[EXPLOSION OF THE TURKISH ADMIRAL'S SHIP.]

We shall dispense with a detail of | the circumstances connected with this celebrated battle, previously to the arrival of the Egyptian fleet in the Morea. This fleet consisted of ninety-two sail, including forty-one transports, eleven of which were armed. It contained two ships of the line, of eighty-four guns; twelve frigates, four of which carried sixty-four guns, besides corvettes, schooners, and fire-ships. The most formidable part of it was composed entirely of Egyptian vessels, organized on the European system, and manned with newly-trained crews. It had on board five thousand troops, a large sum of money for their regular payment, and several French officers to conduct their operations. The fleet sailed from Alexandria in the beginning of August, and after touching at VOL. I.

Candia, appeared at Navarino in the end of the month. The British squadron, under the command of Admiral Codrington, was off that harbour when it approached; but the admiral was ignorant of the refusal of the Porte to accede to the armistice-a refusal which, in fact, had not yet been given; and he had not received the instructions which were to be consequent only on that event. He hailed, however, the Egyptian commander, informed him of the negociations going on at Constantinople, and offered him safe conduct, if he thought proper to order his fleet back to Alexandria. If, on the contrary, he thought proper to enter the harbour of Navarino, he would be permitted to do so without molestation; but, if any of his vessels ventured out, they would be driven back. The

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Egyptian commander chose the latter al-out the instructions of his sovereign; that ternative, and entered Navarino, where he had directed the Capitana Bey to rethe fleet from Constantinople was pre-enter the port, but that he would sail viously at anchor.

with his whole fleet, whenever he received orders to do so; and, without regarding the combined forces of the allies, would expose himself to every danger, however great, in doing the duty of a general determined to execute the instructions of his government. The French squadron having joined on the 22nd, Admiral de Rigny, to convince him that there was no difference of opinion among the allies, sent him a communication in the same terms with that which had been previously transmitted by Sir Edward Codrington; and the two admirals further requested a personal interview with him. The conference took place on the 25th, in the tent of Ibrahim, each of the admirals having been allowed to enter the harbour with his flag-ship and a frigate.

Ibrahim, having landed his new troops, and re-equipped his old ones, was again ready for active hostilities in the north of the Morea, and determined to order round part of the fleet to the gulph of Patras: but it was impossible for the European admirals, especially after the known refusal of the Porte to accede to the armistice, to allow a single ship to leave the harbour for any such purpose. On the 19th of September, however, Ibrahim, desirous probably to ascertain how the British squadron, the only one that had remained before Navarino, would behave towards him, sent out a division of the Turkish fleet, under the command of the Capitana Bey. The English commander, seeing this movement, sent a frigate to request the Turkish commander to put They declared to him, that they had reback, adding, that, in case of resistance, ceived from their courts the most precise he would compel him by force. The instructions to stop the effusion of blood, Capitana Bey replied, "That he was sur- and that they would reduce, by force, prised at such a threat, and that he had either of the two belligerent parties that no orders to receive, except from Ibrahim, should refuse to accede to it; that the to whom he would refer." The English Greeks had already accepted the armisadmiral, on learning this resolution, sent tice; and that, if he resolved to continue one of his officers to Ibrahim with a let- hostilities, he would expose his fleet and ter, informing him that, in consequence the most essential interests of his soveof a treaty between England, France, and reign. After listening with great comRussia, the allied powers had agreed to posure and attention, the Pacha answerunite their forces to hinder all convey-ed, that, as a servant to the Porte, he had ance of troops, arms, or ammunition, to any part whatever of the Greek continent and the islands; that, to enforce that treaty, they had used the humane foresight to send a considerable force, to weaken all opposition from the Ottoman commanders, whose resistance would lead not only to their own destruction, but to consequences fatal to the interests of the Sultan: he was, therefore, earnestly requested not to oppose a resolution, the execution of which it would be impossible to hinder; for the allied commanders had such orders, that they must come to extremities rather than give up the object for which their sovereigns had united together; and if, on this occasion, a single cannon-shot should be fired at them, it would lead to the ruin of the Ottoman flag. Ibrahim answered by his interpreter, whom he sent on board the English admiral, that he would not begin open hostilities against a friendly nation, with

