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his eldest son Lord of Ireland, with royal dominion; yet it has been expressly held, that the King cannot regularly make a King within his own kingdom. 4 Inst. 357, 360. Henry de Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick, was by King Henry VI. crowned King of Wight Island; but it was resolved that this could not be done without consent of parliament; and even then our greatest men have been of opinion that the King could not by law create a King in his own kingdom, because there cannot be two kings of the same place and afterwards the same King Henry made the same Earl of Warwick Primus Comes totius Angliæ. Hal. Hist. Coron.

A King cannot resign or dismiss himself of his office of King without consent of parliament; nor could Henry II. without such consent divide the sovereignty: there is a sacred bond between the King and his kingdom that cannot be dissolved without the free and mutual consent of both in Parliament; and though in foreign kingdoms there have been instances of voluntary cessions and resignations, which possibly may be warranted by their several constitutions, yet by the laws of England, the King cannot resign his sovereignty without his Parliament. Hale's H. Cor.

3. In the exercise of those branches of the royal prerogative which invest this our sovereign lord, thus all-perfect and immortal in his kingly capacity, with a number of authorities and powers, consists the executive part of the government. This is wisely placed in a single hand by the British Constitution, for the sake of unanimity, strength, and dispatch. The King of England is therefore not only the chief, but properly the sole magistrate of the nation; all others acting by commission from and in due subordination to him.

In the exertion of lawful prerogative, the King is and ought to be absolute, that is, so far absolute that there is no legal authority that can either delay or resist him. He may reject what bills, may make what treaties, may coin what money, may create what peers, may pardon what offences he pleases, unless where the constitution hath expressly, or by evident consequence, laid down some exception or boundary, declaring that thus far the prerogative shall go, and no farther. For otherwise the power of the crown would indeed be but a name and a shadow, insufficient for the ends of government, if, where its jurisdiction is clearly established and allowed, any man, or body of men, were permitted to disobey it in the ordinary course of law. It is not now meant to speak of those extraordinary resources to first principles which are necessary when the contracts of society are in danger of dissolution, and the law proves too weak a defence against the violence of fraud or oppression: and yet the want of attending to this obvious distinction has occasioned these doctrines of absolute power in the prince, and of national resistance by the people, to be much misunderstood and perverted by the advocates for slavery on the one hand, and the demagogues of faction on the other. Civil liberty, rightly understood, consists in protecting the rights of individuals by the united force of society. Society cannot be maintained, and of course can exert no protection, without obedience to some sovereign power: and obedience is an empty name, if every individual has a right to decide how far he himself shall obey.

In the exertion, therefore, of these prerogatives, which the law has given him, the King is irresistible and absolute, according to the forms of the constitution; and yet, if the consequence of that exertion be manifestly to the grievance or dishonour of the kingdom, the parliament will call his advisers to a just and severe account. Thus the King may make a treaty with a foreign state, which shall irrevocably bind the nation; and yet, when such treaties have been judged pernicious, impeachments have pursued those ministers by whose agency or advice they were concluded.

With regard to foreign concerns, the King is the delegate or representative of his people. It is impossible that the

individuals of a state, in their collective capacity, can transact the affairs of that state with any other community equally numerous as themselves. Unanimity must be wanting to their measures, and strength to the execution of their counsels. In the King, therefore, as in a centre, all the rays of his people are united, and form by that union a consistency, splendor, and power, that make him feared and respected by foreign potentates, who would scruple to enter into any engagement that must afterwards be revised and ratified by a popular assembly. What is done by the royal authority, with regard to foreign powers, is the act of the whole nation: what is done without the King's concurrence is the act only of private men: and so far is this point carried by our law, that it hath been held, that should all the subjects of England make war with a King in league with the King of England, without the royal assent, such war is no breach of the league. 4 Inst. 152. And by the 2 H. 5. c. 6. any subject committing acts of hostility upon any nation in league with the King, was declared to be guilty of high treason; and though that act was repealed by the 20 H. 6. c. 11. so far as relates to making this offence high treason, yet still it remains a very great offence against the law of nations, and punishable by our laws, either capitally or otherwise, according to the circumstances of the case.

