is made to the intent and purpose that thereby, and by the statute for transferring uses into possession, the lessee may be capable of a release. The bargain and sale therefore, or lease for a year, as it is generally called, operates, and the bargainee is in the possession by the statute. The release operates by enlarging the estate or possession of the bargainee to a fee. This is at the common law; but if the use be declared to the releasee in fee-simple, it continues an estate at the common law; but if the use is declared to a third person, the statute again intervenes, and annexes or transfers the possession of the releasee to the use of the person to whom the use is declared. It has been said, that the possession of the bargainee under the lease is not so properly merged in, as enlarged by, the release; but at all events it does not, after the release, exist distinct from the estate passed by the release. 1 Inst. 271. b. in n. See Release I. As the operation of a lease and release depends upon the lease or bargain and sale, if the grantor is a body corporate, the lease will not operate under the Statute of Uses; for a body corporate cannot be seised to an use, and therefore the lease of possession, considered as a bargain and sale under the statute, is void; and the release then must be of no effect for want of a previous possession in the releasee. In cases of this nature, therefore, it is proper to make the conveyance by feoffment, or by a lease and release with an actual entry by the lessee previous to the release; after which the release will pass the reversion. It may also be observed, that in exchanges, if one of the parties die before the exchange is executed by entry, the exchange is void. But if the exchange is made by lease and release, this inconvenience is prevented, as the statute executes the possession without entry; and all incidents annexed to an exchange at common law will be preserved. 1 Inst. 271. b. in n. When an estate is conveyed by lease and release, in the lease for a year there must be the words bargain and sell for money; and five shillings or any other sum, though never paid, is a good consideration, whereupon the bargainee for a year is immediately in possession on the executing of the deed, without actual entry: if only the words demise, grant, and to farm let, are used, in that case the lessee cannot accept of a release of the inheritance, until he hath actually entered, and is in possession. 2 Lil. Abr. 435. But where Littleton says, that if a lease is made for years, and the lessor releases to the lessee before entry, such release is void; because the lessee had only a right, and not the possession; and such release shall not enure to enlarge the estate, without the possession though this is true at common law it is not so now upon the Statute of Uses. 2 Mod. 250, 251. And if a man make a lease for life, remainder for life, and the first lessee dieth, on which the lessor releases to him in remainder, before entry, this is a good release to enlarge the estate, he having an estate in law capable of enlargement by release, before entry had. 1 Inst. 270. use. No person can make a bargain and sale, who hath not possession of the lands; but it is not necessary to reserve a rent therein; because the consideration of money raises the If a lease be without any such consideration the lessee hath not any estate till entry, nor hath the lessor any reversion; and therefore a release will not operate, &c. 1 Inst. 270, 278; Cro. Car. 169; 1 Mod. 263. On lease at will, a release shall be good by reason of the privity between the parties; but if a man be only tenant at sufferance, the release will not enure to him; and as to the person who hath the reversion it is void, for such tenant hath not any possession, there being no estate in him. Lit. § 461, 462; Cro. Eliz. 21; Dyer, 251. A lease and release make but one conveyance, being in the nature of one deed. 1 Mod. 252. A lease dated two days before the release is good to support the latter, which refers to a lease as of the day next before the date of the release. 2 Mau. & Sel. Rep. 434. For further information as to the principles in which this form of conveyance originates, and under which it operates, see Conveyance, Deed, Feoffment, Trusts, Uses, &c. LEASING or LESING. See Gleaning. LEASING-MAKING. Slanderous and untrue speeches to the disdain, reproach, and contempt of the king, his council and proceedings, or to the dishonour, hurt or prejudice of the king or his ancestors. Scotch Acts, 1584, 1585. By these acts this offence was made capital, but being declared a grievance by the petition of right, the punishment of the offenders is, by the act 1703, c. 4. declared arbitrary. LEATHER. By the 11 Geo. 4. c. 16. all the duties and restrictions on the manufacture of leather were repealed: and § 2. enacts, that nothing therein contained shall be construed to continue