Also it is agreed, that the suing out a latitat is a sufficient commencement of a suit, to save the limitation of time, because the latitat is the original in B. R. and may be continued on record as an original writ. 1 Sid. 53, 60; Carth. 233; 1 Salk. 421; see ante, II. 2.

The same is law as to a bill of Middlesex. See Sty. 156, 178; 2 Lord Raym, 880, 1441; 1 Stra. 550; 2 Stra. 736; and 2 Burr. 961.

But if the suing out of a latitat be replied to a plea of the statute of limitations, the defendant, in order to maintain that plea, may aver the real time of suing it out in opposition to the teste. 2 Burr. 950.-And though the suing out an original, or latitat, will be a sufficient commencement of a suit; yet the plaintiff, in order to make it effectual, must show that he hath continued the writ to the time of the action brought. Carth. 144; 2 Salk. 420; 1 Lutw. 101, 254; 3 Mod. 33. The continuances may be entered up at any time before the plaintiff replies. The process sued and filed, and the continuances thereon, must be set forth by the plaintiff in his replication. See 3 T. R. 662; 1 Wils. 167; Esp. N. P. 153. It is sufficient to prove a writ sued out within time, and a declaration within a year afterwards, without showing such writ returned, 7 T. R. 6; unless where the first writ is continued by subsequent writs sued out after the time of limitation. 6 T. R. 617; and see 2 Bos. & Pul. 157.

It is to be observed, that the above decisions are all prior to the Uniformity of Process Act, 2 Will. 4. c. 39; but the principle they establish will apply to cases where the new writs given by that act have been sued out. It may also be remarked, that by the general rules of H. T. 4 Will. 4. the entry of continuances is abolished.

Where a writ of summons under the 2 Will. 4. c. 39. tested in time to save the statute of limitations, was resealed in consequence of an alteration in the description of the defendant and of his residence, and was not served till after the expiration of the six years; it was held that the resealing did not amount to a reissuing of the writ, and that the plaintiff need not show when it took place. 2 C. & M. 408.

7. Assumpsit appears to be the only action in which it has been held that an acknowledgment or promise has the effect of taking the case out of the statute of 21 Jac. 1. c. 16. See 1 B. & A. 92; 3 Bing. 331; 6 B. & C. 605; although from the framing of the 9 Geo. 4. c. 14. hereafter noticed, Lord Tenterden seems to have thought that the doctrine was equally applicable to actions of debt on simple contract. The action of assumpsit must either be a case of guarantee, 1 B. & A. 690; or for a simple contract debt. Thus in 2 Campb. 160, Lord Ellenborough held, that if a cause of action, arising from the breach of contract in not doing an act (other than the payment of money) at a specific time, be once barred, no new acknowledgment or promise can revive it.

Previous to the 9 Geo. 4. c. 14. a parol-acknowledgment (Carth. 470) or promise was sufficient to take the case out of the statute, but much inconvenience being found to result from such a state of the law, it was enacted by the above act, commonly called Lord Tenterden's Act, "That in actions of debt or upon the case, grounded upon any simple

execu

chargeable, in respect or by reason only of any written acknowledgment or promise made and signed by any other or others of them. Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall alter, or take away, or lessen the effect of payment of any principal or interest made by any person whatsoever Provided also, that in actions to be commenced against two or more such joint-contractors, or tors, or administrators, if it shall appear at the trial, or otherwise, that the plaintiff, though barred by either of the said recited acts or this act, as to one or more such jointcontractors, executors, or administrators, shall, nevertheless, be entitled to recover against any other or others of the defendants, by virtue of a new acknowledgment, or promise, or otherwise judgment may be given and costs allowed for the plaintiff as to such defendant or defendants against whom he shall recover, and for the other defendant or defendants against the plaintiff."