The King, therefore, considered as the representative of his people, has the sole power of sending ambassadors to foreign states, and receiving ambassadors at home. How far the municipal laws of England intermeddle with or protect the right of these messengers from one potentate to another, may be seen in this Dict. tit. Ambassadors, and more fully, 1 Comm. c. 7.

It is also the King's prerogative to make treaties, leagues, and alliances with foreign states and princes: for it is by the law of nations essential to the goodness of a league, that it be made by the sovereign power; and then it is binding upon the whole community and in England the sovereign power, quoad hoc, is vested in the person of the King. Whatever contracts, therefore, he engages in, no power in the kingdom can legally delay, resist, or annul. Although, lest this plenitude of authority should be abused to the detriment of the public, the constitution (as has been already hinted) hath here interposed a check, by the means of parliamentary impeachment, for the punishment of such ministers as from criminal motives, advise or conclude any treaty which shall afterwards be judged to derogate from the honour and interest of the nation.

Upon the same principle, the King has also the sole prerogative of making war and peace. For it is held by all the writers on the law of nature and nations, that the right of making war, which by nature subsisted in every individual, is given up by all private persons that enter into society, and is vested in the sovereign power. Puff. b. 8. c. 9. § 6. This right is given up, not only by individuals, but even by the entire body of people, that are under the dominion of a sovereign. It would indeed be extremely improper, that any number of subjects should have the power of binding the supreme magistrate, and putting him, against his will, in a state of war. Whatever hostilities, therefore, may be committed by private citizens, the state ought not to be affected thereby, unless that should justify their proceeding, and thereby become partner in the guilt. Such unauthorized volunteers in violence are not ranked among open enemies, but are treated like pirates and robbers. In order to make a war completely effectual, it is necessary with us in Eng. land that it be publicly [actually or virtually] declared and duly proclaimed by the King's authority; and then all parts of both contending nations, from the highest to the lowest, are bound by it. And wherever the right resides of beginning a national war, there also must reside the right of ending it, or the power of making peace. And the same check of parliamentary impeachment, for improper or in

glorious conduct, in beginning, conducting, or concluding a national war, is in general sufficient to restrain the ministers of the crown from a wanton or injurious exertion of this great prerogative.

The power of making war or peace is enumerated by Lord Hale inter jura summi imperii, and in England is lodged singly in the King; though, says he, it ever succeeds best when done by parliamentary advice. 1 Hale's Hist. P. C. 159; 7 Co. 25.

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And all lands were formerly subject to a tax for building of castles wherever the King thought proper. This was one of the three things, from contributing to the performance of which no lands were exempted; and therefore called by our Saxon ancestors the trinoda necessitas, viz. pontis reparatio, arcis constructio, and expeditio contra hostem. Cowell's Inter. tit. Castellorum operatio. Seld. Jan. Angl. 1, 42. Castles, Forts, &c.

See title

It is partly upon the same, and partly upon a fiscal founA general war, according to the same writer, is of two dation, to secure his marine revenue, that the King has the kinds, 1. Bellum solenniter denunciatum. 2. Bellum non so prerogative of appointing ports and havens, or such places lenniter denunciatum. The first is, When war is solemnly de-only, for persons and merchandize to pass into and out of clared or proclaimed by our King against another prince or the realm, as he in his wisdom sees proper. See title Harstate, which is the most formal solemnity of a war now in bours and Havens; and to this head may be referred also the use. 2dly, When a nation slips suddenly into a war without prerogative as to the erection of beacons and lighthouses; any solemnity, which happens by granting letters of marque, as to which see 4 Inst. 148; 12 Co. 13; Carter, 90; 2 Keb. by a foreign prince invading our coasts, or setting on the 114; 3 Inst. 204; and title Beacons. King's navy at sea; and hereupon a real, though not a solemn, war may arise and hath formerly arisen; therefore to prove a nation to be at enmity with England, or to prove a person to be an alien enemy, there is no necessity of showing any war proclaimed; but it may be averred, and so put upon the trial of the country, whether there was a war or not. 1 Hale's Hist. P. C. 163. See further also as connected with this subject, titles Letters of Marque; Safe Conduct.

