ance Duke of Cornwall, without any new creation. 8 Rep. | to Sir E. Coke's interpretation of nephew; and, therefore, 1; Seld. tit. Lon. 2, 5.

The observations in Coke's reports, however, as well as the words of the statute, it has been remarked, limit the dukedom of Cornwall to the first begotten son of a King of England, and to him only. But although from this it is manifest that a Duke of Cornwall must be the first begotten son of a King, yet it is not necessary that he should be born after his father's accession to the throne.

This is, on the whole, a strange species of inheritance, and perhaps is the only mode of descent which depends upon the authority of a statute. In the Prince's Case, reported by Lord Coke, the question was, whether the original grant to Edward the Black Prince, who was created in the 11th of Edw. 3. Duke of Cornwall, and who was the first duke in England after the Duke of Normandy, had the authority of parliament; or was an honour conferred by the King's charter alone? If the latter, the limitation would have been void, as nothing less than the power of Parliament can alter the established rules of descent. But notwithstanding it is in the form of a charter, it was held to be an act of the legislature. It concludes, per ipsum regem et totum concilium in parliamento. Christian's Note on 1 Comm. c. 4. (See printed Parliament Rolls, 5 H. 4. nu. 22. and 38 H. 6. nu. 29. for full information on this subject. See also this Dictionary, tit. Prince.)

when his late Majesty King George II. created his grandson Edward (the second son of Frederick Prince of Wales, deceased,) Duke of York, and referred it to the House of Lords to settle his place and precedence, they certified that he ought to have place next to the late Duke of Cumberland, the then King's youngest son; and that he might have a seat on the left hand of the cloth of estate. Lds'. Journ. Ap. 24, 1760. But when, on the accession of King George III. those royal personages ceased to take place as the children, and ranked only as the brother and uncle of the King, they also left their seats on the side of the cloth of estate; so that when the Duke of Gloucester, his Majesty's second brother, took his seat in the House of Peers, he was placed on the upper end of the earl's bench, (on which the dukes usually sit,) next to his Royal Highness the Duke of York. Lds'. Journ. 10 Jan. 1765. And in 1718, upon a question referred to all the judges by King George I. it was resolved by ten against the other two, that the education and care of all the King's grand-children, while minors, did belong of right to his Majesty as King of this realm, even during their father's life. Fortesc. Al. 401-440. And they all agreed, that the care and approbation of their marriages, when grown up, belonged to the King, their grandfather. And the judges have more recently concurred in opinion, that this care and approbation extend also to the presumptive heir of the crown; though to what other branches of the royal family the same did extend, they did not find precisely determined. Lds'. Journ. 28th Feb. 1772; 11 St. Tr. 295. The most frequent instances of the crown's interposition go no farther than nephews and nieces, but examples are not wanting of its reaching to distant collaterals. Therefore, by stat. 28 H. 8. c. 18. (repealed among other statutes of treason by 1 Ed. 6. c. 12.) it was made high treason for any man to contract marriage with the King's children, or reputed children, his sisters or aunts, ex parte paterna, or the children of his brethren or sister; being exactly the same degrees to which precedence is allowed by the stat. 31 H. 8. before mentioned. And now by stat. 12 G. 3. c. 11. no descendant of the body of King George II. (other than the issue of princesses married into foreign countries,) is capable of contracting matrimony, without the previous consent of the King signified under the great seal; and any marriage contracted without such consent is void: but it is provided by the act, that such of the said descendants as are above the age of twenty-five, may, after a twelvemonth's notice given to the King's Privy Council, contract and solemnize marriage without the consent of the crown; unless both Houses of Parliament shall, before the expiration of the said year, expressly declare their disapprobation of such intended marriage. All persons solemnizing, assisting, or being present at any such prohibited marriage shall incur the penalties of præmunire.

The rest of the royal family may be considered in two different lights, according to the different senses in which the term royal family is used. The larger sense includes all those, who are by any possibility inheritable to the crown. Such, before the Revolution, were all the descendants of William the Conqueror, who had branched into an amazing extent by intermarriages with the ancient nobility. Since the Revolution and Act of Settlement, it means the Protestant issue of the Princess Sophia, now comparatively few in number, but which in process of time may possibly be as largely diffused. The more confined sense includes only those who are within a certain degree of propinquity to the reigning prince, and to whom, therefore, the laws pay an extraordinary regard and respect.

