these things, saith the objector, were done by natural secrets, or by invisible agents, so might those which you Christians style miracles. If they were done by the power of God, why should not those Egyptians and Romans, who did them, insist on the divinity of their religions, respectively, as well as others, for the like reasons, do on theirs?

But does the objector believe these accounts, or not? If he does, he can no longer surely call in question the truth of evangelical history, in relation to the facts we call miraculous, since those facts are infinitely better attested; but, if he does not, why does he fling the unscriptural miracles in our faces? Have we not as good a right to disbelieve them as he? It is true, as to the performances of the Egyptian magicians, they make a part of that history, which we, as Christians, do profess the belief of, and therefore are obliged to answer on this particular fact.

In the first place, what they did does by no means apappear to have been performed, either by the power of their gods, or in vindication of their religion, but merely in ostentation of their own power, and in opposition to Moses and Aaron; and therefore ought to have no consequences as to religious faith of any kind. In the second place, whatever power it was, it could not have been the power of God; because it was baffled and overpowered by his, in the hands of his servants; and the magicians themselves acknowledged it, when they had unsuccessfully attempted to turn the dust into lice, as Aaron had done: This,' said they, 'is the finger of God,' Exod. viii. 19. Besides, they were afflicted with the miraculous plague of boils, as well as the other Egyptians; and probably suffered, not only in the destruction of the first-born, because there was no house in Egypt exempted, but likewise in all the other plagues. This could not have been the case, nor could they have failed in any of their attempts, had they acted by a commission from God. In the third place, all they did, was done to gratify a tyrant, and to support the cause of injustice and oppression. And, in the fourth place, their skill, or power, extended only to the doing mischief: neither could they undo what they had done; which shews their art was defective and confined, and gives it the air of a trick, far short of a real power over the nature of things. Hence we may

fairly conclude, the whole was either a mere juggle, or a diabolical delusion. But, if it was only a juggle, why, saith the objector, may not our eyes be deceived in other wonderful performances, as well as these? In some others they may; but not in those of Moses, to go no farther than the present trial; not only because the magicians themselves, who suffered, attested the reality of the plagues, but because the whole nation of the Egyptians both saw and felt the severe effects of a truly miraculous power in the messengers of God. Here surely was no room for deceit. But if, saith the objector, the magicians acted by a diabolical power, why may not others, have done so too? Or was not that power sufficient to control the laws of nature, contrary to the doctrine laid down, that nothing but the power of God can do this? Our Saviour hath already returned a full answer to the first part of this objection; intimating, that though the devil may be well enough presumed at the bottom of such apparent wonders, as are calculated to do mischief, which was the case in what the magicians did, or attempted; yet it would be absurd to suppose this malignant spirit should employ the power he hath, be it more or less, in promoting virtue, and reformation of manners. But, in the last place, although the performances of the magicians appear to have been supernatural, it is possible enough they may have had no real title to that character; nay, it is evident they had not; because these men could not go through with what they attempted; which sufficiently shew, they did not act by a power superior to nature; for such would have enabled them to produce lice, as well as frogs; but here they failed, and immediately confessed the finger of God; which was as much as to say, 'Here stops our art; and here it is, we acknowledge, distinguished from the truly supernatural power, by which our adversaries perform these amazing miracles.' But whereas the performances of these Egyptians seem altogether astonishing, and such as never in any other instance, were exhibited in a bad cause; we may presume God permitted them, for this once, when he intended so thoroughly to display the infinite superiority of his own power, that, for the future, all attempts of the like kind, and for the like purpose, might be stigmatized in the disappointment and exposure of this. And indeed, if we con

sider their performances, and those of Moses and Aaron, in one view, they will not bear a comparison. The magicians could do only mischief; whereas the servants of God could only do good; I call it good, as well when they afflicted a guilty nation, in order to relieve one that was innocent and oppressed, as when they withdrew the plagues on the slightest sign of repentance in Pharaoh. The former were confined to three experiments, every one of them perhaps within the circle of natural magic; and when the latter proceeded, as far as the occasion required, to more proofs of divine power, were forced to confess the finger of God in these; which was the same as owning, what they did themselves, was no more than a stroke of art.

But the objector farther urges, That miracles, although confessedly the effects of divine power, are no proofs of a revelation; because there is no connexion, in the nature of things, between a miracle, and the matter of a revelation, whereby the one may be inferred from the other. How does it follow, quoth he, that because sight is bestowed miraculously on the blind, he that does it, speaks the dictates of God, and can speak nothing but the truth? His power cannot prove him proportionably endued with wisdom and integrity.