In all these prerogatives of the King respecting this nation's intercourse with foreign nations, he is considered as the delegate or representative of his people: but in domestic affairs, he is considered in a great variety of characters, and from thence there arises an abundant number of other prerogatives.

First. He is a constituent part of the supreme legislative power, and as such has the prerogative of rejecting such provisions in parliament, as he judges improper to be passed. The expediency of which constitution is evinced at large under tit. Parliament. It may here be added, that the King is not bound by any act of parliament, unless he be named therein by special and particular words. The most general words that can be devised (any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, &c.) affect not him in the least, if they may tend to restrain or diminish any of his rights or interests. 11 Rep. 74. Yet where an act of parliament is expressly made for the preservation of public rights, and suppression of public wrongs, and does not interfere with the established rights of the crown, it is said to be binding as well upon the King as the subject. 11 Rep. 71. The King may likewise take the benefit of any particular act, though he be not especially named. 7 Rep. 32.

The King is considered, in the next place, as the generalissimo, or the first in military command, within the kingdom. In this capacity of General of the Kingdom, the King has the sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies. Of the manner in which they are raised and regulated, more is said in other places. We are now only to consider the prerogative of enlisting and governing them, which indeed was disputed and claimed, contrary to all reason and precedent, by the Long Parliament of King Charles I.; but, upon the restoration of his son, was solemnly declared by the 13 Car. 2. c. 6. to be in the King alone; for that the sole supreme government and command of the militia within all bis Majesty's realms and dominions, and of all forces by sea and land, and of all forts and places of strength, ever was and is the undoubted right of his Majesty, and his royal predecessors, Kings and Queens of England; and that both or either house of parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to See title Militia.

the same.

This statute, it is obvious to observe, extends not only to fleets and armies, but also to forts and other places of strength within the realm, the sole prerogative as well of erecting, as manning and governing of which belongs to the King in his capacity of general of the kingdom. 2 Inst. 30.

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To this branch of the prerogative may also be referred the power which has been vested in the King, from time to time, by various acts, and by the recent statute 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 52, of allowing or prohibiting the importation or exportation of arms, gunpowder, military stores, &c.; and likewise the right which the King has, wherever he sees proper, of confining his subjects to stay within the realm, or of recalling them when beyond the seas.

By the common law, every subject may go out of the kingdom for merchandize or travel, or other cause, as he pleases, without any licence for that purpose; this appears from the statute 5 R. 2. c. 2. made to restrain persons passing out of the realm, but excepts lords, great men, and notable merchants; as also by the statute 26 H. 8. c. 10. which gave power to the King, during his life, to restrain persons from trading to certain countries; which acts had been vain and idle if the King, by his prerogative, might have done it. F. N. B. 85; Dyer, 165, 296; 2 Rol. Rep. 12; 3 Mod. 131; Stil. 442.

But notwithstanding this general liberty allowed by the common law, it appears plainly that the King by his prerogative, and without any help of an act of parliament, may prohibit his subjects from going out of the realm; but this must be by some express prohibition; as by laying on embargoes, which can be only done in time of danger, or by writ of ne exeat regno, which, from the words quamplurima nobis & coronae nostræ præjudicialia ibidem prosequi intendis, appears to be a state writ, though it is never granted universally, but to restrain a particular person, on oath made, that he intends to go out of the realm; indeed, Fitzherbert says, that the King may restrain his subjects by proclamations, and assigns as a reason for it, that the King may not know where to find his subject, so as to direct a writ to him. 12 Co. 33; 11 Co. 92; Fitz. N. B. 89; 2 Inst. 54. See title Imbargo, Ne exeat Regno.

As the King may restrain any of his subjects from going abroad, in like manner he may command them to return home; and disobeying a privy seal for this purpose is the highest contempt. 1st, It is a disobedience to the command of the King himself, directed to the party. 2dly, The command is, that he shall return upon his faith and allegiance, which is the strongest compulsion that can be used. 3dly, The thing required by the King is the principal duty of a subject, viz. to be at the service of his King and country. Dyer, 128b; Lane, 44; Moor, 109; 3 Inst. 179.