At the time of passing the Regency Act, stat. 5 G. 3. c. 27. (see post, V. 2,) the bill, which was framed on the plan of the Regency Act in the preceding reign, empowered his Majesty to appoint either the Queen, or any other person of his royal family usually resident in Great Britain, to be Regent until the successor to the crown should attain eighteen years of age. A doubt arising on the question who were the royal family, it was explained by the law lords to be the descendants of King George II. It was, therefore, found necessary expressly to insert in the act the name of her Royal Highness the Princess Dowager of Wales, widow of the King's eldest son deceased, and mother of King George III. as she was not held to be comprehended under the general description of the royal family. See Belsham's Memoirs of King George III.

The younger sons and daughters of the King, and other branches of the royal family, who are not in the immediate line of succession, were, therefore, little farther regarded by the ancient law than to give them a certain degree of precedence before all persons and public officers, as well ecclesiastical as temporal. This is done by stat. 31 Hen. 8. c. 10. which enacts, that no person, except the King's children, presume to sit or have place at the side of the cloth of estate in the parliament chamber; and that certain great officers therein named shall have precedence above all dukes, except only such as shall happen to be the King's son, brother, uncle, nephew, (which latter Sir E. Coke, 4 Inst. 362, explains to signify grandson or nepos,) or brother's or sister's

shall

son.

Indeed, under the description of the King's children, his grandsons are held to be included, without having recourse

In 1793 a marriage was solemnized at Rome, according to the forms, and by a minister, of the church of England, between his Royal Highness the Duke of Sussex and Lady Augusta Murray, daughter of the Earl of Dunmore, who, on their return to England, were re-married at St. George's, Hanover Square. The second marriage attracted the notice of George III., and at his instigation a suit was commenced in the Court of Arches, and a decree pronounced in 1794 declaring both marriages void. A bill for perpetuating the evidence of the first marriage has lately been filed in the Court of Chancery by Sir Augustus d'Este and his sister, the children of his Royal Highness by the above lady. For further particulars concerning the claim of Sir Augustus d'Este, see Law Mag. vol. vii. 176.

III. In order to assist the King in the discharge of his duties, the maintenance of his dignity, and the exertion of his prerogative, the law hath assigned him a diversity of councils to advise with. These are, his Parliament, his Peers,

enacted that the Kings of England shall always be Kings of the most part it is but a collection of certain prerogatives Ireland.

V. 1. It has been observed, that one of the principal bulwarks of civil liberty, or, in other words, of the British constitution, is the limitation of the King's prerogative, by bounds so certain and notorious, that it is impossible he should ever exceed them, without either the consent of the people, or a violation of that contract which we have seen expressly subsists between the prince and the subject. When we more particularly consider this prerogative minutely, in order to mark out, in the most important instances, its particular extent and restrictions, one conclusion will evidently follow; that the powers which are vested in the crown by the laws of England are necessary for the support of society, and do not intrench any farther on our natural, than is expedient for the maintenance of our civil liberties.

There cannot be a stronger proof of that genuine freedom, which is the boast of this age and country, than the power of discussing and examining with decency and respect the limits of the King's prerogative. This was formerly considered as a high contempt in a subject, and the glorious Queen Elizabeth herself directed her parliament to abstain from judging of or meddling with her prerogative. It is no wonder, therefore, that her successor James I. should consider such a presumption as little less than blasphemy and impiety. But whatever might be the sentiments of some of our princes, this was never the language of our ancient constitution and laws. The sentiments of Bracton and Fortescue, at the distance of two centuries from each other, may be seen by a reference to the place cited in the preceding division IV. And Sir Hen. Finch, under Charles I., after the lapse of two centuries more, though he lays down the law of prerogative in very strong and emphatical terms, yet qualifies it with a general restriction in regard to the liberties of the people. The King, says he, has a prerogative in all things that are not injurious to the subject; for in them all it must be remembered, that the King's prerogative stretcheth not to the doing of any wrong. Finch, l. 84, 85. Nihil enim aliud potest Rex, nisi id solum quod de jure potest. Bract. 1. 3. tr. 1. c. 9.

