COURT'S DRAFT, Defensive subsidiary al OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT, No. 128. which might be made by Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the possessions of either. 309. But the same considerations which claimed our protection of the Nizam against the meditated designs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah upon his highness's territory and power, suggested also the expediency of extending that protection to a general guarantee of his highness's dominions against every hostile and unprovoked attack, from whatever quarter, it might be made. If the interests of the company, and of the Nizam, were become so far identified, as to render it incumbent on us to defend his highness from the ambitious or violent projects of Scindiah, or of the Mahratta power, the security of those interests equally required, that we should counteract every attempt, whether secret or open, from any other quarter, to destroy the power of the Nizam, or to acquire the direction of it. 310. In this view of the subject, the British government felt no hesitation in agreeing to make the guarantee of the Nizam's dominions general, instead of confining it to the designs of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The expediency of such an arrangement was the more obvious, as the Peishwah was completely in the power of Scindiah, who might, at any time, have compelled the Peishwah to take up arms against the Nizam, without appearing, himself, to be any further concerned in the contest, than in h ́s character of a feudatory of the Mahratta empire, bound to obey the commands of his superior, the Peishwah. 311. But although, for the reasons stated, lord Wellesley was entirely prepared to make the proposed guarantee general, he did not think proper to proceed to that extent in the first instance, without obtaining from the Nizam a suitable return for so important a concession. 312. It had been constantly an object of the utmost solicitude at the court of Hyderabad, to obtain a general guarantee from the British government, and to secure the full benefits of the company's efficient protection: that court has evidently a deeper interest in such an alliance than the British government: it was, therefore, reasonable to expect, that his highness, the Nizam, should make suitable concessions to the company on this important occasion The result of this arrangement has produced a considerable augmentation of the subsidiary force serving in the Nizam's dominions; a commutation of the whole amount of subsidy for territory, assigned by the Nizam in perpetuity, and in complete sovereignty to the company; and lastly, the effectual removal of all the existing restraints on the commercial intercourse between the two states; and the regulation of that intercourse on principles mutually beneficial to the subjects of both, 313. The court ground their objections under liances, and commuting this head, on the reluctance with which the different parties COURT'S DRAFT, subsidy for territory. Pa Para. 104 and 105, observe that general Wellesley was obliged to march to Poonah unaccompanied by any of the Peishwah's troops. OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT, · parties entered into the engagements; and observe, that the advantages to be derived from such alliances wil not be realized, because the relu tant, or the constrained party, can never be relied upon in thẹ hour of danger." The court then apply this general principle to the alliances with the Peishwah, the Nizam, and to the rana of Gohud, and Ambajee Ingha 314. This general objection to subsidiary alliances in India is entirely novel; alliances of a similar description have formed the basis of our power in every quarter of India, from the origin of the Eritish dominions in that country to the present moment; and, upon these principles, every foundation of our establishment in India might, with equal reason, be subverted. It is certainly true, that treaties of very unequal conditions have usually been found of short duration, and that no undue advantage should be taken in any political negotiation. But it may be observed, that no connection was ever formed between two states, of great inequality, in point of power, in which the advantages did not, sooner or later, prepon derate in favour of the stronger. But are no such alliances therefore to be formed? Are we to forego our obvious advantages, lest others should not be equally benefited? It it sufficient that the agreemert was voluntary, and that the weaker party conceived it to be his interest to accede to it. No idea has ever been entertained of governing the native states, with whom we have formed alliances, in a sense of govern ment, when applied to their internal relations; but it is obvious, that our superior situation must necessarity create a great ascendancy over the course of their politics, by giving firmness and efficiency to their governments. If the existence of sentiments of jea lousy, with respect to the British influence in India, could have affected our empire, it could never have attained its present extent. No state ever attained great eminence without calling forth the jealousy of its neighbours. And it cannot be doubted, that, in every period of our progress in India, certain states, especially the Mahrattas, have beheld our advance. ment with feelings of envy. Admitting the facts alleged by the court, is there any measure adopted by the British nation, on any former occasion, for its advancement, which was not viewed with equal jealousy? All our treaties of alliance with the native states have arisen from their want of political resources to maintain their respective governments, and must naturally bear the marks of the principles on which they were founded. 