No plan could be wiser or better combined; but Napo- | 1815, there was any possibility of beating the enemy, leon should have commenced two months earlier; he of making them suffer those checks which bring about would not then have found before him a force double his great results, it was undoubtedly on the day of the 16th, and particularly at the left wing of the army. own. A great fault then was committed at this period-it was entirely the Emperor's. In pursuing the examination of facts, it will be easy to perceive the fatal influence of this error on subsequent events. On the 15th of June the armies of the enemy might still have been surprised. They were so In fact, but the corps of which they were composed, were already near enough to each other to prevent this surprise from being fatal. The plan of the campaign was then, as it should have been, to operate the disjunction of the English and Prussian armies, so as to be able to act separately against the one and the other. The details of the movements and engagements of the 15th, on the passage of the Sambre, have nothing striking. The Prussians, who were first encountered by the French columns, gave way, and retreated before them. That was a success, but a success of little importance. In the recitals that have been made of this short and deplorable campaign, it is at this point that the intention is first disclosed of representing the conduct of Marshal Ney, as the principal cause of the reverses of Napoleon. He is reproached for not having occupied the position of Quatre-Bras. The accusasion against the unfortunate Marshal has something plausible in it. Ney commanded the left of the army: the English were opposed to him—and the position of Quatre-Bras was really the point of junction between the English and Prussian armies. In fact, it is probable that the position of Quatre-Bras might have been easily carried on the morning, and even as late as two or three o'clock in the afternoon, as it was but feebly occupied until that hour, and thus the English army might have been separated from the Prussians, and, perhaps its divisions might have been beaten one after the other, as they arrived on the field of battle from different directions. Afterwards this became extremely difficult. The enemy had discovered the importance of this position, and had strengthened it by forces sufficient to render all chance of a successful attack nearly impossible; and yet the failure of a desperate attack on this point would not have been fatal. Marshal Ney had not called his troops to his aid with sufficient promptness; and when they had successively rejoined him, the enemy had already assembled the greatest part of its own. It was then easily enabled to resist the feeble attacks of Prince Jérôme, who was at the wood of Bouffé, while the right wing, though commanded by an officer whose ardor and intelligence on the field of battle were not less brilliant than his eloquence at the tribune (General Foy), itself made no progress. At last, stimulated by the reiterated orders of Napoleon, the Marshal felt, but a little too late, all the importance of the position, and the error he had committed, in not carrying it in time. He then made the greatest efforts to succeed, but it was in vain. The diMarshal Ney, I do not fear to say so, was beneath visions of Prince Jérôme and of General Foy were himself in the campaign of 1815. His adieux and his actively engaged without any result, when Colonel oaths to Louis XVIII, his affair of Lons-le-Saulnier, Forbin Janson, an ordnance officer of the Emperor, carhis return to Napoleon, whose abdication he had urged ried the Marshal the particular orders of Napoleon, in 1814-all these recollections overpowered him. Ney accompanied by these words: "Marshal, the safety of had not the heart of a traitor; it was in good faith that | France is in your hands.” In despair, at not being able he promised Louis XVIII to fight Napoleon. Afterwards he found himself too weak to resist the appeal of him to whom he owed his fortune, under whose eyes he had served so gloriously, and all of whose labors he had partaken. That judges could be found to condemn Marshal Ney, guilty, as he undoubtedly was, but protected by the capitulation of Paris, is a stain upon the peerage. It is an infamous stain upon the memory of Louis XVIII, to have shed the blood of a man, who had poured out so much for France. The conduct of Ney at Lons-le-Saulnier had been openly condemned by his ancient comrades. His presence at the army had been observed with pain. He felt all the difficulty of his situation; and this man, whose coup d'œil had before been so quick and certain, whose action had been so rapid, showed himself, under these circumstances, uncertain and weak. On the 16th, the day of the battle of Ligny, the fate of the army was in his hands. His inaction compromised everything, for it was at the point which he commanded that the greatest events were to be decided. The battle of Ligny was an unfortunate success, because it advanced nothing. The Emperor required a victory; he yielded to the vain pleasure of driving Blucher's army before him; but his purpose, which from the fault of Marshal Ney he failed to obtain, was to separate the English from the Prussian army. If, in | to possess himself of this position, at seeing the forces of the enemy increase every moment, and the efforts of his infantry continue powerless, the Marshal summoned the lieutenant-general, commanding the Cuirassiers, and repeating the