The nature of our constitution is that of a limited monarchy, in which the legislative power is lodged in the King, Lords, and Commons; but the King is intrusted with the executive part, and from him all justice is said to flow; hence he is styled the head of the Commonwealth, supreme governor, parens patriæ, &c.; but still he is to make the law of the land the rule of his government, that being the measure as well of his power as of the subjects' obedience: for as the law asserts, maintains, and provides for the safety of the King's royal person, crown, and dignity, and all his just rights, revenues, powers, and prerogatives, so it likewise declares and asserts the rights and liberties of the subject. 1 And. 153; Co. Lit. 19, 75; 4 Co. 124.

Hence it hath been established as a rule, that all prerogatives must be for the advantage of the people, otherwise they ought not to be allowed by law. Moor, 672; Show. P. C. 75. Although the King is the fountain of justice, and intrusted with the whole executive power of the law, yet he hath no power to alter the laws which have been established, and are the birthright of every subject, for by those very laws he is to govern; and as they prescribe the extent and bounds of his prerogative, in like manner they declare and ascertain the rights and liberties of the people, therefore admit of no innovation or change but by act of parliament. 4 Inst. 164; 2 Inst. 54, 478; 2 Hal. Hist. P. C. 131, 282; Vaugh. 418; 2 Salk. 510.

The rights and prerogatives of the crown are in most things as ancient as the law itself; for though the statute 17 Edw. 2. c. 1. commonly called the statute De prærogativa Regis, seems to be introductive of something new, yet for

VOL. II.

that were known law long before. Bendl. 117; 2 Inst. 263, 496; 10 Co. 64. And this statute does not contain the King's whole prerogative, but only so much thereof as concerns the profits of his coffers. Plowd. 314.

The nature of the government of our King, says Fortescue, is not only regal, but political; if it were merely the former, regal, he would have power to make what alterations he pleased in our law, and impose taxes and other hardships upon the subject, whether they would or no; but his government being political, he cannot change the laws of the realm without the people consent thereto, nor burthen them against their wills. It is also said by the same writer, that the king is appointed to protect his subjects in their lives, properties, and laws; for which end and purpose he has the delegation of power from the people; likewise our King is such by the fundamental law of our land; by which law the meanest subject enjoys the liberty of his person and property in his estate; and it is every man's concern to defend these, as well as the King in his lawful rights. Fortescue, de Laud. leg. Angl. 17, &c.

If a King hath a kingdom by title of descent, where the laws have taken good effect and rooting, or if a King conquers a Christian kingdom, after the people have laws given them for the government of the country, to which they submit, no succeeding King can alter the same without the parliament. 7 Rep. 17. It has nevertheless been held, that conquered countries may be governed by what laws the King thinks fit, and that the laws of England do not take place in such countries until declared so by the conqueror, or his successor; here, in case of infidels, their laws do not cease, but only such as are against the law of God; and where the laws are rejected or silent, they shall be governed according to the rule of natural equity. 2 Salk. 411, 412, 666. If the King makes a new conquest of any country, the persons there born are his subjects; for by saving the lives of the people conquered he gains a right and property in such people, and may impose on them what laws he pleases. Dyer, 224; Vaugh. 281.

But until such laws given by the conquering prince, the laws of the conquered country hold place; (unless where these are contrary to our religion, or enact any thing that is malum in se, or are silent;) for in all such cases the laws of the conquering country prevail. 2 P. Wms. 75, 76.

If there be a new and uninhabited country found out by English subjects, as the law is the birthright of every subject, so wherever they go carry their laws with them, therefore such new found country is to be governed by the laws of England; though after such country is inhabited by the English, acts of parliament made in England, without naming the foreign plantations, will not bind them. 2 P. Wms. 75; 2 Salk. 411, And see Campbell v. Hall, Corp. 204; Spragge v. Stone, cited Dougl. 35, 37, 38.

Questions of this nature are not at present likely often to arise, since (as in the instance of annexing the crown of Corsica to the British crown in 1794) all such transactions are now regulated by express stipulations; which neither leave to the prerogative of the conquering monarch, nor the laws of his kingdom, any power to interfere.

By the word prerogative is usually understood that special pre-eminence which the King hath over and above all other persons, and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity. It signifies, in its etymology from præ and rego, something that is required or demanded before, or in preference to all others. And hence it follows, that it must be in its nature singular and eccentrical; that it can only be applied to those rights and capacities which the King enjoys alone in contradistinction to others; and not to those which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects; for if once any prerogative of the crown could be held m common with the subject, it would cease to be prerogative

C

of this statute. And the case in question seemed a hard case to the court, because the party himself was the cause why there was no appearance, by beating the party so heinously the very day before they ought to have appeared, that they were disabled thereby to appear. Hard. 334.

