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COURT'S DRAFT,
No. 128.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT,
No. 128.

his troops, and his repeated application for the aid
and direct interposition of the governor-general's
authority and power in delivering the Nabob and his
subjects from evils of such magnitude and violence, as
the existence of a military force without any restraint
of discipline, or of any attachment to the state, or to
the Nabob, were the primary causes which moved the
governor-general to consider the means of applying an
effectual reform to the military establishment of
Onde. The plan of this reform originated, not in the
voluntary suggestion of the governor general's mind,
but in the alarming state of the Nabob's dominions
and power, and in the Nabob's express desire † The
reluction of the Nabob's troops must always have
constituted a necessary branch of any system for the
defence of his dominions; since experience had mani-
fested, that the danger of rebellion and war would
always have been increased in proportion to the
extent of such an armed body, which would always
have required the check and control of an adequate
body of efficient and disciplined troops, and, con-
sequently, must have operated as a proportionate
diversion in favour of an invader or rebel.

to

264. These considerations induced lord Welles'ey commence the reform of the existing abuses in Oude, by the reduction of the Nabob's troops, which constituted the principal source of the public calamity, and the most dangerous obstacle to every improvement. But great delay was opposed by the Nabob to the reduction of his own forces; the neces

sary

* In June, 1799, the Nabob wrote to the governor-general in the following terms: "I therefore hope you will repeat your orders to the resident to be aiding and assisting me in all matters, so that I may concert with him the means of removing my embarrassments, and, with his assistance, carry on the affairs of my government, in a manner to produce ease and satisfaction to my mind." Vide page 9, printed papers, No. 3. Vide also letter to the secret committee, dated sist August, 1800. Printed papers, No. 5, page 5.

+Sir Alured Clarke having, during lord Wellesley's absence at Fort St. George, addressed a letter, on the 25th June, 1799, on the subject of the reform in the military establishments of Oude, the Nabob declared," his thorough concurrence in the sentiments which it contained." The Nabob also, on the 5th September, 1799, observed, of his own accord, "that the proposed measure was not impracticable, but such as, he hoped, might be accomplished." Vide printed papers, No. $, page 15.

In reply to lord Wellesley's letter of the 26th September, 1799, the Nabob declares," that the benefits, both immediate and future, of such a reform, are even more strongly impressed upon my mind than they have been described by your lordship. A year before this time, under a sense of the benefits in question, and of the evils arising from the failure of my resources, and the increase of my expenses, I planned, of my own accord, in my mind, a reform of the system, and was the first to propose it."

In the same letter the Nabob observes, "perceiving, in this, your lordship's kind solicitude and benevolent attention, to the support and prosperity of my government, I am proportionally impressed with sentiments of gratitude and obligation. Please God, by introducing a reform in the military system, ali danger and all apprehension of disturbance will be removed." Vide printed papers, No. S, page 22. Vide also lord Wellesley's letter to the Vizier, dated 9th February, 1600. Page 96 of printed papers, No. 3.

COURT'S DRAFT,

No. 128.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT,

No. 128.

sary consequence of this delay was sensibly felt in an aggravated pressure upon the Nabob's finances; and the Nabob declared, that he found himself unable to provide funds for the payment of the additional British troops, forgetting, in this instance, the unquestionable right, and indispensable duty, of the company to provide an adequate defence for the province of Oude, in the place of troops which were inadequate so that necessary purpose, (even by the admission of the Nabob) and omitting also the recollection of his obligation to defray whatever expense might be incurred by the company, in the prosecution of that right, and in the discharge of that duty.

265. The Nabob's neglect of the duty of effecting a seasonable reduction of his useless and dangerous force, could not exonerate him from the exigency of his duty towards his subjects or towards his allies, and least of all from his obligation to supply the company with effectual means of maintaining the safety of Oude against every existing or contingent danger.

266.

But these means were daily diminishing with the declining con lition of the Nabob's resources, and the Nabob himself had declared his expectation* of an approaching failure in the subsidiary funds. In fact, such was the unhappy state of the Nabob's internal government, and the general distress of his affairs, that, on the 12th Nov. 1799, the Nabob made a voJuntary, formal, and unexpected declaration to the resident at Lucknow, of his "invariable desire, and of his fixed resolution, to relinquish a government, which he felt himself unable to manage, either with satisfaction to himself, or advantage to his subjects." He declared that what he was possessed of was abundant for his own support; that, as the governorgeneral would nominate one of his sons as his successor, his name would remain established; and he demanded to keep possession of the public treasure, and to have the sole and absolute disposal of the whole of the said property." The Nabob said, "that these were the cordial and voluntary suggestions of his own mind, and that he was not disposed to the cares of government. He was disgusted at the want of fidelity and zeal in the men immediately about his person, with the arrogance of some of his aumils, with the open disobedience of others, and with the perverse disposition of the people at large." He concluded by saying,

"the measure was the most serious and momentous a sovereign could undertake," but added," that the execution

Vide the Nabob's letter to colonel Scott, dated 17th November, 1800, in which the Nabob admits the fact, that the apprehended failure of his resources was to be ascribed to the precarious realization of his revenues, and to the declining assets of the country.

