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law; and the relation of author and public, of producer and purchaser, seems likely, through the joint agency of legislation and judicial interpretation, to be finally adjusted on a permanent and satisfactory basis.

So far as we know, there is in our language no work upon Literary Property so complete and satisfactory as this treatise by Mr. Curtis. In the present notice we have barely space to give a general account of its interesting contents, without entering into any extended discussion of the numerous and important topics and principles which are handled in its pages. The literary merits of the book are of a very high order. It is written with remarkable clearness and purity of style, and is free from any attempts at rhetorical embellishment, which would be out of keeping with the proper treatment of the subject. The author has also equally avoided the dry and merely technical manner which a majority of the writers upon subjects related to the law seem to consider it a matter of professional etiquette to adopt. Apart from the interest which every man of letters may be supposed to feel in a discussion of copyright, he will find in Mr. Curtis's volume ample gratification for literary taste. In the course of the work, many curious and valuable details of literary history are introduced, and the notes are enriched with copious illustrations, drawn from biographies, criticisms, and judicial decisions bearing upon the general course of the argument, and of high importance in a literary as well as a scientific point of view. In this way the book combines a great amount and variety of information communicated in the most agreeable manner, which the reader can find collected nowhere else, and which every man occupied with intellectual pursuits should have in his possession.

It will be seen, however, that the discussion is not limited to literature. Music, Engraving, and Sculpture, the property in which has been regulated by the same general principles, receive the author's attention in a just proportion. The literary part of the subject, however, has the most comprehensive application, and involves the largest interests; for in every country, the makers of books will outnumber the artists, and the books themselves must ever be of more vital consequence to the moral and intellectual welfare of the people than machines, engravings, music, or even pictures and statues. A great number of subordinate topics are also treated of, but in

the cursory notice which is all that we can at present give of the work, they must be passed by.

The division and distribution of the subject are carefully made, so that whoever reads with ordinary attention may easily grasp the whole discussion. In the introduction, Mr. Curtis treats of the rights of authors, theoretically considered, deducing them from the principles of natural right, which lie at the foundation of every other species of property. He admits, however, that this theory leads directly and inevitably to the conclusion, that the author is entitled to the property of his works in perpetuity; and he justifies the limitation of this right in the legislation of most countries, by regarding it as a compromise between the abstract justice of the case and the convenience and interests of society. This view seems to be logically correct, and does substantial justice to every party.

There are, we think, some peculiarities in literary property, which distinguish it broadly from every other species of possession, and which further justify society for this exercise of its controlling power, a control undoubtedly reaching beyond that to which other things are subjected. Though property may be said to have some foundation in nature, the extent of the right, if not as to duration of time, yet in the mode and limits of its enjoyment, is determined in all civilized societies by positive law. The value of rights of property may be seriously affected in consequence of the legislative measures which are called for by the general good; and some portions of property may be actually taken away from the individual owner by the same overruling policy that consults the greatest good of the greatest number. The material property, for instance, of one town may be seriously impaired by opening a new road, which shall double the wealth of another, if, in the opinion of the legislature, the road be required by the convenience of the public. This does not interfere, in one sense, with the perpetuity of property; but if a landholder's rental is diminished by one half, the difference to him is not very important, whether the effect is brought about in this indirect manner, or by actually depriving him of one half of his broad acres. Now what we mean to say is, that literary property, besides being to a peculiar degree, and beyond every other species of property, except fancy stocks, the creature of civilized society, has, what other property has not,

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the capacity of instantaneous and indefinite expansion, and the protection of it in this line of its direction is a compensa

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tion for the curtailment of its extent in the line of time. erary property, moreover, is incapable of the minute subdivision by which nearly every other species may be distributed. The copyright of a book cannot be divided like a farm, and the portions held in severalty, wholly independent of each other. The connection between the Siamese twins is not more vital than that between all the individual interests of a copyright. A species of property so intense in its vitality, if the expression may be allowed, cannot be maintained in perpetual life. The attempt to give it this species of immortality would be, not merely inconvenient, but vain. It is a species of monopoly which inevitably terminates for want of the power, and we may therefore add of the right, to enforce it. Sacred as the right of property is, the indefinite accumulation of it in undistributable masses, to which a perpetual copyright would tend, or in multiplying masses to be held in common by combinations of individuals, cannot safely become the policy of a well-ordered state, because this necessary form would combine all the attributes of a joint-stock company, with the power of indefinite expansion, and of a monopoly, with indefinite duration. We come, therefore, to the conclusion, that the essential nature of literary property, no less than a just regard to the convenience and interest of society, demands that it terminate at some definite period of time, and sustains the ground assumed by the nations in legislating upon this subject.