words of the Emperor, said to him-"My dear General, the safety of France is dependant upon the result; an extraordinary effort is required. Take your cavalry-throw yourself in the midst of the English army-crush it, and pass over its prostrate bodies." It was the hottest moment of the day it was between six and seven in the afternoon. Such an order, like that of the Emperor's, was easier to give than to execute. The General represented to Marshal Ney that he had but a single brigade of Cuirassiers with him, that the greater part of his corps had remained, in compliance with the orders of the Marshal himself, two leagues in the rear, at Frasnes. In fine, that he had not force enough for such an enterprise. "No matter," replied the Marshal, " charge with what you have-crush the English army-pass over its body: the safety of France is in your hands. Proceed; you shall be followed by all the cavalry present." In fact, he had at hand more than four thousand horses of the guard, and of the division Pitré, which were half a cannon shot off. There was no time for deliberation at such a moment. The General darted forward, as a victim devoted to death, at the head of six hundred Cuirassiers, and without giving them time to perceive or to calculate the greatness of the danger, he drew them desperately into this gulf of fire. With forces so inferior to an enemy, who trust less than ourselves to chance, it was not necessary to have thus hurried a decision of the campaign; but it would seem that a fatality has in all times led us to precipitate ourselves, in gaiety of heart, into the gulf, and always to attack the English bull by the horns. It may be remarked, that from the battle of Agincourt to that of Waterloo, nearly all the victories gained over us by the English have been in battles in which they acted on the defensive. We rush headlong upon them, when in formidable positions selected before hand, which they know marvellously well how to defend. One may say that we take pains to wage precisely that sort of war upon them which suits their courage. We may cite in modern times Vimiera, Talavera, Bussago, Salamanca, and lastly, Waterloo. Whether it be the character, or the military genius of the English, or the spirit of their government, that imposes greater circumspection on their Generals, one would believe the English nation less suited for an offensive than a defensive war. In consequence of great superiority of force as at Toulouse, or of absolute necessity as at Alknaer, they decided with much difficulty to act on the offensive. It has been seen with what success they did so under the circumstances of the last case in 1799. Why then at Waterloo, were they not forced to become the aggressors? The first regiment of the enemy which it encountered was the 69th infantry. This regiment, composed of Scotch, fired at thirty paces; but without stopping the Cuirassiers passed over the bodies of the men, utterly destroyed it, and overthrew everything in their way. Some even penetrated into the farm of Quatre-Bras, and were there killed. Lord Wellington had only time to leap on a horse, and save himself from this terrible attack. The charge of the Cuirassiers had succeeded against all probability; a large breach was made; the army of the enemy was staggered; the English legions were wavering and uncertain, awaiting what was to come next. The least support from the cavalry in reserve; the least movement on the part of the infantry engaged on the right, would have completed the success. Nothing moved. This formidable cavalry was abandoned to itself; alone, dispersed, disbandoned by the very impetuosity of its charge, it saw itself assailed by the muskets of the enemy, then recovered from their astonishment and fright; it abandoned the field of battle as it had carried it, and without being even pursued by the enemy's cavalry which had not then arrived. The General himself had his horse shot, and returned on foot from the midst of the English, and at last encoun- The day of the 16th resulted in the abandonment of tered near the point from which he had set out, a di- Fleurus, after an energetic resistance on the part of the vision which had just begun to take part in the action, Prussians. For the purpose of supporting the right orders having been given to it too late. The attacks of wing of the Prussians, the Duke of Wellington judged this division, directed against an enemy already reco- it necessary to retire during the night, leaving only a vered from its alarm, were as fruitless as they were tardy. weak rear-guard at Quatre-Bras to make this moveIn war a favorable moment cannot be neglected with ment. Marshal Ney had no knowledge of this manœuimpunity, and the numerous cavalry of the left wing vre, and, remained in his position, waiting further did not take advantage of the proper moment to pre-orders. He was drawn from the inactivity into which cipitate itself upon the enemy. The distant position of three brigades of the reserve of Cuirassiers, was a great misfortune for the army, and for France. If they had been in the line, and ready to profit by this happy boldness, and to throw themselves in the midst of the enemy, perhaps in less than an hour the English army The Emperor thought he had finished with the Pruswould have been disposed off. It would have disap-sians; being ignorant, like Marshal Ney, of the movepeared under the feet of the horses and the swords of ment of the English army, he supposed that the two the cavalry, and this day would