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enacted that the Kings of England shall always be Kings of the most part it is but a collection of certain prerogatives Ireland.

V. 1. It has been observed, that one of the principal bulwarks of civil liberty, or, in other words, of the British constitution, is the limitation of the King's prerogative, by bounds so certain and notorious, that it is impossible he should ever exceed them, without either the consent of the people, or a violation of that contract which we have seen expressly subsists between the prince and the subject. When we more particularly consider this prerogative minutely, in order to mark out, in the most important instances, its particular extent and restrictions, one conclusion will evidently follow; that the powers which are vested in the crown by the laws of England are necessary for the support of society, and do not intrench any farther on our natural, than is expedient for the maintenance of our civil liberties.

There cannot be a stronger proof of that genuine freedom, which is the boast of this age and country, than the power of discussing and examining with decency and respect the limits of the King's prerogative. This was formerly considered as a high contempt in a subject, and the glorious Queen Elizabeth herself directed her parliament to abstain from judging of or meddling with her prerogative. It is no wonder, therefore, that her successor James I. should consider such a presumption as little less than blasphemy and impiety. But whatever might be the sentiments of some of our princes, this was never the language of our ancient constitution and laws. The sentiments of Bracton and Fortescue, at the distance of two centuries from each other, may be seen by a reference to the place cited in the preceding division IV. And Sir Hen. Finch, under Charles I., after the lapse of two centuries more, though he lays down the law of prerogative in very strong and emphatical terms, yet qualifies it with a general restriction in regard to the liberties of the people. The King, says he, has a prerogative in all things that are not injurious to the subject; for in them all it must be remembered, that the King's prerogative stretcheth not to the doing of any wrong. Finch, l. 84, 85. Nihil enim aliud potest Rex, nisi id solum quod de jure potest. Bract. 1. 3. tr. 1. c. 9.

The nature of our constitution is that of a limited monarchy, in which the legislative power is lodged in the King, Lords, and Commons; but the King is intrusted with the executive part, and from him all justice is said to flow; hence he is styled the head of the Commonwealth, supreme governor, parens patriæ, &c.; but still he is to make the law of the land the rule of his government, that being the measure as well of his power as of the subjects' obedience: for as the law asserts, maintains, and provides for the safety of the King's royal person, crown, and dignity, and all his just rights, revenues, powers, and prerogatives, so it likewise declares and asserts the rights and liberties of the subject. 1 And. 153; Co. Lit. 19, 75; 4 Co. 124.

Hence it hath been established as a rule, that all prerogatives must be for the advantage of the people, otherwise they ought not to be allowed by law. Moor, 672; Show. P. C. 75. Although the King is the fountain of justice, and intrusted with the whole executive power of the law, yet he hath no power to alter the laws which have been established, and are the birthright of every subject, for by those very laws he is to govern; and as they prescribe the extent and bounds of his prerogative, in like manner they declare and ascertain the rights and liberties of the people, therefore admit of no innovation or change but by act of parliament. 4 Inst. 164; 2 Inst. 54, 478; 2 Hal. Hist. P. C. 131, 282; Vaugh. 418; 2 Salk. 510.

The rights and prerogatives of the crown are in most things as ancient as the law itself; for though the statute 17 Edw. 2. c. 1. commonly called the statute De prærogativa Regis, seems to be introductive of something new, yet for

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that were known law long before. Bendl. 117; 2 Inst. 263, 496; 10 Co. 64. And this statute does not contain the King's whole prerogative, but only so much thereof as concerns the profits of his coffers. Plowd. 314.

The nature of the government of our King, says Fortescue, is not only regal, but political; if it were merely the former, regal, he would have power to make what alterations he pleased in our law, and impose taxes and other hardships upon the subject, whether they would or no; but his government being political, he cannot change the laws of the realm without the people consent thereto, nor burthen them against their wills. It is also said by the same writer, that the king is appointed to protect his subjects in their lives, properties, and laws; for which end and purpose he has the delegation of power from the people; likewise our King is such by the fundamental law of our land; by which law the meanest subject enjoys the liberty of his person and property in his estate; and it is every man's concern to defend these, as well as the King in his lawful rights. Fortescue, de Laud. leg. Angl. 17, &c.

