process at law unduly obtained, by false oath, &c. it is a felonious taking. 3 Inst. 64; Kel. Rep. 43, 44. If a man hath possession of goods once lawfully, though he afterwards carry them away with an ill intention, it is no larceny; where a tailor embezzles cloth delivered to him to make a suit of clothes, &c. it is not felony. H. P. C. 61; 5 Rep. 31. And if I lend a person my horse to go to a certain place, and he goes there, and then rides away with him, it is not larceny; but remedy is to be had by action for the damage; though if one comes on pretence to buy a horse, and the owner gives the stranger leave to ride him, if he rides away with the horse, it is felony; for here an intention is implied. Wood's Inst. 364, 365. In the above cases, there is a lawful possession by delivery, to extenuate the offence; but persons having the possession of goods by delivery, may in some instances be guilty of felony, by taking away part thereof; as if a carrier open a pack, and take out a part of the goods; a miller, who has corn to grind, takes out a part of the same, with an intent to steal it, &c. in which cases the possession of part, distinct from the whole, was gained by wrong, and not delivered by the owner, &c. H. P. C. 62; S. P. Č. 25; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 33. § 5.

To constitute larceny the property must also be taken from the possession of the owner; therefore, to state a case more at large which has already been repeatedly alluded to, where A. intending to go a distant journey, hires a horse fairly and bona fide for that purpose, and evidences the truth of such intention by actually proceeding on his way, and afterwards rides off with the horse, it is no theft; because the felonious design was hatched subsequent to the delivery; and the delivery having been obtained without fraud or design, the owner parted with his possession as well as his property. O. B. 1784, p. 1294; and thereby gave to A. dominion over the horse; upon trust that he would return him when the journey was performed. O. B. 1786, p. 333, 4. But if the delivery of property be obtained with a preconcerted design to steal the thing delivered, although the owner, in this case, parts with the thing itself, he still retains in law the constructive possession of it; therefore, where a man, having feloniously obtained the delivery of a bill of exchange under the fraudulent and delusive pretence of discounting it, converted it to his own use, and it appearing upon the evidence that the owner never meant to part with possession, it was held to be felony. O. B. 1784, p. 294. So also where a horse was obtained with the same design, upon pretence of trying its paces. O. B. 1779, p. 363; O. B. 1784, p. 293. So also to obtain the delivery of money, with design feloniously to take it away, under the false pretence of having found a diamond ring of great value, has been determined by nine judges to be a taking from the possession of the owner, and consequently felony. O. B. 1785, p. 160. So also to obtain the delivery of goods under the pretence of purchasing them, and then to run away with them. Raym. 276. And in general where the delivery of the property is made for a certain, special, and particular purpose, the possession is still supposed to reside, unparted with, in the first proprietor, Therefore, where a master delivers goods to his servant to carry to a customer, but instead of so doing he converts them on his way to his own use, it is a felonious taking; for the master had a right to countermand the delivery of them, and therefore the possession remained in him at the time of the conversion. O. B. 1782, No. 375; O. B. 1783, No. 28. So also if a watchmaker steals a watch, delivered to him to clean. O. B. 1779, No. 83. Or if one steal clothes delivered for the purpose of being washed. O. B. 1758, No. 18. Or goods in a chest delivered with the key for safe custody. O. B. 1770, No. 83. Or guineas delivered for the purpose of being changed into half guineas. O. B. 1778, No. 52. Or a watch delivered for the purpose of being pawned. O. B. 1784, No. 613. In all these instances the goods taken have been thought to remain in the possession

of the proprietor, and the taking of them away held to be felony. Leach's Hawk. P. C. c. 33. § 5. in n. So where a person employed to drive cattle, sells them, it is larceny, for he has the custody merely, and not the right to the possession. Moody's C. C. 368. Also where a carter went and disposed of his master's cart, it was adjudged to be felony. 2 East, P. C. 565.

