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member; and by the last census, the fraction left over, unrepresented, in the State of Mississippi, is larger than the entire population of the State of Oregon. There is also remarkable evidence on this point. Washington exercised, once, his power to veto an act of Congress. The great inconvenience of the unrepresented fractions, when the divisor is applied to each State separately, led to an act of Congress under which it would have been applied to the population as a whole. This was objected to on the ground that it would tend to obliterate the distinct individuality of the States, and impair the federal character of the system; that, in fact, it was a measure of consolidation. This act was vetoed by Washington, on the express ground that it was opposed to the spirit of the Constitution.

On turning from the House of Representatives to the Senate, we find that each State returns two members to that branch of the legislature, without regard to other attribute, than its distinct individuality. A comparison has been made between this position of the Senate and the House of Lords. The House of Lords does not profess to be a representative institution, or an elected body; the Senate does. This was one of the compromises made in the Convention; the smaller States declined to accede on other terms. In this light, as an unavoidable result of a compact between the States, it is quite intelligible. But it appears incredible that any single community,

professing to act on principles of republican equality, would give to Rhode Island, whose population is 174,000, the same power, in the most important branch of the government, as that of New York, with a population of four millions.

What, indeed, is the meaning of a Federal Republic? Clearly it means a government constituted of several constituent republics. To assert that all these were fused into one, is really to deny that the United States are a federal republic. This would be singular, but not more so than to deny the existence of a federal compact, because its terms are entitled a "Constitution;" as if the nature of an instrument depended on the name given to it as if, also, those who framed it had imposed on the country something different from that which alone they were empowered to frame; and this, as we have seen, was a "Federal compact, adequate to the exigencies of government." What also, on the theory of a single people, is the meaning of the powers reserved to the States? These powers include those over property, and over life or death. We are at aloss to see how they could be, for ever, reserved to the separate States, after those States had been consolidated into one.

In the letter which Madison wrote to Randolph, giving his views of the requirements of a new Constitution, he observes: "I think that a consolidation of the States into one simple republic is not less unattainable, than it would be inex

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pedient." De Tocqueville observes: "It was not in the power of the American legislators to reduce to a single nation the people for whom they were making laws." In the Convention, one of the ablest members, Luther Martin, observed: "At the separation from the British empire, the people of America preferred to establish themselves into thirteen separate sovereignties, instead of incorporating themselves into one. To these they look up for the safety of their lives, liberties, and properties. They formed the Federal Government to defend the whole against foreign nations, and to defend the lesser States against the ambition of the larger ones." Here it appears, in clear terms, that one of the objects of the system was to prevent that very consolidation, which we are now told that it effected. The evidence of Mr. Seward cannot be objected to by a Unionist. On the 20th of March, 1850, he thus expressed himself: Every man in this country, every man in Christendom, who knows anything of the philosophy of government, knows that this republic has been thus successful only by reason of the stability, strength, and greatness, of the individual States."

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It may appear superfluous to produce so much evidence to prove that the individuality of the States continues distinct, if it should be known to

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every man in Christendom," that the government of the Union has rested on the greatness of the "individual" States. But we shall find that

there will follow a most important consequence.

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Their individuality remaining distinct, it may prove that their original sovereignty will also continue intact in each of them.

One thing is clear, that on the day when each State ratified the new Constitution it was an independent power. The thirteen colonies were acknowledged by Great Britain, and other countries, each of them as separately independent. We need not, however, go further back than the Articles of Confederation, which declare the mutual relation in which they coexisted in the Union. The question is thus narrowed to this,-if they be no longer separately sovereign, to whom did their power pass, and what evidence exists that a change of such supreme importance has ever occurred?

It is clearly the natural conclusion that it remains where it existed before, unless there be evidence to the contrary; the onus of proof lies with those who dispute this. We seek in vain for this proof, for any explanation of the nature of the change, or for any declaration to whom the extinguished power has passed. Mr. Motley expresses, indeed, impatience of the term sovereign, as being feudal and inappropriate on American soil. No term is more frequently used in the State documents, where, indeed, it appears with a frequency unknown in Europe; and as we find it in the immediate parent of the Constitution, it meets us at the first step. From the general scope of Mr. Motley's arguments, they would appear to

convey the theory that the original sovereignty of each State passed into the Federal Government. This is described as "clothed with imperial attributes," as executing laws, which are the supreme law of the land. It would be the natural inference from this, that the Federal Government has become the depository of the sovereign power, originally in the separate States. But Mr. Motley has not gone so far as to assert this. We are led to the brink, but there the guide disappears. No American writer could, indeed, make the assertion, for it would directly contradict all American jurisprudence, and the fundamental principles of their political creed, which are, that all sovereignty is in the people.

If this be so and none will dispute it—it follows, that any government appointed-with whatever functions endowed-of whatever attributes apparently possessed-is still merely an agent, discharging certain allotted duties. That great authority, the "Federalist," observes: "The Federal and State Governments are, in fact, but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes." Austin, in his work on Jurisprudence, terms the Government the "subjectminister"-minister, as the agentthe agent-subject, in relation to the sovereignty of the people. Lincoln, in his last address, terms the people his masters-forgetting, probably, the strange theory he had propounded, that the States derived their

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