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er thirty men less, but I cannot say; I believe it to have been weaker, because I know we invalided from twenty to thirty men every year, exclusive of those lost by death.

In the year 1801, were not some of the officers of the 27th dragoons absent in England?-I really cannot recollect.

Were you not in the habits of examining the abstract of the pay and allowances of every description to the 27th dragoons, in each month, during your stay in India?-I saw them monthly.

You were obliged to sign them, were you not? Yes.

State to the committee, to the best of your recollection, the amount of the abstracts of the pay and allowances of every description in the field to the 27th dragoons?-I cannot charge my memory with every thing of that sort, it depends so much on the strength of the regiment, and a variety of circumstances; having no memorandum, or any thing by me to assist my memory, I would not pretend

to answer.

Can you state to the committee the highest sum you ever knew it in any month during the time of your residing in the field? It is impossible I should answer that question, unless I was really to take pen and ink, and try to calculate, going back to the different allowances; I do not wish to answer a question of that sort by guess.

Can you state the pay and allowances of the 27th British dragoons, during any month, during which you commanded it? -I do not recollect it, and therefore I shall not attempt to say.

Did not your paymaster receive any of the pay and allowances of the corps from the company's paymaster at Cawnpore?-I believe not, unless upon emergency, when he may have received money upon account, which was subsequently accounted for by the paymastergeneral.

You mean, therefore, to state, that the returns were regularly made to the adjutant-general, and by the adjutant-general to the commander-in-chief of the Bengal

army? Do you mean with respect to the pay?

You have stated, that the abstract returns of the strength of the corps were made monthly to the adjutant-general, and by him to the commander-in-chief? -I beg leave to state, no.

State how they were made.-Monthly returns were made of the regiment, that is, of the strength of the corps, including officers and men.

Did it necessarily follow that that return must be sent to England?-As to the necessity of it I cannot say; the rcturns of all armies are transmitted to England, I suppose, that is to say, of the king's troops.

To whom were the returns made, shewing the actual and bona fide sum paid to the 27th dragoons in each month, during its remaining at Cawnpore ?I do not know any thing upon that subject, further than that the abstract was sent by the paymaster of the regiment to the paymaster-general; there was an estimate frequently sent.

To whom was that estimate sent, to the paymaster general of the king's, or of the company's forces?-The paymaster-general of the king's; it was in the shape of an estimate, I believe, in the first instance, because there were casualties frequently occurred in the course of the month, which created an alteration in that account, which, of course, would have required correction at the end of the month, if it had been in any other shape.

Were the yearly accounts of the regi ment sent to the paymaster-general of the king's forces?—I believe the accounts were settled every six months between the company's paymaster and the king's paymaster-general.

Will it appear from those accounts, if they can be produced, what was the actual sum paid to those regiments during any month or year it was in the field?Of course the accounts will speak for themselves; all I know of them, upon the recollection I have of them, is, that they were perfectly correct.

[Withdrew.

REPORT

REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE opinion, and there certainly was a great difference.

APPOINTED TO TAKE THE EXAMINATION OF GENERAL SIR JAMES HENRY CRAIG, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE

OUDE CHARGE.

Jovis 6° die Junii, 18c6. BENJAMIN HOBHOUSE, Esq. in the chair.

Gen. Sir JAMES HENRY CRAIG examined.

In the year 1798 were you not apprehensive of some attack on the part of Zemaun Shah ?-Yes, the reports were so prevalent.

Was not Zemaun Shah considered as the determined enemy of the British in India ? He was always reported so, and I always considered him

So.

Was not the object of his expedition the conquest and destruction of the British possessions in Hindostan ?-I cannot answer that question; we always supposed the object of his invasion to point to the nabob of Oude's dominions; and from thence it was generally supposed, if successful, he would endea vour to penetrate into the British provinces, but that was only our idea from reports.

Did not the principality of Oude lie directly between him and our possessions? It was the most direct road unques tionably, and that road which, from every point of view, we imagined he would have taken; but I believe, though I am not certain, that he might have come another way, by leaving the Jumma to the east, and penetrating through Bunalecund and the Mahratta country.