The punishment for this offence is seizing the party's estate till he return; and of this there are many instances in our books; and when he does return he shall be fined. 1 Hawk. P C. c. 22. § 4.

William de Brittain, in the 19th of Edw. 2. refusing to return on the King's writ, his goods and chattels, lands and tenements, were seized into the King's hands; so in the case of Edward of Woodstock, Earl of Kent, in the same reign. Dyer, 128 b.

So in the case of one Bartue, who married the Duchess of Suffolk, they obtained a licence from Queen Mary to go out of the realm, under pretence of recovering debts as executors to the duke; when in reality it was on account of the religion established by Queen Mary, and living with other fugitives under the protection of the Palsgrave of the Rhine, in Germany, who was an eminent Calvinist, were sent to by privy seal, but the messenger, in endeavouring to serve them with his letters, being obstructed and abused by their attendants, a certificate was made of this, and their lands and tenements seized. Dyer, 176; Jenk. Cent. 220.

So in the case of Sir Francis Englefield, who departed the kingdom on a licence obtained for three years, but not returning at the expiration of the three years, a privy seal was sent to him by Queen Elizabeth, which he not obeying, and this matter being certified into Chancery by the queen, under her sign manual, his lands and tenements were seized in the fifth year of her reign, by virtue of a commission under the great seal. 1 Leon. 9; Moor, 109; 1 And. 95, S. C. See also 7 Co. 18; Poph. 18; 4 Leon. 135.

So in the case of Sir Robert Dudley, who intending to travel, obtained a licence from James the First to go to Venice; but before his departure, he, by indenture inrolled, for valuable consideration, as was expressed in the deed, (but none paid,) conveyed the manor of Killingworth, with other lands, to the Earl of Nottingham and others, in fee, with a proviso, that on tender of an angel of gold, all should be void; and with a covenant on the part of the bargainees, that they should make all such estates as the said Sir Robert should appoint; the bargainees were not parties to the deed, nor had they notice of it till some time after; but afterwards they made a lease to Sir Robert Lee, to the intent that Lady Dudley should take the profits of part of the premises for ten years, if their estate continued so long unrevoked. The King hearing that Sir Robert had been guilty of some bad practices beyond sea, in the fifth year of his reign, sent his privy seal to him, which he not obeying, the great question in this case was, whether those lands thus conveyed were forfeited; and adjudged that they were, the conveyance being fraudulent as to the King. Lane, 42, &c. In these cases it hath been held, that the King hath only an interest in the offender's lands till he return; and that his restoring them is not a matter of grace but of right. Lane, 48.

The King is also considered as the fountain of justice, and general conservator of the peace of the kingdom. All jurisdiction exercised in these kingdoms, that are in obedience to our King, is derived from the crown; and the laws, whether of a temporal, ecclesiastical, or military nature, are called his laws; and it is his prerogative to take care of the due execution of them. Hence it is that all judges derive their authority from the crown, by some commission warranted by law. Fleta, c. 17; Co. Lit. 99 a, 144; see title Judges.

From the inherent right inseparable from the King to distribute justice among his subjects, it hath been held that an appeal from the Isle of Man lies to the King in council, without any reservation in the grant of the Isle of Man of any such right; and though there had been exclusive words, yet the grant must have been construed to be void on the King's being deceived, rather than the subject should be deprived of a right inseparable to him as a subject, of applying to the crown for justice. 1 P. Wms. 329.

nonsuit; for a nonsuit is the desertion of the suit or action by the non-appearance of the plaintiff in court; but the attorney-general may enter a non vult prosequi, which has the effect of a nonsuit. Co. Lit. 139. For the same reason, also, in the forms of legal proceedings, the King is not said to appear by his attorney, as other men do; for in contemplation of law he is always present in court. Finch, L. 81. From the same original, of the King's being the fountain of justice, may also be deduced the prerogative of issuing proclamations, which is vested in the King alone. These proclamations have then a binding force, when they are grounded upon and enforce the laws of the realm. 3 Inst. 162. For though the making of laws is entirely the work of a distinct part, the legislative branch of the sovereign power; yet the manner, time, and circumstances of putting these laws in execution, must frequently be left to the discretion of the executive magistrate; and therefore his constitutions or edicts concerning these points, which we call proclamations, are binding upon the subject where they do not either contradict the old laws, or tend to establish new ones, but only enforce the execution of such laws as are already in being, in such manner as the King shall judge necessary. Thus the established law is, that the King may prohibit any of his subjects from leaving the realm: a proclamation, therefore, forbidding this, in general, for three weeks, by laying an embargo upon all shipping in time of war, will be equally binding as an act of parliament, because founded upon a prior law. 4 Mod. 177, 179.