If a King hath a kingdom by title of descent, where the laws have taken good effect and rooting, or if a King conquers a Christian kingdom, after the people have laws given them for the government of the country, to which they submit, no succeeding King can alter the same without the parliament. 7 Rep. 17. It has nevertheless been held, that conquered countries may be governed by what laws the King thinks fit, and that the laws of England do not take place in such countries until declared so by the conqueror, or his successor; here, in case of infidels, their laws do not cease, but only such as are against the law of God; and where the laws are rejected or silent, they shall be governed according to the rule of natural equity. 2 Salk. 411, 412, 666. If the King makes a new conquest of any country, the persons there born are his subjects; for by saving the lives of the people conquered he gains a right and property in such people, and may impose on them what laws he pleases. Dyer, 224; Vaugh. 281.

But until such laws given by the conquering prince, the laws of the conquered country hold place; (unless where these are contrary to our religion, or enact any thing that is malum in se, or are silent ;) for in all such cases the laws of the conquering country prevail. 2 P. Wms. 75, 76.

If there be a new and uninhabited country found out by English subjects, as the law is the birthright of every subject, so wherever they go carry their laws with them, therefore such new found country is to be governed by the laws of England; though after such country is inhabited by the English, acts of parliament made in England, without naming the foreign plantations, will not bind them. 2 P. Wms. 75; 2 Salk. 411, And see Campbell v. Hall, Corp. 204; Spragge v. Stone, cited Dougl. 35, 37, 38.

Questions of this nature are not at present likely often to arise, since (as in the instance of annexing the crown of Corsica to the British crown in 1794) all such transactions are now regulated by express stipulations; which neither leave to the prerogative of the conquering monarch, nor the laws of his kingdom, any power to interfere.

By the word prerogative is usually understood that special pre-eminence which the King hath over and above all other persons, and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity. It signifies, in its etymology from præe and rego, something that is required or demanded before, or in preference to all others. And hence it follows, that it must be in its nature singular and eccentrical; that it can only be applied to those rights and capacities which the King enjoys alone in contradistinction to others; and not to those which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects; for if once any prerogative of the crown could be held in common with the subject, it would cease to be prerogative

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any longer, Finch, therefore, lays it down as a maxim, that the prerogative is that law in case of the King, which is law in no case of the subject. Finch, L. 85.

Prerogatives are either direct or incidental. The direct are such positive substantial parts of the royal character and authority as are rooted in, and spring from, the King's political person, and of which we are about to state the law at some length. But such prerogatives as are incidental bear always a relation to something else, distinct from the King's person, and are indeed only exceptions in favour of the crown, to the general rules established for the rest of the community; such as that no costs shall be recovered against the King; that he can never be a joint-tenant; and that his debt shall be preferred before that of a subject. These, and an infinite number of other instances, will better be understood by referring to the subjects themselves, to which these incidental prerogatives are exceptions. As to his prerogative relating to his debts, however, here reckoned among those considered as incidental, see post, VI. at some length; and this Dictionary, titles Execution, Extent, Judgment, &c. Other incidental prerogatives are, that where the title of the King and a common person concur, the King's title shall be preferred. 1 Inst. 30. No distress can be made upon the King's possession, but he may distrain out of his fee in other lands, &c. and may take distresses in the highway. 2 Inst. 131. An heir shall pay the King's debt, though he is not named in the bond; and the King's debt shall be satisfied before that of a subject, from which there is a prerogative writ. 1 Inst. 130, 386. But this is where the debt is in equal degree with that of the subject. See 33 Hen. 8. c. 39. at large; post, VI.; and Cro. Car. 283; Hardr. 23. Goods and chattels may go in succession to the King, though they may not to any other sole corporation. 1 Inst. 90. In the hands of whomsoever the goods of the King came, their lands are chargeable, and may be seized for the same; and the King is not bound by sale of his goods in open market. 2 Inst. 713. No entry will bar the King, and no judgment is final against him, but with a salvo jure regis. Litt. 178; Finch, 46; but see post, 2, as to the nullum tempus act, 9 G. 3. c. 9. &c. The King may plead several matters without being guilty of double pleading, and the party shall answer them all. Bro. Dougl. pl. 57. In his pleading he need not plead an Act of Parliament as a subject is bound to do. 4 Rep. | 75. He is not bound to join in demurrer on evidence, and the court may direct the jury to find the matter specially. Finch, 82; 5 Rep. 104. The King's own testimony of any thing done in his presence is of as high a nature and credit as any record; whence, in all original writs or precepts, he useth no other witness than himself, as teste meipso. 1 Inst. 41, 57.