In order to repel any attack on his part, was it not necessary for our troops to be assembled in Oude?-Unquestionably; I considered it so, and pressed much for their early assembling.

Though there might have been strong reasons for apprehending that the Shah would approach Oude, was it considered as a certainty? Opinions were very much divided; many people thought the Shah never would come so far.

-

Did not some difference of opinion prevail on the subject, both among the officers, and in the government ?I am not aware what passed in the Bengal government, I had no reason to know that any difference existed among the members of the government; with respect to the officers it was all matter of

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Who was appointed to the chief command of the army for opposing Zemaun Shah ?-I was.

Were not the British Forces in Oude considerably augmented ?—Yes, they were.

Did not the nabob's troops also take the field ?-None of the nabob's troops joined the army under my command, though there were some battalions be longing to Almas Ali Cawn; a part of the nabob's troops were however put under the command of general Martin, at my desire, and were employed in guarding the fords and passes of the Ganges; those people were however of little use, as they were reported to me to be mostly unarmed, without clothing, and there was not a gun in that part of the nabob's dominions that was fit for service.

Was that report made by general Martin ?-To the best of my recollection it was made by general Martin; but I forwarded it to the resident, deisring him to lay it before the nabob.

Was the repulsion of Zemaun Shah considered as a common cause between the nabob and the British ?-Undoubt edly; at least the nabob never gave me any cause to suppose otherwise on his part.

Did not the nabob shew the greatest zeal and cordiality in the cause?- He did.

Were those preparations attended with considerable expense both to the company and to the nabob ?- They were; at the same time I must observe, that I had nothing to do with the nabob's expenses; all the expenses of my army were defrayed by the company.

When did the alarm respecting the approach of Zemaun Shah begin?-We had a variety of reports during the summer of 1798, but the first certain accounts that we had were, I believe, in September or October; I rather think October.

When did that alarm subside ?-The accounts of the Shah retiring from La

hore,

hore, which may be considered as his abandonment of his enterprize, reached Anopshire in January, 1799.

When were the preparations to resist the invasion of Zemaun Shaw commenced ?-I do not immediately recollect.

Do you recollect when the preparations ceased?—I marched from Anopshire, and broke up the army within a few days of the end of January, 1799; other services, however, called for a considerable portion of the troops remaining in the nabob's dominions some time longer; by other services, I allude more particularly to the insurrection occasioned by vizier Ali.

Did the British troops return to the British possessions?- By British possessions, I suppose is meant British provinces; some of them did in a short time afterwards, but I really do not recollect the circumstance to answer with all the precision I could wish.

Do you recollect the time at which they returned?-Not exactly.

Considering the object of the invader, the situation of Oude, and the motives which induced the company to make those preparations upon whom did you think that the expense ought to fall?-I am not sufficiently master of the treaties existing between the nabob and us to be able to answer exactly.

What proportion of that expense ought the nabob to pay?-I imagine that must depend upon the treaties which_existed, of which I have already said I am not sufficiently master.

Considering the possession of the important posts of Allahabad, Cawnpore, Futtyghur, and Anopshire, the facilities which are given by the treaty of 1798 to change the cantonments, and to take any positions that might be judged necessary for general defence, as stipulated for in the 9th article, together with the general position of the Bengal army, do you think that the 13,000 British troops,stationed in Oude by the treaty of 1798, were quite sufficient, under proper management, for its complete defence, except upon very extraordinary occasions, such as the threatened invasion by the Shah, and supposing we have nothing to do with the civil government of Oude, and the management of the Country ?-In the ordinary cases of disputes with any of the neighbouring powers, I should have thought it suffi

did

203

cient, but under the formidable attack
threatened by the Shah, I certainly
them sufficient,
not conceive
since I pressed for the army being
augmented to twenty thousand men ;
had the case happened of a war with the
Mahratta confederacy, I should per-
haps have thought an increase equally
expedient.