have secured us one of those results which decide the destinies of empires. In fact, the English army once destroyed, the Prussian army would have found itself attacked in the flank, pressed upon in front, and would have been unable to escape complete destruction; it would never have repassed the Rhine. The victory would have brought back the Belgians to our standards, as well as the inhabitants on the banks of the Rhine; and we would have made cheap work of the Russians and Austrians. This dream might have been realized during nearly the quarter of an hour; it agitated more than one head. It cannot be concluded from these chances of success, that it was prudent to trust everything to chance, as was done in this campaign. The success that we were on the point of obtaining at Quatre-Bras would have been a miracle, and, in the disproportion between the contending armies, a miracle was necessary. But war has so many unexpected chances, that it was not impossible, that that which could alone save Napoleon might turn up; it was within an ace of doing so. he had been plunged by the little success of the previous evening, by the arrival of the Emperor, who moving on the morning of the 17th, with his columns upon QuatreBras, obliged the rear-guard of Wellington to rejoin the main body of the army. armies were separated. Entrusting then to Marshal Grouchy, the care of pursuing the Prussians, and of pressing them without respite, and above all of preventing them from joining the English, he proceeded with the greater part of his forces against the army of Wellington. A sort of fatality presided over the lot of Napoleon. On the right, Marshal Grouchy lost the day of the 17th, and the track of Blucher. On the left, fatigue and the want of order condemned the troops to inaction. It was only at noon that the Emperor, arriving at Quatre-Bras, set the troops of Marshal Ney in motion, for the purpose of following and firing on the retreating rear-guard of the English. Towards three o'clock a beating rain commenced, which continued until the next morning. The army took whatever position it could during the night, not without some disorder and confusion. The AngloBelgic army, on the contrary, had effected its retreat without being disturbed, as no one was informed of the movement; and it had been established since the morning in a camp which it had prepared for itself, and did not suffer either from the bad weather or want of charge by all the cavalry, when at so great a distance food. Too little attention is paid to the effect produced on men, especially on the evening preceding a battle, by excessive fatigue and want of food and rest. Causes of physical exhaustion operate on the moral spirit of an army, and produce discouragement and disgust. Represent then to yourself, the French army, wearied by eight days of forced marches, wanting food, passing through a country covered with water, sleeping in the mud, and without protection against constant rains. You may then judge of the disadvantage under which it had to encounter fresh troops, superior in number, and on ground selected by themselves, and carefully fortified. The Emperor, after separating from Marshal Grouchy, whom he had perhaps suffered to remain at too great a distance from him on the evening of so important a battle, had not more than 55 or 60,000 men to oppose to 90,000 English, Hollanders and Belgians. from the infantry. Such a movement must either be successful or compromise everything: it had failed of success, and from that moment there was no further hope of victory. The evil destiny of France seemed to preside over all the false measures of the day. A brigade of carabiniers, of a thousand horses, had been preserved from the fatal charge. Placed near a battery of the guard, the Major-General had received the most express orders not to make the least movement without the order of his immediate chief. This brigade of carabiniers was then in the plain. Marshal Ney observed it, ran to it, showed great indignation at its inaction, and ordered it to precipitate itself on seven or eight thousand English, placed en echelon on the inclination of a hill, and danked by numerous batteries of artillery. The carabiniers were compelled to obey. Whether from want of strength, or unskilfulness, their charge was entirely unsuccessful; half of the brigade was in an instant prostrate on the ground. When, as will be seen, the fate of the battle was afterwards determined by the charge of the English guards, one may comprehend the service this brigade of carabiniers might have rendered, had it remained untouched. On the 18th, towards 11 o'clock, the weather cleared off. It could then be seen that the movement effected by the English on the preceding evening, was not a retreat, but a change of position. At the moment that the Emperor was giving his orders to the Generals assembled around him, a cannon, fired from the English camp, gave the signal of combat. The engagement | detach 10,000 men to face this attack. commenced with the left of the French army; the second corps consumed itself in fruitless efforts to carry the wood, and entrenched chateau of Hougoumont. In the centre of the army a corps, maneuvering with a sort of hesitation, was charged by the English cavalry, and had one of its divisions compromised. This movement of the English cavalry necessarily brought on the engagement of our own, and unfortunately involved the greatest part of the French cavalry in the action at a very unlucky moment. Towards