It may not be unapt here to mention one of the prerogatives of the crown with respect to the descent of lands, that wherever either a general or special custom of descents would operate so as to sever lands, before held by the King jure coronæ, from the person of his successor, there that custom cannot prevail, "for the crown and the lands whereof the King is seised jure corona are concomitantia." Thus, if the King dies, leaving two sons by different wives, and the elder having succeeded, and having been seised of lands in fee, dies without issue, the younger will on succeeding to the crown inherit these lands, though of the half-blood only to the person last seised. So, if a King die, leaving two daughters, the eldest alone will, with the crown, take all the lands whereof he was seised jure coronæ, and not as coparcener with her sister. These two are instances where the general custom as regards subjects will not prevail against the jure corona. So, if the King purchase lands of the nature of gavelkind, where by the custom all the sons inherit equally, yet upon the King's demise his eldest son shall succeed to those lands alone in exclusion of any other sons. See 1 Inst. 15.

It is also held, that the King is by his prerogative universal occupant, as all property is presumed to have been originally in the crown; and that he partitioned it out in large districts to the great men who deserved well of him in the wars, and were able to advise him in time of peace. Hence the King hath the direct dominion; and all lands are holden mediately or immediately from the crown. Co. Lit. 1; Dyer, 154; 1 Bend. 237; Seld. Mare Claus.

If the sea leaves any shore by the water suddenly falling off, such derelict lands belong to the King; but if a man's lands lying to the sea are increased by insensible degrees, they belong to the soil adjoining. Dyer, 326; 2 Rol. Abr. 170. This distinction was fully established in Rex v. Lord Yarborough, 3 Barn. & C. 91; 5 Bing. 163; and see 4 Barn. & C. 495.

So, if a river, so far as there is a flux of the sea, leaves its channel, it belongs to the King; for the English sea and channels belong to the King; and, having never distributed them out to the subjects, he hath a property in the soil. 2 Rol. Abr. 170.

But if a river, in which there is no tide, should leave its bed, it belongs to the owners on both sides; for they have in that case the property of the soil; this being no original part or appendix to the sea, but distributed out as other lands. 2 Rol. Abr. 170.

If land be drowned, and so continue for years; if it be after regained, every owner shall have his interest again, if it can be known by the boundaries. 8 Co. Sir Francis Barrington's case.

It is said, that there is a custom in Lincolnshire, that the lord of the manor shall have derelict lands; and that as such it is a reasonable custom; for if the sea wash away the lands of the subject, he can have no recompence, unless he should be entitled to what he regains from the sea.

Dict.

The King hath the sovereign dominion in all seas and great rivers, which is plain from Selden's account of the ancient Saxons, who dwelt very successfully in all naval affairs; therefore the territories of the English seas and rivers always resided in the King. Seld. Mar. Cl. 251, &c.; 1 Rol. Abr. 168, 169; 1 Co. 141; 5 Co. 106.

And as the King hath a prerogative in the seas, so hath he likewise a right to the fishery and to the soil; so that if a river as far as there is a flux of the sea leaves its channel, it belongs to the King. Dyer, 326; 2 Rol. Abr. 170.

Hence the Admiralty Court, which is a court for all maritime causes or matters arising on the high seas, is deemed the King's court, and its jurisdiction derived from him who protects his subjects from pirates, and provides for the security of trade and navigation. 4 Inst. 142; Molloy, 66.

From the King's dominion over the sea it was holden, that the King, as protector and guardian of the seas, might, before any statute made for commissions of sewers, provide against inundations by lands, banks, &c. and that he had a prerogative herein as well as in defending his subjects from pirates, &c. 10 Co. 141.