Considering all those circumstances, do you not think that a force able to oppose any enemy that could be expected on the frontiers of Oude might be assembled in time ?-We had no cantonment at Anopshire; no difficulty_ex-` isted in assembling the troops from Cawnpore and Futtyghur, which could always be done at either cantonment in about five days.

Should you think that it was necessary to maintain constantly in Oude a British force which would be able to repel any attack that could be made upon Oude, such for instance 'as that menaced by Zemaun Shah ?-The Shah's dominions were at so great a distance, that, with the ordinary attention in procuring intelligence of his movements, I think an additional force might have always been procured from the company's provinces.

Ought such an immense force to be maintained at the sole expense of the nabob?-It appears to me that the defraying of the expense must depend upon treaties, of which I have already said I am not sufficient master to judge.

When did you first hear of marquis Wellesley's intention of introducing a change in the affairs of Oude ?—I first heard of the marquis's wish to disband a part of the nabob's army early in December, 1799.

From whom did you hear it?-In a confidential letter from the marquis himself; and I believe on the same day I had a communication to the same purport from colonel Scott.

What were the changes which were to be introduced ?- Early in December I was made acquainted with the marquis's wish to prevail upon the nabob to disband a part of his army, and to substi tute British troops in their room; I also was then made acquainted with a proposal that the nabob had made of abdicating his musnud.

Were these changes to be introduced with the consent of the vizier?—I always understood so.

If

If the vizier's consent could not be obtained, were they not to be introduced without it?-No such intention, that I recollect, was communicated to me.

Did you not think, that to introduce them by force against the vizier's consent, from your knowledge of the country and people, might have been attended with most serious conseqences? I do not think the nabob would have made any opposition to force. It was in consequence of its being thought that the measure of reducing the nabob's army might produce opposition from the troops, that measures of precaution were taken against that.

Did not the marquis state his determination of effecting a complete change in the administration of the affairs of Oude -I have not the marquis's letters here to refer to; but I am not aware that they alluded to any other subject than the reduction of the nabob's army, and the proposal of abdicating, which the nabob had made.

What number of troops did the marquis Wellesley state his intention of introducing into Oude ?—I really do

not remember.

Was there at that time any apprehension of invasion or rebellion? No.

On the contrary, did not a profound quiet prevail at that time? Certainly.

Was there not every reason to believe that this tranquillity would remain undisturbed for a considerable time ?-I do not know that it was any otherwise threatened, except by the menaces of the Shah to return on the following year, but there was no immediate prospect

of it.

Did either the marquis or colonel Scott state a determination of introducing this additional force whether the vizier approved of it or not, and of making him pay the expense of it ? I do not recollect that the marquis entered into any particulars of that nature in his letter to me. I always understood from both of them, that the reduction of the nabob's army was to be by his

consent.

Some time in 1800, did you not go to Lucknow for the express purpose of consulting with colonel Scott about the measures necessary to be adopted in disbanding the nabob's ?-I think it probable I did, but I do not remember; I went frequently to Lucknow.

State, to the best of your recollection, what passed on the subject before referred to, and what was resolved on?My conversations with colonel Scott alluded only to the re-partition to be made of our own troops, with a view to prevent any possible disturbance that might arise from those of the nabob.

Did you not clearly understand from colonel Scott, that the nabob was in the highest degree inimical to the dis banding of his army ?--I understood that he opposed it at first, but I believe he afterwards consented to it. I beg to observe, that I was never consulted by colonel Scott with respect to his intercourse with the nabob; therefore I cannot be supposed to know what passed between them.

Did you not clearly understand, that if he persevered in withholding his consent, the measure notwithstanding was to be carried into effect ?-I do not recollect that any such communication was ever made to me.

Were not those additional troops finally sent ?-Some arrived while I was there; but I believe not all that were intended to be sent.

Did you not receive orders to take the necessary measures for the marching of those troops, particularly those that were to be stationed at Rohilcund?—I sent the troops that were stationed in Rohilcund from Cawnpore and Futtyghur, and of course gave an order for their marching; the others who came from the provinces below, their destination was mostly given by colonel Scott, but in some instances of those I sent the orders.

