have entered a European port of the Government to which she belongs."

President Grant's proclamation of Oct. 8, 1870, For. Rel. 1870, 48.
October 10, 1870, Sir Edward Thornton wrote to Earl Granville, enclosing
a copy of the proclamation of the President of the United States of
the 8th of October, as to the treatment of armed vessels of the bellig-
erents in ports of the United States. Sir Edward Thornton said that
the issuance of this document had been instigated by the recent acts
of French vessels of war in the neighborhood of the port of New
York; that French gun-boats had lately moored at the entrance of
that port, and had sometimes anchored outside, within three miles
of the coast, for the purpose of intercepting any North German
vessels which might leave New York, and particularly the German
steamers which, in consequence of the termination of the blockade
of the German ports, had renewed their voyages. On one occasion
the French gun-boat Latouche Tréville steamed up the New York
bay, around the German steamer Hermann, went out again and
anchored outside. Recently a French frigate and two smaller
vessels of war had arrived at New London, Conn., on the pretext of
requiring repairs. They remained there for some days, though they
only had to repair some spars, which could have been done nearly as
well at sea as on shore. But from that point notice could be given
of the sailing of the German vessels from New York, and men-of-war
stationed at New London could easily intercept them. Mr. Fish, so Sir
Edward Thornton said, had told him that he had represented to the
French minister that, although he could not positively allege a viola-
tion of international law, he considered that the proceedings of
belligerent vessels of war in hovering about the entrance of a neutral
port, and as it were blockading it and making the neighborhood a
station for their observations, were contrary to custom, and were
unfriendly and uncourteous to the United States. Mr. Fish added
that Mr. Berthémy had written on the subject to the French admiral,
who, in reply, had denied the fact of hovering about the port, or of
using the neighborhood as a station of observation, but confessed
that the proceeding of the Latouche Tréville, in entering the port of
New York for the purpose of observing the German steamer, was
improper, and that her commander had consequently been severely
reproved. Sir Edward Thornton said that his Prussian colleague, in
expressing his satisfaction at the issuance of the proclamation, had
made observations indicating that he maintained that by its pro-
visions merchant vessels were prohibited from exporting arms and
ammunition from the ports of the United States for the use of the
belligerents, and he feared that Baron Gerolt might have telegraphed
in that sense to his Government. He did not feel called upon to
question Baron Gerolt's view of the case, but could find no expression
in the application which justified such an interpretation. Indeed,
Mr. Fish denied that it was intended to convey any such meaning.
(61 Br. & For. State Papers, 878.)

The foregoing proclamation is incorporated, mutatis mutandis, in the neutrality proclamation issued by President Roosevelt, Feb. 11, 1904, on the outbreak of the war between Russia and Japan.

For. Rel. 1904, 32.

"The Pacific fleet, under Commodore George Dewey, had lain for some weeks at Hongkong. Upon the colonial proclamation of neutrality being issued and the customary twenty-four hours' notice being given, it repaired to Mirs Bay, near Hongkong, whence it proceeded to the Philippine Islands under telegraphed orders to capture or destroy the formidable Spanish fleet then assembled at Manila."

President McKinley, annual message, Dec. 5, 1898, For. Rel. 1898, LVIII.