so much of the 48 Geo. 3. c. 60. as prohibits tanners from carrying on the business of shoemakers, curriers, leather-cutters, &c. LECCATOR. A debauched person, lecher, or whore master. LECHERWITE. See Lairwite. LECTISTERNIUM. A bed; sometimes all that belongs to a bed. Flor. Worc. p. 631. LECTRINUM. A pulpit. Mon. Angl. tom. 3. p. 243. LECTURER. [Prælector.] A reader of lectures. London, and other cities, there are lecturers who are assistants to the rectors of churches, in preaching, &c. These lecturers are chosen by the vestry, or chief inhabitants of the parish, and are usually the afternoon preachers: the law requires that they should have the consent of those by whom they are employed, and likewise the approbation and admission of the ordinary: and they are, at the time of their admission, to subscribe to the thirty-nine articles of religion, &c. required by the 13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 4. They are to be licensed by the bishop, as other ministers, and a man cannot be a lecturer without a licence from a bishop or archbishop; but the power of a bishop, &c. is only as to the qualification and fitness of the person, and not as to the right of the lectureship; for if a bishop determine in favour of a lecturer, a prohibition may be granted to try the right. Mich. 12 W. 3. B. R. If lecturers preach in the week-days, they must read the common prayer for the day when they first preach, and declare their assent to that book; they are likewise to do the same the first lecture-day in every month, so long as they continue lecturers, or they shall be disabled to preach till they conform to the same: and if they preach before such conformity, they may be committed to prison for three months, by warrant of two justices of the peace, granted on the certificate of the ordinary. 13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 4. Where lectures are to be preached or read in any cathedral or collegiate church, if the lecturer openly, at the time aforesaid, declare his assent to all things in the book of Common Prayer, it shall be sufficient, and university sermons or lectures are excepted out of the act concerning lecturers. There are lectures founded by the donations of pious persons, the lecturers whereof are appointed by the founders, without any interposition or consent of rectors of churches, &c. though with the leave and approbation of the bishop; such as that of Lady Moier at St. Paul's, &c. But such is not entitled to the pulpit without the consent of the rector, or vicar, in whom the freehold of the church is. Cases, B. R. 420, 433. The court of B. R. will not grant a mandamus to a bishop to license a lecturer without the consent of the rector, where the lecturer is supported by voluntary contributions, unless an immemorial custom to elect without such consent is shown. R. v. London, (Bp.) 1 T. R. 331. Nor will that court grant a mandamus to the rector, to certify to the bishop the election of a lecturer chosen by the inhabitants, where no such custom is shown, though the lecturer has been paid out of the poor rates. But such immemorial custom, if in fact it exists, is binding on the rector. 4 T. R. 125. LECTURES on Divinity, Law, Physic, &c. in the universities of Oxford and Cambridge; see Regius Professor. LECTURNIUM, [lectorium.] The desk or reading place in churches. Stat. Eccl. Paul. Lond. MS. 44. LEDGRAVE, or LEDGREVE. See Lathreve. LEGA, or LACTA. Anciently the allay of money was so called. Spelm. LEGABILIS, signifies what is not entailed as hereditary; but may be bequeathed by legacy, in a last will and testament. Articula proposita in parliamento coram Rege; anno 1234. LEGACY. [LEGATUM.] A bequest, or gift of goods and chattels by will or testament: the person to whom it is given is styled the legatee and if the gift is of the residue of an estate after payment of debts and legacies, he is then styled the residuary legatee. This bequest transfers an inchoate property to the legatee; but the legacy is not perfect without the assent of the executor; for if one has a general or pecuniary legacy of 100%., or a specific one of a piece of plate, he cannot in either case take it without the consent of the executor. For in him all the chattels are vested; and it is his business first of all to see whether there is a sufficient sum left to pay the debts of the testator. See Co. Litt. 111; Aleyn. 