demanded, why I arrive at such a conclusion, I can only say, that it is forced on me by my nature; and I, therefore, regard it as an ultimate fact, of which no explanation can be given.

P. 102.

A fact attested, &c.

That the confidence we place in testimony proceeds from an original principle in our nature, and is not the result of experience, has been satisfactorily shewn by Adam Smith, * Campbell, † and Dugald Stewart. Credulity is strongest in children; and, it is only as experience demonstrates that the fact is not

* Theory of Moral Sentiments.
+ Essay on Miracles.

Outlines of Moral Philosophy.

always in accordance with testimony that we learn to distrust it. In receiving evidence we are called upon to exercise our reason. What is here stated as a first truth, cannot be admitted as such, though it may be readily conceded that no one could justly doubt of a fact, when attested by a multitude of competent witnesses. But, in this case, we can assign reasons for our assent; such as the improbability that a considerable number of persons should agree in bearing witness to a falsity; the improbability that they should be all deceived; the improbability that they should all have an interest in deceiving; but, the degree of probability or improbability, varies according to the number, the character, and other circumstances of the witnesses, and must be measured by analogical reasoning from instances furnished by experience. But, this is destructive of the character of a first Truth, which the Author has correctly defined as incapable of being proved by any more clear than itself. The nature of the fact attested must be also taken into account :

stronger evidence being required to establish the truth of an extraordinary event, than of one of ordinary occurrence. Yet there is no fact, unless it involve a contradiction which may not be rendered credible by the evidence of testimony; if on balancing the probabilities we find it more improbable that the witness should be false, than that the fact should be true, we are bound in reason to believe it. But, it is no unusual practice to set up what we call probability as the sole criterion of historical truth, though our notions of probability are frequently formed from a very limited range of experience, and every fact not in accordance with this arbitrarily chosen standard is at once rejected as incredible, without any regard to the testimony brought forward in its support. But it is notorious, that many occurrences actually take place very different from what past experience would have led us to expect; according to the paradoxical observation of Agatho,* that

* 66 Ταχ' αν τις εικος αυτο τετ' ειναι λεγοι βροτοις πολλα TUYXAVEL EX EIXOтa."-Aristot. Rhet., l. iii., c. 24.

"in the affairs of human life, it is probable that many improbable things will happen."

;

The evidence for the facts on which Christianity is built possesses all the requisites for satisfying a candid enquirer into the truth. The witnesses are numerous they could not be deceived themselves as to the events they relate, and they could have no motive for deceiving others; on the contrary they willingly exposed themselves to every kind of persecution in maintaining the truth of their assertions. It is beside the question to argue on the probability or improbability of the intervention of the Deity, because, of a Being of whom we really know so little it is idle for us to determine what he is likely to do, or not to do; but, of Beings similar to ourselves we have some knowledge, and aware how we should act ourselves under any given circumstances, we may come to a safe conclusion respecting the conduct of other men in a parallel case.

P. 110.

Let us demand, on all subjects, that species of evidence, &c.

"The same degree of precision is not to be sought for in every kind of reasoning. A Mind properly trained, will demand only so much accuracy as the nature of the subject treated of admits. It appears nearly as absurd to exact strict demonstration of an Orator, as to be satisfied with probable arguments from a Mathematician.”*

* σε το ακριβες ουχ όμοιως εν απασι τοις λόγοις επιζητητεον, πεπαιδευμενο γαρ εσιν επι τοσ5τον τάκριβες επιζητειν καθ ̓ εκασον γενος ; φ ̓ ὅσον ή τε πραγματος φυσις επιδέχεται· παραπλησιον γαρ φαίνεται, μαθηματικό τε πιθανολογώντος αποδέχεθαι, και ρητορικον αποδείξεις απαιτειν.”Aristotle, Ethic Nicom., l. i., c. 3.