CHAPTER XIV THE ORDER IN COUNCIL OF MARCH, 1915 HE attention of the reader has been THE called to the German Declaration of February 4, 1915, which initiated the socalled submarine blockade, and to certain British correspondence and acts anterior thereto. Before dismissing the action of the Kaiser's Government, which the latter appears to have based upon a certain necessity induced by the activities of the British fleet, and the "toleration" of neutrals, it should be said: I. That no dereliction of a belligerent or neutral could justify the extraordinary features which threatened to make the submarine, as used, a frightful and irrational innovation to the terrors of war. That aside from other characteristics required to make blockade legitimate, the German submarine fleet, far from effectively dominating the waters in which the Imperial Government has pushed its retaliating and military measures against England, which would have been requisite to secure the attention of neutrals, have done little more than maintain a precarious footing. 3. That neutrals were and are under no obligation to pay any attention to the German Admiralty's proclamation of February 4th, because no principle of law outside that of blockade appears to exist or has been advanced in modern times by which a belligerent can close uncontrolled sections of the high seas to neutral vessels without raising a casus belli. With this brief discussion of the extraordinary campaign which Germany is conducting in seas through which all neutrals have a right of way, we turn to the British Orders in Council, transmitted by the American Ambassador March 15, 1915, after a preliminary notice from Sir Cecil Spring Rice dated March 1st. It will be remembered that a simultaneous decree was issued by the French Ministry. Obviously the action taken by the Allies is the direct result of the natural endeavor of these belligerents to meet a situation which was most exasperating. With the opening of the war they had found Germany to be reasonably independent of the commerce between her own and American ports. Advantageously located for war exigencies, she could practically lock up her own harbors and receive such imports as were needed through adjacent neutral countries. Such action negatived much of the offensive value of Great Britain's armored fleets, and could not be permitted. Plans were therefore devised by the adaptation of familiar principles to shut off all merchandise reaching Germany and Austria-Hungary through neutral intermediaries. These comprehended: I. A pushing of the doctrine of contraband to such a limit as would make it possible to detain contraband whether bound to enemy ports or consigned to neutrals who might easily transship it. 2. The seizure of neutral ships within given waters and the taking of such craft to suitable allied harbors for rigid investigation, on the ground that they might have contraband concealed. It is not surprising that such measures shortly after they were adopted did much to discourage the greater part of the trade which Germany had built up. With every neutral vessel, wherever bound, under the suspicion of carrying a consignment for the enemy, and of concealing contraband so cleverly as to require a more particular search than can be effected outside of a suitable anchorage, a belligerent fleet can work havoc both with the enemy and neutrals. It will be recalled that when the United States took exception it was politely pointed out by Great Britain that precedents of the Supreme Court justified the continuous voyage theory; and that ships had become so large that (if, for instance, they carried contraband copper concealed in cotton bales) they could not safely be examined in deep water-arguments which were not accepted as convincing. As for the enemy, which appeared to have been badly crippled by the adoption of such measures, something positive seemed necessary, and the submarine terror was inaugurated, only to bring in retaliation the definite Order in Council of March 15th, already referred to. This purports to be a blockade, but is not, as was immediately noted by the State Department of the United States. Referring to Germany, the British declaration recites: "Her opponents therefore are driven to frame retaliatory measures in order in their turn to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany"; and adds, after noting that a humane method of enforcement will be adopted, "It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable to condemnation." To which, as part of a longer note, the United States properly replied March 5th: "While |