An incident of the early stages of the war between the United States and Spain suggests the need of an amplification of the rule by which a belligerent man-of-war is required, except in case of stress of weather or of need of provisions or repairs, to leave a neutral port within twenty-four hours after her arrival. On May 11, 1898, Captain Cotton, of the auxiliary cruiser Harvard, cabled from St. Pierre, Martinique, to the Secretary of the Navy that the Spanish torpedoboat destroyer Furor had touched during the afternoon at Fort de France, Martinique, and had afterwards left, destination unknown, and that the governor had ordered him not to sail within twenty-four hours from the time of the Furor's departure. At noon on the 12th of May Captain Cotton was informed by the captain of the port at St. Pierre that the Furor had about 8 a. m. again called at Fort de France and would leave about noon and that he might go to sea at 8 p. m.; but that if he did not do so he would be required to give the governor twenty-four hours' notice of his intention to leave the port. On the same day Captain Cotton received information which led him to telegraph to the Secretary of the Navy that he was closely observed and blockaded at St. Pierre by the Spanish fleet, and that the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer Terror was at Fort de France. Later Captain Cotton cabled that the Spanish consul protested against his stay at St. Pierre, and that he had requested permission to remain a week to make necessary repairs to machinery. Replying to these reports, the Secretary of the Navy telegraphed to Captain Cotton as follows: "Vigorously protest against being forced out of the port in the face of superior blockading force, especially as you were detained previously in the port by the French authorities because Spanish men-of-war had sailed from another port. Also state that United States Government will bring the matter to the attention of the French Government. Urge the United States consul to protest vigorously." It proved to be unnecessary to take further action. Captain Cotton's request for time was granted. The gov ernor showed no disposition to force him out of port, only requiring twenty-four hours' notice of an intention to sail; and the dangers to which the Harvard seemed to be exposed soon disappeared. It may be observed, however, that as the enforcement, under circumstances such as were described, of the twenty-four hours' limit would con

stitute a negation of the admitted privilege of asylum it is not likely that it would be held to be applicable in such a situation.

Naval Operations of the War with Spain, 383-389, 407–410.

During the war between the United States and Spain an interesting question arose as to the U. S. S. Monocacy in China. By communications of the Tsung-li yamên to Mr. Denby, United States minister at Peking, of May 2 and May 9, 1898, official announcement was made that the yamên had telegraphed the viceroys, governors, and taotaisgeneral of the Yangtze and maritime provinces to instruct their sub- · ordinates to observe the laws of neutrality. In the communication of the 9th of May it was stated that, in due observance of international law, vessels of war of the belligerents would not be allowed to "anchor in Chinese ports." In the proclamation of the taotai of Shanghai, issued May 22, 1898, it was more precisely declared that such vessels must not use Chinese-controlled waters and ports for anchorage or fighting purposes, or anchor there for lading war supplies; and that, should any such vessel enter a Chinese port, except under stress of weather or for necessary food or repairs, it must not remain over twenty-four hours. A question having arisen as to the applicability of these provisions to the Monocacy, an antiquated ship of war of light draft, which had, because of her adaptation to river service, for years been kept in Chinese waters for the protection of American citizens, the Government of the United States maintained (1) that, as the circumstances of her long-continued employment and her unfitness for service at sea rendered it apparent that her presence was not connected with the war, she did not come within the operation of rules designed to prevent the use of neutral waters as a base of hostilities, and (2) that the existence of war between the United States and a third power could not deprive the former of the right to take the customary measures for the protection of its citizens in China.

Mr. Day, Sec. of State, to Mr. Denby, min. to China, No. 1593, June 7,
1898, MS. Inst. China, V. 566. The Monocacy remained in China.
For the proclamation of the taotai of Shanghai, see Proclamations and
Decrees during the War with Spain, 18-20.

3. REPAIRS.

(1) OF WAR DAMAGE INADMISSIBLE.

§ 1316.

The Buenos Ayrean privateer Juncal put in at Baltimore for the purpose of making repairs after an action at sea with a Brazilian cruiser. Under these circumstances, the collector of customs at Baltimore was instructed: "Whilst you will not fail to allow her the

usual hospitality, and to procure the necessary refreshments, the President directs that you will be careful in preventing any augmentation of her force and her making any repairs not warranted by law. With respect to the latter article, the reparation of damages which she may have experienced from the sea is allowable, but the reparation of those which may have been inflicted in the action is inadmissible."

Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. McCulloch, April 7, 1828. 22 MS. Dom.
Let. 177.

See, to the same effect, Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Thompson, col-
lector at New York, April 9, 1828, 22 MS. Dom. Let. 178.