If one servant delivers goods to another servant, this is a delivery by the master; yet if the master or another servant delivers a bond, or cattle to sell, and the servant goes away with the bond, and receives the money thereon due, or receives the money for the cattle sold, and goes away with the same, this was held to be no felony or larceny within the stat. 21 Hen. 8. c. 7. (which is now repealed by the 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 27.) Dalt. 388; H. P. C. 62; 3 Inst. 105. So if a servant receives his master's rents; for the master did not deliver the money to the servant, and it must be of things delivered to keep and if things delivered to the servant to keep, are under 40s. value, and he goes away with them, this is only a breach of trust, by reason of the delivery; but if the goods were not delivered to him, it is felony and larceny to go away with or embezzle them, though under the value of 40s. &c. Dalt. 369. Where, however, goods, of which the master has never been in possession, are delivered to the servant for the master's use, and the servant, instead of delivering them to his master, by depositing them in his house or the like, converts them to his own use, this is no larceny at common law. 2 East, P. C. 568. Therefore, if a shopman receive money from a customer of his master, and instead of putting it into the till secrete it; 2 Leach, 841; or if a banker's clerk receive money at the counter, and instead of putting it into the proper drawer, purloins it, 2 Leach, 835; or receive a bond for the purpose of being deposited in the bank, and convert it to his own use, 1 Leach, 28; 2 East, P. C. 570: in these cases, it has been held that the clerk or shopman is not guilty of larceny.

Now, by the 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 29. § 47. a clerk or servant receiving any chattel, money, or valuable security, for or on account of their master, and fraudulently embezzling the same, is to be deemed to have stolen such chattel, &c.; but the offence is still treated as an embezzlement, and ranked under that head.-See Embezzlement.

Secondly, There must not only be taking, but a carrying away; cepit et asportavit, was the old law Latin. A bare removal from the place in which he found the goods, though the thief does not quite make off with them, is a sufficient asportation or carrying away. As if a man be leading another's horse out of a close, and be apprehended in the fact, or if a guest, stealing goods out of an inn, has removed them from his chamber down stairs, these have been adjudged suf ficient carryings away to constitute a larceny. 3 Inst. 108, 109. Or if a thief, intending to steal plate, takes it out of a chest in which it was, and lays it down upon the floor, but is surprised before he can make his escape with it, this is larceny. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 33. § 18.

A man was detected in taking the contents of a bale of goods in a waggon. It appeared that the bale laid horizon. tally, and that he had set it on its end; but as it had not been removed from the spot, this was held, upon a case reserved, not to be a sufficient carrying away. But where a man with a felonious intention had removed goods from the head to the tail of a waggon, it was held a sufficient removal to constitute a carrying away. O. B. 1784, p. 734. So a diamond ear-ring snatched from a lady's ear, but lodging in the curls of her hair, and not taken by the thief, was held to be a sufficient asportation. O. B. 1-784, No. 537; Leach's Hawk. P. C. c. 33. § 18. in n. And where the prisoner drew a book from the inside pocket of the prosecutor's coat, about an inch above the top of the pocket, but whilst the book was still about the person of the prosecutor, the latter suddenly raised his hand, whereupon the prisoner let the book

larceny. 1 Hal. P. C. 512. For the punishment now inflicted by statute for stealing dogs or other animals, not the subject of larceny at common law, see tit. Dogs.

As to stealing oysters, see that title. Notwithstanding, however, that no larceny can be committed unless there be some property in the thing taken, and an owner, yet, if the owner be unknown, provided there be a property, it is larceny to steal it; and an indictment will lie for the larceny of the goods of a person unknown. 1 Hal. P. C. 512. This is the case of stealing a shroud out of a grave, which is the property of those, whoever they were, that buried the deceased; but stealing the corpse itself, which has no owner (though a matter of great indecency,) was no felony, unless some of the grave-clothes were stolen with it. It was, however, punishable by indictment as a misdemeanor, even though the body were taken for the improvement of the science of anatomy; it being a practice contrary to common decency, and shocking to the general sentiments and feelings of mankind. See 2 Term Rep. 733.

Where a person finds the goods of another that are lost, and converts them to his own use, it is no larceny; H. P. C. 61; even should he deny the finding of them, or secrete them. 1 Hale, 506. But it seems that in some extraordinary cases the law will rather feign a property, where in strictness there is none, than suffer an offender to escape justice. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 33. § 29.

