to coalesce or co-operate with much zeal or cordiality. They contended for annual parliaments and universal suffrage: on these points sir Francis Burdett never expressed any very clear or definite ideas. In parliament the only person who advocated this extreme reform was lord Cochrane; and a cause advocated by a man, certainly of more talents and knowledge as a seaman than a politician, was not likely to be supported either with much judgement or much acuteness or learning. Out of parliament the most strenuous advocates for universal suffrage and annual parliaments were major Cartwright, Mr. Cobbett, and Mr. Hunt. The name of major Cartwright has stood conspicuous in the list of the advocates for these doctrines for nearly half a century: his zeal and perseverance have supported him, notwithstanding the defection of his earliest co-operators on these points, and the hitherto total failure of all his plans to bring about what he so ardently and sincerely desires. But his zeal and perseverance are much more conspicuous than his judgement, common sense, or knowledge of the world.-In Mr. Cobbett these doctrines found a much more able supporter and advocate: not that his arguments in their support will stand the examination of a calm judgement, extensive views, and sound sense, but they are admirably adapted to work their way with the majority of the nation; being addressed, like all his other arguments, to the feelings and the supposed interests of those who are little inclined, and as little able, to think for themselves.-Mr. Hunt brings to the support of the cause neither the calmness of major Cart wright, nor the point and force of

Mr. Cobbett, but only violence and positive assertion.

The measures adopted by major Cartwright to establish and bring to perfection his favourite object, displayed his wonderful zeal and perseverance: he actually made a pilgrimage, or missionary tour, throughout England and Scotland, for the purpose of instructing the people in their rights, and forming associations, that might co-operate towards the same great object. In this scheme he was assisted by the writings of Mr. Cobbett, and the harangues of Mr. Hunt. The latter was to be seen and heard at every public meeting at which he had a right to attend.

The suspension of the habeas corpus act, however, struck an unexpected and almost fatal blow into the hopes and plans of these apostles of reform. Major Cartwright, having been always mild and peaceable, though ardent and zealous in the cause, had nothing to fear. But as the writings of Mr. Cobbett had, in most unequivocal terms, and in that language which he knows so admirably how to adapt to the taste and the comprehension of the great mass of the people, told the labouring classes, that the remedy for the oppression and taxes under which they laboured lay in their own hands, he was justly afraid, that during the suspension of the habeas corpus act he would be deprived of his liberty; he therefore deemed it prudent to retire to America-promising, however, to return as soon as England was again under the protection of her constitution; and in the mean time to transmit from America his Weekly Register. Scarcely was he when several gone weekly publications started up, some of them as violent in their language,

language, and outrageous in their doctrines, as his Register had been; but very far behind it in talen, and the power of exciting the people to schemes of mischief, and feelings of disaffection.

It is foreign to the purpose of this work to state or examine minutely the object which the ultra-reformers had in view, or the facts and arguments by which they endeavoured to establish their cause: but the history of Britain at this period cannot be well understood, without a brief and general outline on this subject, and therefore we shall give it.

The ultra-reformers contended, that all the evils under which the people of Britain laboured,-exces. sive taxation, and its consequent poverty and misery,―extravagance in the expenditure of the public money,--and, in short, mal-administration in every respect, arose entirely from the nation not being fully and fairly represented in the house of commons. This full and fair representation, which was to be the panacea for all public evils, according to some of the advocates for reform, would be obtained, provided every householder was titled to vote for a member of the house of commons. According to others, the right of franchise must be extended to every male person paying taxes, except those who were insane, criminals, or under age; but with respect to the duration of parliament, all were agreed that they ought to be annual. On the mode of collecting and giving the votes, and other inferior points, there was some difference of opinion.

en

Such was the object which major Cartwright, Mr. Cobbett, sir Francis Burdett, lord Cochrane, and the other reformers had in view; and

they supported their cause by facts drawn from the history of England, as well as by arguments.

