Would not the demand of the civil and military adininistration of the country, though positively refused by the nabob, be a violation of the treaty of 1798, noarrears of subsidy being against him-1 think the concluding line of the treaty gives a satisfactory answer to that question.

If the Nabob paid not only regularly the seventy-six lacs of rupees, but any demand made for troops that were introduced to repel foreign invasion, do you think the company under any pretext, under the treaty, could demand territorial cession? -I know no ground upon which the company could demand territorial cession, but as a security for making good the pecuniaty stipulations in the treaty, after failure in the discharge of them. Withurew.

After a few minutes, the committee was resumed; and his lordship was again called in.

Your lordship has stated, that under the seventh article of the treaty concluded by your lordship with the nabob vizier, the nabob was bound to pay the expense incurred by posting any number of troops in Qude beyond the number of thirteen thousand men?-Ycs.

In what manner would that expense have been calculated; would not the estimate of the expense of those troops have been calculated upon the full complement of officers and men, and horses, and have included the average annual expense

of arins, accoutrements, bandings,

houses, and every other contingent exe?--I never considered that question, pense but I think I should have demanded from the nabob the actual expense of those

troops.

Should you have included the average annual expense of arms, accoutrements, buildings, houses, and every other contingent expense?-1 should not have considered the arms and accoutrements, but the pay and bactà of the soldiers; I do not believe that those things were ever part of the calculation at any period ;' I should have looked probably to have seen how the expenses had been charged to the nabob; when the brigade was charged at two lacs, 60,000 Sacca rupees per month; whether that included arms and acoutrements or not, I cannot say; but should have made the deinand probaably according to that precedent.

Can your lordship give the committee

an account of the state of the admini stration of the nabob's of Oude?-I would rather speak generally as to what I

know of it; all the papers printed by the house sufficiently shew what the state of that country was, that its administration was exceedingly bad in all the depart ment, the whole administration was as bad as it well could be in all its departments, and it was the perpetual object of government to prevail on the rabob to make a change in his administration; lord Cornwallis had attempted it, and it was equally urged by the governufent abroad and the company at hoine.

Have the goodness to state its general operations in the civil, financial, judicial, and military branches of the government, and whether the defects your lordship alludes to appeared in them ?-In the civil, financial, and judicial, most certainly; with respect to the military I know less, but I believe a great part of the military was a very disorderly rabble, requiring reformation as much as any other.

How were the people disposed towards the government of Oude?-1 really had very little opportunity of forming an opinion on that subject; they submitted as they would have done to any government. I do not suppose they could have much attachment to a government of that

kind.

Could the ordinary operations of govern ment have been carried on in any part of Oude without the support and interference of the nabob's military in every concern? With respect to the collection of the revenue the military were always employed, and to enforce authority in most

instances.

Inform the committee in what state was the nabob's military force when your lordship was in Oude, and whether to be depended upon either as an efficient body, or a body in whose fidelity reliance could be placed in the moment of danger ?—I should have very little opinion of them as an efficient body on account of their discipane, but whilst the company's troops were stationed in Oude, I should not have doubted their allegiance, excepting in the event of a powerful foreign invasion. in which case I think it probable some of them might join the invader.

Does not your lordship consider that the 12th article of the treaty which your lordship concluded with th aabob Saadut Ali in 1798, gave to the British government the right to require the nabob of Oude to reduce the military establishments to a scale as low as might be deemed necessary for the tety of both powers?I have already answered in part that ques tion, how tar I thought the company's interference,

terference, and to what object necessary, I stated in the explanation which I gave to council in my minute of the 5th of March, and I would rather refer to the opinion I gave to them, as more distinct than any thing I could give on recollection. I state there, that the 12th article of the treaty authorized the interference, on the part of the Company, in the reduction of the superfluous charges of the public establishment, servants, &c.; in order to secure the payment of the subsidy. I considered the reduction of the nabob's troops in some degree certainly necessary to enable him to pay his subsidy, and I thought the company authorized to interfere in advising the carrying that measure into

execution.

Does your lordship conceive that the clause of the 17th article of the same treaty, viz. that the same nabob shall possess full authority over his household affairs, hereditary dominions, his troops, and his subjects, was intended to prevent the company's government from requiring the nabob to make such reductions of his military establishments as might be deemed advisable, or to interfere, by their advice or remonstrance, in every affair of his government in which it might be deemed expedient to interfere, according to the orders of the company?-Taking the two articles of the treaty, the 12th and the 17th, I have already stated how far I thought the company's interference under the 12th article of the treaty might go; that the interference to the extent I have mentioned, was not precluded by the last clause, but relative to interference gerally under the treaty, what I considered was this; that, for the purpose of prevailing on the nabob to introduce order into his administration, I should have thought the company intitled to interfere by advice, representation, and remon strance; that had been the invariable practice of the government; but that the internal administration of his affairs was to remain entirely with the nabob, without any interference by the company: that was the principle settled by lord Cornwallis in 1787, and was strictly adhered to. The most pointed instance of my own interference which occurs to me, was in my attempts to prevail on Asoph ul Dowlah to dismiss a very worthless person who, without the name or appointment of the minister of Oude, executed the duties of that office with absolute power, and in a manner equally injurious to the interest of the nabob and the prosperity

of the country. He did submit to that at my importunity.

