CONCERNING THE UNDERTAKING OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS BY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Die Veneris, 14 Aprilis, 1780.

The order of the day for the Lords to be summoned being read, it was moved that the Bill, intituled "An Act for restraining any person, being a member of the House of Commons, from being concerned himself, or any person in trust for him, in any contract made by the Commissioners of the Navy, the Board of Ordnance, or by any other person or persons, for the public service, unless the said contract shall be made at a public bidding," be now read a second time; which being done, it was moved that the Bill be committed, and it being objected to, after long debate, the question was put thereupon.

It was resolved in the negative.

Contents, 41-Not Contents, 61.

Then it was moved to reject the Bill, and the question was put thereupon.

Resolved in the affirmative.

Dissentient',

Richmond,

Because the Commons, desirous of re-establishing the reputation and authority of Parliament, and of giving satisfaction to the people, at a time when the most cordial and unsuspicious confidence between the representative and constituent bodies is essentially necessary, have come to a resolution, "that it is necessary to declare, that the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished."

This resolution we conceive to be undeniably true, and highly seasonable. Their commencement of the diminution (which they have solemnly engaged to make), by the Bill here rejected, is no

less judicious. In the midst of a war, in which nothing (an its unhappy circumstances) is more remarkable than the proc with which it is carried on, it appears peculiarly necessary to reso from Parliament the suspicion that the rash adoption, the obst continuance, and the corrupt supply of military arrangements: connected with the support of a court majority in Parliament.

2dly, Because the people, oppressed with actual impositions. terrified with the certain prospect of farther and heavier bunic have a right to be assured that none should have a power of kr those burdens, who have an interest in increasing them. Ne is it fit that they who are the principal subject of complaint, sh sit as the controllers of their own conduct. Contracts can never y fairly made, when the parliamentary service of the contracters. necessary understood part of the agreement, and must be reckon into the price. But the most unexceptionable contract being matter of great advantage to the contractor, it becomes a mess: influence even when it is not a principle of abuse. It is the gras of all the bribes a minister has to bestow; and one day's job be worth the purchase of the fee of most of the places and pensia that are held in that House.

3dly, Because no reasons have been assigned for the rejection & this Bill, but such as appear to us frivolous or dangerous. It argued as necessary to abate "the frenzy of virtue," which beg show itself in the House of Commons. This new species of fre we look upon to be rather a character of soundness, than a sympt of insanity; and we fairly declare, that as we frequently come i contact with the other House, we heartily wish that that distempe may become contagious. Another reason assigned against this B "that it is impossible for vast pecuniary emoluments to have influence on Members of Parliament," appears to originate from. perfect a puerility of understanding, or such a contempt of that f the House and the nation, that it is mentioned as a matter to be animadverted upon, not answered. Of the same nature is the arg ment drawn from supposed improbability of abuses in contracts because the law has left in the hands of ministers the means prosecuting at law the supporters of their power, and the accomplices of their own fraud and malversation! These arguments will give little satisfaction to those who look at the House of Lords as a barrier against some possibly sudden and mistaken warmth of the House of

mmons, that might be injurious to the just prerogatives of the gwn, or the rights of the people; but we will not bear the gross use of this constitutional power, or that this House should set elf as an obstruction to the most honourable, manly, and virtuous solution ever come to by a House of Commons; a resolution made direct conformity to the petitions of their constituents. We prost, therefore, against our standing in the way of even the first eps taken towards promoting the independence, integrity, and rtue of a House of Parliament.

For the first and third reasons, adopting however very heartily, in the present state of parliamentary representation, the sound principles contained in the second, which yet I conceive inapplicable to this Bill.

RADNOR.

CONCERNING THE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN TROOPS INTO GREAT

BRITAIN, &c.

Die Veneris, 21 Februarii, 1794.

The order of the day being read for the Lords to be summoned, the Earl of Albemarle presented to the House a Bill, intituled "An Act to indemnify such persons as have advised his Majesty to bring within the dominions of Great Britain certain troops belonging to the Landgrave of Hesse."