But notwithstanding the King's prerogative in seas and navigable rivers, yet it hath been always held, that a subject may fish in the sea; which being a matter of common right, and the means of livelihood, and for the good of the commonwealth, cannot be restrained by grant or prescription. 8 Edw. 4. 18, 19; Bro. Custom, 46; Fitz. Bar. 1 Mod. 105; 2 Salk. 637.

Prima facie any subject has a right to take fish found on the sea shore between high and low water mark; but such general right may be abridged by the existence of an exclusive right in some individual. And the public have not any common law right of bathing in the sea; and, as incident to it, of crossing the sea shore on foot, or with bathing machines for that purpose. Bagott v. Orr, 2 Bos. & P. 472; Blundell v. Catteral, 5 Barn. & A. 268.

Also it is held, that every subject of common right may

fish with lawful nets, &c. in a navigable river as well as in the sea; and the King's grant cannot bar them thereof; but the crown only has a right to royal fish, and that the King only may grant. 6 Mod. 73; Salk. 357, S. C. & S. P. See title Fish, &c.

It is also said, that the King, as a perpetual sign and acknowledgment of his dominion of the seas, hath several creatures reserved to him under the denomination of royal creatures, as swans, sturgeons, and whales, all which are natives of seas and rivers. 7 Co. 16. See post, 4.

2. The law ascribes to the King the attributes of sovereignty or pre-eminence. See Bract. l. 1. c. 8. He is said to have imperial dignity, and in charters before the Conquest is frequently styled Basileus and Imperator; the titles respectively assumed by the emperors of the East and West. His realm is declared to be an empire, and his crown imperial, by many Acts of Parliament, particularly 24 Hen. 8. c. 12; 25 Hen. 8. c. 28; which at the same time declare the King to be the supreme head of the realm in matters both civil and ecclesiastical; and, of consequence, inferior to no man upon earth, dependent on no man, accountable to no man. See also 24 G. 2. c. 24; 5 G. 3. c. 27.

No King of England used any seal of arms till the reign of Richard I. Before that time, the seal was the King sitting in a chair of state on one side of the seal, and on horseback on the other side; but this King sealed with a seal of two lions; and King John was the first that bare three lions; and afterwards Edward III. quartered the arms of France, which was continued until the Union between Great Britain and Ireland. King Henry VIII. was the first to whom Majesty was attributed; before which, our Kings were called Highness, &c. Lex Constitut. 47, 48.

The meaning of the legislature when it uses these terms of empire and imperial, and applies them to the realm and crown of England, is only to assert that our King is equally sovereign and independent within these his dominions, as any emperor is in his empire, and owes no kind of subjection to any other potentate upon earth.

Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the King, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. All jurisdiction implies superiority of power; authority to try would be vain and idle without authority to redress; and the sentence of a court would be contemptible unless that court had power to command the execution of it; but who, says Finch, shall command the King? Finch, l. 83. Hence it is likewise, that by law the PERSON of the KING is SACRED, even though the measures pursued in his reign be completely tyrannical and arbitrary; for no jurisdiction upon earth has power to try him in a criminal way, much less to condemn him to punishment. If any foreign jurisdiction had this power, as was formerly claimed by the Pope, the independence of the kingdom would be no more; and if such a power were vested in any domestic tribunal, there would soon be an end to the constitution, by destroying the free agency of one of the constituent parts of the sovereign legislative power.

