investigation of nature's laws, shamefully but vainly opposed by the hierarchy and papal orthodoxy, came to be viewed as an essential object of philosophy.

Thus, even before the time of Bacon, the justice of the tyrannic sway which scholasticism had exercised over the minds of men had been called in question, and in opposition to servile obedience to external authority, a revolutionary spirit had raised its head; nor had the fortresses of that dominion remained free from direct and repeated attack. But the fundamental reason of the injustice of that rule had not been clearly pointed out: the revolution needed the guidance of some master-mind, who should plan and effect an assault upon the citadel itself, and who should sketch the outline of a future government which merited the lofty name of sci

ence.

In the words of Mr. Morell, "Two such minds arose, both of gigantic powers and almost inexhaustible resources. Each of them applied his whole strength to aid the work of reformation; and their combined influence succeeded in turning the stream of all scientific investigation into the two main directions, which it has been pursuing more or less ever since. The first of these was Lord Bacon; the next in the order, both of time and influence, was Descartes." We postpone the comparison of their merits and philosophical methods.

Francis Bacon was born at York House, in the Strand, January 22, 1561. He was the son of Sir Nicholas Bacon, who, during the first twenty years of Elizabeth's reign was lord-keeper of the great seal, and in legal ability and political wisdom was universally ranked second only to the great Burleigh. His mother, who was the second daughter of Sir Anthony Cooke, was well versed in the Greek, Latin, and Italian languages, and also eminent for her piety. He was delicate in health, and fond of sedentary pursuits. His activity of intellect, which early showed itself in attempts to explain the anomalies of legerdemain, and the curious echo in a vault in St. James' Fields, was no doubt fostered by contact with the varied minds of a Cecil, a Jewel, a Sidney, a Raleigh, and a Drake, and won the flattering acknowledgement of Queen Elizabeth, who conferred upon him the title of her young Lord-keeper.

At the age of thirteen he entered Trinity College, Cambridge. The university was at that time the scene of much activity. The works of the great reformers, and recent in

a

vestigations in mathematics, astronomy, and political philosophy, gave birth to a life of disputation and contest. Bacon, however, did not avail himself of those advantages of college discipline, which, by extending his sphere of knowledge, would not only have benefited his mind at the time, but have saved him from faults which mark his subsequent writings. He left Cambridge with " just scorn for the trifles on which the followers of Aristotle had wasted their powers, and no great reverence for Aristotle himself." As he declared to his secretary, Dr. Rawley, he fell into a dislike of the philosophy of Aristotle, "not for the worthlessness of the author, to whom he would ever ascribe high attributes, but for the unfruitfulness of the way; being a philosophy, as his lordship used to say, only strong for disputations and contentions, but barren of the production cf works for the benefit of the life of man.'

"

In his seventeenth year he was sent to Paris, in the suite of Sir Amias Paulet, Queen Elizabeth's ambassador. This visit had doubtless a lasting influence on his character. The state of a country which had but recently witnessed the massacre of St. Bartholomew's day, abidingly confirmed his adherence to Protestant principles. He travelled through several French provinces, and subsequently published the results of his acute and extensive observations in a work entitled "The State of Europe."

On receiving intelligence of the sudden death of his father, Bacon returned hastily home. His father having died intestate, he found himself bereft of pecuniary resources. Hence he was compelled to seek some lucrative occupation. After having in vain endeavored to obtain a government post through the patronage of his uncle, Lord Burleigh (who wished to promote his own son, afterwards Sir Robert Cecil), he enrolled himself as a student at Gray's-inn. For some years he labored in obscurity. At length, by his profound acquaintance with the principles of law, and his admirable talents and address, he acquired such reputation, that the queen appointed him her "counsel extraordinary" (1590). Cecil also procured for him the reversion of the registrarship of the Star Chamber, which lucrative office fell in after some years.