315. In adverting to the treaty with the Peishwah, the court observes, that only two chiefs joined general Wellesley on his march to Poonah. The fact, however, is, that general Wellesley was accompanied to Poonah by all the chiefs who had any power or autho rity in the southern provinces of the Mahrattá state, and the governor-general's orders in that respect were strictly obeyed. It is true, that these chieftains did COURT'S DRAFT, Para. 107. Relative to the conduct of Nizam, and to a speech made by the minister at Hyderabad to the British resident. OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT, No. 128. did not at all take part in the war afterwards, for causes which are unconnected either with the policy or justice of the treaty of Bassein, and which it does not appear to be necessary to explain in this place. 316. The speech which the court has quoted as an observation by the minister at Hyderabad, viz. Surely there must be some bound to demand and concession, lest the city of Hyderabad should be claimed of us next," was made by the minister, when the resident applied for an increase of the subsidy, as the revenues of the ceded districts had not, at that time, Since the year 1800, the ceded districts have, under prudent management, greatly increased in value. By a letter from lieutenant-colonel Munro, the collector, to lord Wellesley, dated Anantpoor, 28th July, 1804, it appears that, "during the two last years, the same drought. which caused a famine in the Deccan, produced a great scarcity in the ceded districts, and retarded their recovery from the exhausted state to which they had been reduced under the Nizam's government. The season of 1804-5 having been favourable, the cultivation was extended, and the revenue considerably augmented in that year. The amount of the principal heads of revenues was as follows: Land rent Licenses, chiefly spirituous liquors Star Pagodas, 14,89,565 63,900 65,000 Settlement, exclusive of Kurnoul, Total S. Pags. 16,18,465 20,799 Difference between the settlements and schedules, Pagodas "The revenues of the ceded districts, not including the Kurnoul Peishcush, will probably in 1805-6 amount to twenty-one lacs of Cantary pagodas; but as the board of revenue will most likely make an abatement of ten or twelve per cent. in order to facilitate the introduction, of the permanent system, the average settlement for the ensuing five years cannot be taken at a higher sum than nineteen or nineteen and a half lacs of Cantary pagodas. Were the customary rate of assessment continued, I should have no hesitation in reckoning it at twenty-two lacs. The difficulties which were at first experienced in realizing the revenue, owing to the turbulent spirit which had been encouraged by the weakness of the Nizam's government, have all gradually disappeared. Of the settlement of 1803-4, there is not a rupee outstanding: of that of 1801-5, above 99 per cent. is already in the treasury: and the whole of the remainder, without a balance, will be received in the course of a few weeks. "The principle exports of the ceded districts are grain and cloth. The trade with the company's possessions below the ghauts is increasing, but that with the Mahratta states has suffered some diminution, in consequence of the anarchy that has prevailed during the last ten years, in the southern parts of the Deccan. "About seventeen thousand weavers, and twenty thousand looms, fabricate annually, cloths of different kinds, to the value of above twenty lacs of rupees, and, were the demand greater, the produce might be increased eight or ten lacs. The demand will be augmented by the return of peace, by the growing prosperity of the country in general, and, perhaps, at no distant period, by an investment on account of the company. COURT'S DRAFT, OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT, time, produced their estimated amount, and not in the 317. Indeed, the advantages of the treaty with the Nizam have been so frequently discussed in the correspondence with the government at home, that it appears to be unnecessary to enter into any further explanation of them in this place. It is impossible to form an accurate idea of the nature of Asiatic alliances without considering the nature and constitution of the contracting parties; their objects and systems, the rules of policy by which they are respectively influenced, and their respective connection with other sovereign authorities. 