ministers, these men may be examined and punished. The
constitution has therefore provided, by means of indictments
and parliamentary impeachments, that no man shall dare to
assist the crown in contradiction to the law of the land.
But at the same time it is a maxim in those laws, that the
King himself can do no wrong; since it would be a great
weakness and absurdity in any system of positive law, to de-
fine any possible wrong, without any possible redress.
As to such public oppressions as tend to dissolve the consti-
tution, and subvert the fundamentals of government, these
are cases which the law will not, out of decency, suppose;
being incapable of distrusting those whom it has invested
with any part of the supreme power; since such distrust
would render the exercise of that power precarious and im-
practicable. For, wherever the law expresses its distrust or
abuse of power, it always vests a superior coercive authority
in some other hand to correct it; the very notion of which
destroys the very idea of sovereignty. If therefore (for
example) the two Houses of Parliament, or either of them,
had avowedly a right to animadvert on the King, or each
other, or if the King had a right to animadvert on either of
the Houses, that branch of the legislature, so subject to
animadversion, would instantly cease to be part of the
supreme power; the balance of the constitution would be
overturned; and that branch or branches, in which this
jurisdiction resided, would be completely sovereign. The
supposition of law therefore is, that neither the King, nor
either House of Parliament (collectively taken) is capable of
doing any wrong; since in such cases the law feels itself in-
capable of furnishing any adequate remedy. For which
reason all oppressions, which may happen to spring from any
branch of the sovereign power, must necessarily be out of
the reach of any stated rule or express legal provision; but
if ever they unfortunately happen, the prudence of the times
must provide new remedies upon new emergencies.

Indeed, it is found by experience, that whenever the unconstitutional oppressions, even of the sovereign power, advance with gigantic strides, and threaten desolation to a state, mankind will not be reasoned out of the feelings of humanity, nor will sacrifice their liberty by a scrupulous adherence to those political maxims which were originally established to preserve it. And, therefore, though the positive laws are silent, experience furnishes us with a very remarkable case, wherein nature and reason prevailed. When King James II. invaded the fundamental constitution of the realm, the Convention Parliament declared an abdication, whereby the throne was considered vacant, which induced a new settlement of the crown. And so far as this precedent leads, and no further, we may now be allowed to lay down the law of redress against public oppression. If, therefore, any future prince should endeavour to subvert the constitution by breaking the original contract between King and people, should violate the fundamental laws, and should withdraw himself out of the kingdom, we are now authorized to declare that this conjunction of circumstances would amount to an abdication, and the throne would be thereby vacant. In these, therefore, or other circumstances, which a fertile imagination may furnish, since both law and history are silent, it becomes us to be silent too; leaving to future generations, whenever necessity and the safety of the whole shall require it, the exertion of those inherent (though latent) powers of society, which no climate, no time, no coninstitution, no contract, can ever destroy or diminish.

Are then, it may be asked, the subjects of England totally destitute of remedy in case the crown should invade their rights, either by private injuries or public oppressions? To this we may answer, that the law has provided a remedy in

both cases.

As to private injuries, if any person has, in point of property, a just demand upon the King, he must petition him his Court of Chancery, where his chancellor will administer right as a matter of grace, though not upon compulsion. Finch, 1. 255. See this Dictionary, title Chancery; and post, as to the perfection ascribed to the King.

As to cases of ordinary public oppression, where the vitals of the constitution are not attacked, the law has also assigned a remedy. For as a King cannot misuse his powers without the advice of evil counsellors, and the assistance of wicked

It may not be amiss to conclude this part of the subject with observing, that all persons born in any part of the King's dominions, and within his protection, are his subjects; thus are those born in Ireland, Scotland, Wales, the King's plantations, or on the English seas; who by their birth owe such an inseparable allegiance to the King, that they cannot by any act of theirs renounce or transfer their subjection to any foreign prince. 7 Co. 1, &c.; Calvin's case; Molloy, 370;

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Besides the attribute of sovereignty, the law also ascribes to the King, in his political capacity, absolute perfection. The King can do no wrong. Which ancient and fundamental maxim is not to be understood, as if every thing transacted by the government was of course just and lawful, but means only two things. First, that whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs is not to be imputed to the King, nor is he answerable for it personally to his people. And, secondly, it means that the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury; it is created for the benefit of the people, and therefore cannot be exerted to their prejudice. Plowd. 487.

Or perhaps it means that, although the King is subject to the passions and infirmities of other men, the constitution has prescribed no mode by which he can be made personally amenable for any wrong that he may actually commit. The law will therefore presume no wrong where it has provided no remedy. The inviolability of the King is essentially necessary to the free exercise of those high prerogatives which are vested in him, not for his own private splendor and gratification, as the vulgar and ignorant are too apt to imagine, but for the security and preservation of the real happiness and liberty of his subjects.