But a proclamation to lay an embargo in time of peace upon all vessels laden with wheat (though in time of a public scarcity,) being contrary to law, and particularly to a statute then in force (22 C. 2. c. 13.) the advisers of such a proclamation, and all persons acting under it, always found it necessary to be indemnified by special acts of parliament. See stats. 7 G. 3. c. 7; 30 G. 3. c. 1; and title Imbargo. By the stat. 31 H. 8. c. 8. it was enacted that the King's proclamations should have the force of acts of parliament; a statute, which was calculated to introduce the most despotic tyranny, and which must have proved fatal to the liberties of this kingdom, had it not been luckily repealed in the minority of his successor, about five years after, by stat. 1 Edw. 6. c. 12. It was anciently held, though that is not now law, that the King might suspend, dispense with, or alter any particular law that he deemed hurtful to the public; and it has been said, that he may dispense with a penal statute wherein his subjects have not any interest. 4 Inst. 7; 4 Rep. 36; but by stat. 1 W. & M. st. 2. c. 2. it is declared and enacted, "that no dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or any part thereof, be allowed, but that the same shall be held void and of none effect, except a dispensation be allowed in such statute." It is plain, however, that the King, by his prerogative, may in certain cases and on special occasions, issue proclamations for prevention of offences, to ratify and confirm an ancient law, or, as some books express it, quoad terrorem populi, to admonish them that they keep the laws on pain of his displeasure; and such proclamations being grounded on the laws of the realm, are of great force. Fortesc. de Laud. c. 9; 11 Co. 87; 12 Co. 74, 75; Dal. 20. pl. 10; 2 Rol. Abr. 209: 3 Inst. 162.

It is likewise clear, that the subject is obliged, on pain of fine and imprisonment, to obey every proclamation legally made, and though the thing prohibited were an offence beA consequence of this prerogative is the legal ubiquity of fore, that yet the proclamation is a circumstance which highly the King; his Majesty, in the eye of the law, is always pre-aggravates it, and on which alone the party disobeying may sent in all his courts, though he cannot personally distribute be punished. 12 Co. 74; Hob. 251. It is clearly agreed, justice. Fortesc. c. 8; 2 Inst. 186. His judges are the that no private person can make any proclamation of a mirror by which the King's image is reflected. It is the regal public nature, except by custom, as is usual in some cities office, and not the royal person, that is always present in and boroughs; this being a prerogative act, with which court, always ready to undertake prosecutions or pronounce alone the King is intrusted. Bro. Procl. pl. 1; 12 Co. 75; judgment for the benefit and protection of the subject; and Crom. Juris. 41. from this ubiquity it follows, that the King can never be

But, according to the principles already laid down, the

King, by his proclamation, cannot change any part of the common law, statutes, or customs of this realm; nor can he by his proclamation create any offence which was not an offence before. 11 Co. 87 b; 12 Co. 75.

On this foundation it hath been held that the King's proclamation prohibiting the importation of wines from France, on pain of forfeiture, was against law, and void; there being at that time no war subsisting between the nations. 2 Inst. 63.

So where an act was made by which foreigners were licensed to merchandize within London; and Henry IV. by proclamation, prohibited the execution of it, and ordered it should be in suspense usque ad proximum parliamentum and this was held to be against law. 12 Co. 75.

n;

On a conference between some lords of the privy council, and the two chief justices (of which Lord Coke was one,) and chief baron and baron Altham, the question was,

1st, Whether the King by proclamation might prohibit new buildings in and about London?

