insane, should be found to give Information, and that none of the authorities that ruled over Vellore, or its pottah, "the commandant," "the paymaster of stipends," or "collector," (for, by late regulation all had joint, where, for security, there should have been but one sway) had a single faithful adherent to watch the design, or report the meetings of the conspirators. It is even stated in evidence,(1) amid the numerous bands of the family of Tippoo, collected from all parts of the country, and resident in the pottah, there were five hundred persons in regular pay. Thus the extraordinary liberality and munificence of the British government, with indulgence to the same extent, became instruments towards their own destruction. An agitation that arose at Wallajahbad, subsequent to the mutiny at Vellore, demands the next attention; accounts of a very alarming but still general nature, were received from lieutenant-col. Lang, who commanded a force of three battalions, assembled at that station for exercise; the commander in chief thought it necessary to repair to that quarter, that the promptest measures might be effected, or the requisite investigation pursued. It would only increase, unnecessarily, the length of this account, to describe the detail of the transaction, (2) or inquiry, that took place; it appeared to the commander in chief, that real cause of alarm had never existed, that under the unfavourable impression that prevailed, apprehension was very natural; but that representation had been much exaggerated, and that casual expressions from individuals of the corps, of a seditious ten- Justice, and the spirit of con- Information was given here by (1) Military court of Inquiry. (2) Vide Proceedings before government. пега ner, so delicate a concern demanded. An extraordinary embarrassment attends the evidence; at the time the subadar, Secunder Khan, a man of the most respectable appearance and pretension, gave the intelligence, information was transmitted to colonel Montresor, at Hyderabad, that he was a man of the most dangerous character, and known disloyalty; and that all his actions should be watched. His information respecting the cavalry has by no means been confirmed, but still there were alarming points in his intelligence, that are known to be the truth, and correspond entirely with the confession of the chief conspirator at Vellore, Shaik Cassim. It is possible, that this man, conscious of his guilt, and even apprehending the information against his own character, became informer to screen himself; since that period he has become reserved and silent, and seems to wish to weaken even his own intelligence. Whatever related to the cavalry, or the general name of Moorman, from the earliest moment, gave the commander in chief the greatest inquietude; for while it was the common conversation, that it was a Moorish plot, to restore the mussulman government, (1) it could not escape reflection, that the regiments of cavalry are nearly all of that description; and the apprehension of imprudence on this point, became so strong, that the commander in chief privately addressed the general and commanding officers, to suppress as much as possible such dangerous language. Uneasy sensations were experienced at the presidency, and suspicion entertained upon the con duct and disposition of the two corps, that formed the garrison of Fort St. George. The commander in chief cannot determine, whether the apprehensions, which proceeded to great extent, were founded or otherwise, as he was absent; but if just, they must be imputed to the poison of Vellore, for the two battalions, 2d of the 4th regiment, and 1st of the 22d, had been stationed in that quarter, within the last six months; and without doubt exposed to all the artifices of that place. Except Vellore, Wallajahbad, and the presidency, universal good order and satisfaction prevailed throughout the whole of the territory of Fort St. George, in the army, and the turban, and "obnoxious orders" never were mentioned. The remaining instance is the imputed design of the subsidiary force, at Hyderabad, in foreign dominion, to have acted the same dreadful scene, as took place at Vellore. To the latest period the commander in chief received the most favourable reports from colonel Montresor, (2) the commanding officer, of the discipline, the subordination, the harmony, that prevailed; nothing led to the most distant suspicion, that any dissatisfaction existed; at once, as subsequent reports confirm, the most mutinous spirit broke forth, and accident, or judicious measures, seem to have averted the calamity of Vellore. Proof may yet be wanting to establish the connection that subsisted, but coincidences are too strong in dates, and circumstances, in every fair reasoning upon the subject, to admit the doubt, but that similar artifices had been (1) Letter to general officers-Vellore, July 19th, 1806. ·(2) 9th July. VOL. 9. *I been practised; and though the exact object might be different from Vellore, yet the general end was the same, to overturn the British, and restore the Mussulman government. Details of circumstances are not required; they must be pursued through all the documents, that again run over all the case of turban, orders, &c. but, at Hyderabad, as at Vellore, the same machinations appear, the same inflammation, the same at tempts (the ground work of deiusion) to persuade, that christianity was at hand, and the sepoys to be made the first converts. The extraordinary appearance of the chief sirdars from the city, every where in the camp, unusual intercourse of the most dangerous characters with the battalion attempted, all prove, that some general object was in agitation, and at this moment the extent of design or dan ger then frustrated, is not known, but still requires active and cautious investigation. At Hyderabad the painful points of the native officers come forward in a shape, and with a force, that truly demands the most interesting attention.(1) The commanding officer, colonel Mostre sor, has invariably stated his opinion, that the alarms and agitation that have so recently distracted the subsidiary force, have been instigated by these persons; and though he failed to obtain required proofs, in conjunction with the opinion of the resident, he had been obliged to send away to Masulipatem, in confinement, three native officers, of whose complicated guilt no doubt existed; and that their influence and disloyalty was so great, that their immediate removal was necessary to the security and tranquillity of the force. The commander in chief has lately laid before government, a letter transmitted to him by colonel Montresor, (2) the authenticity of which he does not seem to doubt, from the principal of those native officers, addressed to the nizam, which, if true, communicates disaffection, and the most sanguinary design on the part of the native officers of that force, to an extent most alarming; and carries with it other reflections that excite apprehension in a different quarter. In several minutes the comman. der in chief has expressed his per suasion, that in the late commotion, the object of our enemies has been to corrupt the native offi. cers, and, by securing their co-ope ration, they well knew, that the ignorant multitude would be de luded into any belief. It remains yet to be discovered, what have been the exact sources of the general misrepresentation that is abroad; whether they are of domestic or foreign origin, or perhaps an united effort; but a revivalof Mussulman power seems to be the object; and with this in view it has been a wise, but fatal policy to seduce the native officers, the majority of whom, it has long been the practice of this army to select from that fith, and their seduc tion on that account the easier to be accomplished. Since the event at Vellore, the subject of the punishment of the guilty persons has often come under consideration, and the comman der in chief has recorded his sentiments (1) Colonel Monsor's letter, 12th September, 1806. (2) September 20th, 1836. timents in several minutes, to which he requests attention.