The King moreover is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing; in him is no folly or weakness. If, therefore, the crown should be induced to grant any franchise or privilege to a subject, contrary to reason, or any way prejudicial to the commonwealth, or a private person, the law will not suppose the King to have meant either an unwise or an injurious action; but declares that the King was deceived in his grant; and, therefore, such grant is rendered void, merely upon the foundation of fraud and deception, either by or upon those agents whom the crown has thought proper to employ. See title Grants of the King. But a latitude of supposing a possibility of some failure of this personal perfection is allowed in the case of inquiries frequently instituted by Parliament, even as to those acts of royalty which are most properly and personally the King's own; but which are to be conducted in those assemblies with the decency and respect due to the kingly character. See further Parliament. The following is a concise statement of the remedies for the various injuries which may proceed from, and also for those which may affect, the rights of the crown.

The distance between the sovereign and his subjects is such, that it can rarely happen that any personal injury can immediately and directly proceed from the prince to any private man; and as it can so seldom happen, the law in decency supposes that it never can or will happen at all. But injuries to the rights of property can scarcely be committed by the crown, without the intervention of its officers, against whom the law furnishes various methods of detecting their errors or misconduct.

The common law methods of obtaining possession or restitution from the crown of either real or personal property are, by petition of right, (already alluded to above,) or monstrans de droit, manifestation or plea of right; as to both which see title Monstrans de Droit.

The methods of redressing such injuries as the crown may receive from a subject are, either by such usual commonlaw actions as are consistent with the royal prerogative and dignity; or by such prerogative modes of process as are peculiarly confined to the crown. As the King, by reason of his legal ubiquity, cannot be disseised or dispossessed of any real property which is once vested in him, he can maintain no action which supposes a dispossession of the plaintiff, such as an assise or ejectment. Bro. Ab. 1; Prerogative, 89. But he may bring a quare impedit, which always supposes the plaintiff to be seised or possessed of the advowson;

and he may prosecute this writ like every other by him brought, as well in the Court of King's Bench as of Common Pleas, or in whatever court he pleases. F. N. B. 32; 3 Comm. c. 17. So too he may bring an action of trespass for taking away his goods; but such actions (of trespass) are not usual, though in strictness maintainable for breaking his close or other injury done upon his soil and possession. Bro. Ab. 1; Prerogative, 130; F. N. B. 90; Y. B. 4 H. 4, 4. Much easier and more effectual remedies are, however, usually obtained by prerogative modes of process. Such is that of inquisition or inquest of office, as to which see title Inquest. Where the crown hath unadvisedly granted any thing by letters patent which ought not to be granted, or where the patentee hath done any act that amounts to a forfeiture of the grant, the remedy to repeal the patent is by writ of scire facias in Chancery. See Dyer, 198; 3 Lev. 220; 4 Inst. 88. So also, if upon office untruly found for the King, he grants the land over to another, he who is grieved thereby, and traverses the office itself, is entitled before issue joined, to a scire facias against the patentee in order to avoid the grant. Bro. Ab. 1; Scire Facias, 69, 185. See title Scire Facias. An information on behalf of the crown is a method of suit for recovering money, or obtaining damages for any personal wrong to the lands or possessions of the crown; as to which see title Information. A writ of quo warranto is in the nature of a writ of right for the King against any person claiming or usurping any office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the right. Finch, l. 322; 2 Inst. 282. See title Quo Warranto. And something of the same nature is the writ of mandamus, as to which see titles Corporation, Mandamus.

The law also determines that in the King can be no negligence or laches, and therefore no delay will bar his right. Nullum tempus occurrit Regi has been the standing maxim upon all occasions; for the law intends that the King is always busied for the public good, and therefore has not leisure to assert his right within the times limited to his subjects. Finch, l. 82; Co. Litt. 90. This maxim applies also to criminal prosecutions which are brought in the name of the King; and therefore by the common law there is no limitation in treasons, felonies, or misdemeanors. By stat. 7 W. 3. c. 7. an indictment for treason, except for an attempt to assassinate the King, must be found within three years after the commission of the treasonable act. See title Treason. But where the legislature has affixed no limit, nullum tempus occurrit Regi holds true; thus a man may be convicted of murder at any distance of time within his life after the commission of the crime. This maxim obtains still in full force in Ireland. 1 Ld. Mountm. 365.