2d, If the King might prohibit the making starch of wheat? And the judges were of opinion that the subject could not be restrained in these particulars by the King's proclamation. 12 Co. 74.

The King, by proclamation, may call or dissolve parliament, and declare war or peace; for these are prerogative acts with which he is intrusted, as the executive part of the law; but if there be an actual war, it is not necessary in pleading to shew that such war was proclaimed. 3 Inst. 162; 1 Hal. H. P. C. 163; Owen, 45; Rast. Ent. 605; see ante. The King, by proclamation, may legitimate foreign coin, and make it current money of this kingdom, according to the value imposed by such proclamation; he may legitimate base coin, or mixed below the standard of sterling; he may enhance coin to a higher denomination or value, and may decry money that is current in use and payment; and in all these cases a proclamation, with a proclamation writ under the great seal, is necessary. Co. Lit. 207 b; 5 Co. 114b; Dar. 21; 1 Hal. H. P. C. 192, 197; see title Coin.

The King, by proclamation, may appoint fasts and days of thanksgiving and humiliation, and issue proclamations for preventing and punishing immorality and profaneness, and enjoin reading the same in churches and chapels. Comp. Incumb. 354.

A proclamation must be under the great seal, and if denied, is to be tried by the record thereof; but if a man pleads he was prevented doing a thing by proclamation, it seems the better opinion that he need not aver that such proclamation was under the great seal; for alleging that such proclamation was made, it shall be intended to have been duly made. Cro. Car. 180; see 1 Rol. Rep. 172; vide Cro.

Car. 130.

The King is likewise the fountain of honour, of office, and of privilege; and this in a different sense from that wherein he is styled the fountain of justice; for here he is really the parent of them. It is impossible that government can be maintained without a due subordination of rank, that the people may know and distinguish such as are set over them, in order to yield them that due respect and obedience; and also that the officers themselves being encouraged by emulation, and the hopes of superiority, may the better discharge their functions: and the law supposes that no one can be so good a judge of their several merits and services, as the King himself who employs them. It has, therefore, intrusted with him the sole power of conferring dignities and honours, in confidence that he will bestow them upon none but such as deserve them. And, therefore, all degrees of nobility, of knighthood, and other titles, are received by immediate grant from the crown, either expressed in writing by writs or letters-patent, as in the creation of peers and baronets; or by corporal investiture, as in the creation of a simple knight. See titles Precedency, Peer.

VOL. II.

From the same principle also arises the prerogative of erecting and disposing of offices; for honours and offices are in their nature convertible and synonymous. All officers under the crown carry in the eye of the law an honour along with them; because they imply a superiority of parts and abilities, being supposed to be always filled with those that are most able to execute them. And, on the other hand, all honours in their original had duties or offices annexed to them; an earl, comes, was the conservator or governor of a county; and knight, miles, was bound to attend the King in his wars. For the same reason, therefore, that honours are in the disposal of the King, offices ought to be so likewise; and as the King may create new titles, so may he create new offices; but with this restriction, that he cannot create new offices with new fees annexed to them, nor annex new fees to old offices, for this would be a tax upon the subject, which cannot be imposed but by act of parliament. 2 Inst. 533. Wherefore, in 13 H. 4. a new office being created by the King's letters-patent for measuring cloths, with a new fee for the same, the letters-patent were, on account of the new fee, revoked and declared void in parliament.

On this subject it hath been further said, that the King, as the fountain of justice, hath an undoubted prerogative in creating officers, and all officers are said to derive their authority mediately or immediately from him; those who derive their authority from him are called the officers of the crown, and are created by letters-patent; such as the great officers of state, judges, &c.; and there needs no stronger evidence of a right in the crown herein, than that the King hath created all such officers time immemorial. Dyer, 176; 2 Rol. Abr. 152; 4 Co. 32; 2 Inst. 425, 540; 12 Co. 116; 1 Rol. Rep. 206; Show. Par. Ca. 111; 1 Lev. 219. But though all such officers derive their authority from the crown, and from whence the King is termed the universal officer and disposer of justice; yet it hath been held, that he hath not the office in him to execute it himself, but is only to grant or nominate; nor can the King grant any new powers to such officers, but they must execute their offices according to the rules prescribed by law. Co. Lit. 3, 114; 2 Vent. 270; 4 Inst. 125; 6 Co. 11, 12.