§ 3. "No indorsement or memorandum of any payment, written or made after the time appointed for this act, to take effect upon any promissory note, bill of exchange, or other writing, by or on the behalf of the party to whom such payment shall be made, shall be deemed sufficient proof of such payment, so as to take the case out of the operation of either of the said statutes."

§ 4. The said recited acts and this act shall be deemed and taken to apply to the case of any debt or simple contract, alleged by way of set-off on the part of any defendant, either by plea, notice, or otherwise."

The 9 Geo. 4. c. 14. has made no alteration with respect to the effect of payment of any part of the principal, or of any interest.

In the case of debt due from a single individual, it has been long established, that the payment of either part of the principal, or of interest, is an admission of the debt which would take it out of the statute.

And where there are several debtors, it has been held that a payment by one of them was sufficient to take the case out of the statute. Dougl. 652.

One of two makers of a joint and several promissory note having become a bankrupt, the payee receives a dividend under his commission, on account of the note; this will prevent the other maker from availing himself of the statute of limitations, in an action brought against him for the remainder of the money due on the note; the dividend having been received within six years before the action brought. 2 H. Bl. 340.

A payment by one of two makers of a joint and several note, operates as a promise to the full extent of the promise in the instrument, and consequently takes the note out of the statute, as against the administrator of the other, who died after the payment made. 8 B. & C. 36. which recognizes 2 H. Black. 340; and Dougl. 652. But after the death of one maker of a joint and several note, the joint-contract is severed, and a payment by the executor of the deceased will not take the note out of the statute against the surviving maker. 1 B. & A. 396; and see 2 B. & C. 23.

As to the payment of interest on a note given by parish officers, see 1 Ad. & E. 196; and as to the payment of principal and interest to one of two legatees, see 2 C. & M. 322; 4 Tyr. 94. 8. It seems to be admitted, that the statute of limitations

must be pleaded positively by him that would take advantage thereof; and that the same cannot be given in evidence, especially in an assumpsit, because the statute speaks of a time past, and relates to the time of making the promise. I Lev. 111; 1 Sid. 253; and see Cro. Jac. 115. See ante, II. 2. But, in debt for rent, upon nil debet pleaded, the statute of limitations might have been given in evidence. 1 Salk. 278. The modern practice however has been to plead the statute in debt as well as assumpsit, and it was held by Mr. Justice Bayley, that the statute could not be given in evidence on nil debet. Woodhouse v. Williams, Bac. Ab. Limitation of Actions, (F.) (7th ed.)

Now by the general rules of H. T. 4 W. 4. the plea of nil debet has been abolished, and consequently the statute must in all cases be pleaded.

Where the cause of action is to arise from an executory consideration, as some act to be performed, and a promise to pay in consequence of it, there non assumpsit infrà sex annos is not the proper plea; for the assumpsit does not arise till the consideration is performed; it should be actio non accrevit infra sex annos. Espinasse, 156. See 2 Salk. 422.

In replevin the defendant pleaded Not guilty, De capt prædict' infra sex annos jam ultimo elapsos; and though it was urged, that this was the same with pleading non cepit, and if he did not take, he could not be guilty of the detainer; and if this way of pleading were not allowed, the statute would be entirely evaded as to this action; yet the plea was held ill, because he ought to have answered to the detainer, as well as to the taking; also a thing may be lawfully distrained, although unlawfully kept; as by being put into a castle, &c. by which means it could not be replevied. 1 Sid. 81; Keb. 279; and see Lord Raym. 86; 1 Lev. 110; 1 Keb. 566.

&c., here the daughters shall not have any thing in it so long as there is a male, for the estate to the heirs male is first limited. limited. Co. Lit. 3, 13.