three o'clock the heads of the columns of General Bulow were perceived, and Napoleon had to It has been asserted that the appearance of the heads of the columns of the Prussian corps of Bulow caused a fatal error, and that these troops of the enemy were mistaken for the avant-garde of the body of Marshal Grouchy's army, to which numerous officers of ordnance had been despatched. I do not know whether such an error was committed, but there is little probability that it was. The indecision of Marshal Grouchy, under these circumstances, was undoubtedly a great misfortune; but it is doubtful whether the Marshal, had he even acted with decision, could have presented himself in line. The arrival of Bulow's corps had a fatal in This charge was neither skilfully nor successfully executed. The masses of cavalry did not advance in that compact and imposing order which inspires confi-fluence on the result of the battle, but only in consedence, and gives promise of success. Instead of reserv- quence of the necessity which it produced, of withdrawing the great effort for the moment of meeting the ing ten thousand men from the main body of the army, enemy, the cavalry of General Milhaud was let loose already so much weakened. The attack of the Prusfirst, then that of the Imperial Guard, and lastly, the sians on this point was not only restrained, but repulsed right of the reserve cavalry of the 4th corps, which was with a vigor above all praise, by Count Lobau and imprudently involved by its General, in consequence of General Duhesme. This was, perhaps, the finest feat his not receiving the orders of his commander-in-chief; of arms of the day; it was a service of the highest and all arrived in disorder, pellmell, and out of breath, importance, for had the movement of Bulow been sucon the rideau occupied by the line of English artillery.cessful, the French army would have been divided, and The pieces were abandoned, but the horses might have the route of Charleroi would have been closed against us. been driven away. This, which it must be confessed, was the only success during the day, is, perhaps, what was called a victory. This pretended success had, it is true, great effect on the distant positions of the enemy, where movements for a retreat were commenced; but in the rear of the artillery there was a double line of infantry formed in a square. Our cavalry had to remain several hours in this cruel position, unable to retire for fear of drawing the army after it, or to charge again for want of room. Without infantry and without artillery to support it, in presence of the enemy's squares (which, however, reserved their fire), but exposed to a cloud of marksmen, whose every fire counted-thus receiving death without being able to return it. Napoleon quickly recognized the imprudence of a The old guard still remained untouched; the day drew to a close. The fighting grew more and more feeble, but even while yielding, the field was not deserted by flight, and the corps were not seriously injured. If success was afterwards impossible, a retreat might at least have been effected during the night behind the Sambre, thus securing the only reserve which remained. The Emperor did not, however, judge this expedient; the old guard was suffered to take part in the engagement. This was a decisive stroke-it might save or lose everything; but, if it repaired nothing, the army would be left without resource. The guard, with all its courage, and all its admirable devotion, could not cut through the masses of English, land had soon to fall back before an impetuous charge VOL. IV-5 of a division of English guards, and a brigade of cavalry, | and without any supreme head, was of little importance. which had just arrived upon the field. Then it was The Emperor was no longer with them, and the elethat there was cause to regret the imprudent movement ments of resistance, which the imprudence of the march which had involved the brigade of carabiniers. When of the enemy might have rendered powerful, were this fatal movement was ordered, this brigade was sta-paralyzed from the want of any direction. It was with tioned precisely at the point where the English cavalry difficulty that the exertions of the fourth corps of debouched; and to this cavalry Napoleon himself attri-cavalry at Senlis, succeeded in enabling the wrecks of buted the retreat of the guards. It is probable that the French army to arrive before the enemy under the this brigade would have been enabled to arrest the walls of Paris. It has been said that the news of the movement of the English cavalry, and thus have pro- abdication of the Emperor, decided Wellington and tected the retreat of the only reserve of the army. Blucher to march directly on Paris; this is a mistake. The report addressed to the English government by Lord Wellington, immediately after the battle of Wa Now, everything was finished; a retreat was inevitable. Night came on-it was impossible to re-establish order, or to arrest those who were running away.terloo, contains these words: "I shall direct my course There was nothing but confusion and a fearful and irremediable rout, and such as might be expected after a battle, in which the whole army, even to the last battalion, had been engaged. The causes of the loss of the battle of Waterloo have been long discussed. There was one great cause, predominant over the rest, and that was the great disproportion of the forces. When armies are nearly equal in intelligence, discipline and valor, victory