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from the nabob, and I sent troops after them to stop them.

Do you not know that the troops were generally paid by the aumils in the vicinities where they were stationed, and not by the nabob ?— I believe they

were.

Did you not issue orders to enforce the disbanding of the nabob's troops in case there should be any opposition?Generally speaking, colonel Scott gave the orders to the detached battalions; indeed, I believe I might say in every

case.

How far did those orders extend; that is, what degree of compulsion did those order authorize to be used, as far as you know any thing upon the subject?—I do not remember the particulars of the directions; I know it was the intention to use the gentlest means that could carry the purpose into effect; and in general our officers interfered to settle the disputes upon the claims of arrears, although colonel Scott sent a person with the nabob's concurrence, from Lucknow, for the same purpose.

Was not Meer Jaffier the person sent from Lucknow ?-Meer Jaffier was the person sent to Rohilcund.

Although you say that the gentlest means were to be employed, do you not know that, in case of actual resistance, the nabob's troops were actually to be coerced?-In case of actual resistance, I apprehend they would have been forced to obey the nabob's orders.

Were the instructions given to the British officers sanctioned by the vizier, or had they his consent?-I do not know; I referred nothing directly to the vizier; all my communications were with the resident.

Were there any lives lost on either side in disbanding the nabob's army ?-Not that I remember.

During the time employed in disbanding the troops, was the vizier's right of Sovereignty over Oude universally acknowledged?—I do not recollect that I had any reason to suppose other wise.

What is your opinion, in a military point of view, of scattering 15,000 of the Bengal army in small bodies, of from four to six companies, under the command of young officers, or in some cases in single battalions, for the purpose of overawing the inhabitants, and enforcing the collections --The scattering armies in the

small detachments described by the question, whatever be the view with which it was done, must be detrimental to the discipline of every army.

Considering the state of the Bengal army, do you not conceive that the scattering over Oude so large a body as fifteen thousand, would be particularly prejudicial?—I have already said, such a dispersion must be detrimental to the discipline of any army, and conséquently to the Bengal army.

Did you not give the subject of the dispersing the troops great attention ;— It was very much my wish that the detachments should in no case be less than a battalion; and I think I expressed that wish in my correspondence with colonel Scott.

Were you not decidedly of opinion that it was essential for the discipline of the army, that they should assemble yearly in considerable bodies during the cold season?-That must have been the opinion of every military man.

Do you not imagine that employing fifteen thousand of the Bengal army, in superintending the collections and overawing the inhabitants, throughout so extensive a surface as Oude, must be attended with the worst possible effects, and, in a military point of view, highly dangerous?-Such a dispersion must certainly be attended with very bad effects to the discipline of the army; had the overawing the people in general been the object, I should certainly have kept them in larger bodies; in that case the separating diem in smaller detachments might have been dangerous.

Must it not tend to relax and utterly destroy the discipline of the forces so scattered and so employed?-Certainly.

If troops were absolutely necessary for the collections, what was your opinion of the nabob's army for that specific purpose?-I suppose the nabob's army was equal to that duty, but they were equal to nothing else.

When did you take the command of the troops in the field?—I arrived at Cawnpore in the end of November, or beginning of December, 1797.

In what state of discipline did you find the troops under your command?—Not in so good a state as I had been taught to expect.

On taking the command, did you not find it absolutely necessary to issue various orders to enforce a stricter discipline,

and

and to improve the general state of the my, and make alterations and regulaions?- Upon taking the command of the army, I issued such orders as appear ed to be requisite, and applied principally to field exercises and movements, which I wished to introduce, according to the regulations lately adopted in the King's army at home.

What did you find most defective ?— Field exercise and movement.

How long did you continue commanding in the field station?—I left it at the end of September, 1800.

What was the state of the army in the field when you quitted Cawnpore, as to numbers, discipline, and, if possible, efficiency?—I do not recollect the exact number; I had done my utmost to improve its dicipline, and I had met with every assistance and good will from the officers; with regard to its efficiences, I know no otherwise but that it was efficient in every respect.

Had you not, however, infinite trouble and pains to bring the army to that state?-I never thought any thing of trouble in the discharge of my duty; we all laboured hard; the officers had as much trouble as myself, and did it with great good will.