Neither can the King create any new office inconsistent with our constitution or prejudicial to the subject. 2 Inst. 540; 2 Sid. 141; Moor, 808; 4 Inst. 200.

And on this foundation an office created by letters-patent for the sole making of all bills, informations and letters-missive in the council of York was unreasonable and void. 1 Jon. 231. See further title Office.

Upon the same, or a like reason, the King has also the prerogative of conferring privileges upon private persons, such as granting place or precedence to any of his subjects as shall seem good to his royal wisdom. 4 Inst. 361. "See title Precedence. Or such as converting aliens, or persons born out of the King's dominions, into denizens, whereby some very considerable privileges of natural-born subjects are conferred upon them. See title Aliens. Such also is the prerogative of erecting corporations; which is grounded upon this foundation, that the King, having the sole administration of the government in his hands, is the best and the only judge in what capacities, with what privileges, and under what distinctions, his people are the best qualified to serve

and act under him.

Another light in which the laws of England consider the King, with regard to domestic concerns, is as the arbiter of domestic commerce, by the establishment of markets, the regulating of weights and measures, and of the coin. See this Dictionary under those titles.

The King is, lastly, considered by the laws of England as the head and supreme governor of the national church.

To enter into the reasons upon which this prerogative is founded, is matter rather of divinity than law. It shall only, therefore, be observed, that by stat. 26 H. 8. c. 1. (reciting Ꭰ

be, as surely it is, the primary foundation of magistracy, it is perhaps more honourable to be nearer the source, than to deduce a title through a series not free from some whose vices or deficiencies may have sullied the splendour of their descent.

marrying, were naturally dead. To act, therefore, consis- | as the recollections of yesterday. And if the people's claim tently with themselves, and at the same time pay as much regard to the old hereditary line as their former resolutions would admit, they turned their eyes on the Princess Sophia, Electress and Duchess Dowager of Hanover. For upon the impending extinction of the Protestant posterity of Charles I. the old law of regal descent directed them to recur to the descendants of James I.; and the Princess Sophia being the youngest daughter of Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia, who was the daughter of James I. was the nearest of the ancient bloodroyal, who was not incapacitated by professing the Popish religion. On her, therefore, and the heirs of her body, being Protestants, the remainder of the crown, expectant on the death of King William and Queen Anne, without issue, was settled by stat. 12 & 13 W. 3. c. 2. See also 4 & 5 Ann. c. 4. by which the Princess Sophia and her future issue were naturalized.

This is the last limitation of the crown that has been made by parliament, and all the several actual limitations from the time of Henry IV. to the present, (stated at large in 1 Comm. c. 3.) do clearly prove the power of the King and Parliament to new model or alter the succession. And, indeed, it is now again made highly penal to dispute it; for by stat. 6 Ann. c. 7. it is enacted, that if any person maliciously, advisedly, | and directly, shall maintain by writing, or printing, that the Kings of this realm, with the authority of Parliament, are not able to make laws to bind the crown, and the descent thereof, he shall be guilty of high treason; or if he maintains the same only by preaching, teaching, or advised speaking, he shall incur the penalties of a pramunire.

The Princess Sophia dying before Queen Anne, the inheritance thus limited descended on her son King George I., and having taken effect in his person, from him it descended to King George II., from him to his grandson and heir, King George III., from him to his son King George IV., and on the death of the latter to our present sovereign William IV.

The title to the crown therefore, though at present hereditary, is not quite so absolutely hereditary as formerly; and the common stock or ancestor, from whom the descent must be derived, is also different. Formerly the common stock was King Egbert, then William the Conqueror; afterwards, in James I.'s time, the two common stocks united, and so | continued till the vacancy of the throne, occasioned by the abdication of James II. in 1688: now it is the Princess Sophia, in whom the inheritance was vested by the King and parliament. Formerly the descent was absolute, and the crown went to the next heir without any restriction; but now, upon the new settlement, the inheritance is conditional; being limited to such heirs only of the body of the Princess Sophia, as are Protestant members of the Church of England, and are

married to none but Protestants.