39; Bract. l. 2. c. 26. But if there is a fund to pay the debts, and the executor then refuses his assent to a legacy, he may be compelled to give it, either by the spiritual court, or by a court of equity. March, Rep. 19. In case of a deficiency of assets, all the general legacies must abate proportionably, in order to pay the debts; but a specific legacy (of a piece of plate, a horse, or the like,) is not to abate at all, or allow any thing by way of abatement, unless there be not sufficient without it. 2 Vern. 111. Upon the same principle, if the legatees have been paid their legacies, they are afterwards bound to refund a rateable part in case debts come in more than sufficient to exhaust the residue after the legacies paid. 2 Vern. 205. If the legatee dies before the testator, the legacy is a lost or lapsed legacy, and shall sink into the residue. And if a contingent legacy be left to any one, as when he attains, or if he attains the age of twenty-one, and he dies before that time, it is a lapsed legacy. Dy. 59; 1 Eq. Ab. 295. But a legacy to one to be paid when he attains the age of twentyone years, is a vested legacy; an interest which commences in præsenti, although it be solvendum in futuro: and if the legatee dies before that age, his representatives shall receive it out of the testator's personal estate, at the same time that it would have become payable in case the legator had lived. This distinction is borrowed from the civil law; and its adoption in our courts is not so much owing to its intrinsic equity, as to its having been before adopted by the Ecclesiastical Courts. For since the Chancery has a concurrent jurisdiction with them, in regard to the recovery of legacies, it was reasonable that there should be a conformity in these determinations; and that the subject should have the same measure of justice in whatever court he sued. 1 Eq. Ab. 295. But if such (contingent) legacies be charged upon a real estate, in both cases they shall lapse for the benefit of the heir; for, with regard to devises affecting lands, the Ecclesiastical Court hath no concurrent jurisdiction. 2 P. Wms. 601, 610. And in case of a vested legacy due immediately, and charged on land, or money in the funds, which yield an immediate profit, interest shall be payable thereon from the testator's death; but if charged only on the personal estate, VOL. II. which cannot be immediately got in, it shall carry interest only from the end of the year after the death of the testator. 2 P. Wms. 26, 27. Besides the formal legacies contained in a man's will and testament, there is also permitted another death-bed disposition of property; which is called a donatio causâ mortis; a gift in prospect of death. And that is, when a person in his last sickness, apprehending his dissolution near, delivers, or causes to be delivered, to another the possession of any personal goods, (under which have been included bonds and bills drawn by the deceased upon his banker,) to keep in case of his decease. This gift, if the donor dies, needs not the assent of his executors; yet it shall not prevail against creditors; and is accompanied with this implied trust, that if the donor lives, the property thereof shall revert to himself, being only given in contemplation of death; mortis causá. Pre. Ch. 269; 1 P. Wms. 406, 441; 3 P. Wms. 357. See 2 Ves. 431. As this donation may be avoided by creditors, so may it by the wife or children of a freeman, if it break in on their customary shares. 2 Vern. 612. The delivery of receipts for South-Sea annuities does not amount to a gift of the annuities themselves. Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. 442. There may be a donatio causâ mortis of bonds, bank notes, and bills payable to bearer, but not of other promissory notes or bills of exchange, those being choses in action which do not pass by delivery. See 2 Ves. 431, Ward v. Turner ; which case collects all the laws on the subject of donations causa mortis, and particularly considers what shall be a sufficient delivery of different kinds of property to give effect to such donations. One cannot sue in the spiritual court for a donatio causá mortis. 2 Stra. 777. See further Donatio causâ mortis. Having said thus much on the subject of legacies in general, we may proceed more particularly to inquire, 1. Who may be legatees; of legacies lapsed, vested or contingent, or conditional. 2. Of the payment of legacies; and herein of specific legacies. 3. Of interest on legacies. 4. Of suits to recover legacies. 5. Of devises to creditors, &c. in satisfaction of demands due from the testator. Some persons are incapable of taking by legacy, under several statutes, as in 13 Wm. 3. c. 6. officers, counsellors, lawyers, &c. not taking the oaths, and persons twice denying the Christian religion to be true, or the divine authority of the Scriptures. (9 & 10 Wm. 3. c. 32.) The name of a legatee being very falsely spelled, it was referred to a master in chancery, to examine who was the person intended. 1 P. Wms. 425. The general rule is, that if a legatee die before the testator, or before the condition upon which the legacy is given be performed, or before it be vested in interest, the legacy is extinguished. Treat. Eq. lib. 4. pt. 1. c. 2. § 3.