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received orders to push the war in the Morea, and to finish it by a decisive attack on Hydra; and he would brave every danger to execute these orders. The admirals attempting to represent to him the inefficacy of the means of the Porte, he replied, that he had only to execute the orders of his sovereign, who was the sole judge of the necessity of continuing or terminating the contest, and he would consider as enemies all without distinction, who, under any pretext whatever, should wage an unjust war with his master; that he had no power to listen to the communications made to him, or, of his own authority, to take any part; that, however, the orders of the Porte not having provided for the extraordinary case which now presented itself, he should send couriers to Constantinople and Egypt, and he gave his word, that, till their return, his fleet should not quit Navarino, however hard it was forhim to be

stopped at the moment when all was finished, since the strength of his expedition, such as they saw it, was evidently irresistible by the Greeks. A sort of armistice for twenty days was accordingly concluded, after a long conference; but it seems to have rested on what then passed between the commanders, and not to have been reduced into a formal do

cument.

thousand men to Calamata, another of three thousand men to Arcadia, and prepared to march himself, at the head of a third body, into the district of Maina. His footsteps were marked by blood and desolation. He issued orders to put all to the sword who should be found armed; and in the villages of Maina, where some resistance had been shown, these orders were ruthlessly executed. Continual clouds of fire and smoke rising all round the gulph of Coron, bore frightful testimony to the devastation that was going on. The miserable survivors, who escaped slavery and the sword, sought concealment in caves among the mountains, where women and children were daily dying of absolute starvation; for, even in the plains and around the cities, the war had already produced famine. A morsel of boiled grass was almost the only food within the reach of these miserable people.

Trusting to the engagement which Ibrahim had come under not to quit Navarino till he should have received new instructions from Constantinople, the British and French squadrons had immediately sailed, the former to Zante, the latter to Milo, to obtain a supply of fresh provisions, leaving an English and a French frigate to watch the harbour, and the motions of the Turks. Taking advantage of their absence, Ibrahim, on the 30th of September, before there was time for any answer to have arrived to a request for Admiral Codrington, who had refurther instructions, despatched by him united the squadrons before Navarino, in on the 25th, ventured out to sea, with the the middle of October, having received view of sailing to Patras. An armed an official account of these atrocities brig brought intelligence of this violation from an officer whom he had sent into of the armistice to Admiral Codrington the gulph of Coron to learn what was at Zante, on the 2nd October. The ad- going on, resolved, in conjunction with miral immediately put to sea again with his colleagues, to put a stop to them, if his own ship, one frigate, and two brigs, possible. They had already, by flags of the only force which he could then dis- truce, made many unavailing remonstranpose of. He soon discovered a part of ces to Ibrahim against his violent prothe Turkish fleet, sailing along the coast ceedings; they had urged and advised of the Morea; composed of seven fri-him to return with his own fleet to Alexgates, nine corvettes, two brigs, and nineteen transports; all the ships of war were Turkish. He sent a message to the Turkish commander, expressing his surprise at such a breach of faith, and telling him, that he was ready to oppose by force the passage of the Ottoman squadron, the British ships, at the same time, clearing for action. The Turks immediately tacked about, escorted by the English vessels. In a short time a second division appeared, composed of six frigates and eight brigs. The same summons was followed by the same result, and the whole Turkish fleet then returned into the harbour of Navarino.

Disappointed in his attempt at naval operations, Ibrahim proceeded to execute his orders to put down the insurrection on land; and, irritated perhaps by his disappointment, he executed them mercilessly with fire and sword. On the 19th October, he marched a corps of six

andria, and send the Turkish to Constan tinople, to which they would present no hindrance; they had exhausted their means of persuasion and conciliation. All these endeavours, however, had, they said, "been treated as mockeries, and the troops of the pacha were continuing a species of war more destructive and exterminating than before, putting women and children to the sword, burning their habitations, and tearing up trees by the roots, in order to complete the devastation of the country.” As these proceedings were directly contrary to the object of the treaty of London, the enforcing of an armistice de facto, in all events, which object the fleets were intrusted to carry into execution, the three admirals came to be of opinion, that they had only one of three courses to adopt. These courses, they said, were, "first, the continuing throughout the whole of the winter, a blockade, difficult, expensive, and per