will naturally range itself with the greatest number of troops, unless some miracle, some one of those extraordinary events, on which it is always imprudent to reckon, intervene. by forced marches, and by the shortest route, towards Paris.” When he wrote this on the evening of the 18th, he had received various news from Paris, but he could have had no knowledge of the abdication, which was only signed on the 22d. It was on the 29th of June that the army entered the lines of Paris, and not until the 1st of July that the corps of Marshal Grouchy rejoined it. Marshal Davoust assumed the command. His first care was to send a detachment of three hundred horsemen to St. Germain, for the purpose of guarding that point, and seeing to the destruction of the bridge of Pecq, and watching all the passages of the Seine as far as Mantes; The picture of disorder and confusion on the fearful but in the meantime, a Prussian detachment had prenight that followed this battle was frightful indeed; it sented itself, and treason had opened a passage for it. was a general sauve qui peut. The occupation of this important point, which opened From this moment the Emperor completely disap-to the enemy a passage over the Seine, decided its pears from the military operations. At Charleroi, general movement in that direction. They had thus where he had left no orders for rallying the army, they were even ignorant of the direction he had taken, Some troops of cavalry were united, who succeeded in covering the retreating movement, and corps were formed on the route of such fragments as they encountered. It was only at Avesnes that it was known that Laon was indicated as the rallying point. the double advantage of turning our positions at Montmartre, and of attacking Paris in the rear, if it was decided to force an entry. It obtained, besides, positions that would menace us. It sufficed, in fact, to glance at the heights of Meudon, St. Cloud, and St. Germain, to be convinced that the French army was not in a condition to dislodge the enemy. Marshal Davoust has been reproached for not having profited by this movement, to fall on the flank of the enemy in passing by St. Denis, and thus to have let slip an opportunity for crushing it. But could so decisive an action have been attempted with troops oppressed by fatigue, and absolutely demoralized? And at what moment could this sortie have been made? The march of the enemy was We are only at the 20th of June. The second abdication of the Emperor, signed the 22d, was only known to the army on the 24th. But from the 20th the cause of Napoleon was lost, even among his own troops. The word abdication had been pronounced by the army, even before it was debated at Paris. On the 20th of June many of the most distinguished Generals of the army were assembled at Avesnes. At this meet-not known, when, thanks to a timely treason, it was ing, in the presence of a Prince of the Emperor's family, and with his approbation, the errors of Napoleon were denounced in the most violent terms, and the necessity of depriving him of the command was as boldly asserted. Certainly France had still other resources. An army of imposing size might, in the early days of July, have been assembled at Aisne. It might still have been expected that the enemy would march with prudence; it could hardly have been supposed that, inflated with the pride of victory, it would have neglected all the ordinary measures of precaution; that it would have left strong places behind it without taking the necessary steps for masking them, and have marched upon Paris without troubling itself with our army thus left on its flanks. But certain devoted friends had taken the pains to reassure the enemy upon the condition of the interior; and an assembly of disorganized troops, without orders, executed; and the instant that it was executed it was too late to act with effect. But the General-in-chief of the French army was, and ought to have been influenced by an anxious desire of preserving Paris from an assault. He could not have been justified in sacrificing the capital to the hope of a triumph without object, and of which, the result would probably have been unimportant. The passage of the Seine, and the establishment of the main body of the enemy on the heights of Meudon and Châtenai, had rendered the situation of Paris and that of the French army much more critical. The army had to repass in great haste to the left bank to cover the capital, which was completely exposed on that side. It was anxious for battle, and would have defended, with desperation, the trust confided to it; but the Generals of the enemy would have taken care to avoid hazarding an ill-timed attack against troops, de termined to struggle to the very last, and for the sole | ness and sang froid of the old regiments destroyed in purpose of advancing, by only a few days, their entry Russia, and in the campaign of 1813. abandoned him for the purpose of providing for his own future interests. But these treasons were of but little service to the enemy, who did not require them. To arrive at the truth concerning the catastrophe of 1815, we must always recur to the same point. Success could only have been secured by a miracle, and fortune was weary of serving us. into Paris. They accordingly took up their positions That there were treasons in the interior, I have no on the formidable heights of St. Cloud and Meudon, doubt. I have spoken of that of the bridge of Pecq, stretching out their right towards the