If a limitation of an estate be uncertain, the limitation is void; and the estate shall remain as if there had been no such limitation. Cro. Eliz. 216. But a thing that is limited in a will by plain words, shall not be afterwards made uncertain by general words which follow. Hil. 23 Car. B. R. Where a devise is to the eldest son, upon condition that he pays such legacies; and if he refuses, the land to remain to such lega cies; on his refusal, the legatees may enter by way of limitation. Noy, 51. And in all cases, where, after a condition, an interest is granted to a stranger, it is a limitation. 1 Leon. 269; Cro. Eliz. 204. See Condition, I. 2.

As to the origin and progress of the Limitation of Estates, see 1 Inst. 271. b. in n; and see Conveyance. See also Deed, Estate, Feoffment, Gift, Grant, Lease and Release, Powers, Remainder, Trusts, Uses, &c. From the note above cited has been extracted the following summary with respect to the limitations and modifications of landed property, unknown to the common law, which have been introduced under the statute of uses, 27 H. 8. c. 10.

The principal of these are known by the general appellation of springing or secondary uses. No estate could be limited upon or after a fee, though it were a base or qualified fee; nor could a fee or estate of freehold be made to cease as to one person and to vest in another, by any common law conveyance. But there are instances where even by the common law these secondary estates seem to have been allowed, when limited, or rather when declared by way of use. See Jenk. Cent. 8. c. 52. After the statute of uses the judges seem to have long hesitated whether they should receive them. In Chudleigh's Case, (1 Rep. 120; Jenk. 276; Poph.

Evidence of an acknowledgment by the defendant within six years of an old existing debt, of above six years' standing, due to the plaintiff's intestate, but which acknowledgment was made after the intestate's death, will not support a count by the administrator, laying the promise to be made to his intestate, to which the statute of limitations was pleaded. 8 East, 409. To an action brought by the assignees of an insolvent debtor, to recover money owing to him before his insolvency, in which the plaintiffs declare, that in consideration of the money being due to the insolvent the defendant promised to pay them as assignees, it is a bad plea to say that the cause of action first accrued to the insolvent before the plaintiffs became assignees, and that six years had elapsed before the cause of action accrued to the insolvent, and before the suing out of the writ. 2 H. Blackst. 561.

Assumpsit on a note payable by instalments; plea in bar as to the said several causes of action, except the last instalment, "that the said several causes of action did not nor did any of them accrue within six years;" held on special demurrer, that though some of the instalments might be barred, and the others not, yet, that the introduction to the plea and the body of it were inconsistent. 2 Bos. & Pul. 427. See further, Prescription.

LIMITATION OF THE CROWN. See King, I. LIMITATION OF ESTATE. A modification or settlement of an estate, determining how long it shall continue; or is rather a qualification of a precedent estate. A limitation by Littleton, a condition in law. Lit. § 380; 1 Inst. 234. -It is generally made by such words as durante vita, quamdiu, dum, &c. And if there be not a performance according to the limitation, it shall determine an estate without entry or claim; which a condition doth not. 10 Rep. 41; 1 Inst. 204. See Condition, I. 2.

Limitation is also taken for the compass and time of an estate; or where one doth give lands to a man, to hold to him and to his heirs male, and to him and the heirs female,

wrong to make any estate of freehold an inheritance, lawfully vested, to cease as to one, and to rest in others against the rule of law; and that no estates should be raised by way of use, but those which could be raised by livery of seisin at the common law. The courts, however, admitted them. After they were admitted it was found necessary to circumscribe them within certain bounds: because when an estate in fee-simple is first limited, there is no method by which the first taker can bar or destroy the secondary estate; as it is not affected either by a fine or common recovery.

It is now settled, that when an estate in fee-simple is limited, a subsequent estate may be limited upon it, if the event upon which it is to take place be such, that if it does happen, it must necessarily happen within the compass of one or more life or lives in being, and twenty-one years and some months over; [i. e. as many months as it is possible a child may be legitimately born after the death of its father:] it was long before the courts agreed on this period; which was not arbitrarily prescribed by our courts of justice with respect to these secondary fees, but wisely and reasonably adopted in analogy to the cases of freehold and inheritance, which cannot be limited by way of remainder, so as to postpone a complete bar of the entail by fine or recovery for a longer space. 1 Inst. 20. in n.