The lucid discussion of this question is followed by a very interesting history of literary property, in the jurisprudence of England and America. The next chapter is occupied with a most intelligible description of the subjects of literary property, before and after publication, under the several heads of manuscripts, letters, lectures, dramatic compositions, and the like, together with the rules, principles, and decisions of law applicable to each. The right of property in lectures is of particular consequence at present, since this ancient mode of conveying instruction has been revived to so remarkable a degree within the last few years. A custom has grown up, particularly in New York, of publishing in the newspapers verbatim reports, so called, of whole courses of lectures, delivered by eminent literary and scientific men. Mr. Agassiz, and Dr.

Nichol have been both complimented and injured in this way; for such a proceeding is as much a violation of the rights of property, unless sanctioned by the lecturer, as the act of printing a copyrighted book. Upon this subject we quote the following passage.

"In the United States, the right of property in lectures depends upon the general principles of the common law, and the statute which protects the owner of manuscripts.

"In relation to a lecture purely oral, of which the speaker has no manuscript, or any other writing which is such in its nature, as that, coupled with what is delivered orally, it may be taken that he has substantially a written composition, the common law has not gone the length of saying that he can, on the footing of property, have a remedy for an unauthorized publication. A written composition has been hitherto held to be the subject of literary property; concerning which the court must be satisfied that the publication complained of is an invasion of a written work, and this can only be done by comparing the composition with the piracy.

"But it does not follow that because the information communicated by a lecturer is not committed to writing, but orally delivered, it is therefore within the power of any person who hears it to publish it. When persons are admitted, as pupils or otherwise, to hear public lectures, it is upon the implied confidence and contract that they will not use any means to injure or to take away the exclusive right of the lecturer in his own lectures. The hearer may take notes for purposes of his own information, but he may not publish them for profit.

"Accordingly, if a person attending such lectures undertakes to publish them, or furnishes another person with the means of publishing them, a court of equity will restrain such a publication, as a violation of trust and confidence, founded in contract, or implied from circumstances.

"Where a lecture has been reduced to writing, either wholly or substantially, the author has a right of property in it as a literary composition, in the same manner as in the case of other manuscripts. The admission of persons to hear such a lecture affords no presumption that the speaker intends to give them a right to publish the information which they may acquire. But when a court of equity is called upon to restrain a publication, on the ground that it is a piracy of a composition in writing, the writing must be produced.

"The act of Congress, 3d February, 1831, § 9, gives an action on the case against any person who shall print or publish any NO. 140.

VOL. LXVII.

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manuscript whatever without the consent of the author or proprietor, and empowers the courts of the United States to grant injunctions according to the principles of equity, to restrain such publication. The remedy thus afforded would, without doubt, extend to the case of any lecture, of which the author could produce notes, showing that he had substantially reduced the same to writing." - pp. 101 - 103.

The third chapter shows what persons are entitled to the protection of the statutes, and the fourth relates to the character of the works claiming the protection of the law. In this portion of the work, many curious particulars are given of the exercise of individual discretion, and the influence of particular opinions upon the legal decisions of English judges. The following passage is amusing and instructive.

"Works injurious to religion. With regard to publications supposed to be of this character, the adjudged cases have not proceeded upon very satisfactory doctrines. The general principle upon which they proceed is the same as that which denies protection to a work injurious to public morals.

"In 1822, an application was made to Lord Eldon for an injunction to restrain a piratical edition of Lord Byron's Cain. The injunction was refused, upon the ground of a doubt, whether the poem was not intended to vilify and bring into discredit that portion of Scripture history to which it relates. His Lordship read the poem, and refused the injunction until the counsel for the plaintiff should show him that an action could be maintained at law. With great submission, I am obliged to differ from the reasoning employed by his Lordship in this case. Without entering into the question of criticism raised by comparing the poem with Paradise Lost, upon which a great critic and poet held a very different opinion from that expressed by Lord Eldon, — and admitting that an injunction before a trial at law should not be granted in a palpable case of malicious attack upon the Scriptures or the doctrines of revealed religion, it is yet quite too strict to say, that, because a poem admits of a suspicion of improper intentions, the author's copyright is not to be protected until he has purged himself of that suspicion. The boldness and license of poetry admit of a latitude which would not be allowed in didactic prose; and where the line is to be drawn closely, the court may not only mistake the tendency and intention of the work, but may, as Lord Eldon did on this occasion, apply its own views of doctrinal subjects to determine the innocence of the author's intention, instead of judging it by that broad, liberal, and catholic spirit in which the intent of all poetry

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