See, also, Sec. of State to At. Gen., April 22, 1828. 22 MS. Dom. Let. 187:
Wirt, At. Gen., May 3. 1828, 2 Op. 86.

June 3, 1905, three Russian men-of-war, the Aurora, the Oleg, and the Zemtchug, after an engagement with the Japanese, sought asylum at Manila. The commander of the squadron, Admiral Enquist, stated that the Aurora and the Oleg were seriously damaged, and that the Zemtchug was in bad condition; and he requested permission to make repairs and to fill up with provisions and coal. On board the ships there were a hundred and thirty wounded men. Permission was at once granted by the local authorities for the landing of a number of these; and an examination was made by a United States naval board of the condition of the ships. It was found that the Aurora and the Oleg, which were seriously injured near the water line, would require, respectively, thirty and fifty days to repair, while the Zemtchug would require seven; and that none of them had coal enough to steam. Admiral Enquist desired three thousand tons of coal. The facts were immediately reported by the authorities in the Philippines to the War Department and the Navy Department, by which they were in turn communicated to the Department of State.

In a memorandum of June 5, 1905, Mr. W. L. Penfield, then solicitor of the Department of State, after referring (1) to Art. VI. of the treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, by which it is declared that a neutral government is bound not to permit either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other or for the purpose of renewal or augmentation of supplies of arms and munitions of war or the recruitment of men; (2) to the clause in the President's neutrality proclamation of Feb. 11, 1904, limiting the stay of belligerent men-of-war to twenty-four hours. except in certain cases; (3) to the similar clause in the British neutrality proclamation issued during the Spanish-American war; and (4) to the clause in the neutrality rules promulgated by the Italian Government in 1864, and again in 1898, forbidding the increase. under pretext of repairs, of warlike force by belligerent ships, or the

execution, under such pretext, of any work that could in any way add to their fighting strength, expressed the opinion that the President's proclamation of February 11, 1904, in what it said concerning repairs of belligerent ships, referred only to damage caused by the sea and not to damage caused by war, and that, if the Russian ships were permitted to renew their fighting strength, either by the restoration of their guns or of their armor plate, or to repair any other damage caused by the guns of the Japanese fleet, the neutral port in which such things were allowed would become a naval arsenal for the belligerent and a base of his hostile operations. He adverted to the internment of the Russian cruiser Lena at San Francisco, in the summer of 1904, on the ground that the repairs which she required were so extensive as to amount to a renovation of the ship, although in that case there was no war damage to be repaired.

In conformity with the view taken in this memorandum, the Secretary of the Navy on the same day telegraphed to Admiral Train, commanding the United States Asiatic Fleet, then at Cavite, that the Russian vessels could not be allowed to repair war damages unless interned, it being the policy of the United States to restrict all belligerent operations in its ports. Admiral Train was instructed to confer with Mr. Wright, governor-general of the Philippines, and if he approved to take charge of the vessels.

On the next day, June 6, the War Department instructed Governor Wright to advise Admiral Enquist that as his ships were suffering from damage due to battle and as it was the policy of the United States to restrict all operations of belligerents in neutral ports, the President could not consent to any repairs unless the ships were interned at Manila till the close of hostilities. Governor Wright was further directed, after notifying Admiral Enquist of this conclusion, to turn over the execution of the order to Admiral Train.

In reporting on June 6 the execution of these orders, Governor Wright stated that Admiral Enquist, on being advised of the ruling as to repairs, had expressed a wish to cable his government on the subject, and had asked whether he would be required to put to sea within twenty-four hours or would be allowed to obtain coal and provisions sufficient to take him to his nearest port. The ships, said Governor Wright, had been allowed to take only 150 tons of coal for use in the harbor, and enough food supplies to last from day to day. Governor Wright also stated that he had just received a communication from the Japanese consul at Manila calling attention to the fact that three Russian war ships had been in the harbor since the night of June 3, and asking whether the 24-hour limit would be enforced. He had replied that, in view of the condition of the ships and of their request for coal and repairs, he was awaiting instructions.