But the reason which induced the courts to adopt this analogy, with respect to these estates when limited upon an estate in fee-simple, does not hold when they are limited upon or after an estate in tail; because in this latter case, the tenant in tail, by suffering a common recovery before the event takes place, bars or defeats the secondary estate, and acquires the fee-simple absolutely discharged from it. See Page v. Haywood, 2 Salk. 570, and 1 Lev. 35; Goodman v. Cook, 2 Sid. 102. Hence, if these secondary estates are limited upon or after an estate in tail, they may be limited generally, without restraining or confining the event or contingency upon which they are to take place to any period. See Treat. Eq. ii. 95.

Thus, if an estate be limited to A. and his heirs; and if B. (a person in esse) dies without leaving any issue of his body living at the time of his decease; or, having such issue, if all of them die before any of them attain the age of twentyone years, then to C. and his heirs: here the limitation to C. is limited after a previous limitation in fee-simple, and it is a good limitation; because the event upon which it is to take place must, if it does happen at all, necessarily happen within the period of a life in being, and twenty-one years and a few months. But if the estate were limited to A. and his heirs; and, after the decease of B., and a total failure of heirs, or heirs-male of the body of B., to C. and his heirs ; here as the secondary use is limited after a previous limitation in fee-simple, and the event on which the fee limited to C. is to take place, is not such as must necessarily happen within the period prescribed by law, (for B. may have issue, and that issue may not fail for many years after the expiration of twenty-one years after B.'s decease,) the limitation to C. and his heirs is void. But suppose the estates were limited to A. for life, then to trustees and their heirs, during his life, for preserving contingent remainders, then to A.'s first and third sons successively in tail-mail, with several remainders over; with a priviso if B. dies, and there should be a total failure of heirs or heirs-male of his body, the uses limited to A. and his sons, and the remainders over, shall determine, and the lands remain and go over to C. and his heirs; here the limitation to C., and his heirs is limited upon or after previous limitations for life or in tail; and the event upon which it is to take effect may possibly not happen till after a period of one or more life or lives in being and twenty-one years: but so far as it is limited on an event which may happen during the continuance either of one or more life or lives in being, it is within the bounds mentioned; and so far as it is limited on an event which may happen during the continuance of the estate of the tenants in tail, or after them, the first tenant in tail in possession, by suffering a recovery before the event happens, may bar the limitations over, and thereby acquire an estate in fee-simple: and therefore the limitation to C. and his heirs is good. See tit. Executory Devise.

LIMOGIA. Enamel; opus de limogia, or opus limoceum, is enamelled work. Monast. 5 tom. 331, LINARIUM. A flax plat, where flax is sown. Pat. 22 Hen. 4. par. 1. m. 33. LINCOLN. In attaint of a verdict of the city of Lincoln, the jury shall be impanelled of the county of Lincoln. See 13 Rich. 2. st. 1. c. 18; 2 Hen. 5. st. 2. c. 5.

LINCOLN'S INN FIELDS. To be inclosed by trustees, who may employ artificers, &c. And yearly rates shall be made on all houses there, not exceeding 2s. 6d. in the pound: this square and back streets are to be a distinct ward, as to the scavengers' rates and watch; and the persons annoying the fields by filth, to forfeit 20s.; and assembling to use sports, or breaking fences, &c. incur a forfeiture of 40s. levied by the warrant of a justice of the peace. 8 Geo. 2. c. 26. LINDESFERN. A place often mentioned in our ancient histories; being formerly a Bishop's see, now Holy Island. LINEAL CONSANGUINITY. Is that which subsists between persons, of whom one is descended in a direct line from the other. See tit. Descent, Kindred.

LINEAL DESCENT. The descent of estates from ancestor to heir, i. e. from one to another, in a right line. See

tit. Descent.

