every man and woman that we are endowed with a free will by which, in the proper exercise of the power of volition, we may reject the evil and choose the good.

Assuming as I have been compelled to do in attempting to solve the problem of human life, that the living entity within our material bodies, -life, soul, mind and spirit,-constitutes an organism which is the complete counterpart of the physical structure, it has necessarily led me into several new principles of metaphysical psychology involving distinctions not hitherto recognized by religious metaphysicists in their attempts to refute materialism on the basis of the soul's existence. As my view of the soul, mind, and life thus makes them in combination a real incorporeal organism, I am necessarily obliged to attach to such structure the qualities of form, size, dimension, appearance, etc., the same as we apply to the corporeal body. Former writers, not recognizing this incorporeal organism, have confounded the vital and mental entity, called the soul, with its attributes or operations, such as love, grief, hope, fear, anger, etc., and because the qualities of size, form, and appearance would surely not be applicable to grief, joy, hope, fear, etc., they have fallen into the grave error of supposing that these properties are equally inapplicable to man's mental and vital entity itself. They have even tried to show this by asking the question, as if to ridicule the idea of the form of the soul, is grief square or hexagonal? Is joy round or triangular? Is hope oblong or octagonal? etc., thus making no distinction whatever between the soul and its operations or attributes. Such want of discrimination is hardly conceivable in great writers, but it is a fact. Even the usually careful metaphysical reasoner, Joseph Cook, may be cited as one who has fallen into this very error. I will quote a single passage in which this absence of all proper distinction between the vital and mental entity of our being and its operations or attributes prominently occurs:

"When Cæsar saw Brutus stab, and muffled up his face at the foot of Pompey's statue, was his grief round, or square, or triangular? [Laughter.]" "When Lincoln, by a stroke of his pen manumitted four million slaves, was his choice hexagonal or octagonal?" "These questions show that the terms which we apply to matter are totally inapplicable and meaningless when applied to mind."-Lectures on Biology, page 224. In " mind," in this quotation, he evidently includes soul, life, spirit, since on page 154 he says: "Only matter and mind exist in the universe," and as soul is not matter, it must be embraced under the general division of "mind." Now, is it logical, not to use a stronger word, to teach that because a property of the soul is without form, being neither "square" nor" round," nor "triangular," that the soul itself is formless and bodiless, having no shape or appearance, could our eyes be illumined so as to see it? This eminent lecturer could just as readily and logically have proved that a bar of iron is without size or shape, and thus have shown that form is "totally inapplicable and meaningless when applied to it, because its density or fusibility is neither long, square, nor hexagonal! He could with the same

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philosophical and metaphysical perspicacity have held a strip of wood in his hand, and declared to his audience that shape or size is "totally inapplicable and meaningless" as applied to it, since its combustibility is neither big nor little, neither straight nor crooked! Suppose he were exhibit ing an India rubber ball to his audience, and should use no finer discriminating power in distinguishing between the properties of that body and the body itself than he did between the soul and its properties, he might be expected to reason something like this, varying the quotation slightly: "When I hold this ball in my hand and compress it between my fingers, you observe that form or size is totally inapplicable and meaningless when applied' to it, because its elasticity is neither round, nor square, nor triangular. [Laughter.]"

I forbear to comment upon the appropriateness or real drift of this "laughter," not knowing whether the audience detected or overlooked the truly laughable character of the reasoning. It is thus entirely clear that the logic of our greatest metaphysicists which ignores an incorporeal organism, and would thus deny form to our vital and mental entity because its qualities or properties of grief and joy, hope and fear, are not of a certain shape, must also deny form to all material bodies because their known properties, such as hardness, density, elasticity or malleability are not square, flat, six-sided, straight or crooked.

To make this distinction still plainer, if possible, we ought to observe that the properties of all bodies or substances, like their motions, are not entitative, being merely the name which we give to a condition or re'ation of a thing and not a name applied to the thing itself. Thus, the properties of the soul or the attributes of the mind cannot have an entitative existence any more than can the qualities or properties of a material body, such as its ductility or fusibility; or any more than can its motions, which exist only in name, being our mode of designating its acts in changing from one position to another. So grief, love, joy, anger, etc., are but modes of motion of our incorporeal, vital, and mental organism, and in no sense are they an entitative part of the organism itself, any more than is the hardness of the diamond an entitative factor or part of this gem. I trust the reader grasps the metaphysical and philosophical distinctions here pointed out.