In civil actions relating to landed property, by stat. 9 G. 3. c. 16. commonly called the Nullum Tempus Act, the King, like a subject, is limited (in respect to claims in Great Britain) to sixty years. For the occasion of passing this act, see Belsham's Memoirs of George III. sub. an. 1768. See also the stats. 21 Jac. 1. c. 23; 11 G. 3. c. 4. The provisions of the 9 G. 3. c. 16. were extended to Ireland by the 49 G. 3. c. 47.

The King is also expressly bound by two of the recent statutes of limitations, viz. the 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 100. for shortening the time in claims of modus decimandi; and the 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 71. for shortening the time of prescription in certain cases. See further Modus, Tithes, and the various titles relative to incorporeal hereditaments.

In the King also can be no stain or corruption of blood; for if the heir to the crown were attainted of treason or felony, and afterwards the crown should descend to him, this would purge the attainder ipso facto. Finch, L. 82; Rot. Parl. 1 R. 3.

Neither can the King, in judgment of law, as King, ever be a minor or under age; and therefore his royal grants and

assents to acts of parliament are good, though he has not in his natural capacity attained the age of twenty-one. Co. Litt. 43; 2 Inst. Proem. 3. Indeed by stat. 28 H. 8. c. 17. power was given to future Kings to rescind and revoke all acts of parliament that should be made while they were under the age of twenty-four; but this was repealed by stat, 1 Edw. 6. c. 11. so far as related to that prince; and both statutes are declared by stat. 24 G. 2. c. 24. to be determined. It hath also been usually thought prudent, when the heir-apparent has been very young, to appoint a protector, GUARDIAN, or REGENT for a limited time; but the very necessity of such extraordinary provision is sufficient to demonstrate the truth of that maxim of the common law, that in the King is no minority, and therefore he hath no legal guardian.

The methods of appointing a GUARDIAN or REGENT, in case of an infant-heir to the crown, have been so various, and the duration of his power so uncertain, that from hence alone it may be collected that his office is unknown to the common law; and therefore the surest way is to have him made by authority of the great council in parliament. 4 Inst. 58. The stats. 24 H. 3. c. 12; 28 H. 8. c. 7. [q. 17?] provided, that the successor, if a male, and under eighteen, or a female, and under sixteen, should be till such age in the government of his or her natural mother, (if approved by the King,) and such other counsellors as his majesty should by will or otherwise appoint; and he accordingly appointed his sixteen executors to have the government of his son Edward VI. and the kingdom, which executors elected the Earl of Hertford protector. The stat. 24 G. 2. c. 24. in case the crown should descend to any of the children of Frederic, then late Prince of Wales, under the age of eighteen, appointed the princess dowager; and the stat. 5 G. 3. c. 27. in case of a like descent to any of the children of King George III. empowed the King to name either the queen, the princess dowager, or any descendant of King George II. residing in this kingdom, to be guardian and regent, till the successor attained such age, assisted by a council of regency, the powers of them all being expressly defined and set down in the several acts. See ante, II.

By the statute 1 W. 4. c. 2. " to provide for the administration of the government in case the crown should descend to the Princess Alexandrina Victoria when under the age of eighteen," her mother, the Duchess of Kent, (widow of the deceased Duke of Kent, the fourth son of King George III.) was appointed her guardian, with authority, in the name of the princess and in her stead, under the style and title of regent, to exercise the royal power during such minority, in case the King, William IV. should die without issue; with a proviso, that if any child of his should be born after his decease, all the powers of the act should cease and determine, §1. If on the demise of the crown there should not be any child living born of his queen, the privy council are directed to cause the princess to be proclaimed as sovereign, but subject to and saving the rights of any issue of King William IV. which might be afterwards born; and such reservation was also to be added to the oath of allegiance till parliament should otherwise order, § 2. If at the death of King William IV. no child of his should be living, but a child should be afterwards born, his Queen is to be guardian of the child, and regent until the child shall be eighteen, § 3. Such child shall be proclaimed King or Queen, § 4. In case of the birth of such posthumous child, parliament shall meet forthwith, and the laws regarding parliament and all offices, &c. shall apply as on a demise of the crown, § 5. All acts of royal power exercised during the regency otherwise than according to the direction of this act declared void, § 6. Oath of regent to be administered by and taken before the privy council, § 7. The regent on taking the oath "shall make, subscribe, and audibly repeat," the declaration against Popery required by the 30 Car. 2. st. 2. and produce a certificate of having taken the sacrament, § 8. The King or