—Even where a legacy is given to a man and his executors, &c., or to a man and his representatives, if the legatee dies before the testator, though the executors are named, yet the legacy is lost; for the words "executors," &c. are deemed surplusage, inasmuch as those persons would have taken the legacy in succession, and not by way of representation, whether expressly named by the testator or not. 1 P. Wms. 83; 4 Ves. 435; 3 Bro. C. C. 128, 142, 143. But a bequest may be so specially framed as to prevent the death of the legatee operating as a lapse of the legacy. See 3 Atk. 572, 580. Neither will the rule extend to a legacy to two or more; for though, by the civil law, there is no survivorship amongst legatees, yet it is settled that a legacy to two or more jointly, is not extinguished by the death of one, but will vest in the survivor. Gilb. Rep. 137; 2 Atk. 220. But where the legacy is to two or more severally, or to be divided share and share alike, and one dies, his share will lapse. See 1 P. Wms. 700; 2 P. Wms. 489; 2 Stra. 820, and the notes there. Where, however, a legacy is given to a class of persons in general terms as tenants in common, as to the children of A., the death of one of them before the testator will not occasion a lapse of any part of the fund, but those of the described class who survive the testator will take the whole. 2 Cox, 190; S. C. 2 Bro. C. C. 658. A further exception, as to the doctrine of lapse in cases of legacies given to tenants in common, occurs in instances where the will contains a limitation over of the legacy to the survivors. 9 Ves. 566. Nor will the rule extend to those cases where the legacy is given over after the death of the first legatee; for in such cases the legatee in remainder shall have it immediately. 1 And. 33. pl. 82; 2 Vern. 207; 1 P. Wms. 274; 3 P. Wms. 113; Pre. Ch. 37; Mosel. 319; 2 Vern. 378. Nor will a legacy lapse by the death of a legatee in the testator's life-time, if he be to take as a trustee. See 1 Ves. 140; 1 Cox, 1; and 2 Vern. 468, in which latter case the point is doubted. A man devised 2001. à piece to the two children of A. B. at the end of ten years after the death of the testator; afterwards the children died within the ten years, and it was held a lapsed legacy; for there is a difference where a devise is to take effect at a future time, and where the payment is to be made at a future time; and whenever the time is annexed to the legacy itself, and not to the payment of it, if the legatee dies before the time happens, it is a lapsed legacy. 2 Salk. 415. A bequest of money to one at the age of twenty-one, or day of marriage, without saying to be paid at that time, and the legatee dies before the term, this is a lapsed legacy and so it is if the devise had been to her when she shall marry, or when a son shall come of age, and they die before. Godb. 182; 2 Vent. 342. But a devise of a sum of money, to be paid at the day of marriage, or age of twenty-one years, if the legatee dies before either of these happen, the legatee's administrator shall have it, because the legatee had a present interest, though the time of payment was not yet come; and it is a charge on the personal estate which was in being at the testator's death; and if it were discharged by this accident, then it would be for the benefit of the executor, which was never intended by the testator. 2 Vent. 366; 2 Lev. 207. A father bequeathed goods to his son, when he should be of the age of twenty-one years, and if he die before that time, then his daughter should have them; afterwards the father died, and then the son died before he was of age; adjudged, that the daughter shall have the goods given in legacy immediately, and not stay till her brother would have been of age, if he had lived. 1 And. 33. And where a legacy was devised to an infant, to be paid when he shall come of age, and he died before that time; it was ruled that his administrator should have it presently, and not stay until the infant should have been of age, if he had lived. 1 Leon. 278. In a case of this nature, it has been decreed in equity, that although the administrator should have the legacy, yet he must wait for it till such time as the child would have come to twenty-one. 2 Vern. 199. . If the legacy be to the legatee payable to him at certain age, and the legatee die before he attain such age, this is a vested and transmissible interest in the legatee. See 2 Vent. 342; 2 Ch. Ca. 155; 1 Vern. 462; 3 P. Wms. 138; 2 Vern. 199. Otherwise, if the legacy be to the legatee generally, at or when he attains such age. 2 Vent. 342; 2 Salk. 415; 1 Eq. Ab. 295, 6; and see I Bro. C. R. 119. If the legacy be made to carry interest, though the words to be paid, or payable, are omitted, it is a vested and transmissible interest. 2 Vent. 342; 2 Ch. Ca. 155; 2 Vern. 673; 2 Ves. 263; 3 Atk. 645. So if the bequest be to A. a for life, and after the death of A. to B., the bequest to B. is vested upon the death of the testator, and will not lapse by the death of B. in the life-time of A. 2 Vent. 347; 1 P. Wms. 566; 2 Vern. 378; Ambl. 167; 1 Bro. C. R. 119; and the notes there. 