But there are other classes of psychological facts or principles growing legitimately out of this view of an internal vital and mental organism, and which have an unanswerable bearing against materialism, facts which no metaphysicist, who does not recognize such an incorporeal structure or psychical organism, has any right to use or can use. I refer, in the first place, to the fact that in the darkest night, with our bodily eyes closed, we can clearly see with the eyes of our mental and vital organism objects and forms as distinctly and vividly as we might behold the same things with our corporeal eyes, and in broad day light. Yea, more vividly and distinctly. And this is not to be explained on the principle of memory, since, as every inventor knows, new machines, never seen before by

mortal eye, have been figured out and their working parts all seen to operate with the utmost distinctness by the psychical and mental eyes alone, as a real prophetic vision of what is afterward put into corporeal form. Tell such an inventor that his vital and mental entity is organless,that the soul is sightless, even with the physical orbs extinguished,-and he will pronounce you an ignoramus, incapable of properly analyzing your own mental workings. If our vital and mental being is not an organism, then how does the soul possess eyes with which it sees even more acutely than with the external organs, and can behold every wheel of a complex chronometer, even through its case, a thing impossible to do by means of the physical sense of sight?

The same thing is true of the other senses. We can hear sounds with our psychical and mental ears that we never heard through the physical tym. panic membrane. Take the musical composer as an example. He lies in his room surrounded with darkness, and when all is still as the chamber of death. His thoughts turn to his art and to his favorite employment. He touches the keys of his piano with the fingers of his soul and feels them tremble under the touch as truly and as substantially as if his corporeal digits pressed the veritable ivories. He sees upon the music sheet before him the staves and bars and notes as vividly as he ever saw them with his bodily eyes, and, what is more, he sees new combinations of notes that never existed before; and lastly, he hears the strains of the new music with his psychical ears, and which make an impression upon his mind so imperishable that the next morning he goes to his piano and plays the new concerto from memory, and writes down every note just as the fingers of his soul felt them, the eyes of his soul saw them, and the ears of his soul heard them, and in the original production of which neither his corporeal fingers, eyes nor ears had anything to do. If the soul be not an organism, how can such mental and psychical phenomena as these be accounted for?

In reading the metaphysical arguments of our greatest reasoners, drawn from the analogies in Nature, aimed to meet and break down materialism by demonstrating the existence of the soul, how often have we felt the utter weakness of the logic, and seen the whole chain of reasoning fall into a mass of broken links for the want alone of this rational view of the problem of human life which makes the soul the "inner man," constituting it a substantial organism as real in form, outline, and detail of structure as is the veritable organic body that we see with our physical eyes and handle with our physical hands! I reluctantly refer again to the lectures of Joseph Cook, only as an explicit illustration of the point I am making and by which to impress it upon the mind of the reader, and not in any way to disparage the valuable services of this great worker in psychological science and religious philosophy. In his Lectures on Biology he employs the following analogical argument to prove the existence of the soul as a distinct entity, separate from, and external to, the brain. The reasoning is like this: The eye cannot see without the aid of light-an agent wholly external. The ear cannot hear without the aid of sound

So the brain, being

an agent wholly external. inert, cannot think without the aid of the soulan agent equally external. And as the destruction of the eye does not destroy the external agent, light; or the destruction of the ear does not destroy the external agent, sound; so the destruction of the brain does not destroy the external agent, soul. And to show the importance of this analogical argument in support of the substantial nature of the soul, he refers to Dr. Beale, author of the great work on Bioplasm, Dr. Draper, Hermann Lotze, and others who have used this same analogy in support of the immortality of the soul.

To a casual reader this illustration seems severely logical and conclusive, but when carefully examined under the "logical microscope," as Mr. Cook is in the habit of doing, it is seen to be incurably lame at every joint, and out of which Prof. Huxley could crush the life with his thumb-nail, and show that, in every feature, it is directly favorable to materialism. This I propose to allow him to do, but let me first quote the exact words of the lecturer:

"26. As, therefore, from the structure of the eye, we may infer the existence of a wholly external agent, light, or from that of the ear, the existence of a wholly external agent, sound, so, because of the absolute inertness of the cerebral structure in itself, we must attribute its activities to an agent as external to it as sound is to the ear, or light to the eye." "That agent is the soul."