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Queen under age prohibited from marrying without the consent of the regent, § 9. Regent disabled from giving royal assent to any bill for changing the order of succession to the crown contrary to act, 1 W. 3. c. 2; or for altering the English act, 13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 4; or the Scotch act, 1702, c. 3. for securing the Protestant religion, § 10. If the Duchess of Kent shall during his Majesty's lifetime, without his consent, or after his death if any such regent shall marry a Roman Catholic, or a foreigner, without consent of parliament, or shall cease to reside in the United Kingdom, she shall cease to be regent, § 11. In case of the decease of the Queen of William IV. and his subsequent marriage, the act shall determine, § 12.

As to the mode of proceeding in appointing a custos or guardian of the realm, and executing the sovereign authority in case of a demise of the crown, while the successor is in foreign parts, see Macpherson's Original Papers, containing the secret history of Great Britain, from the Restoration to the accession of the House of Hanover, 4to. 1776, vol. ii. p. 475, &c.; a paper from the minister of the Elector of Hanover, asking the opinion of his friends in England concerning the measures to be taken in the event of Queen Anne's death; and p. 481, &c. a letter from the Earl of Sunderland to the Elector's minister at the Hague, inclosing an answer to the minister's inquiries, and the powers of commissioners necessary on such an occasion.

Upon King George III.'s illness in 1811, the act 51 G. 3. c. 1. was passed to provide for the administration of the royal authority, and the care of his Majesty's person during the continuance of such illness. By this act the Prince of Wales was appointed "REGENT of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland," under certain restrictions, many of which were afterwards removed. The other acts passed for regulating the regency were 52 G. 3. c. 6, 7; 53 G. 3. c. 14; and 55 G. 3. c. 15.

From the maxim that the King, as King, cannot be a minor, grants, leases, &c. made by him, though under age, bind presently, and cannot be avoided by him either during his minority, or when he comes of age: for it is a maxim of politics, that he who is to govern the kingdom should never be considered as incapable, from minority, of governing his own affairs. Dy. 209. pl. 22; Plowd. 289; Co. Lit. 43; 5 Co. 27; Raym. 90.

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The law ascribes to the King's Majesty, in his political capacity, an absolute immortality. The King never dies. Henry, Edward, or George may die, but the King survives them all for immediately upon the decease of the reigning prince, in his natural capacity, his kingship or imperial dignity, by act of law, without any interregnum or interval, is vested at once in his heir, who is eo instanti King to all intents and purposes: and so tender is the law of supposing even a possibility of his death, that his natural dissolution is generally called his demise, demissus regis vel coronæ, an expression signifying merely a transfer of property. By the term demise of the crown, therefore, is understood, that in consequence of the disunion of the King's natural body from the body politic, the kingdom is transferred or demised to his successor, and so the royal dignity remains perpetual. Plowd. 177, 234. Thus, too, when Edward IV. in the 10th year of his reign, was driven from his throne for a few months by the house of Lancaster, this temporary transfer of his dignity was denominated his demise; and all process was held to be discontinued, as it then was upon the natural death of the King. M. 49 H. 6. pl. 1—8.

King Henry II. took his son into a kind of subordinate regality with him, so that there were Rex Pater and Rex Filius: but he did not divest himself of his sovereignty, but reserved to himself the homage of his subjects. And notwithstanding this King, by consent of parliament, created his son John King of Ireland; and King Richard II. made Robert de Vere Duke of Ireland; and Edward III. made

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