of a man's name, if it be in such a manner that from what goes before and follows after it must be understood, by the natural construction of the whole, to signify and point at such a particular person, is as properly a libel as if the whole name was expressed at large. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 73. § 5. For, adds Hawkins, it brings the utmost contempt upon the law, to suffer its justice to be eluded by such trifling evasions: and it is a ridiculous absurdity to say that a writing which is understood by every the meanest capacity, cannot possibly be understood by a judge and jury. On application for an information for this offence, some friend of the party complaining should in such case state by affidavit the having read the libel, and that he understands and believes it to mean the party. 3 Bac. Abr. in n. And in the case of actions for libels by signs or pictures, it seems necessary always to shew, by proper inuendoes and averments of the defendant's meaning, the import and application of the scandal, and that some special damage has followed, otherwise it cannot appear that such libel by picture was understood to be levelled at the plaintiff, or that it was attended with any actionable consequences. 3 Comm. c. 8, p. 126. So printing or writing may be libellous, though the scandal is not directly charged, but obliquely and ironically; and where a writing, pretending to recommend to one the characters of several great men for his imitation, instead of taking notice of what they are generally famous for, pitches on such qualities only which their enemies charge them with the want of; as by proposing such a one to be imitated for his learning, who is known to be a good soldier, but an illiterate man, &c. this will amount to a libel. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 73. § 4. Though a private person or magistrate be dead at the time of making the libel, yet it is punishable, as it tends to a breach of the peace. Hob. 215; 5 Co. 125; Hawk. P. C. c. 73. § 1; 4 T. R. 126; 129, in n. But an indictment for publishing libellous matter reflecting on the memory of a dead person, not alleging that it was done with a design to bring contempt on the family of the deceased, and to stir up the hatred of the king's subjects against them, and to excite his relations to a breach of the peace, cannot be supported; and judgment was in this case accordingly arrested. R. v. Topham, 4 Term Rep. 126. See 4 T. R. 129, in n. A private libel for a private matter, as a letter scandalizing a person courting a woman, is indictable and punishable by fine. Sid. 270. No writing is esteemed a libel, unless it reflect upon some particular person; and a writing full of obscene ribaldry is not punishable by any prosecution at common law; but the author may be bound to the good behaviour, as a person of evil fame. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 73. § 9. It was so agreed in Read's case, 1 Mod. 142; but in the case of the K. v. Curl, Mich. 1 Geo. 2. for publishing an obscene book, the court were unanimous that it is a temporal offence, and that Read's case was not law. Stra. 788, 834. See also 4 Burr. 2527. To print of any person that he is a swindler, is a libel, and actionable. 1 T. R. 748. Accusing a bishop of the established church with offering money and preferment to a catholic priest, on condition of his becoming a protestant, was held to be a libel. 5 Bing. 23. The petition of the seven bishops in the reign of King James II. against the king's declaration, setting forth, that it was founded on a dispensing power, which had been declared illegal in parliament, &c. was called a seditious libel against the king, and they were committed to the Tower; but after being tried at bar, they were acquitted, 3 Mod. 312. See State Trials. The printing of a petition to a committee of parliament, (which would be a libel against the party complained of, were it made for any other purpose,) and delivering copies thereof to the members of the committee, is not the publication of a libel, being justified by the order and course of proceedings in parliament. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 73. § 8. Scandalous matter in legal proceedings by bill, petition, &c. in a court of justice, amounts not to a libel, if the court hath jurisdiction of the cause. Dyer, 285; 4 Rep. 14. But he who delivers a paper full of reflections on any person, in nature of a petition to a committee to any other persons, except the members of parliament who have to do with it, may be punished as the publisher of a libel. 1 Hawk. c. 73. § 8. § 8. And by the better opinion, a person cannot justify the printing any papers which import a crime to another to instruct counsel, &c. but it will be a libel. Sid. 414. An order made by a corporation and entered in their books, stating, that A. B. (against whom a jury had found a verdict with large damages, in an action for a malicious prosecution for perjury, which verdict had been confirmed in C. B.) was actuated by motives of public justice in preferring the indictment, is a libel reflecting on the administration of public justice, for which the Court of K. B. will grant an information against the members making the order. 