haps useless, since a storm might disperse | the squadrons, and afford to Ibrahim the facility of conveying his destroying army to different points of the Morea and the islands: secondly, the uniting the allied squadrons in Navarino itself, and securing by this permanent presence the inaction of the Ottoman fleets; but which mode alone would lead to no termination, if the Porte persisted in not changing its system: thirdly, the proceeding to take a position with the squadrons in Navarino, in order to renew to Ibrahim propositions, which, entering into the spirit of the treaty, were evidently to the advantage of the Porte itself." This last proposition seemed just to mean that they would enter the harbour, and renew to Ibrahim their demands that he should desist from his military enterprises, under the alternative that, if he refused, they would attack and destroy his fleet; for, if they merely "took a position with the squadrons in Navarino," without opening their guns, they merely brought themselves into the circumstances of the second alternative. This last mode was the one which they unanimously agreed to adopt, in the hope "that it might produce a determination leading to the desired object, without the effusion of blood, and without hostilities, but simply by the imposing presence of the squadrons." Their entrance, therefore, was to be with a hostile intention; the enemy was to yield to the actual application of force, if he resisted the imposing display of it: and if they entered the harbour resolved to fire on Ibrahim's ships in the event of his saying no, then was Ibrahim, determined as he probably was to say "no," perfectly justified in keeping them, if he could, out of the harbou, by the same means by which they intended to constrain him, when they should have gotten in. Their first movement towards the habour was a hostile

act.

The admirals having adopted this plan on the 18th October, proceeded to carry it into effect on the 20th. At two o'clock in the afternoon, the combined fleets passed the batteries to take up their anchorage, formed in the order of sailing in two lines; the British and French squadrons forming the weather or starboard line, and the Russian squadron the lee line. The Turkish ships were moored in the form of a crescent; the larger ones pre

senting their broadsides towards the cen-
tre, the smaller ones in succession within
them, filling up the intervals. The Asia,
which carried Admiral Codrington's flag,
led in, followed by the Genoa and Al-
bion, and anchored close alongside a ship
of the line, bearing the flag of the Capi-
tana Bey, another ship of the line, and a
large double-banked frigate; each of the
three British ships having thus her proper
opponent in the front line of the Turkish
fleet. The four ships to windward, part
of the Egyptian squadron, were allotted
to the squadron of Rear-Admiral de
Rigny; and those to leeward, in the
bight of the crescent, were to mark the
stations of the whole Russian squadron
|—the ships of their line closing those of
the English line, and being followed up
by their own frigates. The French fri-
gate Armide was directed to place her-
self alongside the outermost frigate, on
the left hand entering the harbour; the
Cambrian, Glasgow, and Talbot were
next to her, and abreast of the Asia, Ge-
noa, and Albion; the Dartmouth and the
Musquito, the Rose, the Brisk, and the
Philomel, were to look after six fire-
vessels at the entrance of the harbour.

As the Admiral's first object was only to have the enemy's fleet within his grasp, and then, before laying hold of it, to make his propositions to Ibrahim, orders were given, that not a gun should be fired, unless the Turks should begin; and these orders were strictly observed. The three English ships were accordingly permitted to pass the batteries, and to moor, without any act of open hostility, although there was evident preparation making for it in all the Turkish ships; but, upon the Dartmouth sending a boat to one of the fire-ships, the Turks, probably imagining that the boat was approaching for the purpose of boarding, fired, and a lieutenant and several of her crew were killed by a discharge of musketry. Upon this the Dartmouth, and the flag-ship of the French admiral, opened with musketry in return. This was followed by the French admiral receiving a cannon-shot from one of the ships, to which the Frenchman answered with his broadside-and thus the battle, apparently without plan or design, became general. Moharem Bey, the commander of the Egyptian ships, appeared anxious to put a stop to the confusion. Though his ship was

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