And the above doctrine does not apply if he knows the owner; and, therefore, where a bureau was given to a carpenter to repair, and he found money secreted in it which he converted to his own use, it was held to be a felony. 8 Ves. 405; 2 Leach, 952. So if a hackney-coachman convert to his own use a parcel left by a passenger in his coach, by mistake, it is a felony if he know the owner; or if he took him up or set him down at any particular place where he might have inquired for him. 2 East P. C. 664; 1 Leach, 413, 415, n. And in all cases where there are marks on the property by which the owner may be traced, a conversion of it by the finder will be a larceny. 2 Russ. 102.

It must be proved on the trial that the goods stolen are the absolute or special property of the person named in the indictment. If he be described as a certain person to the jurors unknown, and it appears in evidence that his name is known, the prisoner will be acquitted. See 3 Camp. 264; 1 Holt, 595; 2 East, P. C. 651.

Where goods are stolen from a bailee, they may be described either as the property of the bailor or bailee, 2 Hale, 181, although they were never in the real owner's possession, but in that of the bailee merely. R. & R. 136. The property must not, however, be laid in one who has neither the actual nor constructive possession of the goods. R. & R. 225. Thus if it appear the person named is merely servant to the owner, the prisoner must be acquitted, for the possession of the servant is the possession of the master. R.&R.

412.

By the 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 29. § 44. (before noticed) in case of the larceny of any fixtures in any square, street, or other like place, it is not requisite to allege the same to be the property of any person. See further, Indictment, VI.

2. Many learned and scrupulous men have questioned the propriety, if not lawfulness, of inflicting capital punishment for simple theft. The natural punishment for injuries to property seems to be the loss of the offender's own property; and might be universally the case were all men's fortunes equal. But as those who have no property themselves are generally the most ready to attack the property of others, it has been found necessary, instead of a pecuniary, to substitute a corporal punishment.

Our ancient Saxon laws nominally punished theft with death, if above the value of twelvepence; but the criminal was permitted to redeem his life by a pecuniary ransom ; but in the ninth year of Henry I. this power of redemption

was taken away, and all persons guilty of larceny above the value of 12d. were directed to be hanged. 1 Hal. P. C. 12; 3 Inst. 53. And grand larceny, or the stealing above the value of 12d. continued liable to be visited with death at common law until the passing of the late statute, already mentioned, by which the distinction of grand and petit larceny was abolished. The value of the goods stolen is now immaterial, and every theft, whatever be the amount of property taken, is punishable under the third section of the same act, which provides that every person convicted of simple larceny, or of any felony by that act made punishable like simple larceny, shall (except as otherwise provided in the act) be liable to be transported for seven years, or be imprisoned not exceeding two years, and if a male to be once, twice, or thrice publicly whipped in addition to such imprisonment: and by § 4 such offenders (and persons convicted of any misdemeanor punishable under the act) may be sentenced to be imprisoned, or imprisoned and kept to hard labour in the common gaol or house of correction, and may also be kept in solitary confinement for the whole or any portion of such imprisonment, or such imprisonment with hard labour. By 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 28. § 7. no person convicted of felony shall suffer death unless for some felony, which was excluded from the benefit of clergy before or on the first day of the then session of parliament, or which is made punishable with death by some statute passed after that day.

An acquittal of larceny in one county may be pleaded in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same stealing in another county and an averment that the offences in both indictments are the same, may be made out by witnesses, or inquest of office, without putting it to trial by jury; though that of later years hath been the usual method. 2 Hank. P. C. c. 35. § 4. But it is no plea in appeal of larceny, that the defendant hath been found not guilty in an action of trespass brought against him by the same plaintiff for the same goods; for larceny and trespass are entirely different; and a bar in an action of an inferior nature will not bar another of a superior. 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 35. § 5. If a person be indicted for felony or larceny generally, and upon the evidence it appears that the fact is but a bare trespass, he cannot be found guilty, and have judgment on the trespass, but ought to be indicted anew; though it may be otherwise where the jury find a special verdict, or when the fact is specially laid, &c. In trespass, where the taking is felonious, no verdict ought to be given unless the defendant hath before been tried for the felony. 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 47. § 6. All felony includes trespass, so that if the party be guilty of no trespass in taking the goods, he cannot be guilty of felony or larceny in carrying them away; and in every indictment of larceny there must be the words felonice cepit & asportarit, &c. H. P. C. 61; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 33. § 2.

II. 1. Larceny in the dwelling-house, though it seems to have a higher degree of guilt than simple larceny, yet is not at all distinguished from the other at common law; unless where it is accompanied with the circumstance of breaking the house by night, and then it falls under another description, viz. that of Burglary.