1 Bro. C. R. 181. Where a legacy is to arise out of the real estate, it shall not go to the representative of the legatee, but sink in the inheritance. And yet where 1000l. was given by a person out of lands, to his daughter, and interest to be computed from his death, &c. here, though the legatee died before the time appointed for paying the same, it was held, the legacy should be raised notwithstanding; and the lord chancellor said, that this legacy was a vested one. 2 Vern. Rep. 617; Barnardist. 328, 330. A person by will, &c. gives a portion or legacy to a child, payable at twenty-one years of age, out of a real and personal estate, and the child dies before the legacy becomes payable; in that case so much thereof as the personal estate will pay, shall go to the child's executors and administrators; but so far as the legacy is charged upon the land, it is said shall sink. 2 Peere Williams, 613. Also if a legacy be given to one to be paid out of such a fund, and the same fails, it has been resolved that it ought to be paid out of the personal estate, and the failing of the manner appointed for payment shall not defeat the legacy. 1 P. Wms. 779. A testatrix gave a legacy to the sole and separate use of a married daughter for life, with a power of appointment, and in default thereof to her next of kin, as if she were sole and unmarried; the daughter died in testator's life-time: held, that the legacy did not lapse, but that the next of kin took it as purchasers. Hardwick v. Thurston, 4 Russ. 380. A conditional legacy is a bequest depending upon the happening or not happening of some uncertain event, by which it is either to take place, or to be defeated. By the civil law, which has been adopted in our courts of equity, (1 Eden, 116,) and which differs from the common law as regards devises of real estates,-when a condition precedent to the vesting of a legacy is impossible, the bequest is discharged of the condition, and the legatee will be entitled as if the legacy were unconditional. Swinb. pt. 4. c. 6. pl. 2, 3; Com. Rep. 738. Where the performance of a condition subsequent is illegal, then, as well at the common law as by the civil law adopted in the courts of equity, the condition is void, and the bequest freed from it. Co. Lit. 206 a. b.; 6 Mad. 32. A condition that a legatee shall not dispute the will, is generally considered merely in terrorem, and will not operate as a forfeiture, by reason of the legatee having disputed the validity (2 Vern. 90; 3 P. Wms. 344,) or effect (1 Atk. 414,) of the will. But it is otherwise if the legacy or breach of such a condition is given over to another person. 2 P. Wms. 528. It is now settled that conditions which do not import an absolute injunction to celibacy are valid. 2 Dick. 721. Thus, conditions restraining marriage under twenty-one, or other reasonable age, without consent of executors, guardians, &c., (1 Bro. C. C. 303; 3 Ves. 18; 4 Russ. 325,) or requiring or prohibiting marriage with particular persons, (2 Dick. 721; 9 East, 170,) and the like, are valid. Where a father makes a provision for a child by his will, and afterwards gives to such child, being a daughter, a portion in marriage, or, being a son, a sum of money to establish him in life, (such portion or sum being in amount equal to, or greater than, the legacy,) it is an implied ademption of the legacy; for the law will not intend that the father designed two portions to one child. 1 P. Wms. 680; 2 Ch. Rep. 85; 2 Vern. 115, 257; 2 Atk. 216; Ambl. 325; 2 Bro. C. R. 307. But this implication will not arise, if the provision by the will be by bequest of the residue. 2 Atk. 216; or if the provision in the father's life-time be subject to a contingency, 2 Atk. 491,-or be not ejusdem generis with the legacy, 1 Bro. C. R. 425,—or if the testator be a stranger, 2 Atk. 516; 2 Bro. C. R. 499. And such implication is always liable to be refuted by evidence. 2 Atk. 516; 2 Bro. C. R. 165, 519. 2. If a legacy be given generally, without specifying the time of payment, it is due on the day of the death of the testator (Swinb. pt. 7. s. 23. pl. 1.) though not payable till the end of a year next after. If a legacy, when due, be paid to the father of an infant, it is no good payment; and the executor may be obliged in equity to pay it over again; and where any legacy is bequeathed to a feme covert, paying it to her alone is not sufficient, without her husband. 1 Vern. 261. An executor, however, may discharge himself from all responsibility with respect to the payment of legacies due to infants, by paying such legacies into the Bank of England, with the privity of the accountant-general, under the provisions of the 36 Geo. 3. c. 52. § 32. Executors are not bound to pay a legacy, without security to refund. Chan. Rep. 149, 257. And if sentence be given for a legacy in the Ecclesiastical Court, a prohibition lies, unless they take security to refund. 