2 T. R. 199. But it is no libel to assign on the books of a Quakers' meeting their reasons for expelling a member. 1 Black. R. 386. It has been determined that it is neither the subject of a criminal prosecution, nor of an action, to publish a true account of the proceedings in parliament, or the courts of justice. See R. v. Wright, 8 T. R. 293; Curry v. Wells, 1 Bos. & Pul. 525. But a member of the House of Commons was convicted in the Court of King's Bench upon an indictment for a libel, in publishing in a newspaper the report of a speech delivered by him in that house, containing libellous matter; although the publication was proved to be a correct report of such speech, and to be made in consequence of an incorrect publication having appeared in that and other newspapers. R. v. Creevey, 1 Mau. & Sel. 273. As the privilege of publishing judicial proceedings with impunity, notwithstanding the inconvenience and mischief which such publications may occasion to individuals, is founded upon grounds of public policy and convenience; the condition necessarily annexed to immunity is, that the proceeding shall be fairly, impartially, and correctly reported. 1 Starkie on Libel, 269. Therefore it is a libel to publish a highly-coloured account of proceedings in a court of record, mixed with the party's own observations and conclusions upon what passed in court, which contained an insinuation that the plaintiff had committed perjury. 7 East, 493. So a report of a trial, containing the ex parte statement of the plaintiff's counsel, and those parts of the judge's address to the jury which were unfavourable to the defendant, and omitting all but a few sentences of the defence, was held not to be a privileged report. Saunders v. Mills, 6 Bingh. 213. So the publishing a counsel's speech in a judicial proceeding, coupled with a general assertion, that his statement was proved by a witness called upon that trial, cannot be justified. 4 B. & A. 605. And where, in a recent case, the defendant published a report of the proceedings under a commission of funacy, which the plaintiff had attended as a witness, and stated that the object was to set aside a will; that the plaintiff's testimony, being unsupported by that of any other person, failed to have any effect on the jury; and that Mr. J. (the counsel against the commission)_commented with cutting severity on the testimony of Mr. D. (the plaintiff,)" it was held, that the whole, taken together, was a libel; and that a plea, justifying only the words "Mr. J. commented, &c." was bad. 10 Bing. 519. Neither is a reporter privileged in publishing a speech of a counsel containing reflections on the character of an individual, annexed to a short summary of the trial, without stating the evidence. 4 B. & C. 473. But the publication of ex parte proceedings, as before magistrates, &c. is not privileged. 5 Esp. 123; 2 Camp. 563. So in the case of Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. it was decided, that the publication of a charge, imputing to the plaintiff indecent conduct to a female child, could not be justified on the ground that the alleged libel was no more than a correct account of the proceeding which had taken place at a public police office. Where the writing is a confidential communication, which is reasonably called for by the occasion, it is not considered libellous. Thus a servant cannot maintain an action against his former master for words spoken, or a letter written, by him in giving the character of a servant, unless the latter prove the malice (or unless from the circumstances of the case malice may be inferred by a jury,) as well as the falsehood of the charge; even though the master make specific charges of fraud. See 1 T. R. 110; 3 Bos. & Pul. 587; 1 B. & A. 240; and tit. Servants. II. No one is punishable for writing a libel unless he actually publishes it to the world. 5 Mod. 165, 167. The communication of a libel to any one person is a publication in the eye of the law; Moor, 813; and therefore the sending an abusive private letter to a man is as much a libel as if it were openly printed; for it equally tends to a breach of the peace; 2 Brownl. 