By the 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 29. § 11 & 12. breaking and entering any dwelling-house, and stealing to any amount; stealing in a dwelling-house, any person being put in fear; or stealing therein to the value of 5l., were made capital felonies. But by the 2 & 3 Wm. 4. c. 62. the punishment of death for stealing to the value of 57. in a dwelling-house was abolished, and transportation for life substituted. And the 3 & 4 Wm. 4. c. 44. takes away the capital punishment for breaking and entering any dwelling-house and stealing to any amount, and in lieu thereof subjects the offender to transportation for life, or for not less than seven years, or previously to transportation to imprisonment for not exceeding four years or less than one year, with or without hard labour. See further as to stealing in dwelling-houses, &c. Buildings, Burglary, &c,

of the kitchen. Cowell.

LARDING-MONEY. In the manor of Bradford, in the county of Wilts, the tenants pay to their lord a small yearly rent by this name, which is said to be for liberty to feed their hogs with the masts of the lord's woods, the fat of a hog being called lard; or it may be a commutation for some customary service of carrying salt or meat to the lord's larder. This was called lardarium in old charters; et decimam lardarii de haga. Mon. Ang. tom. 1. p. 321.

LARONS [Fr.] Thieves; mentioned in the 18 Edw. 2. for view of frank pledge.

LASCARS. By the 3 & 4 Wm. 4. c. 54. (for the encouragement of British shipping and navigation,) § 18, ships trading eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, within the limits of the East India Company's charter, may be navigated by Lascars, or other natives of countries within those limits. LASTATINUS. Often occurs in Walsingham, and signifies an assassin or murderer. Anno 1271.

LAST [Sax. hlæstan, i. e. onus, Fr. lest.] Denotes a bur. den in general, and particularly a certain weight or measure of fish, corn, wool, leather, pitch, &c. As a last of white herrings is twelve barrels; of red herrings, twenty cades or a thousand; and of pilchards, ten thousand; of corn, ten quarters, and in some parts of England twenty-one quarters; of wool, twelve sacks; of leather, twenty dickers, or ten score; of hides or skins, twelve dozen; of pitch, tar, or ashes, fourteen barrels; of gunpowder, twenty-four firkins, weighing a hundred pounds each, &c. See 32 Hen. 8. c. 14. (repealed); 1 Jac. 1. c. 33; 15 Car. 1. c. 7; and tit. Weights and Measures.

LAST-COURT. In the marshes of Kent, is a court held by the twenty-four jurats, and summoned by the bailiffs; wherein orders are made to lay and levy taxes, impose penalties, &c. for the preservation of the said marshes. Hist. of Imbanking and Draining, 54.

LASTAGE [lastagium.] A custom exacted in some fairs and markets to carry things bought where one will by the

interpretation of rastal; but it is more accurately taken for the ballast or lading of a ship. Lastage is also defined to be that custom which is paid for wares sold by the last; as herrings, pitch, &c.

LASTAGE AND BALLASTAGE. See Ballast.

LAST HEIR [Ultimus hæres.] He to whom land comes by escheat for want of lawful heirs; that is, in some cases the lord of whom they held, but in others the king. Bract. lib. 7. c. 17. See Descent, Escheat, Heir, Tenure.

LATERA. Sides-men, companions, assistants. Cowell. LATERARE. To lie side-ways in opposition to lying end-ways, used in the description of lands. Chart. Antiq. LATHE, LETHE, LEID, or LETHIEN [Læstum, Leda, Sax. lathe.] A great part of a county, containing three or four hundreds or wapentakes, as it is used in Kent and Sussex, in the latter of which is called a rape. 1 Comm. 116; Leg. Edw. Confess. c. 35; Pat. 1 Hen. 4. par. 8. m. 8. See Trithing.

LATHREVE, LEDGREVE, OF TRITHINGREVE. The officer under the Saxon government who had authority over that division called a lathe. See Trithingreve.

LATIMER. Is used by Sir Edward Coke for an interpreter. 2 Inst. 515. It seems that the word is mistaken, and should be latiner, because heretofore he that understood Latin, which in the time of the Romans was the prevailing language, might be a good interpreter. Camden agrees, that it signifies a Frenchman or interpreter, and says the word is used in an old inquisition. Britan. fol. 598. It may be derived or corrupted from the Fr. latinier, q. d. latiner.