Knowing the vizier's aversion to the introduction of the troops, was not it suggested to you, by colonel Scott, to make the impostor, Golum Kaudir Khan, the pretext for the marching to Rohilcund? The troops were originally intended to be sent to Rohilcund, by way of securing the tranquillity of that country, which was threatened by the ap proach of a person assuming the name of Golum Kaudia Khan; we certainly had accounts of the dispersion of his followers by Begum Sumroo's troops before they marched, and they were then sent with a view to prevent any disturbance that might arise on the occasion of the disbanding the nabob's troops; but this precaution was taken, upon the supposi tion that the troops themselves would oppose their being disbanded, not that

the

the nabob would, for he had at that time given his consent to it.

How do you know that the nabob had at that time given his consent to it-I always understood that the measure was not begun upon until he had consented; the communication of his having consented must have been from colonel Scott.

In whose name, and by whom, were the orders for the distribution of the British troops, given to you ?—I was ordered to act in concert with colonel Scott, and it was an arrangement made between us.

Were not the British troops scattered in different small detachments almost all over Oude? No, I do not recollect any instance in which they were in smalJer detachments than a battalion, and I remember particularly objecting to their being more divided; they were scattered in different parts of Oude.

Were they not not scattered in that manner in consequence of the instructions which you received ?-Certainly.

From hom did you receive those instructions?- When I say instructions I mean the general instruction of concurring with colonel Scott, and it was in consequence of the arrangements with him.

Did you not subsequently know from colonel Scott, that it was lord Wellesley's fixed determination, if possible, to get the whole of Oude for the company, or failing in that, one half of his dominions, in lieu of the subsidy fixed by the treaty of 1798 ?-Officially, certainly not; and I am pretty confident that colonel Scott never told me so, even in pri

vate conversation.

Do you conceive that detaching an army in that mannner throughout the country, is the best way of disposing troops for the complete defence of Oude, to maintain the spirit and discipline of the Bengal army, such as you knew them to be in 1800?-Certainly not; it would be better to keep them more together.

Were not the troops dispatched in that manner mere for the purpose of overawing the people of Oude, than for the purpose of defending Oude ?-The principal view in detaching them in the way in which they were separated, was to assist in the collection of the revenue, in lieu of the troops who were disbanded; I do not recollect that it was at that time thought necessary to take any precautions against the people of Oude."

Did you not understand that the nabob and the people of Oude were completely intimidated and over-awed by the presence of those troops ?—I do not know that they were.

Was not all Oude completely in the power of those troops?-The troops were masters of the immediate spots where they were stationed, but had I been called on to coerce the people of Oude, I should have kept them in larger todies.

Could the nabob have opposed or resisted the measures of the marquis in Oude, if he had been so disposed ?-I believe the force in Oude was much superior to any opposition the nabob could have made.

What orders did you receive respecting the pay and support of those troops ?-They were paid in the usual manner, with which I had very little to do.

What orders did you give to the officers commanding corps, which

were to march in case the nabob should refuse to grant perwunnahs or orders for the supply of provisions for those additional troops P-1 do not remember that I ever gave any directions upon a case which I did not fancy as likely to hap

pen.

Were those perwunnahs issued, and those troops continued to be supplied during the whole time that you remained in the command in Oude? I do not remember that it happened otherwise.

Were you not informed officially of the disbanding of great numbers of the nabob's troops in consequence of marquis Wellesley's requisitions ?—I have already related the communications I have had upon that subject; colonel Scott generally wrote to me, and the officers reported to me, when the disbanding of the troops was effected.

Were they disbanded in great numbers?-I really do not remember the numbers.

Did the disbanding of the nabob's troops produce considerable discontent and disturbance throughout Oude ?None, that I ever heard of among the people of Oude; the troops, in some instances, expressed discontent, but it was chiefly on account of arrears of pay that they claimed; in one instance, I remember that two battalions set out on their march to Oude to claim their arrears

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