In these heirs of the Princess Sophia, (to use, with some modification, the expressions of a modern historian, already quoted in the course of this article,) the right to the crown is as truly hereditary as it ever was in the Plantagenets and the Tudors. But they derive it not from those ancient families. The blood, indeed, of Cerdic, and of the Conqueror, flows in the veins of his present Majesty. Our Edwards and Henrys illustrate the almost unrivalled splendour and antiquity of the House of Brunswick. But they have transmitted no more right to the allegiance of England than Boniface of Este, or Henry the Lion. That right rests wholly on the Act of Settlement, and resolves itself into the sovereignty of the legislature. We have, therefore, an abundant security that no prince of the House of Brunswick will ever countenance the silly theories of imprescriptible hereditary right, which flattery and superstition seem still to render current in other countries. He would brand his own brow with the names of upstart and usurper. For the history of the Revolution, and that change in the succession which ensued upon it, will, for ages to come, be as fresh and familiar |

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The Bill of Rights was reckoned hasty and defective, some matters of great importance had been omitted, and in the period which elapsed from the passing of that statute to the Act of Settlement, new abuses had called for new remedies. It was, therefore, determined to accompany that settlement with additional securities for the subject's liberty, and eight articles were inserted in the act, to take effect only from the commencement of the new limitation to the House of Hanover. Some of them appeared to spring from a natural jealousy of the unknown and foreign line; some should not strictly have been postponed so long, but it is necessary to be content with what it is practicable to maintain. These articles were: 1. That whoever should hereafter come to the possession of the crown should join in communion with the Church of England as by law established. 2. That in case the crown should come to any person not being a native of the kingdom, the nation should not be obliged to engage in any war for the defence of any dominions or territories, which do not belong to the crown of England, without the consent of parliament. 3. That no person who should hereafter come to the possession of the crown should go out of the dominions of England, Scotland, or Ireland, without consent of parliament. [This article was repealed by stat. 1 Geo. 1. c. 51.] 4. That all matters relating to government cognizable by the Privy Council should be transacted there, and all resolutions taken thereon should be signed by the privy councillors advising and consenting to the same. [This provision was repealed by stat. 4 Ann. c. 8. and see 6 Ann. c. 7. and_tit. Privy Council.] 5. That no person born out of the kingdom of England, Scotland, or Ireland, or the dominions thereunto belonging, (although he be naturalized or made a denizen,) except such as are born of English parents, shall be capable of being of the Privy Council, or a member of either House of Parliament, or to enjoy any office or place of trust, either civil or military, or to have any grant of lands or tenements from the crown to himself, or any others in trust for him. [By 1 Geo. 1. stat. 2. c. 4. it is enacted, that no bill of nauralization shall be received without a clause disqualifying the party to sit in Parliament.] 6. That no person having an office or place of trust or profit under the king, or receiving a provision from the crown, shall be capable of serving as a member of the House of Commons. [This has been repealed and otherwise provided for. See tit. Parliament.] 7. That judges' commissions be made quam diu se bene gesserint, and their salaries ascertained and established; but upon the address of both Houses of Parliament it shall be lawful to remove them. [See tit. Judges.] 8. That no pardon under the great seal of England be pleadable to an impeachment by the Commons in Parliament. [See tit. Impeachment.]

As to offences in denying the King's title, see this Dict. tit. Misprision; in oppugning it, tit. Treason.

II. The first and most considerable branch of the King's royal family, regarded by the laws of England, is the Queen; as to whom see this Dict. tit. Queen.

The Prince of Wales, or heir-apparent to the crown, and also his royal consort; and the Princess Royal, or eldest daughter of the King, are likewise peculiarly regarded by the laws. For, by stat. 25 Edm. 3. to compass or conspire the death of the former, or to violate the chastity of the latter, is as much high treason as to conspire the death of the King, or violate the chastity of the Queen. See this Dictionary, tit. Treason. The heir-apparent to the crown is usually made Prince of Wales and Earl of Chester, by special creation and investiture; but being the King's eldest son, he is by inherit

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