151, 157; 12 Rep. 35; Hob. 215; Poph. 139; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 73. § 11; 4 Comm. c. 11. p. 150; Bac. Abr. tit. Libel (B 2); in which latter book it is stated that this was a matter of doubt; but a case is mentioned where an information was granted under such circumstances; and at all events it is an offence against the king's peace, punishable by indictment; and if copies of it are afterwards dispersed, it aggravates the crime, or rather makes it a new crime, for which the party may have an action. Poph. 45; Hob. 62. Writing a letter to a man, and abusing him for his public charities, &c. is a libellous act, punishable by indictment. Hob. 215. In the case of the seven bishops, the delivery by them to King James II. of a petition, which was termed a libel, was held a publication. See Phillips's State Trials, 300, 301. In the making of libels, if one man dictates, and another writes a libel, both are guilty; for the writing after another shows his approbation of what is contained in the libel; and the first reducing a libel into writing may be said to be the making it, but not the composing; if one repeats, another writes, and a third approves what is written, they are all makers of the libel; because all persons who concur to an unlawful act, are guilty. 5 Mod. 167. The making a libel is the genus; and composing and contriving is one species; writing a second species; and procuring to be written, a third; and one may be found guilty of writing only, &c. 2 Salk. 419, &c. But observe, a mere writing, without a publication, was not in question in Salkeld. It is conceived that for the mere writing of a libel, not published, no action can be maintained, nor prosecution legally supported. If one writes a copy of a libel, and does not deliver it to others, the writing is no publication: but it has been adjudged, that the copying a libel, without authority, is writing a libel; and he that thus writes it, is a contriver; and that he who hath written a copy of a known libel, if it is found upon him, this shall be evidence of the publication: but if such libel be not publicly known, then the mere having a copy is not a publication. 2 Salk. 417; 2 Nels. Abr. 1122. When a libel appears under a man's own handwriting, and no author is known, he is taken in the manner, and it turns the proof upon him; and if he cannot produce the composer, it is hard to find that he is not the very man. Ibid. If one reads a libel, or hears it read, and laughs at it, it is not a publishing; for before he reads or hears it read, he cannot know it to be a libel: though if he afterwards reads or repeats it, or any part thereof, in the hearing of others, it is a publication of it: yet if part of it be repeated in mirth without any malicious purpose of defamation, it is said to be no offence. 9 Rep. 59; Moor, 862. Every one convicted of publishing a libel ought to be esteemed the contriver or procurer; the procurer and writer of a libel have been held to be both contrivers; also he who procures another to publish it, and the publisher, are both publishers. Moor, 627; 5 Rep. 125; 3 Inst. 174; 3 Cro. 17. See 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 73. When any man finds a libel, if it be against a private person, he ought to burn it, or deliver it to a magistrate; and where it concerns a magistrate, he should deliver it presently to a magistrate. 5 Rep. 125. If a libel be found in a house, the master cannot be punished for framing, printing, and publishing it; but it is said he may be indicted for having it, and not delivering it to a magistrate. 2 Vent. 31. The sale of a libel by a servant in a shop is prima facie evidence of a publication, in a prosecution against the master; and is sufficient for conviction, unless contradicted by contrary evidence showing that he was not privy, nor in any way assenting to it. 4 T. R. 126; 5 Burr. 2686, 2687; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 73. § 10. in n. So the proprietor of a newspaper is liable for whatever libel appears in it, but he may, under special circumstances, rebut such liability. M. & M. 433. Proof that the defendant gave a bond to the stamp-office for the duties on the advertisements in a newspaper, under 29 Geo. 3. c. 50. § 10., and had occasionally applied at the stamp-office respecting the duties, is strong evidence to prove that he is the publisher. 4 T. R. 126. A delivery of a newspaper, according to the provisions of 38 Geo. 3. c. 78., to the officer of a stamp office, is a sufficient publication, though it is directed by the statute, for the officer has an opportunity of reading it. 4 B. & C. 35. For the regulations respecting the publication of newspapers, pamphlets, &c. see tit. Newspapers. III. It is immaterial, on a criminal prosecution, with respect to the essence of a libel, whether the matter of it be true or false; because it equally tends to a breach of the peace; and the provocation, not the falsity, is the thing to be punished criminally; though doubtless the falsehood of it may aggravate its guilt and enhance its punishment. See 7 T. R. 4, that it is not necessary to allege the falsity of the libellous matter. In a civil action a libel must appear to be false as well as scandalous; for if the charge be true, the plaintiff has received no private injury, and has no ground to demand a compensation for himself, whatever offence it may be against the public peace: and therefore upon a civil action the truth of the accusation may be pleaded in bar of the suit. But in a criminal prosecution the tendency which all libels have to create animosities and to disturb the public peace is the whole that the law considers. And therefore in such prosecutions, the only points to be inquired into are, first, the making or publishing of a book or writing; and, secondly, whether the matter be criminal; and if both these points are against the defendant, the offence against the public is complete. 