LINEAL DESCENT OF THE CROWN. See tit. King, I.

LINEAL WARRANTY. Was where the heir derived, or might by possibility have derived his title to land warranted, either from or through the ancestor who made the warranty. See tit. Warranty.

LINEN. No person shall put up to sale any piece of dowlas, linen, &c, unless the just length be expressed thereon,

on pain to forfeit the same. 28 Hen. 8. c. 4. Using means whereby linen cloth shall be made deceitfully, incurs a forfeiture of the linen, and a month's imprisonment and a fine. 1 Eliz. c. 12.

By 15 Cha. 2. c. 15. § 2. any person, native or foreigner, may without paying any thing, in any place privileged or unprivileged, corporate or non-corporate, set up and exercise the occupation of breaking, hickling, or dressing of hemp or flax; as also of making or whitening of thread; as also of spinning &c. any cloth made of hemp or flax only; as also the mystery of making twine or nets for fishing, or of stoving of cordage; as also the trade of making tapestry hangings.

§ 3. Foreigners that shall use any of the trades aforesaid three years, shall (taking the oaths of supremacy before two justices near unto their dwellings) enjoy all privileges as natural born subjects.

Linen of all sorts made of flax or hemp, of the manufacture of this kingdom, may be exported duty free. 3 Geo. 1. c. 7.— Stealing of linen, &c. from whitening grounds, or drying houses, to the value of 10s., is felony. 4 Geo. 2. c. 16. By the 17 Geo. 2. c. 30. affixing on foreign linens any stamp put upon Scotch or Irish linens, or affixing a counterfeit stamp on British or Irish linens, incurs a penalty of 51. Besides various other premiums and encouragements, bounties were granted on the exportation of linen for a long period down to 1830, when they were withdrawn.

By the 6 Geo. 4. c. 122. the former acts for the regulation of the linen and hempen manufactures of Ireland were repealed, and other provisions substituted. That act was repealed by the 9 Geo. 4. c. 62. which in its turn has been supplanted by the 2 & 3 Will. 4. c. 77, which is to continue in force for two years, from the end of the then session of parliament, and from their expiration to the end of the then next session.

By the 27 Geo. 3. c. 13. a sum of 63351. 15s, was set apart out of the customs for the encouragement of raising and dressing hemp and flax, but that and all other acts authorizing money to be so appropriated have been repealed by the 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 14.

Linen and other goods are protected whilst in the course of their manufacture by the 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 29. § 16. which punishes by transportation for life or years, imprisonment. and whipping, the stealing of them to the value of ten shillings, whilst placed or exposed during any stage or process of manufacture in any building, field, or other place.

As to the malicious destruction of linen in the course of manufacture, &c. see tits. Frames, Malicious Injuries. With respect to the copyright of printed linens, see tit. Literary Property.

LION. See Lyon.

"

LITERE SOLUTORIÆ. Were magical characters supposed to be of such power, that it was impossible for any one to bind those persons who carried these about them. Bede, lib. 4. c. 22.

LITERARY PROPERTY.

The property that the author, or his assignee, hath in the copy of any literary work.

The right which an author may be supposed to have in his own original literary compositions, so that no other person without his leave may publish or make profit of the copies, is classed by Blackstone among the species of property acquired by occupancy; being grounded on labour and invention. He expresses, however, some doubt whether it subsists by common law and this being still, after all the determinations on the subject, in some measure, vexata quæstio, the following extracts deserve the attention of the student. See 2 Comm. 405.