Cowell.

LATIN. There are three sorts of Latin. 1. Good Latin, allowed by grammarians and lawyers. 2. False or incongruous Latin, which in times past would abate original writs, though not make void any judicial writ, declaration, or plea, &c. And, 3, Words of art, known only to the sages of the law, and not to grammarians, called Lawyers' Latin. 1 Lil. Abr. 146, 147. See 36 Edw. 3. c. 15. which directed all pleas, &c. to be debated in English, and recorded in Latin; but now, by 4 Geo. 2. c. 26; 6 Geo. 2. c. 14. the records and proceedings are to be in English. Formerly the use of a word not Latin at all, or not so in the sense in which used, might in many cases be helped by an Anglicè; though where there was a proper Latin word for the thing intended to be expressed, nothing could help an improper one. And when there was no Latin for a thing, words made which had some countenance of Latin were allowed good, as velvetum, Anglicè velvet, &c. 10 Rep. 133. See Pleading, I. 3, Process.

LATINARIUS. An interpreter of Latin, or Latiner, from the Fr. latinier. 2 Inst. 515. See Latimer.

LATITAT. A writ whereby all men are originally called to answer in personal actions in the King's Bench; having its name upon a supposition that the defendant doth lurk and lie hid, and cannot be found in the county of Middlesex to be taken by bill, but is gone into some other county, to the sheriff of which this writ is directed, to apprehend him there. F. N. B. 78. Terms de Ley.

The origin of it is this: In ancient time, while the King's Bench was moveable, when any man was sued, a writ was sent forth to the sheriff of Middlesex, or any other county where the court was resident, called a bill of Middlesex, to take him; and if the sheriff returned non est inventus, then a second writ was sued out, recicing that it was testified that the defendant lurked and lay hid in another county, and thereby the sheriff of that county was commanded to attach the party in any other place where he might be found; and when the tribunal of the King's Bench came to be settled at Westminster, the same course was observed for a long time; but afterwards, by the contrivance of clerks, it was devised to put both these writs into one, and so attach the defendant upon a fiction that he was not in the county of Middlesex, but lurking elsewhere; and that therefore he was to be ap

prehended by the sheriff of the county where he was suspected to be, and lie hid.

As this writ is in effect abolished by the Uniformity of Process Act, 2 Wm. 4. c. 39. by which a writ of summons is made the only process for commencing non-bailable actions, and a writ of capias the process for commencing those where the defendant is arrested, it is unnecessary further to expound the law relating to latitats, which will be found at large in Mr. Tidd's Book of Practice, 9th ed.

For other matters connected with and explanatory of the subject of this title, see Ac-etiam, Capias, Common Pleas, King's Bench, Practice, Process, &c.

LATRO [Latrocinium.] He who had the sole jurisdiction de latrone in a particular place; it is mentioned in Leg. Wm. 1. See Infangthef.

LAVATORIUM. A laundry, or place to wash in. Applied to such a place in the porch or entrance of cathedral churches, where the priest and other officiating members were obliged to wash their hands, before they proceeded to Divine service. See Liber Statut. Eccl. Paul. London. MS. f. 59. LAVERBREAD. In the county of Glamorgan, and some other parts of Wales, they make a sort of food of a sea-plant, which seems to be the oyster-green, or sea liverwort; and this they call laverbread.

LAVINA. See Labina.

LAUDARE. To advise or persuade. Leg. Edw. Confess. c. 39; Hoveden, 729. Laudare signifies also to arbitrate; and laudator, an arbitrator. Knight, 25, 26.

LAUDUM. An arbitrament or award. Walsingham, 60. LAUNCEGAYS. A kind of offensive weapons now disused, and prohibited by the 7 Rich. 2. c. 13.

LAUND or LAWND [landa.] An open field without wood. Boun.

LAURELS. Pieces of gold coined in the year 1619, with the king's head laureated, which gave them the name of laurels the twenty-shilling pieces whereof were marked with XX., the ten shillings X., and the five shilling piece with V. Camd. Annal. Jac. 1. MS.