Does not your lordship conceive, that the 11th article of the treaty of 1798, gave to the British government a right to require from the nabob's of Oude such security as should be satisfactory for the discharge of existing arrears, and for the regular payment of the rents due; by existing arrears, mean arrears whether for the troops stationed in his country_under the second article of the treaty, or for any troops stationed there for the defence of Oude beyond the number of thirteenthousand men?-This article, in its primary signification, had certainly only a reference to the stipulation of seventysix lacs of rupees; and they certainly were authorized by it to require security in the event of failure on the part of the nabob; and the nature of that security was left to the company's opinion. With respect to security for an increased force, I should think the principle of the treaty might be fairly applied to such a case; but as I said before, whether I should think it right whether to demand that increase all at once, I should certainly say that I should regulate my demand with a view both to the nabob's and the company's convenience.

Does not your lordship conceive that the sum of fifty lacs of rupees per annum,. in addition to seventy-six lacs of rupees per annum, which the nabob had bound himself to pay by the third article of the treaty of 1798, formed an amount which it would have been difficult for the nabob of Oude to realize from the country, and to pay to the company, under the existing defects in his administration, without the extensive reform of the civil and military establishments and expenses of the nabob's government?-Certainly, I think a very extensive reform would have been necessary to enable him to pay that additional

sum.

Your lordship, I believe, was acquainted with colonel Scott?—I had the honour of knowing him very well.

State to the committee your opinion of his character? Of his public character, and his character as an officer; by officer I do not mean simple military officer, but an officer of government, I had the highest opinion of his integrity and ability; I can so far speak the opinion of lord Cornwallis of his merit: when I returned to Bengal in 1793, I recollect lord Cornwallis telling me he regretted he had not been sooner so well acquainted

with the merit of colonel Scott as he was at that time.

Whether you do not think, according to the description you have given of the distresses of the country, that the sum of fifty lacks of rupees, in addition to the seventy-six, was an excessive demand made upon the nabob?-What the state of the country was in 1801 I know not, because I left the country in March, 1798; if the country was not improved between March, 1798 and 1851, it certainly would have required very extensive reforms to enable the nabob to pay that

sum.

Supposing the country not to have improved, would not that demand be an unreasonable demand ?—I should have thought it would have been a demand very difficult for the nabob to pay.

Would that not have been a demand contrary to the treaty?-The only justifiable grounds upon which the demand for the increase of subsidy could be made, whether five fes or fifty, would arise from the additional number of men above the thirteen thousand stationed in that country; with respect to the nabob's cupa city to pay it; I can only say if the country, in 1851, was in the same state as in 1798, he would not have been able to pay it without large reforms of his military and Civil establishments.

You have already stated, that the seventy six lacs was a considerable sum, and that it would have required very extensive reforms of his military and civil establishments to pay that sum ?--I do not think I sad very extensive, but certainly it would have required some reforms.

Whether, when you examined into the right to the musnud, you entered into the examination in virtue of the general authority you found yourself possessed of, arising out of the dependence of Oude on the British government ?—I considered that the government, from their situation, were competent to be arbitrators of the right of succession to Oude; the origin of my enquiry, I think, was suggested by information which I received from the late minister, Tofuzzal Hussein Khan, when I was at Juanpore; on my approach to Oude, on the grounds of that information stated in the papers before the house, I thought it my duty to make the enquiry which I did; it was a case which seemed to be unconnected with any positive treaties.

State your opinion what the right was on which you thought the British govern

ment possessed of the right to arbitrate on the succession to Oude?-The connection between the two countries was such, that the company were forced to assume the authority of doing it; it was impossible to leave the country in the disordered state in which it would have been, the possessions of the nabob and of the company aje so identified, that their interests could not be separated.

Was not the hope you formed that the arrangement you formed with Saadut Ali by treaty would be permanent and answer the purpose for which it was intended, founded on an expectation that great retrenchments would be made by the nabob, and a better system of administration introduced into his dominions?—I was in hopes considerable retrenchments would have taken place, I principally depended on the economical habits of Sandut Ali, which I thought would induce him to retrench every expense he could, and that the necessity was so apparent to him, he would set himself to correct every abuse in the administration; I had no reason to doubt that the arrangements would be, permanent.