In 1593 Bacon took his seat in parliament for the county of Middlesex, and soon became distinguished as an orator and debater. "There happened in my time," says Ben Jonson, "one noble speaker who was full of gravity in his speaking. His language,

liberated in two days. The fine was released by the crown. By the year 1624 all his punishment was remitted. Government granted him a pension of £1200 a year. During the last five years of his life he commenced a Digest of the Laws of England," a "History of England under the House of Tudor," a "Body of Natural History," and a "Philosophical Romance." He also published his "De Augmentis Scientiarum" in 1623.

"The great apostle of experimental philosophy," says Mr. Macaulay, "was destined to be its martyr. It had occurred to him that snow might be used with advantage for the purpose of preventing animal substances from putrefying. On a very cold day, early in the spring of the year 1626, he alighted from his coach near Highgate to try the experiment. He went into a cottage, bought a fowl, and with his own hands stufed it with snow. While thus engaged, he felt a sudden chill, and was so much indisposed that it was impossible for him to return to Gray's-inn. After an illness of about a week, he expired on the morning of Easter-day, 1626. His mind appears to have retained its strength and liveliness to the end. He did not forget the fowl which had caused his death. In the last letter that he ever wrote, with fingers which, as he said, could not steadily hold a pen, he did not omit to mention that the experiment of the snow had succeeded excellently well." His will contains the strikingly prophetic passage-" For my name and memory I leave it to men's charitable speeches, and to foreign nations, and the next ages.

His writings may be divided into-1. Scientific; 2. Moral and Historical; 3. Epistolary and Miscellaneous. His great philosophical works are, "The Advancement of Learning" (published 1605); "Instauratio Magna" and "Novum Organum" (published 1620); and "De Augmentis Scientiarum" (published 1623). Hallam remarks, "I find upon comparison that more than two-thirds of this treatise (i. e., the De Augmentis Scientiarum") are a version, with slight interpolation or omission, from "The Advancement of Learning," the remainder being new matter. The "Instauratio Magna" is divided into six parts:

1. Partitiones Scientiarum, intended to furnish a general summary of knowledge already gained, and indications of lacuna. This first part, Bacon tells us, is wanting in the "Instauratio;" he has substituted for it the "De Augmentis Scientiarum."

2. The second part was to contain the new logic, or inductive method. As far as he completed it, it is known under the name of the "Novum Organum," which was to consist of nine parts; we possess, however, only the first.

3. The third part was to form an entire natural history, under which were to be included one hundred and thirty particular histories. Of course, Bacon, in his age, could accomplish but little of so vast a work.

4. The fourth part, called Scala Intellectus, was to supply "types and models, which place before our eyes the entire process of the mind in the discovery of truth, selecting various and remarkable instances." This part is wanting, except a few introductory pages.

5. The fifth part, which Bacon calls Prodromi, sive Anticipationes Philosophic Secundæ, was to give a sample of that new philosophy, which was to be erected on the basis of his natural history, and by means of the inductive method. The Cogitata et Visa, Cogitationes de Natura Rerum, Filum Labyrinthi, and others, form fragments of this part.

6. The sixth and last part, philosophia secunda, was to present a complete system of philosophy, attained by the inductive method. To perfect this last part," he "is above our powers and beyond our hopes. We may, as we trust, make no despicable beginnings; the destinies of the human race must complete it."

says,

Such," says Mr. Hallam, “ was the temple, of which Bacon saw in vision before him the stately front and decorated pediments, in all their breadth of light and harmony of proportion, while long vistas of receding columns, and glimpses of internal splendor, revealed a glory that it was not permitted him to comprehend. In the treatise 'De Augmentis Scientiarum,' and in the Novum Organum,' we have less, no doubt, than Lord Bacon, under different conditions of life, might have achieved; he might have been more emphatically the high-priest of Nature, if he had not been the chancellor of James I., but no man could have filled up the vast outline which he alone, in that stage of the world, could have so boldly sketched."