"30. As the dissolution of the eye does not destroy the light, the external agent which acts upon it; and as the dissolution of the ear does not destroy the pulsations of the air, the external agent which acts upon it; so the dissolution of the brain does not destroy the soul, the external agent which sets it in motion. [Applause.]”—Biology, pp. 181, 182.

To all of which Prof. Huxley would reply: Though the dissolution of the eye does not destroy the external light, yet it does destroy the power of seeing; and of what use would light be if the sense of seeing were obliterated? And though the dissolution of the car does not destroy external sounds, yet it does destroy the power of hearing; and of what use would sound be if the sense of hearing were obliterated? And though the dissolution of the brain may not destroy that non-atomic etherial enswathement, called soul, yet it does destroy the power of thinking and feeling; and of what use would such an enswathement be with all thought and feeling obliterated?"

"And again," Prof. Huxley continues, "you make light an agent external to the eye, and sound an agent external to the ear, as soul is an agent external to the brain. Now, you admit that both light and sound, according to all established principles of science, are mere modes of motion, one of the particles of ether and the other of the particles of air, and that neither of them are substantial entities. This is plain by your speaking of sound as 'pulsations of the air.' The only conclusion, then, from this analogy is, that the soul, the agent external to the brain is also a mode of motion and not a substance of any kind, being merely the complicated motion of

or doubted by a single scientific writer for 2,500 years, or since its origination in the time of Pythagoras.

The truth is, the wave-theory-or, as it is popularly known, the undulatory theory -of sound has been so long in existence with no one to question its correctness, that modern physicists have been in the habit of accepting it, handed down from generation to generation, with all its unspeakable difficulties, as a kind of legacy bequeathed from scientists of the past; and, with an acquiescence unparalleled in the annals. of physical investigations, have labored to explain its inexplicable contradictions and reconcile its infinite absurdities, with a patient persistence which a love of science can alone inspire. Hence it is that no physicist has had the hardihood, if he had the originality, to cut loose from the ancient landmarks of the theory, or to venture an hypothesis to take its place. The writer of these chapters is a solitary -possibly an unfortunate-exception, the result of whose venture the following pages will disclose.

I will only extend these introductory remarks here by adding that I have not ignored the important fact in thus attempting to revolutionize the theory of Sound, that I have to meet face to face the powerful intellectual abilities of such physicists as Helmholtz, Tyndall, Kuntz, Blacerna, Mayer, and a host of others, either one of whom, when it comes to the investigation of questions relating to physical science, is sufficient to make a cautious writer quail and hesitate, and even repudiate the deliberately formed convictions of his own. judgment. This was the actual impression on my own mind for many months before putting pen to paper, even after I had become thoroughly satisfied in reading, experimenting, and investigating, that the

visionary, having not a single correctly understood fact of science on which to rest. I have at last thrown off my natural timidity and hesitancy, and, though the combat may be mortal on my side, I shall not have proved the first one who has immolated himself upon the altar of his scientific convictions.

It should be observed that Sir Isaac Newton held to the substantial or corpuscular theory of light, but which he was finally forced to abandon for the undulatory theory based upon the supposed existence of an intangible ether filling interstellar space, for which, by the way, not one scintilla of scientific proof exists. It was claimed by Newton's opponents that the refraction of light could be more easily explained by waves of some kind of substance, and hence this wonderful ether was invented to meet the trouble. Was there ever, before, such a trifling scientific difficulty magnified into such importance as actually to require the invention of a substance filling all space to meet it? (Query. Why do not scientists invent a substantial God filling all space to account for ten thousand times greater difficulties in Na-. ture? Is it because the natural heart is at enmity against God, but not against ether?) Had Newton thought of the simple fact that light is generated in pulses or waves by the incandescent tremor of luminous bodies, he need not to have been

driven from his ground; for surely a wave of substantial light itself will just as readily explain refraction as a wave of this supposed ether! What was the use of inventing an all-pervading substance out of which to construct wave-motion, when substantial light, emitted in pulses or waves (as it really is), accomplishes the same result?

Sound is a parallel phenomenon every way we can view it, as it is well known to every scientific student that it was only the universally acknowledged fact that sound-phenomena resulted from the supposed undulatory motion of the air, which