Originally they contended every male person (with the exceptions above stated) voted for a member of the house of commons, and parliaments were annual.-Before examining into the accuracy of these statements, it may be proper to remark, that if the mere antiquity of any political institution proves its wisdom, or its beneficial character and tendency, there are an almost infinite number of laws and usages, now repealed or gone into disuse, which the reformers ought to advocate as strongly and zealously as parliamentary reform; but which, if any attempts were made to revive them, we are confident they would oppose, as destructive of the rights and liberties of the people. Besides, it is absurd to go back to ages of comparative ignorance, barbarism, and slavery, for usages and institutions conducive to the personal or political happiness of a nation. But, setting aside these considerations, there is no clear and direct evidence that in the former periods of our history parliaments were annual; and all could not vote at a time when nearly all the lower classes were in the eye of the law villains, or the slaves of the great land-holders.

The argument from history, therefore, in support of this extreme parliamentary reform, in no point of view deserves much notice or respect: let us therefore attend to the other argument by which this plan is supported. It was often contended by Mr. Cobbett and the other advocates for parliamentary reform, that the people had a right to this reform; that every person paying taxes had a right to vote for representatives; but it is obvious

this

this doctrine must be modified in some degree; and is in part modified by those who advocate it in the most determined manner; for not even Mr. Cobbett contends that women, insane persons, criminals, or persons under age, though they pay taxes, ought to vote for representatives. If asked why the privilege should not extend to them, he would probably reply, Because it would not be for the good of the whole that it should be so. Hence it appears, that right must be limited, and in fact created, by what is for the public good; and that, unless annual parliaments and universal suffrage can be proved to be for the public good, the arguments drawn from former periods of our history, and from the alleged right of all who pay taxes to be represented in parliament, are not worth rush.

We must therefore close with the strong hold of the reformers: they maintain, that if the members of the house of commons were chosen annually, and by all the people (with the exceptions above stated), they would be more intelligent, more pure, and consequently better able and more disposed to legislate solely for the good of the nation.

Let us see, what this takes for granted. It takes for granted, in the first place, that the great mass of the people are so enlightened and pure, that they would select much more pure and enlightened members than at present sit in the house of commons; and in the second place, that of all the great questions that come before parliament, the people are adequate judges; for,according to the plan of reform, the constituents are to instruct their members, and the latter on all points are to follow these instructions.

But even granting that the people

were sincerely and anxiously desirous to select only such members as were pure and enlightened,-can it be believed, that the people in this country are in such a state of information, as to enable them to make such an election? Let us, however, suppose a house of commons chosen in this manner: what would be the consequence if, instead of deliberating, and acting on their own cool, comprehensive deliberation, their votes and proceedings were in all important cases to be directed by the orders of their constituents. They would, indeed, be then the real representatives of the people; and we imagine that this word representation has had the effect of blinding the over-zealous advocates for reform to all the evils and disadvantages that would result from it.

The mode in which the members of the house of commons are chosen is comparatively of little importance, provided they perform their duty. In fact, the mode of election is of importance only so far as it may secure an enlightened and patriotic assembly. That the mode proposed by the reformers would render the members entirely dependent upon their constituents, and would in fact reduce the nation to the state of being governed, in many cases, by the people, there can be no doubt. But it may well be doubted, whether under this government the people themselves would prosper and be happy. A house of commons composed of men of talents, information, zeal, and patriotism, actuated, as little as human nature would allow us to expect, by any other motives than a desire to study and promote the public good, is the kind of assembly that would most benefit the nation; and can it be believed

that

that such an assembly could exist if its members were chosen annually by the people at large, and if their votes and conduct were to be under the control of their constituents? At the same time, we are decidedly of opinion, that the house of commons, as at present elected and constituted, is not such an assembly as we have described; but if the choice must be made, we should undoubtedly prefer its present mode of election and frame, to an assembly chosen annually by universal suffrage.