After the conclusion of that treaty, and the obligations the nabob was under to pay a considerable subsidy, notwithstanding the article which has been alluded to, if there was any great probability of the na bob's failure in the payment of the subsidy, in case he did not make those retrenchments which you expected him to make, to enable him to fulfil the subsidy, should you not have thought it a matter of duty to have demanded from him some other security, notwithstanding he had not fallen into arrear? If he had not fallen into arrear I should cenanly not have thought the treaty authorised any demand for a security until he failed.

Not specifically under the treaty, but under the general duty of governor-gene, ral presiding over India?--I will endeavour to explain to the house my Idea; I think Saadut Ali would have a right to expect to be treated in the same way as his predecessors; arrears had been incurred of two or three months by his predecessor, or perhaps four months. I should think he would expect to be treated with the same kind of indulgence as his predecessor had; with respect to demand for security, I think that demandable under no other circumstances than the actual failure of the nabob.

You

pany's having been so put to that increased expense, you thought it necessary to call on the vizier to make an increased payment to the company in consequence of increased expenses ?-I do not think any demands was made on the vizier for those increased expenses; at the same time the company's records would show whether it was or was not.

Probably your lordship may recollect that in the beginning of the year 1796, when you proceeded to Lucknow, there was an apprehension that Zemaun Shah intended to invade Hindostan, and he had advanced to Lahore, in consequence of that some of our troops were called forth, and no doubt an increased expense was incurred at that time; was any increased demand made upon the vizier at that time, as far as your lordship knows? -That was in the latter end of 1796, because I have a recollection that Zemaun Shah went back from Lahore the very day I left Calcutta ; I believe no demand was made on the nabob on that occasion, I do not recollect to what extent the troops were put in motion, or what were the expenses.

Did your lordship ever neglect to demand from the vizier any sums justly due from him to the company ?-I do not recollect that ever I did, but I remember when lord Cornwallis formed the treaty, or rather entered into an engagement with Hyder Beg Khan on the part of Saadut, there were considerable sums

due from the nabob, which lord Cornwallis relinquished at that time.

Your lordship was of opinion the country of Oude was defective in the administration of the revenues, and of the civil and judicial branches of the government; does your lordship think the state of Oude was materially different from that of every other Mohammedan government, either that of the Nizam's or that of Nugiff Khan ?--I do not recollect any thing of Nugiff Khan's government; with respect to the nizam's, that was very bad; I cannot state how far, that was better or worse; but I have no doubt in general the Mohammedan governments are badly administered.

Is not the administration adopted in Ou le the same as in the other parts of the Peninsula of India ?—I think in Oude there was no justice at all; in other countries I think there was a regular, decentlycon lucted court of justice. Justice was at the arbitrary discretion of the officer employed by the nabob; in some Moham

medan governments their is more attention paid to justice; I believe in the reign of Aurungzebe particularly there

Was.

What I wish to confine myself to, is the governments which have prevailed the last fifty years?-There is the govern ment of the Nizam, the government of the nabob of Arcor, I believe them all to be very bad; I speak positively to my knowledge of the government of Oude, as well as what lord Cornwallis has particularly detailed in the first and second numbers of the papers before the house, of the abuses, as far as they were known

to us.

Your lordship has said, that you had not thought it necessary to make a demand for the increased expenses incurred by the expedition against the Rohillas, nor the troops intended to oppose Zemaun Shah; you have also stated that there is an uncertainty in the treaty previous to your lordship's own treaty, namely, the stipulation with regard to the overplus, or the number of troops below the number stipulated by the treaty; was your lordship induced to refrain from asking for the payment of those extraordinary expenses in consequence of that uncertainty in the treaty ?-I have stated that I do not recollect that any demand was made in either case, either for the expense of the preparations on the apprehensions of Zemaun Shah's coming, or to subdue the Rohillas; but I do not believe that any additional troops were drawn into Oude on either of those occasions; I believe the brigades stationed in Oude were demanded sufficient for the Rohilla War. I believe the company made some addition to their establishment generally, though I do not recollect exactly at what period; I know a proposition had been made by the commander in chief to add to the company's forces, on the grounds that they were hardly sufficient, but I for get how far that was carried into execution.

You have stated that the company were to be the judges of the necessity of increasing the number of troops beyond thirteen thousand, did the nabob vizier understand the treaty in that sense?—I believe he understood it in that sense, for he had it a considerable time in his possession before he signed it. By the treaty, the whole political conduct is left with the company. I conceive the line of distinction to be this: the defence of the country, and the management of the political