Do you imagine it possible to continue the army in the high state of discipline in which you left it, if divided and subdivided into companies and battalions, and scattered all over Oude? I have already said, that the scattering of all armies must be detrimental to their discipline.

Did you not, about the time the nabob's army was disbanding, issue orders to the whole of the army under your command to be ready to march at the shortest notice?—I do not remember that I did.

Do you remember that you did so during any part of the year 1800 ?-I do not recollect that I did.

[Sir James Craig was desired to read the letter, beginning in page 278 of the Supplement, No. 2 10 No. 3 of the printed papers.]

If you had received the letter now put into your hand whilst you were provincial commander in chief of the army, what would have been your sentiments as to the disposal of the truly-formidable

force you left in the field?—I should have lamented the necessity of forming such a detachment; but what would have been my opinion must have been my opinion must have depended upon the knowledge of so many other circum stances with I am totally unacquainted that it is impossible for me to say what it would have been.

If you had received that letter, could you have imagined that we were possessed of an army sufficient for the defence of the British possessions, the internal tranquillity of the vizier's coun try, and the protection of it against Zemaun Shah, or any powerful invader?-I should have seen no reason to doubt it; the army, however dispersed, might have been assembled, and I have already said, that the distance of the Shah's dominions would always allow time for reinforcing it from below; with regard to the internal tranquillity of the nabob's country, I must observe, however, that that letter alludes to it at a period, and under circumstances of which I have no knowledge, and therefore am not competent to judge of the indipensable necessity that might exist for the presence of troops.

What was the strength of the army assembled on the froutier when you commanded the same, to repel Zemaun Shah ?-The army under my immediate command amounted to something more than fifteen thousand men, and I left also four battalions in the nabob's dominions; the whole exceeded nineteen thou sand men.

What would have been your opinion of the security of Oude, and ultimtely of our own possessions, if it was impossible to assemble a larger army on the frontier than five thousand infantry and cavalry, to oppose the Shah or any other hostile power?-I should have apprehended the loss of dominions; for I do not think such a force at all equal to their defence against the Shah.

Would you have undertaken the re

pelling of the Shah with such an army,

the other districts of Oude, without conconsidering the state of Rohilcund and siderable apprehensions as to the issue ?— Most certainly not.

What force did you recommend to be collected on the frontiers, or in any other parts of Oude ?—I wished for twenty thousand men at least.

Was

at an end, and throughout Oude ?-I be

Was an adequate force actually collected when you took the command?-lieve so. I should have been very glad if it had been greater; but, from the call for other services, it was not in the power of the Bengal government to give me

more.

When was Golum Kaudir Khan, the pretender, defeated? It was just before the march of the troops to Bareilly; I really do not recollect the exact date.

What became of the pretender, GoJum Kaudir Khan ?-I do not know that I ever heard.

From the time the army broke up at Anopshire, in January, 1799, to the latest period you remained in the field, was there any threat of invasion from any quarter? Not that I recollect; there was a letter found among the vizier Ali's papers, which gave cause to suspect some engagement, on the part of Ambagee, to assist him in his attempt, in consequence of which I had instructions relative to the assembling a force in the Doab; but the suspicion blew over, and I do not remember that any active measure actually took place about it.

When did you first hear of the defeat and death of Zemaun Shah?-I remember hearing of his defeat, and of his being deprived of sight; but do not recollect at what time.

What was the utmost number you ever understood to have attached themselves to vizier Ali, and what description of people were they whilst in the district of Gotuckpore?-I believe the greatest number to which his force was ever carried, was reported to be six thousand; they were of all descriptions, but very few men of consequence among

them.

Amongst those six thousand do you imagine there were any soldiers that could at all be formidable to the British forces in Oude?- I never considered him as formidable, the difficulty was to get at him.

Was there any insurrection in any other part of Oude in consequence of the flight of vizier Ali from Benares into Goruckpore, after the fatal transaction at Benares ?—I do not believe there

was.

After vizier Ali fled, was not any dissurbance, even in Gorackpore, entirely

How many of his partizans attended him in his flight?-He was then in Goruckpore; and had those six thousand men. I never understood how many attended him immediately in the latter part of his flight. I always understood not above two or three.

Were you commanding officer of the British troops stationed in the vizier's territories, in the years 1798, 1799, and 1800?-Yes.