W. put 1001. out at interest to defendant, and took bond in the name of one J. who became felo de se, and the plaintiff was relieved against the King on this trust, in equity upon this statute. Sed quære, whether this statute extends to any equity against the King, otherwise than in case of pleas by way of discharge? But it was likewise decreed in this cause that the plaintiff should be saved harmless from all others. Hard. 176.

the words (licet tangat nos); but he agreed, that if the lands of the felon be liable to [sufficient to answer] all the debt of the Queen, the court may in discretion take all the lands in extent, and leave the goods to the patentee. And as to a petition of Coxhead praying a discharge of the lands, &c. by him purchased of the officer debtor to the Queen, it was answered, that the land was subject to the Queen's extent for all arrears of receipts by his office, received before the conveyance thereof, though the receipt be after the conveyance, and that by reason of the statute; but as to another office accepted after the conveyance of the land, the arrears of that shall not charge the land so conveyed.

B. L. having purchased a long term for years in houses, afterwards purchased the inheritance; afterwards he became receiver of North Wales, and having occasion for 500l. assigned over the term by way of mortgage to J. S. Afterwards on the marriage of E. L. his son, he settled the houses in St. Clement's (inter alia) on himself for life, remainder to E. L. his son, and the heirs of his body. There was issue of the marriage, a daughter, the wife of P.; after this B. L. mortgages these houses to N. for 18007. The King extends these houses for the debt of B. L.; N. gets an assignment of the extent, and a privy seal for the debt. Resolved, first, that by the statute of Elizabeth, the land and the real estate of B. L. was bound and stood liable to answer the King's debt, although he was not actually a debtor to the King, nor any extent against him in several years after. Secondly, that where a term is attendant on the inheritance, he shall have a right to the term: but if it be a term in gross, and assigned before any actual extent, the assignment will stand good, and the term not liable to the King's debt. 2 Vern. 389, 390.

And the matter so showed be sufficiently proved.] Scire facias issued against T. the father, and T. the son, to show cause wherefore they did not pay the King 1000l. for the mesne profits of certain lands holden by them from his Majesty, for which land judgment was given for him in the Exchequer, and the mesne rates were found by inquisition, which returned that the said mesne profits came to 1000l. upon which inquisition this scire facias issued; whereupon the sheriff returned that T. the father was dead, and T. the son appeared, and pleaded that he took the profits but as a servant to his father, and by his command, and rendered an account to his father for the profits, and also that judgment for the lands was given against his father and him for default of sufficient pleading, and not for the truth of the fact; and he showed this statute, which he pretended aided him for his equity; whereupon the King demurred. Tanfield, chief baron, said, that the matter in equity ought to be sufficiently proved, and here is nothing but the allegation of the party, and the demurrer for the King; and, if the demurrer be in law an admittance of the allegation, and so a sufficient proof within the statute, is to be advised on; and for that point the case is but this: A scire facias issues to have execution of a recognizance, which within this act ought, by pretence and allegation of the defendant, to be discharged for matter in equity, and the defendant pleads his matter in equity, and the King, supposing this not to be in equity within this statute, demurs in law, whether that demurrer be an insufficient proof of the Upon this statute many questions were moved; first, if the allegation within the statute or not? Adjornatur. Lane, 51. debtor died, whether the land might be sold? Secondly, By § 33 of the said stat. 33 H. 8. c. 39. it is provided, when the account is determined after his death? Thirdly, that the said act shall not take away any liberties belonging When the accountant, after becoming debtor, and in arrear, to the duchy and county palatine of Lancaster. makes feoffment, or other estate over, or charges or incumProcess and executions for debts in the Court of Exche-bers the land, either to his issue or others of his blood, to quer shall be made in the Exchequer by such officer as hath been used, as by this act is limited, § 34.

The stat. 34 & 35 H. 8. c. 2. directs how the King's receivers and collectors shall be charged; and the stat. 7 Edw. 6. c. 1. makes further regulations on that subject, and requires all officers to find sureties for duly accounting. See title Accounts, Public.