(1) It will be found, that his first object was to discover and protect innocence; but that he never lost sight of the necessary vindication of the crimes, that equally outraged humanity, and violated every principle of fidelity and discipline. Such is the undistinguished mass of guilt, (2) that, were an amnesty to take effect, it would bring back into the ranks wretches, covered with blood, who must lock those surviving officers in the face they attempted, but could not destroy. Innocency has not been discoverable, except in a few solitary instances; the prisoners are chiefly those, who only ceased their murder and plunder at the moment of flight, and the native gencral court martial now engaged upon the trials, (3) are the most forward to express their sense of the general guilt, and to press for banishment. Such was the general sentiment at first; and from the hour the intention was altered, difficulty has increased upon every deliberation. To the proposed confinement the commander in chief dissents in the most solemn manner; even impunity, with all its risque, is preferable; while it continues, mutual malevolence will never cease; the European and the seppy never can be friends. It will supply a perpetual theme of fatal consideration; and "termination and oblivion," "terms so highly prized," and in the front of all proceedings, can never have existence. The commander in chief has now detailed, with as much brevity as the case would permit, the several circumstances that actuate the object of the present dispatch to England. It appears to rise out of the subject, that some general opinions should be annexed upon the state of the country, that our rulers at home may know how far real improvement has taken place, and whether the order of things, in this part of India, is amended by the variety of late règulations. As a stranger, the commander in chief cannot feel himself competent to deliver an opinion; but, in zeal for the public advantage, he may be permitted to state the prevailing sentiments of others, the most moderate, and most experienced in the society of this presidency. The general belief is, (it may not yet have reached the government) that the condition of the people is not as happy as it was; that their own arrangements, their own institutions, pleased them better than our regulations. It is reasoned, with apparent force, that slaves, as they are, to their own customs and habits, in every trifle of their lives, the introduction of all our systems (which it is vain to make them comprehend) alarms and annoys them, and they view them only as preparatory to greater innovations, which may extend to every circumstance that surrounds them. It is said, while the treasures of the state are expended on judicial establishments, throughout countries without distinction, where even military force, at times, is unable to preserve subjection, it would be better to enquire into the state of the inhabitants, and regu late the means of subsistence; that the numerous dependants, on for mer (1) 9th, 14th, September, &c. &c. (2) Lieutenant-colonel Forbes's report. (3) Letter from the deputy judge advocate to colonel Harcourt, September, 1806. the design universally prevails, however difficult to account for it; and if the pursuit be continued, or the suspicion suffered to gain further ground, our existence in the country is at stake. A paper of this nature cannot well close without some general remark on the situation of the army (1) on this establishment. In the minutes the commander in chief has occasionally laid before government, in different shapes, he has given his opinion on defects that appeared, and proposed measures of improvement; before his departure it will be his duty to enlarge upon the subject to the utmost of his ability. mer power, and ancient establish- this ardour? Apprehension of ment, the crowds of Moormen, in the different provinces, unemployed, may not remain in distress, and continue to excite discontent. The inhabitants of this country do not comprehend the convulsion at present before their eyes; within their shortest remembrance, military establishment and control attracted all their attention; they understood and felt its origin,as congenial to their own notion of authority; at present they view a different order of things, and in the place of the old and experienced officer, to whom they have long looked up with respect, they see his power and ascendency passed away, and the youthful inexperienced judge, or boyish collector, occupy all, and more than his former place. In England such institutions are right, are suited to the civilization and felicity of that incomparable land; but in India, where nothing is alike, it seems visionary, to order all things to be the same, and it is feared will only prove the goodness of the intention. The people of India must be left to find happiness in their own way, and our attention directed to the security of our own "singular situation," and the general advantage of the state. In the range of desired improvement, philanthropy and religion, cannot fail to make a person wish to see christianity extended; but what danger will not follow from What seems to require immediate attentions, is the augmentation of the number of European officers to the native corps. Το establish, by a more powerful incentive than the doubtful effect of a common order, a better communication, and more intercourse between the European officer and the native soldier; to promote the attainment of the native languages by every encouragement and reward; and to consider "well" the situation of the native officer in our service, whether, placed as such in his own corps, in the enjoyment of that respect and confidence due to the appellation or rank of officer, (2) and without hope of further elevation or emolument, his mind may not naturally (2) 30th November, 1805.-ed January, 1806. (2) Vide commander in chief's letter to the adjatam-general, June 16th, 1806"I cannot close this subject without giving vent to an opinion, I have long formed, that it is the prevailing practice of this service to withhold that respect and intercourse from the native commissioned officers, to which their situation and common opinion, as attached to the appellation of officer entities them; and thus, outcasts from confidence, or even friendly communication, it will in vain be expected, that at moments of difficulty, or pressure, these men will proffer that rapid aid, and energetic assistance, which affection, or indentity of feeling or interest alone will inspire. "I am so impressed with this sentiment, from concurring proofs every day, that I |