4 Comm. c. 11. p. 150, 151. See post, IV., and tit. Jury, III. 2. as to the intent of the party publishing. It seems to be clearly agreed, that in an indictment or criminal prosecution for a libel, the party cannot justify that the contents thereof are true, or that the person upon whom it is made had a bad reputation; since the greater appearance there is of truth in any malicious invective, so much the more provoking it is for as Lord Coke observes, in a settled state of government the party grieved ought to complain for every injury done him, in the ordinary course of law, and not by any means to revenge himself by the odious course of libelling or otherwise. Bac. Abr. tit. Libel (A. 5.) cites 5 Co. 125; Hob. 253; Moor, 627; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 73. But although it has been held, at least for these two centuries, that the truth of a libel is no justification in a criminal prosecution, yet in many instances it is considered as an extenuation of the offence; and the Court of King's Bench has laid down this general rule, viz. that it will not grant an information for a libel, unless the prosecutor who applies for it makes an affidavit, asserting directly and pointedly that he is innocent of the charge imputed to him. But this rule may be dispensed with, if the person libelled resides abroad; or if the imputations of a libel are general and indefinite; or if it is a charge against the prosecutor for language which he has held in parliament. Dougl. 271 (284), 372 (388); 5 B. & A. 595. Where on application for an information the truth of the libel is not denied, the court (except in the particular instances above mentioned) will leave the injury to be remedied in the ordinary course of justice by action or indictment. Stra. 493. See post, IV. But the court will not grant this extraordinary remedy by information, nor should a grand jury find an indictment, unless the offence be of such signal enormity, that it may reasonably be construed to have a tendency to disturb the peace and harmony of the community. In such a case the public are justly placed in the character of an offended prosecutor, to vindicate the common right of all, though violated only in the person of an individual; for the malicious publication of even truth itself cannot in policy be suffered to interrupt the tranquillity of any well-ordered society. This is a principle so rational and pure that it cannot be tainted by the vulgar odium which has accompanied the derivation of the doctrine from the tyranny of the star-chamber; the adoption of it by the worst of courts can never weaken its authority; and without it all the comforts of society might with impunity be hourly endangered or destroyed. See Law of Libels; 1 Hank. P. C. c. 73. § 6. in n. The court of K. B. is now in the practice of granting an information for any description of libel. See Information. With regard to libels in general, there are, as in many other cases, two remedies; one by indictment or information, and the other by action. The former for the public offence; for, as has been repeatedly remarked, every libel has a tendency to the breach of the peace, by provoking the person libelled to break it; which offence, we have seen, is the same in point of law, whether the matter contained be true or false, and therefore it is that the defendant, on an indictment for publishing a libel, is not allowed to allege the truth of it by way of justification. But in the remedy by action on the case, which is to repair the party in damages for the injury done him, the defendant may, as for words spoken, justify the truth of the facts, and show that the plaintiff has received no injury at all. The chief excellence, therefore, of a civil action for a libel consists in this, that it not only affords a reparation for the injury sustained, but it is a full vindication of the innocence of the person traduced. See 3 Comm. c. 8. p. 125, 126, and n. It is not competent to a defendant charged with having published a libel, to prove that a paper, similar to that for the publication of which he is prosecuted, was published on a former occasion by other persons who have never been prosecuted for it. 5 T. R. 436. Neither is it a defence to an action for the publication of a libel, that the libellous matter was communicated to the defendant by a third person, and that such defendant's name was published at the same time with the libel; and the court intimated that in oral slander, (see Holt, 513,) though a man, at the time of speaking the words, names the person who told him what he relates, cannot plead that circumstance to an action against him. Crespigny v. Wellesley, 5 Bing. 392. It would seem that a defendant may, under the general issue, give general evidence of the plaintiff's character, but not of particular facts tending to show that he has been guilty of the act imputed to him, in mitigation of damages. See 2 Camp. 251; 1 M. & S. 251; and 2 Starkie on Libel, 87-97. A libel in a newspaper purported to be a report of proceedings before one of the corporation commissioners. Under the general issue the defendant was allowed to give the accuracy of the report in evidence in mitigation of damages only; and the plaintiff was then allowed to give evidence in reply of the inaccuracy of the report. 