2 Vent. 358. If an executor pays legacies, and seven years after covenant is broken, for which action is brought against the executor, the court inclined that it was a devastavit, and that the executor ought to have taken security for his indemnity upon payment of the legacies. Allen, 38. Though it has been adjudged that a covenant is no duty till broken; and therefore since it is uncertain whether it will be broken or not, it shall be presumed it will not; and the legacies being a present duty, it shall be paid by the executor notwithstanding any covenant not actually broken. Sty. 37; 1 Nels. Abr. 786. If one binds himself and his executors in an obligation, &c. to perform a certain thing, and in his will gives divers legacies, and dies, leaving goods only sufficient to pay the obligation when forfeited, this obligation shall be no bar to the legacies, because it is uncertain whether the same may ever be forfeited; though the executor may therefore make a delivery upon condition, viz. to return the legacies if the obligation becomes forfeited, and the penalty be recovered. 1 Rol. Abr. 928; 2 Vent. 358. The old practice of the Court of Chancery was, that the legatee should in all cases give the executor security to refund, if debts should afterwards appear. 1 Chan. Cas. 257. But the court has ceased to require such security, and therefore creditors have in modern times been allowed to follow assets in the hands of legatees, as well as of the executor. By Lord Hardwicke, in Harg. MSS.; Amb. 804. The executor is to pay the legacies after the debts; but executors cannot, in equity, pay their own legacies first, where there is not enough to pay all of them, but shall have an equal proportion with the rest of the legatees. Chan. R. 354. An executor has election, where any chattel is given to him, to have and take it in one right or the other, viz. as executor or legatee, which is to be made by a special taking or declaration, &c. 10 Rep. 47; Plowd. 519; Dyer, 277. If there be a specific legacy given of any thing, as a horse, silver cup, &c. it must be delivered before any other legacy, provided there be assets. Off. Ex. 317. And if there be enough to pay all the legacies after the debts are satisfied, the legacies shall all be paid; but if there is not sufficient to pay debts or more, the legatees must lose their legacies, or a proportionable part of them. Plowd. 526. See 1 Lil. Ab. 579. A specific legacy is, where, by the assent of the executor, the property of the legacy will vest; as there is a benefit one way to a specific legatee, that he shall not contribute (in case of a deficiency to pay all the legacies,) so there is a hazard the other way; for instance, if such specific legacy, being a lease, be evicted; or, being goods, be lost or burnt; or, being a debt, be lost by the insolvency of the debtor; in all those cases such specific legatee shall have no contribution from the other legatees, and therefore shall pay none toward them. Hinton v. Pinke, 1 P.Wms. 539. These consequences attending a specific legacy have raised, in the several cases to be met with in the books, the question whether a legacy was specific or general. A specific legacy (strictly speaking) is said by Lord Hardwicke, in Purse v. Snaplin, Atk. 417, to be a bequest of a particular chattel, specifically described and distinguished from all other things of the same kind, or, in other words, an individual legacy. Money, therefore, if sufficiently distinguished, may be the subject of a specific bequest, as money in a certain chest, &c. Lawson v. Stitch, 1 Atk. 508. Or a particular debt, as to the ademption of which latter by payment in the testator's life-time, see Thomond (Earl) v. Suffolk (Earl), 1 P. Wms. 461. So of stock, in Ashton v. Ashton, Talb. 152; Avelyn v. Ward, 1 Ves. 424; Drinkwater v. Falconer, 2 Ves. 623. So a bequest of a part of a specific chattel may be equally a specific legacy. 3 Atk. 103. But the legatees of specific parts, though not liable to abatement with general legatees, yet must abate, proportionably among themselves, upon deficiency of the specific thing bequeathed. Sleech v. Thorington, 2 Ves. 563; or on deficiency of the general assets for payment of debts. Long v. Short, 1 P. Wms. 403. So specific legacies of distinct chattels shall abate proportionably on a deficiency of general assets. Devon (Duke) v. Atkins, 2 P. Wms. 382. On the other hand, a mere bequest of quantity, whether of money or any other chattel, is a general legacy; as of a quantity of stock; Purse v. Snaplin, 1 Atk. 414; Sleech v. Thorington, 2 Ves. 562. And where the testator has not such stock at his death, it is a direction to the executor to procure so much stock for the legatee. Partridge v. Partridge, Talb. 227. So the purpose to which a general legacy is to be applied will not alter its nature; as in the case