road to Orleans, the author of which is well known: there were others with a view to surround the French army, and to starve besides. The Generals of the enemy would not have out the capital. Will it be pretended that Marshal risked a direct movement on Paris, had they not been Davoust should have sought out the enemy? He might invited thither. Fouché, a man of great cunning, perand ought to have received battle on the plain of Mon- fectly comprehended the dangers of the Emperor's situatrouge; he desired it and he waited for it, but it would | tion; he had foreseen the issue of his attempt, and had have been the height of imprudence to have offered it elsewhere. He could not suffer himself to be shut up in Paris, necessity forcing him to absent himself before the roads were closed against him; nor could he allow the capital to fall unconditionally into the hands of the enemy. In this delicate situation he was compelled to treat for the surrender of a place which he was unable any longer to preserve; and to take advantage of the impatience of Wellington and Blucher, to secure the fate of Paris and the retreat of the army. These considerations determined the capitulation of the 3d of July. Had that capitulation not been made, it would not have been the less necessary for the army to quit Paris; orders indeed, had been given, to effect that very night a retreat which it would have been imprudent to defer. The loss of a battle would have delivered Paris to the horrors of a city carried by assault-and yet battle was not refused; but in consequence of the enemy's inaction in avoiding a combat, a retreat was forced upon us. WATER. that does not at once feel and confess the influence of a body of There is no man, however cold or unexcitable in disposition, water. Go where you will, or with whom you may, when you approach the ocean, or an inland stream, or lake, every one will, in some way, by some exclamation, show that if all other things fail, this, at least, will awake the "sleeping poetry of the soul." The most grand and magnificent view of water, is from some craggy cliff, to watch the ocean in its wrath, when lashed to fury by the howling tempest. The most soothing and pleasant view, is of some small lake in the heart of the woodsthe sun just tipped by the trees, and not a sound nor a breath moving, or aught to disturb, save some "hastening bird on weary wing." The beautiful and clear reflection of every tint and delicate tracery of the woods in the glassy water, the calm And besides, were the French army and its leaders well convinced of the disposition of the population? The royalist party, overwhelmed by the event of the 20th of March, had been restored to life by the rumor of the defeat at Waterloo. The Emperor had quittedness of its surface, and the holy silence that reigns around, never Paris, and left his most decided partizans without de- fail to speak to the heart. There is every variety of water fence and without hope. From the 22d, the minister, view, all pleasing and exciting-such as the heavy water-fallthe little mountain stream, dashing in merry haste to the valley then become the head of the provisionary government, below-the village rivulet, with its farm houses and rural beauhad been negotiating with the Bourbons; a second re-ties, or the broad inland river that affords vigorous support to storation was inevitable. What good then would have busy industry. But, altogether, I have never met with any been effected by the floods of blood which might have water view more varied and beautiful, or peculiar in its influstill been shed? Far from condemning Marshal Da-ence, than that of the James River, near Richmond. Every voust (and without minutely scrutinizing his intimate motives), we may thank him for not having yielded to the puerile vanity of risking a battle which might have added something to his military glory, but which, even in the event of the most brilliant success, could not have prolonged the struggle more than eight days farther. Finally, treason has been spoken of; there was none in the army. There were three desertions on the evening of the 17th; but they had no influence on the events of the campaign. Faults committed at that period, have also been spoken of. There were some, doubtless, but the principal were those of the Emperor. It has been asserted, that the Generals exhibited weakness and indecision, and that the devotion of the soldiery was thus paralyzed. In this statement there is some truth and some falsehood. It will not be asserted that the Generals Count Lobau, Count de Valmy, Dahesme, Foy and some others, exhibited weakness or indecision. But there was but little enthusiasm in the army. The Generals, for the most part, fatigued with war, dared not risk anything, because they no longer found in their soldiers, who were too young, the firm stranger, as well as inhabitant, confesses its charms, and the pencil has striven, in vain, to trace its beauties. But lovely as is the river by day, yet to me, there is a melancholy pleasure and fascination in it at night, which I have never experienced elsewhere. The variety of its course, and the steady, unceassounds, lead on the imagination with an irresistible impulse. ing roar, made doubly impressive by the absence of other If I am alone in this peculiar feeling, I am not alone in my ad miration of its other attractions. While under this influence a few nights since, I penned the following hasty ADDRESS TO JAMES RIVER. 'Tis sweet, as falls the twilight hour |