chief, incline to overleap the constitutional barriers, in order to aid their advancement, or gratify their ambition. But the solid judgment of a senate may stay the evil, if its own duration of power exceeds that of the other branches of the government, or if it combines the joint durability of both. In point of fact, the senate has this desirable limit. It combines the period of office of the executive with that of the members of the house; while at the same time, from its own biennial changes, (as we shall presently see,) it is silently subjected to the deliberate voice of the states.

§ 365. In the next place, mutability in the public councils, arising from a rapid succession of new members, is found by experience to work, even in domestic concerns, serious mischiefs. It is a known fact in the history of the states, that every new election changes nearly or quite one half of its representatives; and in the national government changes less frequent, or less numerous can scarcely be expected. From this change of men, there must unavoidably arise a change of opinions; and with this change of opinions a correspondent change of measures. Now experience demonstrates, that a continual change, even of good measures for good, is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success. In all human affairs, time is required to consolidate the elements of the best concerted measures, and to adjust the little interferences, which are incident to all legislation. Perpetual changes in public institutions not only occasion intolerable controversies, and sacrifices of private interests; but check the growth of that steady industry and enterprise, which, by wise forecast, lays up the means of future prosperity.

§ 366. But the ill effects of a mutable government are still more strongly felt in the intercourse with for

eign nations. It forfeits the respect and confidence of foreign nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. It not only lays its measures open to the silent operations of foreign intrigue and management; but it subjects its whole policy to be counteracted by the wiser and more stable policy of its foreign rivals and adversaries." One nation is to another, what one individual is to another, with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantages of the indiscretions of each other. If a nation is perpetually fluctuating in its measures, as to the protection of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, it exposes all its infirmities of purpose to foreign nations; and the latter with a systematical sagacity will sap all the foundations of its prosperity.

§ 367. Further; foreign governments can never safely enter into any permanent arrangements with one, whose councils and government are perpetually fluctuating. It was not unreasonable, therefore, for them to object to the continental congress, that they could not guaranty the fulfilment of any treaty; and therefore it was useless to negotiate any. To secure the respect of foreign nations, there must be power to fulfil engagements; confidence to sustain them; and durability to ensure their execution on the part of the government. National character in cases of this sort is inestimable. It is not sufficient, that there should be a sense of justice, and disposition to act right; but there must be an enlightened permanency in the policy of the government.

§ 368. Considering, then, the various functions of the senate, the qualifications of skill, experience, and

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information, which are required to discharge them, and the importance of interposing, not a nominal, but a real check, in order to guard the states from usurpations upon their authority, and the people from becoming the victims of violent paroxysms in legislation; the term of six years would seem to hit the just medium between a duration of office, which would too much resist, and a like duration, which would too much invite those changes of policy, foreign and domestic, which the best interests of the country may require to be deliberately weighed, and gradually introduced. If the state governments are found tranquil, and prosperous, and safe, with a senate of two, three, four, and five years' duration, it would seem impossible for the Union to be in danger from a term of service of six years.

§ 369. But, in order to quiet the last lingering scruples of jealousy, the succeeding clause of the constitution has interposed an intermediate change in the elements of the body, which would seem to make it absolutely above exception, if reason, and not fear, is to prevail; and if government is to be a reality, and not a vision.

§ 370. It declares, "Immediately after they (the "senators) shall be assembled, in consequence of the "first election, they shall be divided, as equally as may "be, into three classes. The seats of the senators of "the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of "the second year; of the second class, at the expira"tion of the fourth year; and of the third class, at the "expiration of the sixth year, so that one third may be "chosen every second year." A proposition was made in the convention, that the senators should be chosen for nine years, one third to go out biennially, and was

lost, three states voting in the affirmative, and eight in the negative; and then the present limitation was adopted by a vote of seven states against four. Here, then, is a clause, which, without impairing the efficiency of the senate for the discharge of its high functions, gradually changes its members, and introduces a biennial appeal to the states, which must for ever prohibit any permanent combination for sinister purposes. No person would probably propose a less duration of office for the senate, than double the period of the house. In effect, this provision changes the composition of two thirds of that body within that period.

§ 371. As vacancies might occur in the senate during the recess of the state legislature, it became indispensable to provide for that exigency. Accordingly the same clause proceeds to declare: "And if vacan"cies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the "recess of the legislature of any state, the executive "thereof may make temporary appointments until the "next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill "such vacancies." It does not appear, that any strong objection was urged in the convention against this proposition, although it was not adopted without some opposition. There seem to have been three courses presented for the consideration of the convention; either to leave the vacancies unfilled, until the meeting of the state legislature; or to allow the state legislatures to provide at their pleasure prospectively for the occurrence; or to confide a temporary appointment to some select state functionary or body. The latter was deemed the most satisfactory and convenient course. Confidence might justly be reposed in the state executive, as representing at once the interests and wishes of the state, and enjoying all the pro

per means of knowledge and responsibility, to ensure a judicious appointment.

§ 372. Fifthly; the qualifications of senators. The constitution declares, that "No person shall be a sen"ator, who shall not have attained the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United "States, and who shall not, when elected, be an in"habitant of that state, for which he shall be chosen." As the nature of the duties of a senator require more experience, knowledge, and stability of character, than those of a representative, the qualification in point of age is raised. A person may be a representative at twenty-five; but he cannot be a senator until thirty. A similar qualification of age was required of the members of the Roman senate. It would have been a somewhat singular anomaly in the history of free governments, to have found persons actually exercising the highest functions of government, who, in some enlightened and polished countries, would not be deemed to have arrived at an age sufficiently mature to be entitled to all the private and municipal privileges of manhood. In Rome persons were not deemed at full age until twenty-five; and that continues to be the rule in France, and Holland, and other civil law countries; and in France, by the old law, in regard to marriage full age was not attained until thirty. It has since been varied, and the term diminished.

§ 373. The age of senators was fixed in the constitution at first by a vote of seven states against four and finally, by an unanimous vote. Perhaps no one, in our day, is disposed to question the propriety of this limitation; and it is, therefore, useless to discuss a point, which is so purely speculative. If counsels are to be wise, the ardour, and impetuosity, and confiAbr.

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