318. The governments of Asia are constantly fluc tuating they have no established system, the effect of which is to afford protection to their weaker against their mo.e powerful neighbours; on the contrary, the object of every Asiatic state separately, and of all collectively, is to destroy the weak; and if by chance they are induced, under a sense of common danger, to combine their efforts for mutual defence, the combination is dissolved by the first reverse; and in most cases long before the danger has ceased, the apprehension of which originally caused its "Of above thirty thousand military peons employed by the Nizam's officers, and the different Zemindars and Polligars, upwards of seven thousand have been retained in the service; it would have been dangerous to have disbanded the whole at first, for ten or fifteen thousand more depend upon them as fathers. sons, or brothers. By having one man of each family in pay, the fidelity of the whole is insured. Their 'reduction, when begun, should be made very slowly. Their annual pay is above fifty thousand pagodas, but more than half this sem returns to the treasury, as the rent of the lands cultivated by their families who would have those lands waste, were they not enabled to plough them by the hep of the peon's pay. "The expulsion of the Polligars leaves the cultivators at leisure to prosecute without fear the labours of agriculture; and the tranquillity of the country is so firmly established, that were there not a single battalion in it, I should have no apprehensions about the revenue. "But this province is not valuable only on account of its revenue, but also on account of its advanced situation, and its resources in grain and cattle, favouring the operations of our armies in the Deccan. Without the possession of the ceded districts and Mysore, and the command of all their supplies, those armies could not, even under the general by whom they were led, have dissipated the armies of Scindiah and the Berar rajah in the course of one short campaign." COURT'S DRAFT, No. 128. VOL. 9. OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT'S DRAFT, No. 128. all the rules and systems of European policy, and by acts of parliament, not to undertake wars of aggres sion. The company's government is also connected with his Majesty's government; and, as an Asiatic power, is liable to be involved in wars with European powers possessing territories in India, whenever his Majesty may be at war with these powers. 321. This view of the state of politics among the Asiatic power proves, that no permanent system can be adopted for preserving the weak against the strong, and for maintaining the different powers in their relative situation, and for the maintenance of general tranquillity, excepting by the interposition of a power which, either by the superiority of its strength, its military system, or its resources, shall preponderate, and be able to protect every state in alliance with it. The company has been the preponderating power, and any degree of constraint which our allies may be supposed to feel, is the necessary consequence of alliance between powers such as the native states of India, and a power such as the company's government, bound by fixed rules of policy, by act of parliaments, and by the acts of his majesty's government. 322. With respect to the treaty with the Nizam, which has been so particularly referred to for the first time by the court, it is sufficient to state that, after the destruction of the hostile power of Tippoo Sultaun, in 1799, it became necessary for lord Wellesley to determine the relations of the British government towards each of the remaining powers; the Mahrattas and the Nizam. 323. It was obviously the interest of the company, that the power of the Nizam should continue to exist in a state of independence. If any reasonable hope could have been entertained, that the Nizam's government could, without assistance from a foreign power, have been maintained in a state of independence, there might possibly have been no occasion for an alteration of the treaty which then subsisted between the Nizam and the company. By this treaty the Nizam was precluded from the employment of the British subsidiary troops against the Mahrattas, or against certain tributaries of the Nizam and of the Peishwah. It is evident, therefore, that, however advantageous the treaty of 1798 had been in many respects to the Nizam's government, his highness was still in the situation in respect to the Mahrattas, in which he had been previously to the treaty of 1798, with the difference, however, that he had no longer the support and service of the corps commanded by the French officers, which was dissolved by lord Wellesley in 1798. It became necessary, therefore, for lord Wellesley to decide, respecting the Nizam's government, whether he would allow it to fall into the hands of the Mahrattas, whether he would permit it to revert to the French adventurers, (from whose influence he had relieved the Nizam) or whether he would, by an alteration of the treaty of 1798, extend * G the |