of Hinton v. Pinke, 1 P. Wms. 539. Personal annuities given by will, are general legacies. Hume v. Edwards, 3 Atk. 693; Lewin v. Lewin, 2 Ves. 417. How far a legacy of money, to be paid out of a certain fund, shall be adeemed by the failure of the fund, see Savile v. Blackett, 1 P. Wms. 778; 2P.Wms. 330; Mr. Cox's note (1); and see Treat. Eq. lib. 4. pt. 1. c. 2. § 5. in note. The general rule is, that to complete the title to a specific legacy, the thing bequeathed must remain in specie, as described in the will, otherwise the legacy is considered as revoked by ademption: thus if a debt specifically bequeathed be received by the testator, the legacy is adeemed, because the subject is extinguished, and nothing remains to which the words of the will can apply. 3 Bro. C. C. 431. A sum bequeathed out of a debt must be paid, though the debt is recovered by the testator; otherwise of a bequest of the debt itself. 2 Stra. 824. As an executor is not obliged to pay a legacy without security given him by the legatee to refund, if there are debts, because the legacy is not due till the debts are paid, and a man must be just before he is charitable; so in some cases the executor may be compelled to give security to the legatee for the payment of his legacy; as where a testator bequeathed 1000l. to a person, to be paid at the age of twenty-one, and made an executor, and died; afterwards the legatee exhibited a bill in equity against the executor, setting forth that he had wasted the estate, and praying that he might give security to pay the legacy when it should become due; and it was ordered accordingly. 1 Chan. Rep. 136, 257. See post, 4. By the Stamp Act, duties ad valorem are imposed on receipts given for payment of legacies; and these extend now as well to legacies secured on real as on personal property. For the amount of these stamps the executor is made liable, and it is his duty not to pay a legacy without a receipt duly stamped. The stamp is from 17. up to 10l. per cent. (in Great Britain, and from 10s. to 5l. per cent. in Ireland,) ac cording to the propinquity or distance of relationship between the devisor and legatee. For the amount of the stamp duties in Great Britain, see the act 55 Geo. 3. c. 184. For the regulations by which executors are made liable for the payment of the duty, see 36 Geo. 3. c. 52; 42 Geo. 3. c. 99. And as to Ireland, see 47 Geo. 3. st. 1. c. 50, &c. See further tit. Executor. 3. If a legacy is devised, and no certain time of payment, the legatee shall have interest for the legacy from the expiration of one year after the testator's death; for so long the executor shall have, that he may see whether there are any debts. Interest is therefore payable from that time, unless some other period is fixed by the will. 13 Ves. 333, 334. Nor will interest be payable at an earlier date, although the will directs the legacy to be paid as soon as possible." 8 Ves. 410, 413; 6 Mad. 15. 66 But after the expiration of a year from the testator's death, the legacy will carry interest, although payment be, from the condition of the estate, impracticable. 13 Ves. 334. And although the assets have been unproductive. See 1 Sch. & Lef. 10. With respect to interest in general legacies, where the time of payment is fixed by the testator, the general rule is, that they will not carry interest before the arrival of the appointed period; as for instance, when the legatee shall attain twenty-one. 3 Atk. 101. 4 Ves. 1. Nor does it make any difference that the legacy is vested. 3 Atk. 102; 3 Ves. 10. This rule is, however, subject to an exception where the testator is the parent, (or in loco parentis,) 1 P. W. 783; 1 Ves. sen. 308; 3 Ves. & B. 183, of the legatee. For in that case, whether the legacy be vested or contingent, if the legatee be not an adult (1 Swan. 553,) interest in the legacy will be allowed as a maintenance, from the death of the testator, provided there is no other provision for that purpose. Where the payment of a legacy is postponed until the legatee attains twenty-one, and the will directs that payment shall then be made with interest, the legacy will only bear interest from the end of a year after the testator's death. 2 Sim. & Stu. 492. Where a person gives a legacy charged upon land, which yields rents and profits, and there is no day of payment mentioned, the legacy shall carry interest from the testator's death, because the land yields profit from that time; though were it charged on the personal estate, and the will mentions no time for paying it, there the legacy bears interest only from the end of a year after the death of the testator, which is said to be the settled difference. 2 P. Wms. 26. 