+ Vide colonel Scott's report to the governor-general, 22d November, 1799. Printed papers, No. 3.-Letters from the governor-general to the secret committee, dated 28th November, 1799, and 25th January, 1800; also letter from the governor-general in council to the secret committee, dated $1st August, 1809. Printed papers, V. Pages 3, 4, 5, et seq.

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OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT, `
No. 128.

execution of it was indispensable, since he was neither
pleased with his people, nor they with him."

267. But the public treasures then formed a part of the Nabob's means of fulfilling his public engagements, and consequently of the company's security. The governor-general therefore could not consent to the Nabob's abdication, which, indeed, would have exonerated the Nabob from his engagements. But the embarrassments of the state of Oude, and of the company, would have been augmented in the same proportion in which the Nabob would have been relieved. In objecting to the Nabob's abdication, lord Wellesley proposed to the Nabob the only arrangement which was calculated to reconcile the Nabob's desire of retiring from the government, with the principles of national justice and policy, as well as with the personal dignity of the Nabob, and the happiness of his people. His lordship proposed, that the Nabob should commit the entire administration of the government of Oude to the company, under such arrange ments as should provide effectually for the Nabob and his family. But the Nabob rejected this proposition, and determined to retain the charge of the govern

ment.

268. This change in the Nabob's disposition could not, however, be traced to any improvement in the general administration of affairs, to any augmentation of his means of conducting the government, or to the consequent establishment of reciprocal confidence and attachment between the Nabob and his people. The Nabob had again stated the alarming condition of his resources, and renewed and aggravated symptomst appeared, of the most dangerous disaffection towards his person and government.

269. The Nabob's life had been attempted in the month of November, 1800, under circumstances of a formidable nature. Active support had been afforded by his subjects to an impostor, who had recently assumed the name of Viz er Alli, and who, on the 4th November, 1800, published a proclamation, declaring his intention of waging war against the infidels of Europe, and calling upon every "sect to join him in that holy enterprize." He was acknowledged by several Zemindars, was soon enabled to collect a body of men, and was defeated, on the 12th Nov. by a party of British cavalry, who were sent out to apprehend him.

270. At the same it appeared, by the Nabob's own statements, that he was embarrassed by the continu

ance

• Vide notes for a memorial, page 42 of No. 3; and sequel to ditto, page 56 of No. 3,

+ Vide colonel Scott's dispatches, 17th August, 1800; and 7th October, 1800, pages 130 and 132, of No. 3.

Vide colonel Scott's letters to the governor-general, 17th January, 10 February, 1800; and the Nabob's letter to colonel Scott, 17th November, 1800, pages 77. 102, and 141, of No. 3. Vide also lord Wellesley's instructions to colonel Scott, page 145 of No. 3; and lord Wellesley's letter to the Vizier, page 148 of No. 3, dated 22d January, 1801.

COURT'S DRAFT,

No. 128.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT,

No. 128.

ance of the charge of a large portion of his own troops; and that the general resources of his country were actually declining, with a rapidity which menaced the joint interests of the Nabob and of the company in Oude, with utter and speedy destruction.

271. The nature of this decrease of the revenues of Oude will best appear by a reference to the resident's letter to the governor-general of the 21st June, 1798.*

272. There was a deficiency of upwards of 62 lacs, (775,000l.) and the country, so far from improving, continued, by the Nabob's admission, in a declining state. Bareilly, which was ceded to the Nabob in 1774, yielded, at that time, an annual revenue of 62 lacs of rupees (775,0001.) In 1799, the revenue was 36 lacs, or 450,000l. Reher, ceded by the Rohillas in 1794, produced 10 lacs of rupees, or 125,000l.; but in 1798, only yielded 4 lacs, or 50,0001