6 C. & P. 385. IV. In information and law proceedings there are two ways of describing a libel; by the sense and by the words: the first is cujus tenor sequitur, and the second quæ sequitur in hæc Anglicana verba, &c. in which the description is by particular words, and whereof every word is a mark; so that if there is any variance, it is fatal; in the other description by the sense, it is not material to be very exact in the words, because the matter is described by the sense of them. 2 Salk. 660. See Indictment, Information, Pleading. The declaration for a libel must lay it to be " of and concerning the plaintiff," otherwise there can be no judgment. 2 Strange, 934. It hath been held, that writing a seditious libel is not an actual breach of the peace; and that a member of parliament writing such a libel is entitled to his privilege from being arrested for the same. Wilkes's case, 2 Wils. 159, 251; but see title Parliament, IV. 2. ad fin. The arguments in the case of Wilkes (as also in that of the Seven Bishops, State Trials, 4 Jac. 2.) seem to have assumed that a common person not having privilege of parlia ment might be legally apprehended on the charge of writing and publishing a seditious libel: and it is now settled that such person may be apprehended by a justice of the peace, and committed for want of bail for writing or publishing a seditious libel against the government, or a libel against a minister of state, or against a judge. The same principle seems also to apply to the case of writing or publishing a malicious libel against any person. See Butt's case, 1 Brod. & Bing. 548. Previous to the 32 Geo. 3. c. 60. it was held, that on the trial of an indictment for a libel, the only questions for the consideration of the jury are the fact of publishing, and the truth of the inuendoes; that is, the truth of the meaning and sense of the passages of the libel, as stated and averred in the record; whether the matter be or be not a libel is a question of law for the consideration of the court. 428. See further post. 3 T. R. The following extract from a modern historian, (Hallam's History of England from Henry VII. to Geo. II. c. 15,) affords a summary, applicable, as well to this offence itself, as to the province of the jury upon the trial of offenders. For the vigilant superintendance, (of the proceedings of the government by public opinion,) and, indeed, for all that keeps up in us permanently and effectually the spirit of regard to liberty and the public good, we must look to the unshackled and independent energies of the press. In the reign of William III., and through the influence of the popular principles in our constitution, this finally became free. The licensing act, suffered to expire in 1679, was renewed in 1685 for seven years. In 1692 it was continued to the end of the session, which took place in 1693. Several attempts were afterwards made to renew its operation, which the less courtly Whigs combined with the Tories and Jacobites to defeat. Both parties, indeed, employed the press with great diligence in that reign; but, while one degenerated into malignant calumny and misrepresentation, the signal victory of liberal principles is manifestly due to the boldness and eloquence with which they were promulgated. Even during the existence of a censorship, a host of unlicensed publications, by the negligence or connivance of the officers employed to seize them, bore witness to the inefficacy of its restrictions. The bitterest invectives of Jacobitism were circulated in the first four years after the Revolution. The Liberty of the Press consists, in a strict sense, merely in an exemption from the superintendance of a licensor; but it cannot be said to exist in any security, or sufficiently for its principal ends, when discussions of a political or religious nature, whether general or particular, are restrained by too narrow or severe limitations. The law of libel has always been indefinite, an evil probably beyond any complete remedy, but which evidently renders the liberty of free discussion somewhat precarious in its exercise, perhaps more so than might be wished. It appears to have been the received doctrine in Westminster Hall before the Revolution, that no man might publish a writing reflecting on.. the government, nor upon the