The stat. 13 Eliz. c. 4. enacts, "that all the lands, &c. which any accountant of the Queen, her heirs and successors, hath while he remains accountable, shall for the payment of the debts of the Queen, her heirs and successors, be liable, and put in execution in like manner, as if such accountant had stood bound by writ obligatory (having the effect of the statute staple) to her Majesty, her heirs and successors, for payment of the same, § 1.

The Queen, by her letters-patent, granted catalla utlagatorum et felonum de se, within such a precinct; one who was indebted to the Queen is felo de se within the precinct. It was ruled, that notwithstanding the grant by the letterspatent, the Queen shall have the goods for satisfying her debt. 3 Leo. 113; Mo. 126, 127, S. C. between the Queen of the first part, the Bishop of Sarum of the second part, and Oliver Coxhead of the third part; and there, per Manwood, chief baron, the patent does not extend to have the goods of felo de se against the Queen for her debt, because it wanted

If either of the Queen's officers, on rendering of his account, shall be found in arrear, and such arrears shall not be paid within six months after the account past, the Queen, &c. may sell so much of his estate as will answer the debt, and the overplus of the sale is to be rendered to the accountant, or his heirs, by the officer that receives the purchase-money, without further warrant. Stat. 13 Eliz. c. 4. § 2, 3.

prevent the Queen's selling, or on other consideration, whether she may sell the land, the words of the act being make sale, &c. of so much of the lands, &c. of every such accountant or debtor so found in arrear, &c. and that the sale shall be good and available in law against the party accountant, and his heirs claiming as heirs. Fourthly, if the accountant was seised of land in tail, whether this land may be sold to be good against the issue; for the ousting of which doubts the statute of 27 Eliz. c. 3. was made; but this gives remedy only, that the land shall be sold after the death of the debtor, and when the account is made after his death; therefore to remedy the other mischiefs, the statute 29 Eliz. c. 7. was made (but the same, being only a temporary act, is expired.) Mo. 646, &c. pl. 895, (where part of the last-mentioned act is set forth and explained.)

If such accountant or debtor purchase lands in others' names in trust for their use, that being found by office or inquisition, those lands also shall be liable to satisfy the debt in such a manner as before is expressed. Stat. 13 Eliz. c. 4. § 5.

Lands purchased by accountants since the beginning of the Queen's reign, either in their own names, or in the names of others in trust for their use, shall be also liable to be sold for the discharge of their debts as aforesaid, rendering the overplus to the accountant, § 6.

fish with lawful nets, &c. in a navigable river as well as in the sea; and the King's grant cannot bar them thereof; but the crown only has a right to royal fish, and that the King only may grant. 6 Mod. 73; Salk. 357, S. C. & S. P. See title Fish, &c.

It is also said, that the King, as a perpetual sign and acknowledgment of his dominion of the seas, hath several creatures reserved to him under the denomination of royal creatures, as swans, sturgeons, and whales, all which are natives of seas and rivers. 7 Co. 16. See post, 4.

2. The law ascribes to the King the attributes of sovereignty or pre-eminence. See Bract. l. 1. c. 8. He is said to have imperial dignity, and in charters before the Conquest is frequently styled Basileus and Imperator; the titles respectively assumed by the emperors of the East and West. His realm is declared to be an empire, and his crown imperial, by many Acts of Parliament, particularly 24 Hen. 8. c. 12; 25 Hen. 8. c. 28; which at the same time declare the King to be the supreme head of the realm in matters both civil and ecclesiastical; and, of consequence, inferior to no man upon earth, dependent on no man, accountable to no man. See also 24 G. 2. c. 24; 5 G. 3. c. 27.

No King of England used any seal of arms till the reign of Richard I. Before that time, the seal was the King sitting in a chair of state on one side of the seal, and on horseback on the other side; but this King sealed with a seal of two lions; and King John was the first that bare three lions; and afterwards Edward III. quartered the arms of France, which was continued until the Union between Great Britain and Ireland. King Henry VIII, was the first to whom Majesty was attributed; before which, our Kings were called Highness, &c. Lex Constitut. 47, 48.

The meaning of the legislature when it uses these terms of empire and imperial, and applies them to the realm and crown of England, is only to assert that our King is equally sovereign and independent within these his dominions, as any emperor is in his empire, and owes no kind of subjection to any other potentate upon earth.

Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the King, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. All jurisdiction implies superiority of power; authority to try would be vain and idle without authority to redress; and the sentence of a court would be contemptible unless that court had power to command the execution of it; but who, says Finch, shall command the King? Finch, l. 83. Hence it is likewise, that by law the PERSON of the KING is SACRED, even though the measures pursued in his reign be completely tyrannical and arbitrary; for no jurisdiction upon earth has power to try him in a criminal way, much less to condemn him to punishment. If any foreign jurisdiction had this power, as was formerly claimed by the Pope, the independence of the kingdom would be no more; and if such a power were vested in any domestic tribunal, there would soon be an end to the constitution, by destroying the free agency of one of the constituent parts of the sovereign legislative power.

The

ministers, these men may be examined and punished. constitution has therefore provided, by means of indictments and parliamentary impeachments, that no man shall dare to assist the crown in contradiction to the law of the land. But at the same time it is a maxim in those laws, that the King himself can do no wrong; since it would be a great weakness and absurdity in any system of positive law, to define any possible wrong, without any possible redress. As to such public oppressions as tend to dissolve the constitution, and subvert the fundamentals of government, these are cases which the law will not, out of decency, suppose; being incapable of distrusting those whom it has invested with any part of the supreme power; since such distrust would render the exercise of that power precarious and impracticable. For, wherever the law expresses its distrust or abuse of power, it always vests a superior coercive authority in some other hand to correct it; the very notion of which destroys the very idea of sovereignty. If therefore (for example) the two Houses of Parliament, or either of them, had avowedly a right to animadvert on the King, or each other, or if the King had a right to animadvert on either of the Houses, that branch of the legislature, so subject to animadversion, would instantly cease to be part of the supreme power; the balance of the constitution would be overturned; and that branch or branches, in which this jurisdiction resided, would be completely sovereign. The supposition of law therefore is, that neither the King, nor either House of Parliament (collectively taken) is capable of doing any wrong; since in such cases the law feels itself incapable of furnishing any adequate remedy. For which reason all oppressions, which may happen to spring from any branch of the sovereign power, must necessarily be out of the reach of any stated rule or express legal provision; but if ever they unfortunately happen, the prudence of the times must provide new remedies upon new emergencies.

Indeed, it is found by experience, that whenever the unconstitutional oppressions, even of the sovereign power, advance with gigantic strides, and threaten desolation to a state, mankind will not be reasoned out of the feelings of humanity, nor will sacrifice their liberty by a scrupulous adherence to those political maxims which were originally established to preserve it. And, therefore, though the positive laws are silent, experience furnishes us with a very remarkable case, wherein nature and reason prevailed. When King James II. invaded the fundamental constitution of the realm, the Convention Parliament declared an abdication, whereby the throne was considered vacant, which induced a new settlement of the crown. And so far as this precedent leads, and no further, we may now be allowed to lay down the law of redress against public oppression. If, therefore, any future prince should endeavour to subvert the constitution by breaking the original contract between King and people, should violate the fundamental laws, and should withdraw himself out of the kingdom, we are now authorized to declare that this conjunction of circumstances would amount to an abdication, and the throne would be thereby vacant. In these, therefore, or other circumstances, which a fertile imagination may furnish, since both law and history are silent, it becomes us to be silent too; leaving to future generations, whenever necessity and the safety of the whole shall require it, the exertion of those inherent (though As to private injuries, if any person has, in point of pro-latent) powers of society, which no climate, no time, no conperty, a just demand upon the King, he must petition him institution, no contract, can ever destroy or diminish. his Court of Chancery, where his chancellor will administer right as a matter of grace, though not upon compulsion. Finch, 1. 255. See this Dictionary, title Chancery; and post, as to the perfection ascribed to the King.

Are then, it may be asked, the subjects of England totally destitute of remedy in case the crown should invade their rights, either by private injuries or public oppressions? To this we may answer, that the law has provided a remedy in

both cases.

As to cases of ordinary public oppression, where the vitals of the constitution are not attacked, the law has also assigned a remedy. For as a King cannot misuse his powers without the advice of evil counsellors, and the assistance of wicked

It may not be amiss to conclude this part of the subject with observing, that all persons born in any part of the King's dominions, and within his protection, are his subjects; thus are those born in Ireland, Scotland, Wales, the King's plantations, or on the English seas; who by their birth owe such an inseparable allegiance to the King, that they cannot by any act of theirs renounce or transfer their subjection to any foreign prince. 7 Co. 1, &c.; Calvin's case; Molloy, 370;