273. The causes of the defalcation in the Nabob's revenues were notorious † and had daily acquired new strength. In fact, every settlement with an aumil was concluded for a diminished revenue. Had the Nabob's territories been subject to frequent or occasi onal devastations of the enemy, had they been visited by unfavourable seasons, or by other calamities which impair the public prosperity, the rapid decline of the revenues of Oude might have been imputable to other causes than evil administration; but no such visitations had afflicted the provinces of Oude, while the power

*No 13 of printed papers, marked 2.

ful

+ This will be best explained by a statement of the mode in which the revenues were farmed and collected. At the commencement of the year, the aumil, or his agent, entered into written engagements with the ryot, or cultivator, which were signed by both part e9. These engagements were usually moderate, that the ryot might be induced to cultivate as large a portion of land as his means would admit; but, when the crops became ripe, the aumil insisted upon a new engagement, founded upon a calculation of their actual value. The unfortunate cultivator, well aware of the inutility of resistance, usually submitted to the demands of the aumil, but, if he refused compliance, the aumil immediately placed a guard over the crops, and it has sometimes happened, that the cultivator has suffered them to be burnt, and destroyed by the sun, rather than submit to the injustice and rapacity of the aumil. More frequently, however, in the event of non-compliance on the part of the cultivator, the aumil directed the crops to be cut, and appropriated the whole of them to his own advantage. The most fatal consequences naturally resulted from such a system-large tracts of land were left uncultivated, and the inhabitants, encouraged by the Mahrattas, under Mons Perron, upon the frontier, abandoned their native homes, and resorted annually, in large numbers, to the Mahratta country, subject to the authority of the French officers in Hindostan.

The rapacity of the aumil increased in proportion to the decay of the country: having only a temporary interest in the soil, his sole consideration was how he might enrich himself during the period of his lease by every species of extortion, and in violation of every principle of justice, humanity, and good faith. The Nabob never made any enquiry respecting the character of his aumils; the leases were granted to the highest bidders; and it has frequently happened, that, after having had recourse to every species of extortion and violence, in the districts, committed to his management, the aumil, unable to fulfil his engagements, has been thrown into prison by the Vizier.

VOL. 9.

F

COURT'S DRAFT,
No. 128.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT,
No 128.

ful protection of the British for es had maintained the
Nabob's dominions, together with al the company's pos
sessions in that quarter of India, secure from the
ravages of war, in the full enjoyment of peace and
tranquillity. The company's
s territories had been
advancing progressively during the same period of
time, in prosperity, population, and opulence; the
Nabob's dominions, enjoying equal advantages of
tranquillity and security with the possessions of the
company, had rapidly declined The operation of
these evils did not commence with the government
of Saa ut All They necessarily flowed from the
system of admini tration which existed at the period
of his accession to the Musnud. But none of these
evils had been diminished under the government of
Saadut Alli; their daily increase was evident, acknow-
ledged by the Nabob, and wi hout the interference of
the British government, must have been progressive
to the utter ruin of the resources of Oude, and of
the company's interests in that quarter.

274. In addition to these circumstances, the arrears
due, on account of the troops stationed in Oude, in
1798, during the expected approach of Zemaun, (the
justice of which demand it has not been attempted to
dispute) amounted to 38 lacs of rupees, or 475.000l. of
which sum the Nabob had only paid 17 lacs, leaving the
amount of arrears due to the company, at the period
of signing the treaty of Lucknow, in November, 1801,
21 lacs, or 262 5001 But, even admitting that the
Nabob had been punctual in his payments, the appre
hension of the calamities which were to be expected
from the existing system of administration was not
diminished, nor was the company's right to demand
satisfactory security against the operation of evils, of
which the existence was evident, and the effect certain,
in any degree affected. To have refrained from de-
manding adequate security until the resources of the
country should have failed, would have been to have
defeated all expectation of attaining the security to
which the company was entitled.
The resources

which had been found ina lequate to the regular payment of the subsidy, must have proved still more insufficient to have supported the additional burden of a heavy arrear. The danger which existed was permanent in its nature; its immediate exigency might have been so sudden as to have precluded the possi bility of providing against it by any temporary effort. It was, therefore, necessary to resort to such a con

stant

In the month of November, 1798, the force in Oude, in consequence of the threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah, was considerably augmented beyond the largest number defined in the treaty of 1798. Part of the excess was, in a few month, withdrawn, and a portion was necessarily detained for the protection of the Nabob's dominions.

The expense of 13,000 men, with the necessary equipments of ordnance, &c. was set apart as a charge to be borne by the company, and the expense attending the excess of troops above that number, with their necessary equipments, (38,13.590 rupees) was charged to the Nabob, every corps for the actual period it was serving in Oude. Vide page 184, of No. 3.

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