character or even capacity and fitness of any one employed in it. Nothing having passed to change the law, the law remained as before. Hence, in the case of Tutchin, it was laid down, that to possess the people with an ill opinion of the government (that is, the ministry,) was a libel. And the attorney-general, in his speech for the prosecution, urged that there could be no reflection upon those in office under the sovereign, but it must cast some reflection on the sovereign who employed them. Yet in that case the censure upon the administration in the passages selected for prosecution was merely general and without reference to any person; upon which the counsel for Tutchin relied. State Trials, (Howell's edit.) xiv. 1103, 1128. It is manifest, that such a doctrine was irreconcileable with the interests of any party out of power; whose best hope to regain it is commonly by possessing the nation with a bad opinion of their adversaries. Nor would it have been possible for any ministry to stop the torrent of a free press, under the secret guidance of a powerful faction, by a few indictments for libel. They found it generally more expedient, and more agreeable to borrow weapons from the same armoury, and retaliate with unsparing invective and calumny. This was practised with the avowed countenance of government, for the first time by Swift, in the Examiner, and some others of his writings. Both parties soon went such lengths in this warfare, that it became tacitly understood, that the public characters of statesmen and the measures of administration are the fair topics of pretty severe attack. Less than this, indeed, would not have contented the political temper of the nation, gradually and without intermission becoming more democratical, and more capable as well as more accustomed to judge of its general interests and of those to whom they were intrusted. The just limit between political and private censure has been far better drawn in these later times, (licentious as we may still justly deem the press,) than in an age when courts of justice had not deigned to acknowledge, as they do at present, its theoretical liberty. No writer, except of the most broken reputation, could venture at this day on the malignant calumnies of the great ministerial writer of that time. Meanwhile the judges of the courts of law naturally adhered to their established doctrine, and in prosecutions for political libels were very little inclined to favour what they deemed the presumption, if not the licentiousness, of the press. They advanced a little farther than their predecessors, and, contrary to the practice both before and after the Revolution, laid it down as an absolute principle, that falsehood, though always alleged in the indictment, was not essential to the guilt of the libel; refusing to admit its truth to be pleaded or given in evidence, or even urged by way of mitigation of punishment. (See State Trials, xiv. 534; xvii. 659.) But as defendants could only be convicted by verdicts of juries and jurors, both partook of the general sentiment in favour of free discussion, and might, in certain cases, have acquired some prepossessions as to the real truth of the supposed libel, which the court's refusal to enter upon it could not remove, they were often reluctant to find a verdict of guilty. And hence arose by degrees a sort of contention, which sometimes showed itself upon trials, and divided both the profession of the law and the general public. The judges and the lawyers, for the most part, maintained, that the province of the jury was only to determine the fact of publication, and also whether the inuendoes on the record were correct, that is, whether the libel actually meant that which it was alleged in the indictment that it did mean, not whether such meaning were criminal or innocent-a question of law which the court were exclusively competent to decide. That the jury might acquit at their pleasure was undeniable; but it was asserted, that they would do so in violation of their oaths and duty if they should reject the opinion of the judge, by whom they were to be guided as to the general law. Others of great name in our jurisprudence and the majority of the public at large, conceiving that this would throw the liberty of the press altogether into the hands of the judges, maintained, that the jury had a strict right to take the whole matter into their consideration, and determine the defendants' criminalty or innocence, according to the nature and circumstances of the publication. This controversy was put an end to by the act 32 Geo. 3. c. 60. (extended to Ireland by the Irish act 33 Geo. 3. c. 43.) which enacted, that on trials of indictment for libel, the jury might give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter in issue; and though, perhaps, the act is not drawn in the most intelligible and consistent manner, it was certainly designed or hoped that it would make the defendant's intention as it might be innocent or even laudable, or, on the other hand, seditious or malignant, a matter of fact for the inquiry and discussion of the jury. See more fully on this part of the subject, Jury, III. 2. The punishment of libellers for either making, repeating, printing, or publishing the libel, is fine, and such corporal punishment, as imprisonment, pillory, &c. (now abolished,) as the court in its discretion shall inflict; regarding the quantity of the offence, and the quality of the offender. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 73. § ult. If a printer print a libel against a private person, he may be indicted and punished for it; and so may he who prints a libel against a magistrate, and much more one who does it against the king and state; nor can a person in such a case excuse himself by saying they were dying speeches, or the words of dying men; for a man may at his death justify his villainy; and he who publishes it is punishable; and it is no excuse for the printing or publishing a libel, to say that he did it in the way of trade, or to maintain his family. 1 St. Tr. 982, 986. Also if booksellers publish or sell libels, though they know not the contents of them, they are punishable. It has been resolved, that where persons write, print, or sell, any pamphlets, scandalizing the public, or any private persons, such libellous books may be seized, and the persons punished by law; and all persons exposing any books to sale, reflecting on the government, may be punished: also writers of news (though not scandalous, seditious, or reflecting on the government, if they write false news,) are indictable. 2 St. Tr. 477. See False News, Scandalum Magnatum. One was indicted for a libel in scandalizing the King's witnesses, and reflecting on the justice of the nation, and had judgment of the pillory and fine. 3 St. Tr. 50. A person for libelling the Lord Chancellor Bacon, affirming that he had done injustice, and other scandalous matter, was sentenced to pay 1000l. fine; to ride on a horse with his face to the tail from the Fleet to Westminster, with his fault written on his head; to acknowledge his offence in all the courts at Westminster, stand in the pillory; and that one of his ears should be cut off at Westminster, and the other in Cheapside, and to suffer imprisonment during life. Poph. 135. One who exhibited a libel against a Lord Chief Justice, directed to the King, calling the Chief Justice traitor, perjured judge, &c. had judgment to stand in the pillory, was find 1000 marks, and bound to good behaviour during life. Car. 125. Cro. When a person is brought before the court to receive judg ment for a libel, his conduct subsequent to his conviction may be taken into consideration, either by way of aggravation or mitigation of his punishment. 3 T. R. 432. The stat. 60 Geo. 3. c. 8. " for the more effectual prosecution and punishment of blasphemous and seditious libels," enables the court before whom any offender is convicted, or wherein there is judgment by default, to make an order for seizing the copies of the libel. By § 4. persons on a second conviction might have been banished from the united kingdom and all other parts of the king's dominions; but this punishment of banishment (which at the passing of the act was much opposed,) was repealed by the 11 Geo. 4. and 1 Will. 4. c. 73. § 1. See tit. Newspapers. In all the instances where blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels, are punished by the English law, some with a greater, others with a less degree of severity, the liberty of the press, properly understood, is by no means infringed or violated. The liberty of the press is, indeed, essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications; and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done both before and since the Revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and government. But to punish, as the law does at present, any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order of government and religion, the only solid foundation of civil liberty. Thus, the will of individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that free-will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry; liberty of private sentiment is still left. The disseminating or making public of bad sentiments, destructive to the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects. A man (says a fine writer on this subject) may be allowed to keep poisons in his closet, but not publicly to vend them as cordials. And to this we may add, that the only plausible argument heretofore used in the restraining of the just freedom of the press, "that it was necessary to prevent the daily abuse of it," will entirely lose its force when it is shown (by a seasonable exertion of the laws,) that the press cannot be abused to any bad purpose without incurring a suitable punishment; whereas it can never be used to any good one, when under the control of an inspector. So true it will be found, that to censure the licentiousness is to maintain the liberty, of the press. 