And

LAW [Sax. lag; Lat. lex, from lego, or legendo, choosing; or rather à ligando, from binding.] The rule and bond of men's actions; or it is a rule for the well-governing of civil society, to give to every man that which doth belong to him. Law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, is thus defined by Blackstone, in the Commentaries: A rule of action; and is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational. it is that rule of action which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey. 1 Comm. Introd. § 2. Laws in their more confined sense, and in which it is the business of works of this nature to consider them, denote the rule, not of action in general, but of human action or conduct. And this perhaps (it has been acutely observed) is the only sense in which the word law can be strictly used; for in all cases where it is not applied to human conduct, it may be considered as a metaphor, and in every instance a more appropriate term (as quality or property) may be found. When law is applied to any other object than man, it ceases to contain two of its essential ingredients, disobedience and punishment. 1 Comm. Introd. § 2, and Mr. Christian's notes there.

Municipal law is by the same great commentator defined to be "A rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong. The latter clause of this sentence seems to Mr. Christian to be either superfluous or defective. If we attend to the learned judge's exposition, perhaps we may be inclined to use the words "establishing and ascertaining what is right or wrong;" and all cavil or difficulty will vanish. See 1 Comm. 43-53.

Every law may be said to consist of several parts: Declaratory, whereby the rights to be observed, and the wrongs

to be eschewed, are clearly defined and laid down: Directory, whereby the subject of a state is instructed and enjoined to observe those rights, and to abstain from the commission of those wrongs: Remedial, whereby a method is pointed out to recover a man's private rights or redress his private wrongs: Vindicatory, which imposes the sanction whereby it is signified what evil or penalty shall be incurred by such as commit any public wrongs, and transgress or neglect their duty. See 1 Comm. 53.

According to Bracton, Lex est sanctio justa, jubens honesta et prohibens contraria: And the schoolman says, Lex humana est quoddam dictamen rationis, quo diriguntur humani actús. This law is rectum, as it discovers that which is crooked or wrong: And justa requires five properties; possibilis, necessaria, conveniens, manifesta, nullo privato commodo. 2 Inst 56, 587.

Laws are arbitrary or positive, and natural; the last of which are essentially just and good, and bind every where and in all places where they are observed: Arbitrary laws are either concerning such matter as is in itself morally indifferent, in which case both the law and the matter, and subject of it, is likewise indifferent, or concerning the natural law itself, and the regulating thereof; and all arbitrary laws are founded in convenience, and depend upon the authority of the legislative power which appoints and makes them, and are for maintaining public order. Those which are natural laws are from God; but those which are arbitrary, are properly human and positive institutions. Selden on Fortescue, c. 17.

The laws of any country began, when there first began to be a state in the land and we may consider the world as one universal society, and then that law by which nations were governed, is called jus gentium: if we consider the world as made up of particular nations, the law which regulates the public order and right of them, is termed jus publicum: and that law which determines the private rights of men, is called jus civile. Selden, ubi supra.

No law can oblige a people without their consent; this consent is either verbis or factis, i. e. it is expressed by writing, or implied by deeds and actions; and where a law is grounded on an implied assent, rebus et factis, it is either common law or custom; if it is universal, it is common law; and if particular to this or that place, then it is custom. 3 Salk. 112.

The law in this land hath been variable; the Roman laws were in use anciently in Britain, when the Romans had several colonies here, each of which was governed by the Roman laws: afterwards we had the laws called Merchenlage, West Saxonlage, and Danelage; all reduced into a body, and made one by King Edw. Confess. Magna Charta, c. 1. 14: Camd. Britan. 94.

At present the laws of England are divided into three parts: 1. The common law, which is the most ancient and general law of the realm, and common to the whole kingdom; being appropriate thereto, and having no dependance upon any foreign law whatsoever. See Common Law.

2. Statutes or acts of parliament, made and passed by the king, lords, and commons in parliament; being a reserve for the government to provide against new mischiefs arising through the corruption of the times: and by this the common law is amended where defective, for the suppression of public evils; though where the common law and statute law concur or interfere, the common law shall be preferred. See

Statutes.

3. Particular customs; but they must be particular, for a general custom is part of the common law of the land. Co. Lit. 15, 115. See Custom.

Blackstone divides the municipal law of England into two kinds, lex non scripta, the unwritten or common law; and the lex scripta, the written, that is, the statute law.

The lex non scripta, or unwritten law, includes not only