The said Bill was read a first time.

It was moved that the said Bill be read a second time; which being objected to, after debate, the question was put thereupon. It was resolved in the affirmative.

Dissentient',

1st, Because it is contrary to law for the crown to keep an army the kingdom, either in time of peace or in time of war, without previous consent of Parliament. And it is essential that this portant constitutional principle (which was unequivocally adr in the debate) should be for ever maintained inviolate in this cou And the friends of public liberty ought ever to bear in memory admirable vote of the House of Commons, on the 5th day of Mr 1641, when it was resolved, "That this House doth declare, whosoever shall give counsel or assistance, or join in any manner> bring any foreign force into the kingdom, unless it be by comme his Majesty, with the consent of both Houses in Parliament, sh* adjudged and reputed a public enemy to the King and kingdom."

2dly, Because the annual Mutiny Bill is a proof that the c cannot perpetuate or assume a prerogative which Parliament nually bestows; nor exercise at its own discretion that power w the legislature specially limits.

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3dly, Because it is a most dangerous doctrine, that the c has a right (by virtue of an “undefined prerogative,”) to do any which is not warranted, either by common, or by statute law,—t the frivolous pretence of its appearing to ministers to be use And the supineness of Parliament, in the reign of King James IL when so many acts, notoriously illegal, were committed by the cre and yet passed unnoticed by the two Houses, clearly proves, that want of vigilance in certain Parliaments, precedents may be est blished, subversive of the first principles of national freedom.

4thly, Because the maintaining of a foreign army on the establis ment, or within the territory of this kingdom, is in open defiance s the very Act of Parliament which settles the crown on the present royal family (namely, the 12th and 13th of William III. chap. the 24 which expressly enacts, "That no person born out of the kingdom of England, Scotland, or Ireland, or the dominions thereunto belonging (although he be naturalized, or made a denizen, except such as are born of English parents) shall be capable to enjoy any office or place of trust, either civil or military." And the Act of the 29th Geo. II chap. the 5th, is a proof that the legislature deemed a special Act of Parliament necessary, to enable the King to employ even a limited number of subaltern foreign officers in America, only under certain restrictions and qualifications.

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5thly. Because "foreign mercenaries have always been useless, or angerous to those who employ them. Their conduct at first has geneally been peaceable and ensnaring; at last, seditious and destructive. And those states that have carried the points which they intended, by heir assistance, have usually in the event been enslaved by them." 6thly. Because a prerogative in the executive power to introduce ny number, without limit, of armed foreign hirelings into any counwithout the previous and express consent of the legislature, is otally incompatible with any form of a free constitution. For not nly that government is tyrannical which is actually tyrannically dministered; but that government also is tyrannical (however adninistered) where there is no sufficient security against its being tyrannically administered in future. And I solemnly protest against a measure, which tends to endanger the rights and liberties of my fellow citizens, of whom I consider myself only as a trustee. STANHOPE.

Dissentient',

Because as it was in the debate unanimously admitted, that the necessity of keeping in this country troops, whether native or foreign, in time either of war or peace, without the consent of Parliament, is unconstitutional: and as it was also admitted unanimously, that the troops in question are here upon grounds of fitness and expediency; and as the consideration of fitness and expediency, though they may render, and in fact, in the present instance, do render the measure not only justifiable, but highly meritorious, do in no degree change its nature so as to make it more or less constitutional.

This Bill, though of a sort to be very sparingly adopted, yet was of peculiar propriety; for in a matter of great moment, it declared the law, saved the constitution, and did justice to the motives of the executive government.

Because the stopping of this Bill leaves the troops here, without any consent of Parliament.

Because the effect of the declarations by which the right of the crown so to keep troops here was disclaimed, however strong, general, and unequivocal, is yet transitory and fugitive; but the fact that troops are so here, is notorious and recorded; and when the motives which justified, and the declarations that reconciled to the House the measure, are forgotten, may be turned into precedent. RADNOR.