4 Comm. c. 11. ad fin. The above observations deserve the serious attention of every juryman who wishes well to the constitution and happiness of his country; to them we shall add the remark of another celebrated writer on this subject:-" The danger of such unbounded liberty (of unlicensed printing,) and the danger of bounding it, have produced a problem in the science of government, which human understanding seems hitherto unable to solve. If nothing may be published but what civil authority shall have previously approved, power must always be the standard of truth: if every dreamer of innovations may propagate his projects, there can be no settlement; if every murmur at government may diffuse discontent, there can be no peace; and if every sceptic in theology may teach his follies, there can be no religion. The remedy against these evils is to punish the authors; for it is yet allowed that every society may punish, though not prevent, the publication of opinions which that society shall think pernicious. But this punishment, though it may crush the author, promotes the book; and it seems not more reasonable to leave the right of printing unrestrained, because writers may afterwards be censured, than it would be to sleep with doors unbolted, because by our laws we can hang a thief." Johnson, in vitá Milton. The law of libel has of late been much discussed, and a committee of the House of Commons was appointed in the last session (1833) for the purpose of investigating it, previous to the consideration of the important changes which have been proposed by Mr. O'Connell and other members of parliament. For further matter connected with libels, see False News, Scandalum Magnatum, Treason, Words. LIBEL, in the Spiritual Court, from libellus, a little book: the original declaration of any action in the civil law. See 2 Edw. 6. c. 13. By the 2 Hen. 5. c. 3. a libel of that which is surmised against any party cited to appear in the Spiritual Court, is to be granted and delivered without any difficulty. If upon a libel for any ecclesiastical matter, the defendant make a surmise in B. R. to have a prohibition, and such surmise be insufficient, the other party may show it to the court, and the judges will discharge it. i Leon. 10, 128. The libel used in ecclesiastical proceedings, consists of three parts. 1. The major proposition, which shows a just cause of the petition. 2. The narration, or minor proposition. 3. The conclusion, or conclusive petition, which conjoins both propositions, &c. 3 Comm. 100. In the Scotch law, the term libel is used to express the source of complaint, or ground of the charge, on which either a civil action or criminal prosecution takes place. LIBER NIGER. See Black Book. LIBERA. A livery or delivery of so much grass or corn to a customary tenant, who cut down or prepared the said grass or corn, and received some part or small portion of it as a reward or gratuity. Cowell. LIBERA BATELLA. A free boat. Right of fishing. Plac. in itin. ap. Cestr. 14 H. 7. LIBERA CHASEA HABENDA. A judicial writ granted to a person for a free chase belonging to his manor; after proof made by inquiry of a jury, that the same of right belong to him. Reg. Orig. 36. LIBERAM LEGEM, amittere liberam legem. Is to become infamous, and not to be accounted liber et legalis homo. See Battle, Champion. LIBERA PISCARIA. A free fishery, which being granted to one, he hath a property in the fish, &c. 2 Salk. 637. See Fish, Fisheries, and Fishing. LIBER TAURUS. A free bull. Norf. 16 Edw. 1. LIBERATE. A writ that lies for the payment of a yearly pension or other sum of money granted under the great seal, and directed to the treasurer and chamberlains of the Exchequer, &c. for that purpose. In another sense it is a writ to the sheriff of a county for the delivery of possession of lands and goods extended, or taken upon the forfeiture of a recognizance. Also a writ issuing out of the Chancery, directed to a gaoler, for delivery of a prisoner that hath put in bail for his appearance. F. N. B. 132; 4 Inst. 116. This writ is most commonly used for delivery of goods, &c. on an extent; and by the extent the conusee of a recognizance hath not any absolute interest in the goods, until the liberate. 2 Lil. 169. It has been adjudged, that where an extent is upon a statute-merchant, there needs no liberate, for the sheriff may deliver all in execution without it; but where an extent is upon a statute-staple, or a recognizance, there must be a return made of such an extent, and then a liberate before there can be a delivery in execution. 3 Salk. 159. See Extent, Execution. LIBERATIO. Money, meat, drink, clothes, &c. yearly given and delivered by the lord to his domestic servants. Blount. LIBERTAS ECCLESIASTICA. This is a frequent phrase in our old writers, to signify church liberty, or ecclesiastical immunities; the right of investiture, extorted from our kings by force of papal power, was at first the only thing |