The treatise "De Augmentis Scientiarum" is divided into nine books.

The first is designed to remove prejudices against the investigation of truth, and to indicate the causes of error.

In the second book knowledge is divide into-I. History. II. Poetry. III. Phi

sophy; corresponding to memory, imagination, reason.

I. History comprises, 1, Natural History, (1) of Regular Phenomena; (2) of Monstrosities; (3) of the Arts. 2. Civil, or rather Human History; (1) Civil History proper; (2) Sacred History; (3) Literary History. II. Poetry is divided into-1. Narrative. 2. Dramatic. 3. Parabolic.

III. Philosophy or Science. There must be a general science, comprising a body of axioms common to all the special sciences. The special sciences have three principal objects-1. God. 2. Nature [3rd Book]. Natural Science is either speculative or practical Speculative natural science comprises physics, which deal with material and efficient causes, and metaphysics, which deal with formal and final causes. Practical natural science includes mechanics, by which Bacon means experimentation in general, and magic, or experimentation applied to the production of extraordinary phenomena. Mathematics are purely instrumental, and consist of pure mathematics (geometry and algebra) and mixed mathematics.

The fourth to the eighth books treat of science in relation to its third object, MAN. There must be an introductory science explaining personality and the communication between the soul and the body. The science of man Bacon then divides into (1) The Science of Human Nature; and (2) The Science of Civil Society. The former treats [1] of of the body (medicine, cosmical science, gymnastics, music, and painting); [2] of the soul, both its substance and its faculties, which are either logical or moral. Logic is either inventive or traditive, and in its latter phase comprises grammar, rhetoric, criticism and pedagogy. Ethics are either speculative (showing the natural history of character), or practical (treating of the culture of the affections). Under the head of the science of civil society Bacon handles only two points-viz., the methods of enlarging the boundaries of the state, and the princples of universal legislation. He says society is destined to secure solamen contra solitudinem, adjuvamen in negotiis, and adjuvamen contra injurias.

*Bacon formed some very sagacious anticipations about universal grammar. "Grammar," he observes, "is of two kinds, the one literary, the other philosophical... The latter directs the attention, not to the analogies which words bear to words, but the analogies which words bear to things;" or, "to language considered as the sensible portraiture or image of the mental process."

"The ninth and last book, which is short, glances only at some desiderata in theological science, and is chiefly remarkable as it displays a more liberal and catholic spirit than was often to be met with in a period signalized by bigotry and ecclesiastical pride." In the "Novum Organum," the most important topic is what Bacon terms the Idola (eldwλa); i. e., not idols, as most writers (e. g., Playfair, Brown, Stewart, Hoppus,) have supposed; but, as Hallam has shown, 'images, illusions, fallacies, or, as Lord Bacon calls them in the 'Advancement of Learning,' false appearances." These Idola are of four kinds.

I. Idola tribus (of the tribe); illusions common to the whole tribe or race of mankind-" those general prejudices which arise from the infirmity of human nature itself." "The understanding of man," says Bacon, "is like a mirror whose surface is not true, and so mixing in its own imperfection with the nature of things, distorts and perverts them." The sources of these Idola are—(1) Too great a tendency of the mind to assume a greater uniformity in Nature than really exists. (2) A tendency in the human understanding to force all facts into harmony with a prepossessed notion or principle. (3) A liability of the mind rather to be impelled by the imagination than guided by the understanding. (4) The eagerness of the mind to push its investigations beyond its proper limits. (5) The influence of the will and the affections on the understanding. "The light of the understanding," says Bacon, "is not a dry or pure light, but it receives a tincture from the will and the affections, and forms the sciences accordingly; for men are most willing to believe what they most desire. (6) The dullness, incompetency, and errors of the senses. (7) The too great tendency of the mind to abstraction and generalization.

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II. Idola Specus (of the cave or den); "those prejudices which stamp upon each mind its own peculiar character, and are identified with every individual man." These include the particular studies which a person pursues, the difference of men's capacities, attachment to times (e. g., antiquity), and an exclusive predilection for the minute or the vast in nature.