When a man, by the exertion of his rational powers, has produced an original work, he seems to have clearly a right to dispose of that identical work as he pleases; and any attempt to vary the disposition he has made of it, appears to be an invasion of that right. Now the identity of a literary composition consists entirely in the sentiment and the language. The same conceptions, clothed in the same words, must necessarily be the same composition; and whatever method be taken of exhibiting that composition to the ear or to the eye of another, by recital, [see post, the case of Colman v. Wathen,] by writing, or by printing, in any number of copies, or at any period of time, it is always the identical work of the author which is so exhibited; and no other man, it hath been thought, can have a right to exhibit it, especially for profit, without the author's consent. This consent may perhaps be tacitly given to all mankind when an author suffers his work to be published by another hand, without any claim or reserve of right, and without stamping on it any marks of ownership: it being then a present to the public, like building a church or bridge, or laying out a new highway. But in case the author sells a single book, or totally grants the copyright, it hath been supposed, in the one case, that the buyer hath no more right to multiply the copies of that book for sale, than he hath to imitate for the like purpose the ticket, which is bought for admission to an opera or a concert; and, in the other, that the whole property, with all its exclusive rights, is perpetually transferred to the grantee. On the other hand it is urged, that though the exclusive property of the manuscript, and all which it contains, undoubtedly belongs to the author before it is printed or published; yet from the instant of publication, the exclusive right of an author, or his assigns to the sole communication of his ideas, immediately vanishes and evaporates; as being a right of too subtle and unsubstantial a nature, to become the subject of property at the common law, and only capable of being guarded by positive statutes and special provisions of the magistrate. 2 Comm. 406.

The Roman law adjudged, that if one man wrote any thing on the paper or parchment of another, the writing should belong to the owner of the blank materials, meaning thereby the mechanical operation of writing; for which it directed the scribe to receive a satisfaction: for in works of genius and invention, as in painting on another man's canvas, the same law gave the canvas to the painter. As to any other property in the works of the understanding the law is silent; though the sale of literary copies, for the purposes of recital or multiplication, is certainly as ancient as the times of Terence, Martial, and Statius. 2 Comm. 407.

But whatever inherent copyright might have been supposed to subsist by the common law, the 8 Ann. c. 19, hath now declared, that the author and his assigns shall have the

of fourteen years, and no longer; [the words of the statute]; and hath protected that property by additional penalties and forfeitures: directing farther, that if at the end of that term the author himself be living, the right shall then return to him for another term of the same duration. A similar privilege is extended to the inventors of prints and engravings, by 8 Geo. 2. c. 13; 7 Geo. 3. c. 38; 17 Geo. 3. c. 57.— The above parliamentary protections appear to have been suggested by the exception in the statute of monopolies, 21 Jac. 1. c. 3; which allows a royal patent of privilege to be granted for fourteen years to any inventor of a new manufacture, for the sole working or making of the same: by virtue whereof it is held, that a temporary property therein becomes vested in the king's patentee. 1 Vern. 65; 2 Comm. 407. See tit. Patents.

Whether the productions of the mind could communicate a right of property, or of exclusive enjoyment, in reason and nature; and if such a moral right existed, whether it was recognized and supported by the common law of England, and whether the common law was intended to be restrained by the statute of queen Anne, are questions upon which the learning and talents of the highest legal characters in this kingdom have been powerfully and zealously exerted. These questions have, by the supreme court of judicature in the kingdom, been so determined, that an author has no right at present beyond the limits fixed by that statute. See the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, Bro. P. C.

As that determination, however, was contrary to the opinion of Lord Mansfield, of the learned commentator, and of several other judges, Mr. Christian has remarked, that every person may still be permitted to indulge his own opinion upon the propriety of it, without incurring the imputation of arrogance; and he proceeds to deliver his sentiments in the following manner.