The ultra-reformers regard the question of parliamentary reform as of such vital importance, that they never exert their zeal or efforts in support of the reform of any abuse not connected with that which they maintain exists in the representation of the people; and yet there are many abuses and imperfections which have crept into the administration of the British government, in almost all its branches, the reform of which ought to be an object of interest and importance with all parties.

The first subject we shall mention relates to our laws in general, and our criminal code in particular. During the last session that lord Stanhope sat in the house of lords, he moved for and obtained a committee to inquire into and report upon the Statute-book. When it is considered, that the statutes of the realm are so voluminous and complicated, and many of them so contradictory, that the most indefatigable and experienced lawyers, on many points, cannot tell what the law actually is; there can be no doubt, that the inquiry proposed by lord Stanhope was imperiously called for, and must have done good; and yet since his death the subject has been dropped. The

mode of conducting the inquiry might admit of some difference of opinion, as well as the mode of reforming the Statute-book. It seems to us, with respect to the latter object, that all the obsolete statutes should be expunged: that such as are obscure should be rendered plain; such as are loose and indefinite should be rendered precise; such as are contradictory should be reconciled; and such as are framed in relation to a state of society no longer existing, should be adapted to the present time. This ought to be done certainly:-perhaps more; perhaps the Statutes should all be classed under distinct heads; each division prefaced by an exposition of the general principles on which it rested; and the whole statutes prefixed by a clear, simple, and short exposition of the grand principles and objects of law.

Closely connected with this subject is the reform of our criminal law. Towards this most humane, and not less wise and politic object, sir Samuel Romilly has been directing the powers of his vigorous and enlightened mind, and the zeal of his benevolent heart, for some years; but most unaccountably he has experienced considerable opposition, and yet the facts on which he builds his arguments are notorious. It is notorious that our criminal law, by its very severity, defeats its own ob ject; and that so long as the law affixes a capital punishment to those crimes which in the opinion of the world do not deserve, and for all the purposes of punishment do not require it, either the persons suffering from them will allow the criminals to go entirely without punishment, or the administrators of the law will acquit them, or pronounce a lighter punishment than the law awards,-notwithstanding

they

they thus act contrary to the oaths by which they are bound.

The state of our prisons, also, calls for the interference and reform of government. By the reports to the house of commons, as well as by other inquiries, it is ascertained that our prisons, instead of correcting and amending those who are committed to them, in too many instances convert the young and timid criminal into the hardened profligate, by exposing him to the society of the most abandoned of the human species. Indeed, an uncandid person, when he reflects on the state of our laws and our prisons, -on the encouragement given to gaming and drunkenness by the lottery, and the law relating to public houses and spirituous liquors, and on the plan pursued by the police, of enticing to crime for the sake of the reward,-would be disposed to allege, that the object of our govern ment was not to prevent, but to encourage vice; and that they found a satisfaction in punishing crime. The truth is, that all governments are averse to change; and that the French revolution, among the other evils to which it gave birth, has strengthened this aversion to an incredible degree.

Of inferior consequence are the reforms that might and ought to

be effected in the financial department of government. These we shall notice very briefly, and only the most important. In the first place, the taxes might be simplified: the taxes, as at present laid on, give government great influence, by the number of persons employed in their collection, and are collected at a very considerable expense. One tax, on income, if rated fairly and impartially, would be collected with comparatively little expense-would almost annihilate the influence of government in this respect-would be less harassing and oppressive, and would be equally productive. In the second place, the business in the public offices is not conducted with that regularity, and in that efficient and economical manner, in which it might be, and in which it would be if the nation were not the paymaster. Lastly, the accounts of the nation are not kept on the most improved plan: tallies are still used in the exchequer! And even in the other of fices there is a complication, want of method, and obscurity, which, while they prevail, must render it by no means a difficult matter for those who are disposed to cheat the public to do it without detection, and consequently with impunity.

ITH

T is the duty of the annalist and historian not merely to narrate events, but also to afford such explanation and instruction to their 1817.

readers as will enable them to understand those events thoroughly, and to see them in all their bearings, relations, and consequences, S

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