No! Although it does not prove it by immediate consequence, does it not prove it by a consequence so necessary, and so clearly cogent, as not to be resisted by a fair reasoner? God, we all acknowledge, hath wisdom and truth equal to his power. Wherever we see his power exerted, we must infer the presence of his wisdom and truth; and therefore the end, to which that power is applied, can neither be a trivial nor a bad end. If he who works a miracle says, he is empowered to do it by God, in order to prove the truth of the message which he brings from God, this certainly is sufficient to convince us, both of the importance and truth of the message; because, if we know any thing, we must know, that God would never lend his power to be debased to a trifling, or prostituted to a fallacious purpose. But is there any natural immediate connexion between the formality of an oath, and the fact for which it is brought in evidence? No, surely; and yet it would be madness to deny, for this reason, that an oath is evidence; for all the world

knows, that he who swears appeals to the all-knowing avenger of falsehood; and therefore, if they believe he fears God, they must, in proportion, give credit to what he avers, under the sanction of that appeal, although the fact sworn to is not, by the nature of things, made the immediate, nor indeed the necessary, consequent to the antecedent appeal. But our assent to the truth and reality of the fact sworn to, results immediately from our opinion of the swearer's piety; and that from the trials or character we have had of the man's religious principles, now put to the test by solemnly calling God to witness the truth of what he says, and eternally to punish him, in case it is false. Yet, strong as the reason is for relying on this sort of testimony, it may deceive us; whereas the testimony of miracles cannot, for it is the testimony of God, who neither will nor can deceive; and he who credits and receives it as such, hath only set to his seal, that God is true.'

I hope you have already so clearly seen the emptiness and folly of this fine-spun objection, that I need say no more to it. But it will be proper to observe, that it strikes directly at the very root of revelation, which cannot possibly give any other evidence of itself, as the dictate of God, but what must be drawn from miracles, wrought to prove the divine mission of those who publish it to the world. When I say, miracles are the only possible proof of a revelation, I include such prophecies as are attested, either by the event, to all who are apprized both of that and the prediction, or to the prophet himself, by the manner of his inspiration, which can be no other than preternatural and miraculous.

If the natural ignorance, together with both the natural and acquired corruptions of mankind, have made a divine revelation necessary to their reformation and happiness, they have made miracles necessary also. Why should not the Governor of the world sometimes speak to us his subjects? Are we either so good as not to need it, or so very knowing, as to require no instruction? Or, on the other hand, are we so irretrievably lost, as to forbid, for ever, the divine interposition? Is God so destitute of justice, as to rest satisfied with universal wickedness; or so void of mercy and goodness, as to give us up to total ruin? We can no a See Deism Revealed, Dial. I. and V.

more avoid inferring the absolute necessity of a revelation, from the wants of man, than we can the highest probability of it, from the relative attributes of God.

Now, that both these inferences are equally conclusive for miracles, will be glaringly evident to any one who considers, that as a revelation is of itself quite beside the natural course of things, so its evidence must be preternatural also. It is impossible for any man to prove, by arguments drawn from the nature or necessity of his instructions, that God hath sent him in particular to teach the world. He may reason more convincingly, and speak more persuasively, than other men, as Socrates, Confucius, and Cicero, did; and another man, of still greater abilities, may outdo him in these talents; but as all this is purely natural and human, it must be attended with two defects, either of them capable of rendering almost wholly vain whatsoever he can say. In the first place, he may be mistaken, and therefore may be misled. And in the next place, although he should not, yet they who hear him can never be sure of this, nor with any certainty distinguish between his truths and errors; for they know all men are liable to mistakes, men of great abilities, as well as small.

But if a superior being should come to teach us, and give us a law, this could not be done without a miracle. If therefore this necessary work cannot be effected, but by miracles, God may as well employ a man for that purpose, as an angel; because he can render the man infallible, as to the matter of his instructions, by an immediate inspiration, and, at the same time, give full evidence of that infallibility by the miracles he empowers him to perform. Thus were the prophets and apostles qualified for the promulgation and proof of revelation. The miracle of their own inspiration gave them full assurance as to the truth of every thing they were commissioned to declare. The accomplishment in part of what they foretold, and the miracles they were enabled to work, gave equal evidence of that truth to others. Such was the method God took to instruct the world in a right religion. and law. Whether it was matter of choice, and another might have been taken, we know not. That it was the best, we have reason to believe, because it was employed; and the rather, as we cannot conceive the possibility of any