Will you state your opinion of the state of efficiency and discipline of the troops of the nabob vizier at that pe riod?-They were totally undisciplined, mutinous, licentious, and many of the battalions not armed.

Were they attached to the person and government of Saadut Ali Khan, the nabob of Oude ?-I never had much communication with them; but I always understood the reverse, and I know the nabob himself considered them in that light.

Did you consider it to be desirable to reduce the nabob of Oude's troops during the whole of the period of your command in Oude ?- I always thought them both useless and dangerous, consequently, that it was desirable to reduce them.

Did you consider this reduction to be desirable, with reference to the interest of the nabob as well as to the East India company, and with reference to the general defence and tranquillity of the nabob's territories ?- Upon every ground I considered it desirable.

Upon the occasion of disbanding the nabob's troops, was it not necessary to draw into Oude larger bodies of the company's troops than had been there before ?-Certainly.

Was it not necessary to scatter the company's troops in some degree over Oude?-Undoubtedly.

Were they scattered and separated to a greater degree than necessary?—Not during my command,

Upon the occasion of the expected invasion of Zemaun Shah, and the preparations upon that occasion, did you consider that the Shah's advance towards, and arrival at Delhi, might be so sudden as to anticipate the preparations which were making to resist him?— From the little opposition which I looked

for

for from the Seiks, I certainly conceived such an event to be possible.

Did you think it probable, that while the British troops would be in advance upon the frontier, with a view to resist the invasion of Zemaun Shah, the tranquillity of the nabob's territories would be disturbed by the disaffection of his subjects in Rohilcund, and the undiscipline and disaffection of his troops ?-I did; and left four battalions for the express purpose of guarding against that evil.

Were any measures adopted by the government, or the servants of the nabob vizier, at the period of the expected invasion of Zemaun Shah, to collect supplies, or to form magazines for the use of the British army?

Magazines were collected principally by Almas's means, but by order of the nabob, though they were dilatory in doing so, as they were in doing every thing else but the nabob seemed very desirous himself to give every assistance in his power, and collected elephants and bullocks for that purpose with great readiness.

Did the nabob consider his person in danger upon the occasion of vizier Ali's flight from Benares in 1799, after the murder of Mr. Cherry ?-When that melancholy event took place I was at Anopshire with the army, but I understand from Mr. Lumsden, who was then resident, that the nabob was exceedingly alarmed, in consequence of which I marched a considerable part of the army to Lucknow.

Did he express any desire at that time that the company's troops should assemble near Lucknow ?-He was very desirous to have a considerable force there.

Was a detachment of the company's troops, under general Stuart, employed against vizier Ali in Rohilcund and Goruckpore? In Goruckpore they were not in Rohilcund.

Can you state by what means vizier Ali escaped from Oude after your taking such effectual measures to seize his person ?-I do not remember that it was ever known.

Do you recollect the irruption into Rohilcund by the pretended Golaum Kadir?-Golaum Kir never penetrated into Rohilcund; he was defeated before he reached the Ganges, by the troops of Begum Sumroo: Golaum

VOL. 9.

Kadir was himself a Rohilla, and we were apprehensive of disturbances in that country in consequence of his approach.

Do you recollect your correspondence upon this subject with colonel Scott ?I cannot say that I remember all the particulars of it.

When the additional British troops were introduced into Oude at the end of the year 1799 and in 1800,was it expected that that measure would occasion apprehensions in the minds of the nabob's anmildars, or renters and servants ?- I do not remember that there was any particular apprehension on the subject; different people might have different opinions upon it.

Was it not desirable to yourself and colonel Scott in forming the arrangements for the distribution of the British troops upon this occasion, to make use of the invasion of the feigned Golaum Kadir or any other event, as a pretence for posting troops in any particular district, in order to remove the apprehensions of the aumildars and other officers of the nabob's government? — It

was.

Did Zemaun Shah, to your knowledge, ever penetrate further than Lahore ? No, he did not.

Can you state the distance from Lahore to Delhi ?-I do not recollect it.

Can you take upon you to say the shortest period in which the Shah could approach Delhi from Lahore ?--Not recollecting the distance, of course I cannot state the period in which he could march it.

Did you not understand that general Peron was prepared with the whole of his force to oppose the approach of Zemaun Shah? General Peron did not assemble his force, although I believe the Mahrattas would have endea voured to oppose the Shah, had he

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