IV. Idola Theatri (of the theatre); illusions proceeding from the fabulous and visionary representations of philosophical theories. "We call them idols of the theatre," says Bacon, "because all the systems of philosophy that have been hitherto invented or received are but so many stageplays, which have exhibited nothing but fictitious and theatrical words."

The next topic for our consideration is Bacon's method. He lays down the following fundamental principle as his first and leading aphorism concerning "the interpretation of Nature, and man's dominion over it: -"Homo, naturæ minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit, quantum de naturæ ordine, re vel mente, observaverit; nec amplius scit, aut potest.' (Man, the servant and interpreter of Nature, can only understand and act in proportion as he observes the order of Nature; more he can neither know nor do.) The method he recommends for the interpretation of Nature is called the inductive method. In induction we assert, to use the words of Whately, "that what belongs to the individual or individuals we have examined, belongs (certainly, or probably, as the case may be) to the whole class under which they come." The first step in the inductive process of Bacon is to collect a natural history. We must carefully and patiently gather a variety of particular facts and instances which relate to the subject of inquiry; we must not rest satisfied with those facts which spontaneously present themselves, but must institute experiments for the discovery of fresh ones. Being now in possession of a body of facts, obtained by observation and experiment, we must classify them into tables, and, applying the method of "exclusion," reject those which are irrelevant to the matter in hand, and gather the "vintage" of such as are really significant. These selected facts must then be examined as to their relative worth. The most important phenomena are called by him "prerogative instances," as holding a kind of prerogative dignity, from being peculiarly suggestive of causation. Fifteen of these are to guide the intellect, five to aid the senses, and seven to correct the practice. Of these twentyseven we shall adduce only the most important. (1) Instantia solitaria: "examples of the same quality existing in two bodies otherwise different, or of a quality differing in two bodies otherwise the same. In the first instance the bodies differ in all things but one-e. g., crystals, dewdrops, which exhibit color in some situations, have nothing

but the color in common with stones, metals, &c., whose colors are permanent. (These examples guided Newton to the discovery of the composition of light.) In the second instance "the bodies agree in all things but one;" here Bacon adduces as examples the veins of black and white in marble, and the variety of colors in flowers, where the substances agree in almost every thing except color.

2. Instantia migrantes exhibits qualities passing from less to greater or greater to less; e. g., glass, when whole, is colorless; when pulverized, white.

3. Instantia ostensive are instances which show some quality in its highest degree; e. g., the barometer exhibits the weight of air, when the impediment arising from pressure in all directions is entirely removed.

4. Instantiæ conformes-instances that are parallel or analogous,-are facts which resemble or are analogous to each other in some particulars, while very different in all the rest. Bacon mentions, as examples, optical instruments and the eye, the structure of the ear and of caverns that yield an echo.

5. Instantiæ comitatus, atque hostiles, are instances of qualities which always accompany each other, and the reverse. Thus flame and heat always coexist, transparency and malleability in solids are never combined.

6. Instantiæ crucis, crucial instances, are so called from the sign-posts at cross roads, because they determine at once tween two or more possible conclusions. "These instances," says Bacon, "are of such a kind, that, when in search of any nature (cause), the mind comes to an equilibrium, or is suspended between two or more causes, the facts decide the question by rejecting all the causes but one." Suppose that up to a certain point in our investigations, two or more causes seem to explain a given phenomenon equally well, an experiment which decides in favor of one of them is an experimentum crucis.

Perhaps in no part of his discussion concerning the right method of investigation, has Bacon rendered greater service to the cause of science than where he inculcates the necessity of a gradual ascent in our generalizations. "There are," he says, "two ways of searching after and discovering truth; the one from sense and particulars rises directly to the most general axioms, and resting upon these principles and their unshaken truth, finds out intermediate axioms, and this