Alexander McGregor of Fayette-took part in the discussion, but the main debate was between Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Murray.

On the 10th of November, 1798, the house came to a vote on the resolutions and adopted them without amendment. Just as they had been offered by Mr. Breckinridge, they received the legislative sanction. There was but one vote against the entire series, and that was by Mr. Murray. One other member voted with Mr. Murray against the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth resolutions, and two joined him in voting against the ninth.

On the 13th of November, the resolutions were unanimously adopted by the senate, and on the 16th of the same month, were approved by Governor Garrard. The legislature ordered one thousand copies to be printed and it is from a facsimile of one of these copies that the reproduction of these famous resolutions is made in this volume. In conformity with the act providing for the printing, fifty copies were delivered to the governor to be sent to the Kentucky members of congress and to the legislatures of the different states, while the remaining nine hundred and fifty

copies were divided among the legislators for distribution.

It was not long after the governor sent out these resolutions before responses began to come from the different state legislatures.

The little state of Delaware was the first to take action upon the subject. On the 1st of February, 1799, her legislature disposed of the subject in half a dozen lines which characterized the resolutions, “As a very unjustifiable interference with the General Government and constituted authorities of the United States, and of dangerous tendency, and therefore, not a fit subject for the further consideration of the general assembly."

The yet smaller state of Rhode Island came next in opposition. She declared that the authority to pass upon the constitutionality of an act of congress was vested in the judiciary department of the government and that she deemed the Alien and Sedition laws in accordance with the constitution. Clearly right in the contention that the question was one for judicial consideration in the final analysis, it is somewhat amusing to observe the legislature which made that contention at once taking. judicial notice of the question involved and deciding upon its constitutionality-in other words, usurping the authority of the tribunal to which it appealed. While technically correct in stating that the issues involved were for final judicial declaration, there does not appear to be any constitutional inhibition against the legislature of any state declaring its views upon any act of the congress, as Kentucky had done in the Resolutions of 1798.

Massachusetts followed Rhode Island. On the 9th of February, 1799, her legislature adopted quite a lengthy argument against the resolutions in which they took a position similar to Rhode Island. While the latter had contented herself with briefly saying that she deemed the Alien and Sedition laws constitutional, Massachusetts made use of much logic

to show that those acts were both authorized by the constitution and demanded by the exigencies of the times. She even argued the authority for them from the old common law and found in them a mitigation from the severity of that law.

New York followed on the 5th of March, with a moderately long preamble and very short resolution denouncing the resolutions. as "inflammatory and pernicious" and declaring her "incompetency as a branch of the legislature of this state, to supervise the acts of the General Government."

In May, the legislature of Connecticut took action on the subject and showed that she regarded the position taken by the resolutions against the Alien and Sedition acts as their most objectionable features.

On the 14th of June, New Hampshire expressed herself curtly against the resolutions and assuming a belligerent attitude, declared against the resolutions and putting on her war paint, somewhat ridiculously declared that she intended to defend the constitution of the United States "against every aggression, either foreign or domestic." It does not appear to have occurred to the warlike New Hampshire statemen that the Kentucky Resolutions were a dignified and manly protest against a violation of that same constitution, to the defense of which they appeared to be at least legislatively inclined to fly to arms. The "representative from Bunkum" appears to have made an early appearance in the legislatures of the country and is by no means confined to any particular section.

Vermont followed on the 30th of October, with a declaration against the resolutions in which she said: "It belongs not to state legislatures to decide on the constitutionality of laws made by the General Government, this power being exclusively vested in the judiciary." Again it may be stated that this contention appears to be correct, but the right of petition is granted to the people by the consti

tution, and if they select to appeal through their legislature, for the repeal of laws deemed by them as obnoxious and unconstitutional, their action is within their rights and far more likely to receive the attention of the law-making body than a simple petition to congress, though the latter represents thousands of signers and be presented to the house or senate by some man of distinction and then snugly tucked away in a committee room pigeon-hole, there to accumulate dust until the annual cleaning when it takes its way to the paper mill for rehabilitation.

The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were adopted one hundred and twelve years ago. They are still quoted today in the United States congress-in the highest courts of the country and are recognized as a political classic, while the belligerent legislative statesmen of New Hampshire, "dead and turned to clay, may serve to stop a crack and keep the winds away."

These seven states were all that enacted formal resolutions antagonistic to those of Kentucky. An equal number of states-Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Georgia maintained silence on the subject.

Virginia alone adopted resolutions similar to those of Kentucky; so, that of her fifteen. sister states, all that then existed, Kentucky had in response to her resolutions one avowed friend, seven open opponents and seven whose silence left conjecture to form such an opinion as it might as to their sentiments. Virginia. however, was with Kentucky, and that was a mighty support. The Mother of States and of Statesmen had taken the first begotten of the republic by the tender hand and said "well done." What fear had young Kentucky of avowed enemies or doubtful mutes, when Virginia, with her wise statesmen and glorious memories, was with her? The backwoods statesmen who had so often stood firm at the fierce sound of the rifle of the savage con

cealed in his native wilds, were not seriously frightened by the roar of the paper artillery fired at them from the distant seashore. They had greeted their polished brethren on the sunny side of the mountains with their Reso

lutions of 1798 couched in the genteelest language they could command, and when answers came that seemed rough for State papers they rejoined with the Resolutions of 1799, again genteel, but firm and decisive.

Vol. 1-11.