Nothing is more erroneous than the common practice of referring the origin of moral rights, and the system of natural equity, to that savage state, which is supposed to have preceded civilized establishments; in which literary composition, and of consequence the right to it, could have no existence. But the true mode of ascertaining a moral right seems to be to inquire whether it is such as the reason, the cultivated reason of mankind, must necessarily assent to. No proposition seems more conformable to that criterion, than that every one should enjoy the reward of his labour, the harvest where he has sown, or the fruit of the tree which he has planted. And if any private right ought to be preserved more sacred and inviolate than another, it, is that where the most extensive benefit flows to mankind from the labour by which it is acquired. Literary property, it must be admitted, is very different in its nature from a property in substantial and corporeal objects; and this difference has led some to deny its existence as property; but whether it is sui generis, or under whatever denomination of rights it may more properly be classed, it seems founded upon the same principle of general utility to society, which is the basis of all other moral rights and obligations. Thus considered, an author's copyright ought to be esteemed an inviolable right, established in sound reason and abstract morality: no less than eight of the twelve judges were of opinion, that it was a right allowed and perpetuated by the common law of England: but six held, either that it did not exist, or that the enjoyment of it was abridged by the statute of queen Anne; and that all remedy for the violation of it was taken away after the expiration of the term specified in the act; and agreeable to that opinion was the final judgment of the House of Lords. 1 Comm. 407. in n.

For the arguments at length of the judges of the King's Bench, and the opinions of the rest, see the case of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303; 1 Blackst. Rep. 675. In that case the Court of King's Bench determined that an exclusive and

permanent copyright did actually subsist in authors by the common law. But the effect of their opinion was contradicted by the determination of the House of Lords in Donaldson v. Beckett, as above stated.

But whatever the common law may be with respect to the copyright of a printed work, it has been decided that, independent of the statute law, an author has an absolute property over his work, whilst it exists in manuscript. 4 Burr. 2340, 2879; 2 Merr. 435. And the mere delivery of the manuscript to a printer will not divest his right; for the consent to print must be in writing. 4 Vin. Ab. 278. Neither is a person to whom a manuscript has been lent, with liberty to take a copy and make what use of it he thinks fit, empowered to print and publish the work. 2 Eden, 329. And it has been decided that the copyright in a piece of music is not lost, although it has been published in manuscript a year before it is printed. 2 B. & A. 298.

Injunctions have also been frequently granted to restrain the publication of private letters either by the parties to whom they have been written, or by third persons. 2 Atk. 342; Amb. 737.

The following is a general abstract of the statutes relative to this interesting subject, and of some points determined on their construction.

The 8 Ann. c. 19. and 41 Geo. 3. c. 107, enacted, that the author of any book, and his assigns, should have the sole liberty of printing it for fourteen years, and for a further term of fourteen years, if the author were living at the end of the first fourteen.-- By 54 Geo. 3. c. 156. § 4. this term is extended to twenty-eight years absolute, and to the end of the author's life and this advantage is given to authors of books published before the act, § 8, 9.

:

An author whose works had been published more than twenty-eight years before the passing the act 54 Geo. 3. is not entitled to the copyright for life. Brooke v. Clarke, 1 B. & A. 396.

By the acts 41 Geo. 3. c. 107. § 1; and 54 Geo. 3. c. 156. § 3. booksellers, printers, &c. in any part of the United Kingdom, or in any part of the British European dominions, who shall print, reprint, or import, or publish, or expose to sale any such book, without consent of the proprietor, shall be liable to a special action in the case for damages at the suit of the proprietor, and shall also forfeit all the books to the proprietor; and further 3d. per sheet, half to the king, and half to the informer.

No bookseller, printer, or other person, shall be liable to these forfeitures, unless the title to the copy of the book, [the whole book and every volume thereof, 15 Geo. 3. c. 53. $6.] shall before such publication be entered in the register book of the Company of Stationers, at their Hall in London, and unless the consent of the proprietor be entered, § 2; nor unless nine copies of each book be delivered to the company's warehouse-keeper before publication, for the use of the royal library, the libraries of the university of Oxford and Cambridge, of the four universities in Scotland, of Sion College in London, and of the advocates at Edinburgh, § 5, and see 15 Geo. 3. c. 53. § 6; and 41 Geo. 3. c. 107. § 6, requiring copies to be delivered to Trinity College, and King's Inns, Dublin.