4. Legacies being gratuities, and no duties, action will not lie at common law for the recovery of a legacy, but remedy is to be had in the Chancery or Spiritual Court. Allen, 38. Sometimes the common law takes notice of a legacy, not directly, but in a collateral way; as where the executor promised to pay the money, if the legatee would forbear to sue for the legacy, this was adjudged a good consideration to ground an action, but that it would not lie for a legacy in specie; which would be to divest the Spiritual Court of what properly belonged to their jurisdiction, by turning suits which might be brought there, into actions on the case. Raym. 23. So if security be given by bond to pay a legacy, in such case an action at law is the proper remedy; by giving the bond, the legacy is, as it were, extinct, and becomes a debt at common law, and the legatee can never afterwards sue for it in the Spiritual Court. Yele. 39. It is now positively determined that no action at law lies for a legacy; the Court of Chancery being the proper jurisdiction for that purpose. Deeks v. Strutt, 5 T. R. 690. The reason given in this case seems to contradict the principle of two other cases in Cowp. 284, 289, in which it was held, that if an executor, in consideration of assets in his possession, promises to pay a legacy, an action of assumpsit lies against him in his own right. In the first mentioned of these cases, however, no express promise was proved. But Deeks v. Strutt is considered as an unqualified decision that no action at law will lie for a legacy, whether there is an express promise or not. See per Littledale, J. 7 B. & C. 544. And it has lately been held, that an action at law will not lie against an administrator for a distributive share of an intestate's property. Jones v. Tanner, 7 B. & C. 542. But the law is different with respect to specific legacies, for an action at law will lie against an executor to recover a specific chattel bequeathed, after his assent to the bequest. 3 East, 120; 3 Atk. 223. And where executors have ceased to hold the money bequeathed in their representative character, an action at law may be maintained against them. 1 Moore & P. 209. So where, on demurrer to a declaration which was for a legacy that had been retained by the executor for several years, under an agreement by him to pay interest thereon to the legatee, the court was clearly of opinion that the action would lie. Wasney v. Earnshaw, Excheq. T. R. 1834, MS. 5 Madd. Suits for legacies are rarely instituted in the Ecclesiastical Courts, on account of their not possessing adequate jurisdiction to afford complete relief in many cases. 357. Though recent instances of such proceedings may be found. 2 Phill. R. 335; 1 Hagg. Ecc. R. 535. And cases of bequests to married women and infants, which involve the execution of any trust, are subject to the exclusive cognizance of the Court of Chancery. 2 Roper on Leg. 693; and see 9 B. & C. 489, post. The Spiritual Court administers redress in the case of subtraction or the withholding or detaining of legacies, as a consequential part of their testamentary jurisdiction; but in this case the Courts of Equity exercise a concurrent jurisdiction, as incident to some other species of relief required; and as it is beneath the dignity of the king's courts to be merely ancillary to other inferior jurisdictions, the cause, when once brought there, receives there also its full determination. See 3 Com. 98. c. 7. It is without question that the suit for a personal legacy may be brought in Chancery; and if the matter has proceeded to a sentence in the Ecclesiastical Court, it is proper to go into Chancery for the executor's indemnity, where the legatees are to give security to refund, and that court will see money put out for children. On like principles a bill for the distribution of an intestate's personal estate is proper in Chancery, for the Spiritual Court in that case has but an ineffectual jurisdiction. Fonb. Treat. Eq. lib. 4. pt. 1. c. 1. § 2. An executor being in equity considered as a trustee for the legatee, with respect to his legacy, and as a trustee in certain cases for the next of kin as to the undisposed surplus, is the true ground of equitable jurisdiction in enforcing the payment of a legacy, or distribution of personal estate. See 1 P. Wms. 544, 575. That the jurisdiction of our Courts of Equity is, in such cases, more effective and protective of the interest of creditors and legatees, is evident in several instances, particularly in compelling executors to give security for a legacy payable at a future day, the executor appearing to have wasted the estate. 1 Cha. Ca. 121. Or to bring the fund into court. 3 Bro. C. C. 365. And there are cases in which a Court of Equity will restrain proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Court for a legacy; as where a husband is suing for a legacy in right of his wife. See 2 Atk. 420; Toth. 114; Pre. Ch. 548. A testator devised lands to executors, in trust to sell, directing that the money thereby raised should be part of and subject to the dispositions concerning his personal estate; he |