Doubts having been entertained, whether the copies required for the several public libraries were to be delivered if the works were not entered at Stationers' Hall, it is enacted by 54 Geo. 3. c. 156, that the provisions of the acts 8 Ann. and 41 Geo. 3. as to delivering copies of books to public libraries, shall be repealed; and that eleven copies of all works whatever, printed or published, shall be delivered to the several universities &c. if demanded within twelve months after the publication, but not copies of second or subsequent editions without alteration: and that amendments of early editions may be printed separately, and delivered. 54 Geo. 3. c. 156. § 1, 2, 3.

A part of a work published separately and before the completion of the whole, is not demandable by the public bodies mentioned in 54 Geo. 3. c. 156. under the words "the whole of every book, and every volume thereof." British Museum v. Payne, 4 Bing. 450.

All books are required to be entered (within one month if published in London, and three months if published elsewhere,) at Stationers' Hall, and one copy on the best paper to be then delivered for the British Museum.-Two shillings to be paid for each entry; penalty for neglect of entry, 5l., and eleven times the price of the book. 54 Geo. 3. c. 156. § 5. The warehouse-keeper at Stationers' Hall is to transmit lists of all publications to the librarians of the several libraries entitled to copies and to demand the copies of the publishers; but who may deliver the books at the several libraries, if they please, § 6, 7.

An action may be brought, or an injunction obtained in a Court of Equity, although the publication be not entered in the register of the Stationers' Company. 1 Black. 330. In Beckford v. Hood, it was explicitly determined that an author whose work is pirated before the expiration of twentyeight years, from the first publication of it, may maintain an action on the case for damages against the offending party, although the work was not entered at Stationers' Hall, and although it was first published without the name of the author affixed. 7 T. R. 620.

And to remove all doubt it was enacted by the 54 Geo. 3. c. 156. § 5. that a failure in making the entry shall not affect the copyright, but only subject the publisher to the penalty imposed. If the clerk of the Stationers' Company shall neglect to make due entry, or to give a certificate thereof, then notice being given in the Gazette, the proprietor shall have the same benefit as if an entry were actually made: and the clerk shall | forfeit 201. 8 Ann. c. 19. § 3; 41 Geo. 3. U. K. c. 107. § 4, 5.

The above statute 8 Ann. c. 19. particularly provided, by § 9. that the right of the universities or any other person, to the printing or reprinting of any book already printed, should not be either prejudiced or confirmed: after the determination of the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, the universities were so much alarmed at the decision, that they applied for and obtained an act, 15 Geo. 3. c. 53. which secured to the two universities in England, the colleges or houses of learning within the same, the four universities in Scotland, and the colleges of Eton, Westminster, and Winchester, a perpetuity in the copyright of all books given, or devised to, or in trust for them by the authors; which was sanctioned by the same penalties as those contained in the 8 Ann. so long as the books or copies belonging to the said universities or colleges are printed only at their own printing-presses, within the universities or colleges, and for their sole benefit. § 8.

A fair and bona fide abridgment of any book is considered as a new work and however it may injure the sale of the original, yet it is not deemed in law to be a piracy, or violation of the author's copyright. 1 Bro. C. R. 451; 2 Atk. 141.

A translation of a work, either from the ancient classic authors, or of a work written in Latin by an Englishman, 2 Merr. 441. n.; or of papers in any of the modern languages, as the French and German, 3 Ves. & B. 77, is protected by the 8 Ann. c. 19.

Musical compositions have been held to be within the meaning and protection of the statute, Corp. 623; and an action is maintainable for pirating a single sheet of music. 11 Eust, 244.

Every distinct and independent part of a work is also a book within the meaning of the statute, as a tale or piece of music, printed and bound up with other tales or pieces of music. Id.; 2 B. & A. 295.